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HEINRICH SCHMID, D. D.

The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church

Third Edition, revised
Translated from German and Latin

by

CHARLES A. HAY, D.D.

and

HENRY E. JACOBS, D.D.

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THE DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY
OF THE EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH

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Preface to Reprint Edition

The title page identifies the translators of this volume. The worth of their labor is attested by the appearance of this reprint in response to requests from seminary professors and students some sixty years after the last previous edition.

The title page also indicates the nature of the original work. It is not a dogmatic text so much as it is a compilation of theological statements drawn from the writings of fourteen prominent Lutheran theologians who lived during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These quotations are employed to support and clarify the Christian faith after the pattern of presentation developed in the early Lutheran tradition.

In their own preface the translators point out that, "The aim of the compiler was of a purely historical character . . . not to afford a summary of absolutely final definitions of Lutheran Theology, but to exhibit the teaching that had been current up to the time of Rationalism."

Notwithstanding the present emphasis on "back to Luther," the great systematizers who followed him will remain important. A frank recognition of their limitations does not weaken respect for their contribution. It is this respect, and the fact that so small a part of the voluminous writings of these theologians is available in English, which underlies the decision to reissue this volume.

An element of grateful commemoration also upholds the publication of this work. The English edition of Hay and Jacob's translation of Schmid's *The Doctrinal Theology of the Lutheran Church,* in 1875, ranks with the translation of *The Book of Concord,* and Charles Porterfield Krauth's *The Conservative Reformation and Its Theology,* as a significant contribution to the restoration of true Lutheranism in America.

While a reprint does not permit it, the desirability of revision is recognized. Both the author and translators have reckoned with this need. From the Preface to the Third and Fourth Editions we quote, "The second edition of this translation published in 1889, aimed at a faithful reproduction of the Fifth Edition of the original, the last published in the life of its author, together with such additions from the same authorities from which Dr. Schmid had compiled, as would render the work more serviceable to American students. In the present edition, we have followed in general the same plan, but have taken the liberty of dispensing with a few of the quotations from the old theologians, which no one will miss, as, e.g., the long discussion on demoniacal possession. Dr. Schmid's own statements are unchanged and unabbreviated; but his compilations have been edited and enriched. A similar attempt was made in Germany about five years ago, by Professor Dr. Franck, of Erlangen, Dr. Schmid's son-in-law."

Finally, a report that Professor Ratchow of the University of Münster is planning a German revision of Schmid points to the general recognition of the enduring worth of the work.

Thomas P. Solem
Luther Theological Seminary
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

January 1961

CONTENTS.

§ 1–13. Introduction, ... 15–102

CHAPTER I.

Of Theology in General.

§ 2. Meaning of the term—Natural and Revealed—Its Divisions—Its End—Who is a Theologian?—The need of the Holy Spirit, . . . 15–20

CHAPTER II.

Of the General Subject of Theology, viz., Religion.

§ 3. Religion, true and false. Characteristics of the true—Proofs for the Christian Religion, ... 21–25

CHAPTER III.

Of the Source of Theology, viz., Revelation.

§ 4. Revelation—Not Reason—Not Tradition, ... 25–29

§ 5. On the Use of Reason in Theology—What is Reason?—Relation of Reason to Revelation—Reason before the Fall—Reason since the Fall—Reason not normative—Reason a Handmaid to Theology—Reason useful in its Sphere—Mixed and Pure Articles, ... 29–38

CHAPTER IV.

Of the Sacred Scriptures.

§ 6. The terms *Sacred Scriptures* and *Inspiration.* Scriptures, the written Word of God—Their two-fold origin—Meaning of Inspiration—Extent of Inspiration—Inspiration distinct from Revelation, ... 38–50

§ 7. The Attributes of the Sacred Scriptures, ... 50

§ 8. 1. *Authority of the Scriptures.* (a) *Causative Authority of the Sacred Scriptures.* Proofs of Inspiration—Proofs not needed for Believers—Only real Proof, the work of the Holy Spirit—Internal Criteria of Inspiration—External Criteria of Inspiration. (b) *Normative or Canonical Authority of the Sacred Scriptures.* The Scriptures the only Rule of Faith—The Scriptures derive no authority from the Church—The Scriptures the only Judge of Controversies—Who are to interpret the Scriptures?—Original languages alone authoritative, ... 51–64

§ 9. 2. *The Perfection or Sufficiency of the Scriptures.* The consequence of Inspiration—The abuse and use of Tradition, ... 64–68

§ 10. 3. *The Perspicuity of the Scriptures.* Meaning of Perspicuity—Extent of Perspicuity—Perspicuity absolute and ordinate—Piety essential to an Interpreter—The Literal and Spiritual Sense—Obscure Things in Perspicuous Words—Analogy of the Faith—The Mystical Sense, . . 68–80

§ 11. 4. *The Efficacy of the Scriptures.* The topic is discussed under the head of "The Means of Grace," 80

§ 12. Of the *Canon and the Apocrypha.* The Old and New Testaments—The Apocryphal Books—Marks of Canonicity—External and Internal—Testimony of the Ancient Church—The Antilegomena of the New Testament, 80–92

CHAPTER V.

Of the Articles of Faith and of the Symbols of the Church.

§ 13. What are Articles of Faith?—How related to each other?—Pure and mixed—Fundamental and non-fundamental—Earlier and Later Symbols—Relation of the Symbols to the Scriptures—Necessity of the Symbols, ... 92–102

PART I.

OF GOD.

§ 14. Division of the Subject, ... 103

CHAPTER I.

Of God.

§ 15. Preliminary statement—The natural and supernatural Knowledge of God—Innate Natural Knowledge of God—Acquired Natural Knowledge of God—Imperfection of such knowledge—Value of such knowledge—Supernatural Knowledge of God, ... 103–111

§ 16. 1. The Certainty of the Existence of God, ... 111

§ 17. 2. The Nature of God—His name—Cannot be defined—Approximate definitions, ... 111–117

§ 18. 3. The Attributes of God—Not Accidents—They are one with the Divine Essence—Threefold Method of recognizing them—Classification of Divine Attributes. I. *Negative Attributes.* Unity—Simplicity—Immutability—Infinity—Immensity—Eternity. II. *Positive Attributes.* Life—Knowledge—Wisdom—Holiness—Justice—Truth—Power—Goodness, . 117–129

CHAPTER II.

Of the Holy Trinity.

§ 19. The Doctrine is a Mystery—Purely a Matter of Revelation—It is a Fundamental Doctrine—The Church does not claim to understand it—Why described in Philosophical Terms—Gradual Development of the Doctrine—Definition of the Trinitarian Terminology. 1. Numerical Unity of the Divine Essence. 2. Diversity and Plurality; not (*a*) Essential; nor (*b*) Accidental; but (*c*) Hypostatical. Specific Hypostatical Distinctions—Personal Properties. I. God the Father. II. God the Son—The Eternal Generation. III. God the Holy Ghost—Procession. Scriptural Proof of the Doctrine of the Trinity, ... 129–159

CHAPTER III.

Of Creation.

§ 20. 1. Creation a Divine work. 2. The World created from Nothing. 3. Matter not Eternal. 4. Order and Manner of Creation—Dichotomy or Tri-

chotomy?—Creationism or Traducianism? 5. Design of Creation. 6. Excellence of Creation. 7. Time of Creation, . . . 159–170

CHAPTER IV.

Of Providence.

§ 21. The Doctrine taught both by Reason and Revelation—Comprehends Foreknowledge, Predetermination, and Administration—Basis of the Divine Foreknowledge. I. *Preservation*, or Continuous Creation—Influence of Second Causes—May Providence be deceived? II. *Concurrence*, or Divine Co-operation. Does God concur with sin? III. *Government*, or Divine Control—Does not neutralize Human Freedom—Providence embraces all Things—Providence, general and special, extraordinary and ordinary, ... 170–194

CHAPTER V.

Of Angels.

§ 22. When were they created? I. *The Nature of Angels.* Design of their Cretion—Attributes of the Angels. II. *The Moral Condition of the Angels.* Their Original Condition. A. *The Good Angels.* Their Powers enlarged —Their Employments. B. *The Evil Angels.* Consequences of their fall —Demoniacal Possession, ... 195–216

PART II.

OF MAN.

§ 23. General Statement, ... 217

CHAPTER I.

Of the State of Integrity.

§ 24. *State of Integrity Defined.* Meaning of the Image of God—Original Righteousness—Other Features of the Image of God, . . . 217–231

CHAPTER II.

Of the State of Corruption.

§ 25. *State of Corruption Defined.* Of Sin in General—Cause of Sin—Immediate Consequence of Sin, ... 231–234

§ 26. *Man's First Sin and his consequent Depravity.* How did Adam sin?—All men sinned in Adam—Imputation, Arguments of Pelagians answered—What is Natural Depravity?—Natural Depravity Inherent—Natural Depravity Hereditary—Is Original Sin an Accident?—Termination of Original Sin, ... 234–250

§ 27. *Actual Sins.* Classified—Sin against the Holy Ghost, . . 250–257

§ 28. *The Freedom of the Will.* Human Ability—No Free Will in Spiritual Things—Extent of Freedom—Synergism Unscriptural—Civil Righteousness—Threefold Condition of the Will, ... 257–268

PART III.

OF THE SOURCES OF SALVATION.

§ 29. Sources of Salvation, ... 269

CHAPTER I.

Of the Benevolence of God towards Fallen Man.

§ 30. Of the Benevolence of God towards Fallen Man. 1. *The Universal Benevolence of God.* Gratuitous—Impartial—Sincere—Efficacious—Conditioned. 2. *The Special Benevolence of God.* Consequent—Particular—Predestination or Election—Divine Decrees not absolute or arbitrary—Election with respect to faith—Election and Foreknowledge—Divine Decrees not conditioned, but categorical—Election is immutable and irrevocable—Reprobation—Defined and Illustrated, ... 270–292

CHAPTER II.

Of the Fraternal Redemption by Christ.

§ 31. Statement of the Subject, ... 293–294

A.—Of the Person of Christ.

§ 32. Of the Personal Union. I. *Of the Two Natures in Christ,* Truly Divine and truly Human—Attributes of Christ's Humanity. II. *Mode of the Personal Union.* Negatively stated—Positively stated, . 294–309

§ 33. Of the Communion of Natures, the Personal Designations, and the Communicatio Idiomatum—Communion of Natures defined—No Intermixture of Natures, but I. Interchange of Designations. II. Communication of Properties. 1. Idiomatic. 2. Majestatic. 3. Apotelesmatic—Meaning of Perichoresis—Concrete of Nature and Person—Communication—Patristic Designations—Lutheran and Reformed views—Diversity among the Lutheran Dogmaticians, ... 309–337

B.—Of the Office of Christ.

§ 34. The Threefold Office of Christ—His Mediatorial Work in its threefold aspect, ... 337–339

§ 35. *The Prophetic Office of Christ.* Defined—The Immediate and Mediate, 340–342

§ 36. *The Sacerdotal Office of Christ.* Defined. I. *Satisfaction.* Why was Satisfaction needed?—Antitheses of the Socinians—Satisfaction Infinite—Christ's Active and Passive Obedience—Vicarious Satisfaction—Completeness of the Satisfaction—Its Real Object—Its Personal Object. II. *Intercession.* General and Special Redemption, ... 342–370

§ 37. *The Regal Office of Christ.* I. The Kingdom of Power. II. The Kingdom of Grace. III. The Kingdom of Glory—The Delivery of the Kingdom, ... 370–376

C.—The States of Christ.

§ 38. I. *The State of Humiliation.* Conception—Nativity—Circumcision—Education—Earthly Intercourse—Passion—Death—Burial—Incarnation not Humiliation—"The Form of God." II. *The State of Exaltation.* Descent into Hell—Resurrection—Ascension—Sitting at the Right Hand of God. Diverse views of the Dogmaticians, ... 376–407

CHAPTER III.

OF THE GRACE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT IN THE APPLICATION OF REDEMPTION.

§ 39. Preliminary Remarks, ... 407–409

§ 40. The Agent—The Means—The Result, ... 410

§ 41. 1. *Of Faith.* Its Constituent Elements—Explicit and Implicit—Confidence, the Chief Part—Special Faith—Faith of Infants—Living and Dead Faith Contrasted—Nature of Justifying Faith—Efficient Cause of Faith—Instrumental Cause of Faith—Grades of Faith—Assurance of Faith, 410–424

§ 42. 2. *Of Justification.* The immediate Effect of Faith—Justification a Divine Forensic Act, embracing I. The Forgiveness of Sins. II. The Imputation of the Righteousness of Christ. The Ground of Justification—The Means

of Justification—Osiander's Error—Justification a Free Gift of God—Good Works and Justification—The Exclusive Particles—The Effects of Justification, ... 424–441

§ 43. Concomitants and Consequences of Justifying Faith, . . 441

§ 44. 1. *Of the Divine Call.* Necessity, Efficacy and Universality of the Call, ... 442–450

§ 45. 2. *Of Illumination.* Necessity of Illumination by the Holy Spirit—Its Influence upon Intellect and Will—Legal and Evangelical Illumination, ... 450–458

§ 46. 3. *Of Regeneration and Conversion.* The Terms defined and contrasted. I. *Regeneration.* Regeneration a Divine Act—Regeneration of Infants and Adults contrasted—Regeneration always Divinely efficacious—Regeneration amissible and recoverable. II. *Conversion.* Conversion a Divine Act—Elements of Repentance—Private Confession—Conversion ends in Faith—Prevenient and Co-operating Grace—The Divine Word the Instrument—The Human Will in Conversion—Converting Grace may be resisted, ... 458–480

§ 47. 4. *Of the Mystical Union.* Not Metaphorical but Real—Union, General and Special, ... 481–486

§ 48. 5. *Of Renovation.* Renovation contrasted with Regeneration—A gradual work, ... 486–491

§ 49. Supplementary. *Of Good Works.* The Effect of Renovation—Can Unbelievers perform Good Works?—Must Believers perform Good Works?—The Works of the Unregenerate—Reward of Good Works, . 491–499

PART IV.

OF THE MEANS OF GRACE AND OF THE CHURCH.

CHAPTER I.

Of the Divine Word.

§ 50. Preliminary Statement, ... 500

§ 51. *Of the Efficacy of the Divine Word.* The Supernatural Power of the Word—Mysticism and Enthusiasm, ... 500–508

§ 52. *Of the Law and the Gospel.* I. *The Law.* The Ceremonial Law—The Moral Law—Fourfold Use. II. *The Gospel.* The Gospel in Embryo in the Old Testament—The Gospel and the Law Contrasted—Concurrence of the Law and the Gospel, ... 508–520

CHAPTER II.

Of the Sacraments.

§ 53. *Of the Sacraments in general.* What constitutes a Sacrament?—Only Two Sacraments—The two Factors—Requisites—The Act of Administration—"Ex Opere Operato" rejected—Relation of Word to Sacrament—Design of the Sacraments—Proper Use of the Sacraments—Old Testament Sacraments, ... 520–536

§ 54. *Of Baptism.* The Holy Spirit in Baptism—Sacramental Union—Usages—Design—Affusion—Baptismal Formulæ Explained—Exorcism—Baptism by Heretics—Infant Baptism—Infant Faith—Baptismal Grace Continuous—Necessity of Baptism, ... 536–555

§ 55. *Of the Lord's Supper.* I. *The Nature of the Lord's Supper.* The Words of the Institution to be literally interpreted—The Mode of the Saviour's Presence—Omnipresence of the Human Nature of Christ—Sacramental Manducation—Sacramental Union—Distinction between the Lutheran and Reformed Doctrine—No Consubstantiation—Distinction between the Lutheran and Romish Doctrine. II. *The Form of the Lord's Supper.* Consecration and Distribution are Essential - Sacramental Union only during distribution—The Worthy Reception—Is it a Sacrifice? III. *The Design of the Lord's Supper.* Commemorative—Nutritive—Imparts Saving Grace—Promotes Christian Fellowship, ... 555–582

CHAPTER III.

Of the Church.

§ 56. *Of the Church in a Wider and a Narrower Sense.* The Assembly of Believers—Church Militant and Triumphant—Church Catholic—Universal and Particular—In what Sense, Visible and Invisible—Church, True and False, ... 582–599

§ 57. *Of the Church Collective and Representative.* Special and General Councils—Authority of the Councils, ... 599–604

§ 58. *Of the Three Estates in the Church,* 604–605

§ 59. I. *The Ecclesiastical Estate.* The Holy Ministry a Divinely-appointed Office—The Church gives the Mediate Call—Ordination confirms this Call—The Power of the Keys—Is Ordination Necessary?—Duty of Obedience—Grades in the Ministry, ... 605–616

§ 60. II. *The Political Estate.* The Civil Authority Divinely-appointed—Design of the Civil Authority—Relation of the Civil Authority to the Church, ... 616–619

§ 61. III. *The Domestic Estate.* 1. The Marriage Relation—Divorce. 2. The Parental Relation. 3. The Relation of Master and Servant, 619–623

PART V.

OF THE LAST THINGS.

§ 62. Preliminary Statement, ... 624

§ 63. I. *Of Death.* The Consequence of the Fall—The Dissolution of Soul and Body—Death threefold—The Immortality of the Soul—No Intermediate State of Dormancy, ... 624–639

§ 64. II. *Of the Resurrection of the Dead.* Attributes of the Resurrection Body, ... 640–643

§ 65. III. *Of the Final Judgment.* The Signs of its Approach—Antichrist—Conversion of the Jews—Christ the Judge—Form of the Final Judgment, ... 643–655

§ 66. IV. *Of the End of the World,* 655–656

§ 67. V. *Of Eternal Damnation and Eternal Life.* 1. Eternal Death. 2. Eternal Life, ... 656–663

APPENDIX I.

Sketch of the Dogmaticians cited, ... 665–671

APPENDIX II.

Explanation of some Scholastico-dogmatic terms, ... 673–675

INDEX, ... 677

ABBREVIATIONS.

Ap. Conf.,	Apology of the Augsburg Confession.
Art. Smalcald,	Smalcald Articles.
Bchm.,	Bechmann.
Br.,	Baier.
Brchm.,	Brochmann.
Cal.,	Calovius.
Cat. Maj.,	Luther's Large Catechism.
Cat. Min.,	Luther's Small Catechism.
Chmn.,	Chemnitz.
Chmn. ex. c. Trid.,	Chemnitz on the Council of Trent.
Chmn. d. c. D.,	Chemnitz on the Lord's Supper.
Conf. Aug.,	Augsburg Confession.
Form. Conc.,	The Formula of Concord.
Grh.,	Gerhard.
Hfrffr.,	Hafenreffer.
Holl.,	Hollazius.
Hutt.,	Hutterus.
Kg.,	Koenig.
Mel.,	Melanchthon.
Quen.,	Quenstedt.
Schrzr.,	Scherzer.
Seln.,	Selnecker.
Symb. Nic.,	Nicene Creed.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. *Of Theology in General, etc.*

THE Introduction treats: 1. Of *Theology in general;* 2. Of the *Subject of Theology*, Religion; 3. Of the *Source of Theology*, Revelation in general (with an appendix, on the Use of Reason in Theology); 4. Of the *Holy Scriptures*, in which Revelation is contained; 5. Of the *Articles of Faith*, which comprise the contents of the Holy Scriptures; and of the *Symbolical Books*, which contain the Confession of the Church.

CHAPTER I.

Of Theology in General.

§ 2. *Meaning of the terms, Natural and Revealed.*

BY Theology we understand, according to the etymology of the term, the knowledge or doctrine of God and of divine things [1]. Such a knowledge we gain, partly in a natural way, by the use of reason alone, partly in a supernatural way, by special revelation; and hence Theology is divided into *Natural* and *Revealed.*[2] In both cases, however, Theology is not a mere outward knowledge, by which the understanding alone is enriched, but is of such a nature as to make man truly wise, and show him the way to be saved; hence Theology, strictly so-called, must be defined: "*Eminently practical wisdom, teaching from the revealed Word of God all things which sinful man, who is to be saved, needs to know and to do, in order to attain true faith in Christ and holiness of life.*"[3] (Holl. 1.) If,

however, we leave out of view the influence which Theology exerts upon man, and consider only its subject-matter, Theology may be defined as the doctrine concerning God and all religious truths, the province of which is to instruct men concerning the means by which they may be saved. "*Theology, viewed as a system and in a secondary sense, is the doctrine concerning God, which teaches man, from the divine Word, as to the true method of worshiping God in Christ, unto eternal life.*" (Holl. 7.)[4]

[1] Quen. (I, 1); "Theology, if you consider the force and usage of the word, is nothing else than λόγος περι τοῦ θεοῦ και περι τῶν θείων, what is said about God and divine things, as πνευματολογία is what is said about spirits, and ἀστρολογία, what is said about the stars."

The word is sometimes employed in a wider and sometimes in a narrower sense. The different significations are thus stated by Holl. (3): "The word *Theology* is employed in a fourfold sense; (*a*) most comprehensively, for every doctrine concerning God, whether true or mixed with error; (*b*) comprehensively, for true Theology, either in itself considered, or as communicated; either of men on earth or of saints in heaven; either natural or revealed; (*c*) specially, of revealed Theology, that guides mortal man to eternal life; (*d*) most specifically, of the doctrine concerning the one and triune God."

In all these significations, reference is had merely to the Theology of the creature, *i. e.*, to the knowledge which creatures have of God, and not to that which God has of Himself. Theologians distinguish also between these, and call the former *theologia* ἐκτυπος (derived Theology), and the latter *theologia* ἀρχέτυπος (original Theology), by which they mean to say that our knowledge of God, although derived and not original, is, nevertheless, absolutely correct, because derived from God, and only the faithful copy of His own knowledge. Holl. (3 and 4): "Archetypal Theology is the knowledge which God has of Himself, and which in Him is the model of another Theology, which is communicated to intelligent creatures. Ectypal Theology is the science of God and divine things communicated to intelligent creatures by God, after His own Theology, as a pattern. We thus prove our assertion: (1.) Man was made complete, in the image of God. But the image of God consisted in a knowledge of God conformed to the divine wisdom. Therefore its archetype was the infinite wisdom of God. (2.) Fallen man "is renewed in knowledge after the image of God,"

Col. 3 : 10. Therefore his prototype is the divine self-knowledge. For the knowledge of God and of divine things, which divine revelation communicates to the minds of men, is called by the Apostle knowledge after the image of God, for no other reason than because it is expressed in imitation of the knowledge which God has of Himself and of all divine things." Considered in its relation to Christ: "Archetypal Theology belongs to Christ essentially, and through His nature, inasmuch as He is eternal God ; it belongs to Him, as to His human nature, personally, and through the *communicatio idiomatum*, by virtue of the personal union." Concerning Ectypal Theology, QUEN. further adds (I, 5): "We have one Ectypal Theology in Christ, viewed as to His human nature, another in angels, and a third in men. (I, 6.) The Ectypal Theology of mere men is either that of the Way, *i. e.*, of this life, viz., of mortals, or that of the Home,* *i. e.*, of the other and happy life, viz., of the finally saved. The Theology of the Way, or of mortals, is twofold, viz., that before and that after the Fall. That which describes man before the Fall, in the state of integrity, is called also the paradisaical, from the place in which man was placed." But, in reference to all these divisions, BAIER remarks (4): "As the *usus loquendi* does not allow us to call either God, or Christ, or men in heaven, or angels, *theologians*, it readily appears that that meaning must here be rejected, which obtains elsewhere, when we add to the definition, 'the theology of the way.'"

[2] HOLL. (6): "The Theology of the Way is twofold, natural and revealed (supernatural). The former is that according to which God is known both by innate ideas, and by the inspection of created things. The latter is the knowledge of God and of divine things, which God communicates to man upon earth, either by immediate revelation or inspiration (to prophets and apostles), or by mediate revelation or the divine Word, committed to writing."

[3] Still more frequently Theology is called a *practical habit*. As it appeared to the theological writers that the expression *science* gave too much prominence to the mere acquaintance with the subjects concerned, they therefore sought a definition in which it should be distinctly expressed that by Theology there was meant a divinely-wrought knowledge, such as urged its possessor to put to practice what he learned.

[The dogmaticians follow the mediæval mystics and some scholastics, in defining Theology as "wisdom" rather than "science," thus emphasizing the need of spiritual illumination for the appre-

* This distinction is founded upon 1 Cor. 9 : 24; 2 Cor. 5 : 6, 8. It is made as early as Thomas Aquinas.

hension of its truths. Scotus taught that Theology could be a science only to the glorified; to others, it could only be a matter of faith. On this, GRHD. (II, 4): "To believe and know are particularly unlike; for scientific certainty depends upon internal and inherent principles, but that of faith, upon external, viz., upon the authority of the Revealer. Besides, the subject of Theology is Christ, the knowledge of whom cannot be acquired in a scientific way, but from divine revelation. Matt. 16: 17; 1 Cor. 2: 7. In Theology, the intellect is not the source, but the end. 'We believe, that we may know; we do not know, in order that we may believe.' Cf. Is. 7: 9."]

QUEN. (I, 11): "We are here speaking of Theology, not as to what it signifies in a book, but as to what it is, subjectively in the mind."

GRH. thus defines (II, 13): "Theology, viewed as a discipline and concretely, is a divinely-given discipline, bestowed upon man by the Holy Spirit through the Word, whereby he is not only instructed in the knowledge of divine mysteries, by the illumination of the mind, so that what he understands produces a salutary effect upon the disposition of his heart and the actions of his life, but so that he is also qualified to inform others concerning these divine mysteries and the way of salvation, and to vindicate heavenly truth from the aspersions of its foes; so that men, abounding in true faith and good works, are led to the kingdom of heaven."

QUEN. (I, 16): "A distinction is made between *theoretical habits*, which consist wholly in the mere contemplation of the truth, and *practical habits*, which, indeed, require a knowledge of whatever is to be done, but which do not end in this, nor have it as their aim, but which lead to practice and action. Theology, we refer, not to the theoretical, but to the practical habits."

HOLL. (8) thus states the reasons for this distinction: "(1) Because the immediate aim of Theology is true faith in Christ, the operation of which is twofold, viz.: *internal*, which embraces Christ with His benefits, and *external*, which produces good works, the fruit of righteousness. The *ultimate* end of Theology is eternal happiness, which consists not only in the intuitive knowledge of God, but also in the enjoyment of God. (2) Because Theology treats of man, not *theoretically*, as the subject of its description, as certain qualities are ascribed to man in Physiology, but as the subject of its *operation*, or how he, as a sinner, is to be freed from his misery and transferred into a state of blessedness . . . (3) Because Paul himself defines Theology to be 'the knowledge of the truth which is after godliness.' Tit. 1: 1."

[4] QUEN (I, 11): "The term Theology is taken either *essentially, absolutely, and as a mental habitude*, for the knowledge which the mind holds and to which it clings, or in as far as it is a habit of the human mind;* or *accidentally, relatively, systematically*, in so far as it is the doctrine or branch of learning which is taught and learned, or contained in books. The former is the primary, the latter the secondary application of the term."

As to the *subject-matter* of Theology, systematically considered, *out of which it is drawn*, HOLL. (11) states: "It consists of theological truth, *i. e.*, of facts or conclusions known or deduced from the supernatural revelation of God." In regard to the *subject-matter concerning which it treats:* "Theology *in general* discusses God and divine things, in so far as they have been truly revealed through the divine Word to sinful man, to be believed and practiced. *Specifically*, it teaches by what ways and means mortal man, corrupted by sin, is to be introduced into eternal life."

Theology is divided, according to KG., (3) into: "*Catechetical*, or simple, such as is required of all Christians, and *acroamatic*, or more accurate, which is the province of the learned and ministers of the Word. The latter is divided, according to the method of treating it, into *exegetical*, which is employed in the exhibition of the sacred text; *didactic* strictly so-called, which discusses theological subjects in order and systematically; *polemic*, which treats of theological controversies; *homiletic*, which teaches the method of preaching to the people; *casuistic*, which solves doubtful cases of conscience; *ecclesiastical*, which treats of church discipline, visitations, synods, etc., etc.

Corresponding to the two definitions of Theology, we have (HOLL. 13 seq.): "The *Theologian properly and strictly so-called;* a regenerated man, firmly believing in the divine Word, that reveals the mysteries of faith, adhering to it with unshaken confidence, apt in teaching others and confuting opponents. A Theologian, in the general sense of the term, is a man well instructed in the department of Theology, whereby he is rendered prompt in expounding and defending heavenly truth. The *Theologian in a wider sense* may be one who while rightly discharging the office of a Theologian by expounding, confirming and defending theological truths, is, nevertheless, destitute of sincere holiness of disposition." The "*theological knowledge of a truly regenerated and renewed man*" is described as "spiritual knowledge, by which the literal sense of the Biblical language is applied according to the use designed by the Holy Spirit, and produces spiritual and godly emotions of the heart;"

*See explanation of scholastic terms, Appendix II.

the "*knowledge of an unregenerate Theologian*," on the other hand as "*a merely literal knowledge*, which is applied to the investigation, development, and apprehension of the sense of Scripture, and not to the use designed by the Holy Spirit." Concerning this spiritual knowledge, we have the remark: "Far be it from us that we should assert, with the fanatics, that spiritual theological knowledge is derived either from the immediate illumination of the Holy Spirit, or from the internal light or mnemonic power of the soul, through introversion into the hidden recesses of the soul, or that it comprehends only the mystical sense! We know that the literal sense of the Biblical language is primarily and immediately set forth in the words inspired by the Holy Spirit." *Literal theological knowledge* is, moreover, distinguished as "*external*, by which one treats the words of Scripture, in so far as they are analogous to human words, according to the rules of grammar and rhetoric, and searches out and extracts some meaning from them; and *internal*, by which one properly estimates the words of Scripture as the truly divine receptacles or vehicles of the mysteries of the faith, and apprehends, with firm assent, their true literal sense, conformed to the mind of the Holy Spirit." And, with an illusion to QUEN., he adds: "To understand the *internal literal sense*, which is spiritual and divine, the illumination of the Holy Spirit is needed; the illumination may be imperfect, *of which the unregenerate are capable*, or perfect, such as the regenerate enjoy." This internal, literal knowledge is, therefore, not natural or carnal, but supernatural. "It is supernatural (*a*) by virtue of its origin, for it is derived from the light of supernatural revelation; (*b*) by virtue of its object, . . . for the mysteries of the faith are the object of literal knowledge (But what is a mystery other than a doctrine transcending the grasp of unaided reason?) (*c*) in view of the impotence of the intellectual subject, 1 Cor. 2: 14; (*d*) on account of the intimate connection between the Holy Spirit and the Scriptures. For, if the literal internal knowledge of believers be not supernatural, the Holy Spirit is not perpetually and inseparably united with the Holy Scriptures. But the Holy Spirit is perpetually and inseparably united with the Holy Scriptures; therefore," etc.

CHAPTER II.

Of the General Subject of Theology, viz., Religion.

§ 3. *Religion, True and False.*

THE subject of Theology is accordingly, Religion.[1] Religion is the way and manner in which God is worshiped. That is a *false* religion in which God is worshiped in a manner that does not accord with His nature and will; that is the *true and right* religion in which this is done in the manner which He regards as right and which He prescribes,[2] so that hereby man, estranged from God, is brought back again to Him, and secures his salvation. This proper manner is taught in the Holy Scriptures; and thus the true religion, more accurately defined, is that in which God is worshiped in the manner therein prescribed, and therefore the Christian Religion is the true one.[3] The proper manner of worshiping God must, accordingly, first of all, manifest itself in that disposition of soul towards God which is agreeable to Him, and secondly, in love toward our neighbor and the practice of all the virtues enjoined by God.[4] In the widest sense, therefore, Religion embraces all that God commands to be believed and to be done.[5]

[1] Holl. (32): "Some suppose the term *Religion* to be derived from *religando* (Lactantius), others from *relegendo* (Cicero). According to the former derivation, religion signifies the obligation rightly to worship God, or, that which imposes upon man obligations and duties. According to the latter etymology, religion is diligent attention to those things which pertain to the worship of God. The former derivation is more generally received."—Quen. "Synonymous are θρήσκεια, James 1 : 26; ἐυσέβεια, 1 Tim. 4 : 8; λογικὴ λατρεία, Rom. 12 : 1."

[2] Quen. (I, 19): "The Christian religion is the method of worshiping God prescribed in the Word, by which man, separated from God by sin, is led back to God, through faith in Jesus Christ (who is both God and man), so that he is reunited with God, and enjoys Him eternally."

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Holl. (33): "Religion, improperly speaking, signifies the false, properly speaking, the true method of worshiping God."

Holl. (60): "As opposed to the true Religion, we have not only false religion, but also atheism or irreligion. A false religion is that in which either false gods are worshiped, or the true God is improperly worshiped. Irreligion is that in which impious men regard all religion with contempt, so that, denying the providence and punitive justice of God, they boldly and recklessly do as they please."

[3] Holl. (34): "The true Religion is that which is conformed to the Divine Word."

That the Christian religion is the true one is proved by Cal. 1 : 152 sqq.:

"(1) *From the requisites of a true religion.* A religion which is true and has proceeded from God, must have these characteristics: (*a*) Not to teach false, corrupt or absurd things. (*b*) Not to be new but to have existed since the creation of man as an institution for communicating salvation. (*c*) Not to have perished or hereafter to perish. (*d*) Not to leave men in their former errors, much less to sink them the more deeply, but to lead them to holiness. All these characteristics pertain to no other than the Christian religion; since every other religion teaches false, absurd, base things, has originated since men, etc.

(2) *From the truth of Scripture.* For since the Christian religion is comprised in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, its truth will be proved from the truth of these Scriptures, as elsewhere set forth.

(3) *From the religion of the Hebrews.* For the religion of the Christians and of the ancient patriarchs is one and the same.

(4) *From the supreme dignity of its rewards.* For the excellence of the Christian religion is displayed by the fact that in all ages and nations, none can be produced either more excellent in its rewards, more perfect in its precepts, more sublime in its mysteries or more admirable in the method in which it is to be propagated. For while among the Greeks some entertained the hope of life after the end of the present life, nevertheless they spoke with great hesitancy concerning it (Socrates in Plato's Phædo, Cicero's Tusculan Disputations, Seneca's Epistles). Philosophers were divided into diverse opinions concerning the end of man, some making virtue the reward, others contending that pleasure is the highest good; the Christian religion, however, offers the true knowledge of this end, promising, after this life, a happy existence not only for the soul, but also for the body; nor are the joys it promises vile, as the

banquets for which the Jews hope, or the licentious indulgence which Mohammedans expect, but true, solid, perennial. Lactantius has well said (Institutes, l. iii., cap. xii.): 'Virtue is not happy of itself, since all its force is expended in the endurance of evil.'

(5) *From the supreme holiness of its precepts.* The sacred rites of the heathen, throughout almost the whole world, were full of cruelty. The mysteries of Ceres and Bacchus abounded in obscenity. How profane and unworthy of God is Mohammedanism, the Koran can testify. The Christian religion requires an absolutely holy worship of God, holy trust in Him, and all that is most worthy of God; and of like nature are the duties towards our neighbor which it enjoins. Mohammedanism was born in war, breathes nothing but war, is propagated everywhere by war, while Christianity prohibits every injury, and wishes good to all. Many of the most eminent Greek philosophers praised a community of women, and even did not disapprove of sodomy, which was commended by the example of the gods. But the Christian religion teaches that marriage must be held most holy. . . . In short, nothing excellent can be found in any nation which is not taught in the Christian religion with still greater purity, and under sanction of divine authority, as modesty, temperance, prudence, the duties of magistrates and subjects, of parents and children, of husbands and wives, the avoidance of sin, etc.; so that the sum of all its precepts is, to love God above all things, and our neighbor as ourselves.

(6) *From the sublimity of its mysteries.* For whatever mystery other religions seem to have easily brings to those better informed the suspicion of vanity. Only the mysteries of the Christian religion are entirely placed beyond the reach of man's understanding, and can be convicted of no falsity or superstition.

(7) *From the propagation of the Christian religion.* For there is no religion so widely diffused. If Paganism be mentioned, you mention one name, but not one religion.

(8) *From the mode of its propagation.* For the Christian religion made such progress, not by violence or arms, or the example of kings and the powerful. The first teachers of Christianity were of humble rank, and yet, through their agency, within thirty years it not only pervaded all parts of the Roman Empire, but was extended to the Parthians and inhabitants of India, Rom. 15: 19. Nor only in the beginning, but for about three centuries, it was advanced without threats of violence, and even with the power of the empire arrayed against it, so that before Constantine professed Christianity it had conquered almost the greater part of the Roman

world. Nor was this done by any elaborate preparation, whether of eloquence or the various arts whereby philosophers rendered themselves commendable to the Gentiles.

(9) *From the multitude of its miracles.* For, as the faith of the Old Testament was attested by most remarkable miracles, performed at various times but especially on the departure from Egypt and the entrance into Canaan, whereby its fame was spread abroad among the Gentiles, so far more numerous and more illustrious miracles proclaim the authority of the New Testament.

(10) *From the magnanimity of its martyrs.*

(11) *From the testimony of other religions.* 'The Jews,' says Augustine (*De Civitate Dei*, l. xviii., c. 45), 'are dispersed throughout the earth, and by their scriptures give a testimony that we have not invented the prophecies concerning Christ. The Mohammedans acknowledge Christ as the greatest prophet; and among the heathen many things occur corroborating its testimony in historical matters.'

(12) *From the efficacy and power of Christian doctrine*, in arousing, swaying, and soothing souls, attested not only by Scripture, but by innumerable examples of those converted to faith in Christ."

[4] QUEN. (I, 20): "The Christian religion may be viewed either μερικῶς (in part), or ὁλικῶς (as a whole). Taken in the former sense it signifies, first and principally, the immediate worship of God, viz., εὐσέβεια, or the piety which has regard to the worship of God according to the first table of the Law; secondarily, it signifies those other duties by which God is mediately worshiped, which have respect to the second table of the Law. The love of our neighbor presupposes love to God; hence, secondarily and by analogy, the duty of love to our neighbor comes under the name of religion."

BR. (16): "The term Religion signifies, *in a stricter sense*, either the habit of the will by which we are inclined to the love, honor and worship due God, on account of His excellence; or, the acts themselves, of honoring or worshiping God on account of His excellence; and, at the same time, it signifies, on the part of the intellect, the true knowledge of God; on the part of the will, the other virtues (or virtuous acts) which aim at the honor and worship of God. But, *in a wider sense*, it denotes the whole circle of virtues or acts, that pertain to the worship of God."

[5] HOLL. (43): "Under the name of the Christian Religion is comprehended whatever is to be believed and to be done by sinful man, in order to attain eternal life. As God is religiously worshiped by true faith and the sincere effort to perform good works,

so religion, which is the form or method of worshiping God, embraces within its compass things to be believed and things to be done. In a *general* sense, the things to be believed are all things revealed in the written Word of God; in a more *limited* sense, those which are revealed in the Word of God in regard to the salvation of man; in the *most specific* sense, they are mysteries, above the comprehension of reason, and to be learned alone from the divine revelation for our salvation." Hence, "the subject-matter of Religion is faith, and love to God and our neighbor."

We observe further, that GRH. and BR. do not treat of Religion as a separate topic. BR. has, under the head of "The Nature and Constituent Elements of Theology," only the following proposition (14): "In Natural Theology the means of attaining happiness are the acts of the mind and will directed towards God, by which God is rightly known and worshiped. They are known by one name, Religion." This is explained by the definition which the theologians give of Theology, for in accordance with this there is little material left for a special section on the subject of Religion.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE SOURCE OF THEOLOGY, VIZ., REVELATION.

§ 4. *Revelation,—not Reason, nor Tradition.*

IN order to understand what is true and correct Theology, we must inquire for the Source from which we derive our knowledge of it. QUEN. 32: "The source (principium) is that from which anything, in some manner or other, proceeds." This is the Revelation given by God.[1] By this divine Revelation we understand here, not that which is given in nature, but that given in the Word (*supernatural*, as distinguished from *natural* revelation).[2] More accurately, therefore, we say: the source of theological knowledge is the revelation contained in the Holy Scriptures,[3] and this is, moreover, the only source of Theology,[4] and neither reason,[5] nor, at a later date, tradition, or the appeal to the consentaneous doctrine of the ancient church,[6] is to be ranked with it; nor are supplementary revelations now to be expected from any quarter.[7]

[1] CAL. (I, 269); "Revelation is taken either in a formal sense, for the *act* of the divine communication, or *objectively for that which is divinely revealed.* The former sense is here intended."

[2] HOLL. (61): "We speak here not of that *general revelation* or *natural manifestation*, by which God makes Himself known both by the innate light of nature and by the effects conspicuous in the kingdom of nature. But we speak of the *special* and *supernatural revelation*, which is twofold, *immediate* and *mediate.* The Holy Spirit immediately illuminated the prophets and apostles, and suggested to them conceptions of things and of words concerning doctrines of faith and moral precepts. *At the present day God reveals Himself to men by means of the Word written by the prophets and apostles.*" Revelation is, therefore, defined as: "The external act of God, by which He makes Himself known to the human race by His Word, in order that they may have a saving knowledge of Him."—QUEN. I, 32.

CAL. (I, 268) thus states the proof that this divine revelation exists: "It having been proved, if this should be denied, that God is, and that there must be some method in which God may be worshiped by men, we must teach, that it cannot be but that God has revealed that method, so that He may be worshiped properly; then, that God wishes men to be led to the enjoyment of Himself, and also, that He has revealed unto men the manner in which they are to be thus led; finally, the fact that God has revealed Himself, must be taught from history, which revelation God has seen fit abundantly to accompany with miracles and documents, by which we are rendered absolutely certain that it is truly divine. Rom. 1: 16; 2 Cor. 12: 12. But as one general revelation has been made in Nature, Rom. 1: 19 sq., and another special one by verbal communication, it is first to be proved from nature that God is, inasmuch as God has revealed Himself unto all by His works, in the formation of this world; and subsequently it is to be shown that God has revealed Himself to the human race in a more perfect manner by the Word."

[3] QUEN. (I, 32): "The source of Theology is the written, divine revelation contained in the Holy Scriptures." HOLL. (61) more accurately: "Christian Theology is derived from an infallible source of knowledge, viz., divine revelation, which, for the present state of the Church, is mediate, *i. e.*, comprehended in the writings of the prophets and apostles." As proof, John 20: 31; 2 Tim. 3: 14, 15; Rom. 15: 4; 2 Tim. 3: 16, 17. With regard to the different modes of revelation in ancient times, BR. (62): "Formerly God employed many and various methods in revealing those things

which pertain to the salvation of man, Heb. 1: 1. Specifically: (1.) By articulate language, uttered in a supernatural way. Thus revelations were made to the patriarchs, Gen. 18: 2; 19: 1; 22: 1; to Moses, Ex. 3: 2; Num. 12: 6; to the Israelites, Ex. 19: 10. (2.) By dreams or visions, presented to the minds of the sleeping, Gen. 28: 12; Dan. 2: 19. (3.) By ecstatic visions of the waking, Ez. 1: 4; Dan. 10: 5; Acts 10: 10; finally (4.) By the immediate illumination of the intellect, without the intervention of dreams and visions, 2 Tim. 3: 16; 2 Pet. 1: 21. But now, since God has chosen to present, in certain books, those things which are necessary to be known with reference to revealed things, in order to salvation, and not to communicate any new revelations, the only source of Theology is to be found in those ancient revelations which were made immediately to the prophets and apostles and have been committed to writing."

Inasmuch, however, as the religion of the Old and New Testaments is to be regarded as substantially the same, QUEN. (I, 32) adds the remark: "As the divine revelation became more full, in the course of time, so also did Theology, which was based upon it; and as the former, just so the latter, gathered up its own additions in the progress of time, God meanwhile imparting new revelations. These additions did not relate to those things which constitute the foundation of faith and salvation, but to other things which render the statement and comprehension of these more complete, or which relate to various circumstances, rites, and ceremonies, and to ecclesiastical order and discipline."

If, therefore, the Holy Scriptures are thus the Source of Theology, we are authorized to draw the following conclusion: "Whatever the Holy Scriptures teach is infallibly true." Hence the early divines speak of a twofold source, viz., the source *indefinitely stated*, *i. e.*, by a single term; and the source *more fully stated*, *i. e.*, by an entire proposition. The former is the Holy Scriptures. The latter, from which the doctrines of the Christian faith are deduced, and into which they are again merged, is this proposition: "Whatever God has revealed in His Word, that is infallibly true, and must be reverently believed and embraced." From the Holy Scriptures, then, as this source, are drawn all doctrinal truths. "The source, whence theological conclusions are drawn, is but one, viz., the Word of God, or, 'Thus saith the Lord.' Theological conclusions are nothing else than truths concerning the faith, elicited and deduced from the Word of God.

[4] QUEN. (I, 33): "The *sole*, proper, adequate, and ordinary source of Theology and of the Christian Religion is the divine

revelation contained in the Holy Scriptures; or, what is the same thing, that the canonical Scriptures alone are the absolute source of Theology, so that *out of them alone* are the articles of faith to be deduced and proved."

Further (I, 36): "Divine revelation is the first and last source of sacred Theology, beyond which theological discussion among Christians dare not proceed. For every doubt concerning religion in the mind of a true Christian is removed by divine revelation, and by this the faith of the believer grows so strong, and is so firmly established, that it frees his mind from all fear and suspicion of deception, and imparts to him a firm assurance."

[5] QUEN. (I, 38): "Human or natural reason is not the source of Theology and supernatural things."

[6] CAL. (I, 304): "We contend that, over and above the written Word of God, there is at present no unwritten Word of God concerning any doctrine necessary to Christian faith and life, not comprehended in the Scriptures, that ever came forth from the apostles, was handed down by tradition, was preserved by the Church, and is to be received with equal reverence."

QUEN. (I, 44): "The consent of the Primitive Church, or of the Fathers of the first centuries after Christ, is not a source of Christian faith, either primary or secondary, nor does it produce a divine, but merely a human or probable belief." In reference to this latter clause, HOLL. (71): "The consent of the Fathers is not to be esteemed of little, but of great importance, as a ground of credibility, as a secondary source of theological conclusions (viz., because it furnishes opinions or conceptions that are probably true), and as a demonstrative and invaluable testimony that the early bishops of the Catholic Church understood and expounded passages of the Holy Scriptures in the same sense in which the Evangelical Church of the present day understands them."

[7] HOLL. (63): "After the completion of the canon of Scripture, no new and immediate divine revelation was given to be a fundamental source of doctrine, 1 Cor. 4: 6; Heb. 1: 1." QUEN. (I, 48): "The opposite opinion is that of various fanatics who hold that the knowledge of God, and of all doctrines that are to be believed, is not to be sought from the written Word of God, but that a higher wisdom than that contained in the Holy Scriptures is to be sought from a revelation especially made to each individual, and from innate light, from ecstatic raptures, dreams, angelic communications, from an internal word, from the inspiration of the Father, from knowledge internally communicated by Christ, who is essentially united with them, and from the instruc-

tion of the Holy Spirit, speaking and teaching internally." [Cf. Apology, 215: 13; Smalcald Articles, 332: 4; 333: 9, 10; Large Catechism, 499: 13; Formula of Concord, 552: 4; 561: 46.]

§ 5. *Excursus. Concerning the Use of Reason in Theology.*

By the term Reason, we may understand either, the capacity of intellectual apprehension in general—and this is essential to man, for it is only by means of this capacity, which distinguishes him from irrational animals, that he can comprehend the truths of religion; [1] or, the capacity of acquiring knowledge and appropriating truths. [2] The knowledge, however, which one thus acquires is, even if true, still defective and unsatisfactory, [3] and therefore Reason is by no means the source from which man can draw the knowledge of saving truths, [4] but for these the revelation contained in Holy Scripture remains ever the only source.

The question now arises, How is Reason related to this revelation, and what use can Theology make of Reason?

Inasmuch as Reason also derives its knowledge from God, Reason and Revelation are, of course, not opposed to each other. [5] This holds true, however, only of Reason considered *per se*, of Reason as it was before the fall of man. This would have remained conscious of the limits of its sphere; would not have sought to measure divine things by the rule of natural knowledge; would have subordinated itself to Revelation, [6] and would have known that there are truths which, although not in antagonism with it, are yet far beyond its reach. [7]

But the case is very different with Reason as it dwells now in fallen man; for we must concede that, by man's fall, such a change has occurred that Reason now often assumes a position of antagonism to revealed truth. [8] It still, indeed, possesses some knowledge of divine things, but this knowledge is obscured in proportion to the moral depravity of man, and it now, more easily than before, transcends the assigned limits. If now Reason, even before the fall of man, had to keep within modest limits, with respect to the truths of Revelation, much less dare it now, in the fallen condition of man, assume to judge in regard to divine things, or subject the truths of Revelation to its tests; still less dare it reject that which does

not seem to agree with its knowledge: its duty rather is to subject itself to Revelation and learn therefrom. If this be done, however, much will again become intelligible that previously appeared contradictory, and Reason will again approach the condition occupied before the Fall. But this will be only an approach to that condition; for just as man, even through regeneration, never again becomes entirely sinless, so the Reason of the regenerate never attains its original power. [9] We may therefore say of Reason, even when enlightened, that it can have no decisive judgment in regard to matters of faith, and possesses in such matters no normative authority, all the more since this was true of Reason before the Fall. [10]

As to the use, then, that is to be made of Reason in Theology, it follows, from what has been said, that Reason stands in the relation merely of a handmaid to the latter. [11] In so far as it is the capacity for intellectual apprehension in general, the use that is to be made of it will consist in this, that man, by its help, intellectually apprehends the truths of Theology, and accepts from it the means of refuting opponents. In so far, however, as it also conveys knowledge, one may also employ it in the demonstration of a divine truth; in such a case, Reason would contribute whatever of natural knowledge it has acquired. And just in the same proportion as Reason has suffered itself to be enlightened by divine Revelation, will it be able to demonstrate the harmony of divine truth with natural knowledge. [12]

[1] Cal. (I, 358): "Human Reason denotes two things. On the one hand, it designates the intellect of man, that faculty of the rational soul that must be exercised in every kind of knowledge, since it is only by the reason or intellect that man can understand." . . . Holl. (69): "Without the use of reason we cannot understand or prove theological doctrines, or defend them against the artful objections of opponents. Surely not to brutes, but to men using their sound reason, has God revealed the knowledge of eternal salvation in His Word, and upon them He has imposed the earnest injunction to read, hear, and meditate upon His Word. The *intellect* is therefore required, as the *receiving subject* or *apprehending instrument*. As we can see nothing without eyes, and hear nothing without ears, so we understand nothing without reason."

[2] CAL. (ibid.): "On the other hand, Reason denotes Philosophy itself, or the principles known from nature, and the discussion or ratiocination based upon these known principles." These principles are divided "into *organic* and *philosophical* (strictly so called). The *former* (organic) relate to the mediate disciplines, grammar, rhetoric, and logic."—(QUEN. (I, 39): "These are to be employed in Theology, as the means of becoming acquainted with Theology, since without them, neither the sense nor significance of the words can be derived, nor the figures and modes of speech be properly weighed, nor the connection and consequences be perceived, nor discussions be instituted"). The *latter* (the philosophical) are again divided into "*philosophical principles absolutely and unrestrictedly universal* (general or transcendental), which consist of a combination of terms essential and simply necessary, so that they cannot be overthrown by any argument, not even by the Scriptures; *e. g.*, 'It is impossible for anything to be and not to be at the same time;'" and "*philosophical principles restrictedly universal* (special or particular), which are indeed true, to a certain extent, hypothetically, or so far as mere natural knowledge extends, but which, nevertheless, admit of limitation, and which may be invalidated by counter evidence drawn from revelation, if not from nature; *e. g.*, 'As many as are the persons, so many are the essences,' etc." HOLL. (68). Through these philosophical sources we can also gain a knowledge of God, for there is a natural knowledge of God, described elsewhere by the Theologians under the heads of the innate, and the acquired knowledge of God.

[3] CAL. (II, 47): "Of the natural knowledge of God there is predicated, as to those things that are revealed in nature, imperfection; and as to the supernatural mysteries of faith, entire worthlessness [nullitas].

[4] HOLL. (69): "Meanwhile, nevertheless, human reason is not a fountain, or primordial element, from which the peculiar and fundamental principles of faith are derived."

[5] FLACIUS, with his assertion, that "the knowledge of God, naturally implanted, is a light full of error, fallacious and deceptive," and subsequently, Daniel Hofmann ("Philosophy is hostile to Theology; what is true in Philosophy is false in Theology"), gave especial occasion to dispute the antagonism between Reason and Revelation.

CAL. (I, 68): "That Philosophy is not opposed to Theology, and is by no means to be rejected as brutish, terrene, impure, diabolical, we thus demonstrate: 1. Because the true agrees with the true, and does not antagonize it. But what is known by the

light of nature is no less true than what is revealed in Scripture; 2. Because natural and philosophical knowledge has its origin from God; 3. Because Philosophy leads us to the knowledge of God."

As this antagonism was still asserted, the Theologians endeavored to prove it to be only apparent. CAL. (I, 74): "We must distinguish between a real and an apparent contradiction. The maxims of Philosophy and the conclusions of Theology do not really contradict each other, but only appear to do so; for they either do not discuss the same subject, or they do not describe the same condition, mode, or relation of it; as when the philosopher says that the essence is multiplied with the multiplication of persons, he declares this of finite and created persons, not of divine, of which he knows nothing; concerning the latter, the theologian teaches that this is not true. When the philosopher says, 'Of nothing, nothing comes,' *i. e.*, by way of generation, he does not contradict the theologian, who teaches that by the way of creation something does come from nothing. Let Philosophy remain within the limits of its own sphere, then it will not contradict Theology, for this treats of a different subject. But it is not wonderful that those who confound Philosophy with Theology should find contradictions between them, for they pervert both." QUEN. (I, 43): "We must distinguish between contrariety and diversity. Philosophy and the principles of Reason are not indeed contrary to Theology, nor the latter to the former; but there is a very great difference between those things that are divinely revealed in Scripture and those which are known by the light of nature."—As the Theologians here opposed those who asserted a contradiction between Reason and Revelation, they also controverted those who claimed too much for Reason, as over against Revelation, by maintaining that, because Reason came from God, that which opposes it cannot be true. This charge was brought against the Calvinists, Socinians, and Arminians. It was admitted, in opposition to them, that Reason in itself does not contradict Revelation; an inference, however, which might have become derogatory to divine truth, was obviated by explaining any seeming contradiction on the ground that Reason, in such a case, had overstepped its proper limits. To the proposition: "In nowise can that be true which is repugnant to reason," GRH. (II, 371) replies: "Not human Reason, but divine Revelation, is the source of faith, nor are we to judge concerning the articles of faith according to the dictation of Reason, otherwise we should have no articles of faith, but only decisions of Reason. The cogitations and utterances of Reason are to be restricted and restrained within the sphere of those things

which are subject to the decision of Reason, and not to be extended to the sphere of those things which are placed entirely beyond the reach of Reason; otherwise, if they should be received as absolutely universal, and are found opposed to the mysteries of the faith, there arise oppositions of science falsely so called. To the objection: "As a smaller light to a greater, so Reason is not contrary to Scripture," GRH. (II, 372) answers: "This contrariety is not necessary, but accidental. Reason restricted to its proper sphere is not contrary to Scripture, but when it attempts to overleap and surpass this, and to pass judgment upon the highest mysteries of the faith by the aid of its own principles, then, by accident, it comes in conflict with Scripture which informs us in regard to the mysteries of faith. Just as the stronger light often reveals those things which were hidden in the weaker, so the light of grace, enkindled for us in the Word, makes manifest those things which were hidden in the light of nature. Just as any one, therefore, who would deny those things which are visible in the greater light because he had not seen them in the smaller, would fail to appreciate the design and benefit of the smaller, so also he who denies or impugns the mysteries of faith revealed in the light of grace, on the ground that they are incongruous with Reason and the light of nature, fails, at the same time, to make a proper use of the office and benefits of Reason and the light of nature." To the proposition: "What is true theologically cannot be false philosophically, for truth is one," GRH. (ibid.) answers: "In themselves considered, there is no contrariety, no contradiction between Philosophy and Theology, because whatever things concerning the deepest mystery of the faith Theology propounds from Revelation, these a wiser and sincere Philosophy knows are not to be discussed and estimated according to the principles of Reason, lest there be a confusion of what pertains to entirely distinct departments. So when Theology teaches that Mary brought forth and yet remained a virgin, a truly sensible Philosophy does not say this assertion is contrary to its conclusion, that it is impossible for a virgin to bear a child, because it knows that that conclusion must necessarily be received with this limitation, that for a virgin to *bring forth a child naturally* and yet remain a virgin, is impossible. Nor does Theology assert the contrary of this, for it says, *by supernatural and divine power it came to pass* that a virgin brought forth a child. But when some philosophizer attempts to make his axioms and assertions so general that the highest mysteries of the faith are to be adjudged by them, and so invades other spheres, then it comes to pass, by way of accident, that what is true theo-

logically is pronounced false philosophically; *i. e.*, not according to the proper use of a sound Philosophy, but according to the miserable abuse of it. Thus, justice and the nature of law is everywhere the same, *i. e.*, in its general conception, while, nevertheless, the law of this province is not the same as that of other provinces, but each government lives under its own special laws. So truth is one in its general conception, while each branch has its own axioms which are not to be dragged before another tribunal, but to be left in their own sphere."

[6] GRH. (II, 372): "Sound reason is not opposed to the faith, if we accept as such that which is truly and properly so-called, namely that which does not transcend the limits of its sphere, and does not arrogate to itself decisions in regard to the mysteries of faith; or which, enlightened by the Word, and sanctified by the Holy Spirit, does not follow its own principles in the investigation of the mysteries of faith, but the light of the Word and the guidance of the Holy Spirit."

[7] GRH. (II, 372): "The articles of faith are not in and of themselves contrary to Reason, but only above Reason. It may happen, by accident, that they be contrary to Reason, namely, when Reason assumes to decide concerning them upon its own principles, and does not follow the light of the Word, but denies and assails them. Hence the articles of faith are not contrary to, but merely above Reason, since Reason before the Fall was not yet corrupt and depraved; but since the Fall they are not only above but also contrary to corrupt Reason, for this, in so far as it is thus corrupt, cannot control itself, much less should it wish to judge articles of faith by its own principles."

[8] GRH. (II, 371): "We must distinguish between Reason in man *before and since the Fall.* The former, as such, was never opposed to divine Revelation; the latter was very frequently thus opposed through the influence of corruption." GRH. (II, 362): "*Natural human Reason since the Fall* (1) is blind, darkened by the mist of error, inwrapped in the shades of ignorance, exposed to vanity and error, Rom. 1: 21; 1 Cor. 3: 1; Gal. 4: 8; Eph. 4: 17; (2) unskilled in perceiving divine mysteries and judging concerning them, Matt. 11: 27; 16: 17; 1 Cor. 2: 14 sq.; (3) opposed to them, Rom. 8: 6; 1 Cor. 2: 11 sq.; 3: 18 sq.; hence to be brought into captivity to the obedience of Christ, 2 Cor. 10: 4, 5; (4) and we are commanded to beware of its seduction, Col. 2: 8. Therefore natural human Reason cannot be a rule for judging in matters of faith, and any one pronouncing according to its dictation cannot be a judge in theological controversies." QUEN. (I, 43):

"We must distinguish between Philosophy (*i. e.*, Reason) *considered abstractly and in view of its essence*, and Philosophy *considered concretely and in view of its existence* in a subject corrupted by sin: viewed in the former light, it is never opposed to divine truth (for the truth is ever presented as uniform and in harmony with the nature of the objects successively subordinated to it), but viewed in the latter light, in consequence of the ignorance of the intellect and the perversion of the will, it is often preposterously applied by the philosopher to the purposes of perversion and hollow deception. Col. 2: 8."

[9] Grh. (II, 371): "We are to make a distinction between the reason of man *unregenerate* and *regenerate*. The former counts the mysteries of faith foolishness, but the latter, in so far as it is such, does not object to them. Then only, and only so long, is it regenerate as it follows the light of the Word, and judges concerning the mysteries of the faith, not by its own principles, but by the Scriptures. We do not reject Reason when regenerated, renewed, illuminated by the Word of God, restrained and brought into captivity to the obedience of Christ; this does not draw its opinions, in matters of faith, from its own sources, but from Scripture; this does not impugn the articles of belief as does Reason when corrupt, left to itself, etc. We must distinguish also between Reason *partially rectified in this life, and that which is fully rectified in the life to come.* The former is not yet so completely renewed, illuminated, and rectified that it would be impossible for it to oppose the articles of faith and impugn them, if it should follow its own guidance. Just as there remains in the regenerate a struggle between the flesh and the spirit, by which they are tempted to sin, so there remains in them a struggle between faith and Reason, in so far as it is not yet fully renewed; this, however, excludes all opposition between faith and Reason."

[10] Quen. (I, 43): "Reason is admissible as an instrument, but not as a rule and a judge: the formal principles of Reason no one rejects; its material principles, which constitute its rule for judging of mysteries, no wise man accepts. No material principle of Reason, as such, but only as it is at the same time a part of Revelation, produces faith theologically: that God is, we know from nature; we believe it, however, only through the Scriptures. It does not follow, because some parts of Scripture are axioms known by nature, that therefore Reason is the regulator of theological controversies." Id. (I, 43): "Theology does not condemn the use of Reason, but its abuse and its affectation of directorship, or its magisterial use, as normative and decisive in divine things."

[11] Holl. (71): "Reason is not a leader, but an humble follower, of Theology. Hagar serves as the handmaid of her mistress, she does not command; when she affects to command she is banished from the sacred home."

[12] Quen. (I, 42): "A distinction must be made between the *organic* or *instrumental* use of Reason and its principles, when they are employed as instruments for the interpretation and exposition of the Holy Scriptures, in refuting the arguments of opponents, drawn from Nature and Reason, and discussing the signification and construction of words, and rhetorical figures and modes of speech; and the *normal* use of philosophical principles, when they are regarded as principles by which supernatural doctrines are to be tested. *The former* we admit, *the latter* we repudiate." The following from Quen. explains and expands this idea: "It is one thing to employ in Theology the principles and axioms of Philosophy for the purpose of illustration, explanation, and as a secondary proof, when a matter is decided by the Scriptures; and another to employ them for the purpose of deciding and demonstrating, or to recognize philosophical principles, or the argumentation based upon them, as authoritative in Theology, or by means of them to decide matters of faith. The former we do, the latter we do not. There must be a distinction made between consequences deduced by the aid of reason from the Holy Scriptures, and conclusions collected from the sources of nature and reason. The former must not be confounded with the latter. For it is one thing to use legitimate, necessary consequences, and another to use the principles of Reason. It is one thing to draw a conclusion and deduce consequences from the declarations of Scripture, according to logical rules, and another to collect consequences from natural principles. A sort of illustration of heavenly matters can be sought for among those things which Reason supplies, but a demonstration can never be obtained from that source, since it is necessary that this should proceed from the same sphere to which the truth which is to be proved belongs, and not from a foreign one."

This doctrine of the use of reason Grh. develops in a manner somewhat different, although substantially the same, as follows, under the topic, "The Use of Reason in the Rule of Faith." (I, 76, sq.): (1) The *organic* use is the following: When our reason brings with it, to the work of drawing out the treasures of divine wisdom hidden in the Scriptures, knowledge of the grammatical force of words, logical observance of order, rhetorical elucidation of figures and acquaintance with the facts of nature, derived from the philosophical branches. This use we greatly

commend, yea, we even declare it to be necessary. (2) As to the *edificative* use of Reason, it is to be thus maintained: There is a certain natural knowledge of God, Rom. 1 : 19, 20, but this should be subordinate to that which is divinely revealed in the Word; so that, where there is a disagreement, the former should yield to the latter; and where they agree, the former confirms and strengthens the latter. In short, as a servant it should, with all due reverence, minister to the latter. (3) The *destructive* use, when legitimate, is the following: Errors in doctrine are first to be confuted by arguments drawn from the Holy Scriptures, as the only and proper source of Theology, but afterwards philosophical reasons may be added, so that it may be shown that the false dogma is repugnant, not only to the light of grace, but also to the light of Nature. But when the truth of any doctrine has been clearly proved by unanswerable scriptural arguments, we should never allow our confidence in it to be shaken by any philosophical reasons, however specious they may be."

Id. (II, 9): "Although some things are taught in Theology, which can be learned in some measure by the light of Nature and Reason, yet human Reason cannot undertake to become thoroughly acquainted with the mysteries of faith, properly so called, by means of its own powers; and as to such things as, already known from Nature, are taught in Theology, it need not seek for proof elsewhere than in their own proper source, the Word of God, which is abundantly able to prove them. . . . In this latter manner the Theologian becomes indebted, for some things, to the philosopher; not, indeed, as though he were not able to know them without the aid of philosophical principles, from Scripture, as the proper and native source of his own science, but because, in the course of the investigation, he perceives the truth of the proposition according to the principles of philosophy."

That to which GRH. here merely alludes, the later Theologians, such as QUEN., BR., and HOLL., develop at greater length when treating of the *pure and mixed articles;* by the former of which are understood those which contain truths that can be known only by Revelation, by the latter such as contain truths which may, at least in part, be otherwise known. HOLL. (68): "Mixed articles of faith may, in some measure, be known by the principles of Philosophy. But the pure articles of faith can be learned and proved only from Holy Scripture as the appropriate, fundamental, and original source." But the remark of QUEN. is well worthy of attention, that (I, 39) "in the *mixed* articles we grant that philosophical principles may be employed; not, indeed, for the purpose

of decision or demonstration, but merely for illustration, or as a sort of *secondary proof* of that which has already been decided by the Scriptures." And here belongs also the statement of QUEN., concerning the formal and material principles of Reason, already quoted in the tenth note. This statement of QUEN. conveys the same idea as the last, quoted from GRH., and is designed to prevent the assignment of the right of decision in the mixed articles to Reason, although it is to have something to do with them. Those Theologians who observe the distinction, described in note second, between organic and philosophical principles, admit also the use of the absolutely universal principles in Theology. It may be questioned, however, whether these are so accurately distinguished from the restrictedly universal principles which are not admissible, that mistakes may not easily arise. In regard to this BR. (157) thus expresses himself: "The material principles of Reason are also with propriety employed; however, when they are particular or specific, they are subordinated to the universal principle of Theology; but the universal principles of Reason may be employed only when they are absolutely necessary, namely, when the demonstration of the opposite would imply a contradiction. For otherwise, if the principles of Reason were employed, not absolutely, but relatively, or, so to speak, universally and necessarily, it might easily happen that a conclusion would be reached repugnant to the mysteries or to the articles of faith, even to those of fundamental importance."

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES.

IN treating of the Holy Scriptures as the recorded revelation of God, we speak 1, of what is understood by the Holy Scriptures and Inspiration; 2, of the Attributes of the Holy Scriptures; 3, of the Canon.

§ 6. *Of the terms, Holy Scriptures and Inspiration.*

God determined that His revelation should be committed to writing, so that it might be preserved pure and uncorrupted throughout all future time; [1] therefore He has deposited it in the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. [2]

These are, therefore, defined to be the written Word of God. [3] GRH.: "The Holy Scripture is the Word of God recorded in the Holy Scriptures." Between these and the Word of God, there is, then, no real distinction, inasmuch as they contain nothing more than this very Word of God, which was also orally proclaimed; [4] and they contain it entire and complete, so that, aside from them, no Word of God is anywhere to be found. [5] By being the Word of God, the Holy Scriptures are distinguished from all other books, for, in consequence of this, they are, in respect of all their contents, entirely divine; and this by virtue of the fact that they were communicated by inspiration from God to the prophets and apostles. [6] God is therefore their author (*causa principalis*), and the prophets and apostles only the instruments (*causa instrumentalis*) which God employed in their production. [7] We are, therefore, to ascribe the origin of the Holy Scriptures to a peculiar agency of God, by means of which He impelled the prophets and apostles to the production of the Holy Scriptures, [8] and communicated to them both the matter and the form of that which was to be written. [9] This agency of God, by means of which the Holy Scriptures were produced, we call *Inspiration*. [10] BR.: "Divine inspiration was that agency by which God supernaturally communicated to the intellect of those who wrote, not only the correct conception of all that was to be written, but also the conception of the words themselves and of everything by which they were to be expressed, and by which He also instigated their will to the act of writing." Hence it follows, that everything that is contained in the Holy Scriptures is altogether, and in every particular, true and free from all error. [11]

[1] CHMN. (Exam. Conc. Trid. I, 20): "We show . . . . why and wherefore the Holy Scriptures were written; because, viz., by tradition purity of doctrine was not preserved; but, under shelter of that term, many strange and false things were mingled with the true."

GRH. (II, 26): "'Why did God desire His Word, at first orally promulgated, to be committed to writing?' The principal causes appear to have been the following: 1. The shortness of human life. 2. The great number of men. 3. The unfaithfulness to be

expected from the guardianship of tradition. 4. The weakness of human memory. 5. The stability of heavenly truth, Luke 1: 4. 6. The wickedness of man. 7. In the New Testament, the perverseness of heretics, which was to be held in check."

[2] GRH. (II, 13): "The Scriptures have their designation from the formal, external act, viz., that of writing, by which the Word of God, at first orally promulgated, was, by the command of God, recorded. God himself made the grand and majestic beginning of this work when He inscribed His law on Mount Sinai, upon tablets of stone, which, on this account, are called 'the writing of God.' Ex. 32: 16. To distinguish them from all other writings, they are called *the Holy Scriptures*, an appellation derived from Rom. 1: 2 and 2 Tim. 3: 15. The reasons of this designation are drawn, 1. From their original efficient cause, their Great Author, who is God most holy, yea holiness itself, Is. 6: 3; Dan. 9: 24. 2. From their instrumental cause, viz., holy men, 2 Pet. 1: 21. 3. From their matter, for they contain holy and divine mysteries, precepts for holy living, Ps. 105: 42. 4. From their design and effects, for the Holy Spirit sanctifies men through the reading and study of the Scriptures, John 17: 17. 5. From the additional circumstance that they are widely different from all other writings, both ecclesiastical and profane, inasmuch as they are clothed with the sublime attribute of canonical authority, to which every believing and godly mind pays due deference."

Terms synonymous with Holy Scripture are (Id. II, 16): *γραφὴ* or *γραφαί*, John 7: 38 and 42; Acts 8: 12; Rom. 4: 3; *γραφαὶ ἁγίαι*, Rom. 1: 2; *ἱερὰ γράμματα*, 2 Tim. 3: 15; *γραφὴ θεόπνευστος*, v. 16. Titles of honor which are attributed to the Word of God in Scripture, are the following: דְּבַר יְהוָה *λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ*. Rom. 3: 2; *ζῶν ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ*, Heb. 4: 12; *ῥήματα τῆς ζωῆς αἰωνίου*, John 6: 68. The whole collection is termed סֵפֶר הַתּוֹרָה Josh. 1: 8; סֵפֶר יְהוָה Is. 34: 16; מִקְרָא Neh. 8: 8.

[3] GRH. (II, 427): "The Holy Scriptures are the Word of God reduced to writing, according to His will, by the prophets, evangelists, and apostles, perfectly and perspicuously setting forth the doctrine of the nature and will of God, that men may thereby be brought unto eternal life."

HOLL. (77): "In the definition of the Holy Scriptures, *the Word of God* signifies formally the purpose of God, or the conception of the divine mind, revealed for the salvation of men immediately to the prophets and apostles, and mediately, through their ministrations, to the whole race of man."

For the sake of the greatest possible accuracy, the following dis-

tinctions are made. GRH. (II, 14): "By the term Scripture, we are not to understand so much *the external form*, or sign, *i. e.*, the particular letters employed, the art of writing and the expressions by which the divine revelation is described, as *the matter itself or the thing signified*, just that which is marked and represented by the writing, viz., the Word of God itself, which instructs us concerning the nature and will of God. For, as in all writing, performed by an intelligent agent, so also in these prophetic and apostolic writings, two things are to be considered, viz., in the first place, the letters, syllables, and sentences which are written, and which are external symbols signifying and expressing conceptions of the mind; and, secondly, those conceptions themselves, which are the thing signified, expressed by these external symbols of letters, syllables, and sentences; wherefore in the term Scriptures *we embrace both of these*, and the latter especially." According as the term is taken in one or the other of these significations, the relation of the Church to the Scriptures is differently expressed. GRH. (II, 15): "Whence we add, by way of corollary, that certain things are predicated of Scripture, *with reference to its matter*, as that it is more ancient than the Church, that it is the very Word of God itself, formerly preached orally by the apostles and prophets; and others *in reference to its form*, as that it is, in point of time, later than the Church, that at the last day it will perish, while, on the other hand, as to its matter, it can never be destroyed or perish, John 10: 35."

[4] GRH. (II, 15): "That there is no real difference between the Word of God and the Holy Scriptures, viewed in reference to the matter contained in them, is proved, 1. By the subject-matter of Scripture. The prophets and apostles wrote that, and nothing else than that, which, taught by divine inspiration, they had before preached orally, 1 Cor. 15: 1; 2 Cor. 1: 13; Phil. 3: 1; 2 Thess. 2: 15; 1 John 1: 3. 2. By the identity of the spoken and written Word. Because the recorded predictions of the Old Testament are frequently quoted in the New, with these words: 'That it might be fulfilled which was *spoken* by the prophets,' Matt. 1: 22, 2: 15, 4: 14, etc. Therefore, what the prophets said or predicted, is the same as that which they wrote. 3. By the rule of logic: 'The accident does not alter the essence.' It is a mere circumstance in regard to the Word of God, whether it be proclaimed orally or committed to writing. It is one and the same Word of God, whether it be presented to us in the form of spoken or of written language; since neither the original efficient cause, nor the matter, nor the internal form, nor the object, is thereby changed, but only the

mode of presentation by the use of different organs. 4. By the demonstrative particle employed by the apostles. Paul speaks thus distinctively of the Mosaic writings and the other like books of the Old and New Testament: '*τοῦτ' ἐστι το ῥῆμα τῆς πίστεως*,' 'this is the word of faith,' Rom. 10: 8; Peter, in 1 Pet. 1: 25."

CAL. (I, 528): "The fanatical sects, especially, deny that the Scriptures are, strictly speaking, the Word of God, maintaining that the internal Word of God alone can properly be called the Word of God." (Schwenckfeld, Rathmann, Weigel.)*

[5] GRH. (II, 16): 1. "This distinction of the Papists between the written and unwritten Word may, in a certain sense, be admitted, viz., if by the term 'unwritten Word' be understood the divine revelation proclaimed orally by the patriarchs before the Mosaic books were written, but *after the publication of the Scripture Canon, there can be no unwritten Word of God, as distinct from Scripture.*"

2. "We must distinguish between the leading truths of divine revelation which are necessary, essential, etc., and their more full explanation. The prophets and apostles committed to writing the principal doctrines of revelation, which are necessary to be known by all, and which we do not deny that they explained orally at greater length."

[6] QUEN. (I, 56): "The internal form, or that which gives existence to the Scriptures, so that they are indeed the Word of God, that, namely, which constitutes them and distinguishes them from all other writings, is the inspired sense of Scripture, which, in general, is the conception of the divine intellect concerning divine mysteries and our salvation, formed from eternity, and revealed in time and communicated in writing to us; or it is divine inspiration itself, 2 Tim. 3: 16, by which, namely, it is constituted a divine, and is distinguished from a human word."

[7] QUEN. (I, 55): "The *efficient* or principal *cause* of Scripture is the triune God, 2 Tim. 3: 16 (the Father, Heb. 1: 1; the Son, John 1: 18, and the Holy Spirit, 2 Sam. 23: 2; 1 Pet. 1: 11; 2 Pet. 1: 21); 1. By an original decree. 2. By subsequent inspiration, or by ordering that holy men of God should write, and by inspiring what was to be written."

GRH. (II, 26): "The *instrumental causes* of Holy Scripture were holy men of God, 2 Pet. 1: 21, *i. e.*, men peculiarly and immediately elected and called by God for the purpose of committing to writing the divine revelations; such were the prophets of the Old Testament and the evangelists and apostles of the New Testa-

* Ample quotations from Schwenckfeld and Weigel in GRH. xiii: 69 sqq.; for Rathmann, see WALCH'S *Streitigkeiten innerhalb d. Luth. Kirche*, iv: 577 sqq.

ment; whom, therefore, we properly call *the amanuenses of God, the hand of Christ, and the scribes or notaries of the Holy Spirit*, since they neither spoke nor wrote by their own human will, but, borne along by the Holy Spirit (φερόμενοι ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος ἁγίου), were acted upon, led, driven, inspired, and governed by the Holy Spirit. They wrote not as men, but as men of God, *i. e.*, as servants of God and peculiar organs of the Holy Spirit. When, therefore, a canonical book is called a book of Moses, the psalms of David, an epistle of Paul, etc., this is merely a reference to the agent, not to the principal cause."

QUEN. (I, 55): "God, therefore, alone, if we wish to speak accurately, is to be called the author of the Sacred Scriptures; the prophets and apostles cannot be called the authors, except by a kind of catachresis." To the remark that prophets and apostles may be called the amanuenses of God, QUEN. (I: 52) adds: "And not as though these divine amanuenses wrote ignorantly and unwillingly, beyond the reach of and contrary to their own will; for they wrote cheerfully, willingly and intelligently. They are said to be φερομένοι, driven, moved, urged on by the Holy Spirit, not as though they were in a state of unconsciousness, as the Enthusiasts pretended to be, and as the heathen feigned that there was a certain ἐνθουσιασμὸς in their soothsayers; nor, further, by any means, as though the prophets themselves did not understand their own prophecies or the things which they wrote, which was formerly . . . . the error of the Montanists; but, because they wrote nothing of their own accord, but everything at the dictation of the Holy Spirit." Inasmuch as it holds good of all the sacred writers, that they are inspired, those are also accounted such who were not, in the strictest sense, apostles. HOLL. (80): "By the name apostles we here designate those holy men of God, who, after the birth of Christ, wrote the Scriptures of the New Testament; *although they did not all belong to the college of the apostles*, chosen by Christ, before His ascension, to teach all nations; but who, after Christ's ascension, were numbered with the apostles; such were Matthias (whose writings, however, we do not possess) and Paul. But also those apostolic men, nearest to the apostles in office and dignity, are called apostles in a wider sense; such are Mark and Luke, the evangelists, cf. Rom. 16: 7."

[8] HOLL. (83): "Inspiration denotes as well the antecedent divine instigation or *peculiar impulse of the will to engage in writing*, as the immediate illumination by which the mind of the sacred writer is fully enlightened through the supernatural illumination of divine grace, and *the conceptions of the things to be written are*

themselves suggested immediately by the Holy Spirit." The co-operation which here takes place on the part of God is described by QUEN. (I, 65) as "*a most special and extraordinary concurrence*, peculiar to the sacred writers," and to be carefully distinguished from "*the general and common concurrence of God*, by virtue of which He is present to all believers sincerely meditating upon, and writing about, sacred things." HOLL. (83) distinguishes between inspiration and the divine governance. "For the latter merely guards against anything being written that is not true, becoming, congruous; whereas the former, through the Holy Spirit dictating, suggests the conception of the things to be written. The divine governance would warrant the infallibility of the Holy Scriptures, but not their inspiration." If the impulse to engage in writing be embraced under the term inspiration, then it follows that all the Holy Scriptures were written by the command of God, because all are inspired. QUEN. (I, 65): "All the canonical books, of both the Old and New Testaments, were written by God, who peculiarly incited and impelled the sacred writers to engage in the work, and, therefore, the Scriptures of the New Testament were recorded according to the command and will of God by the evangelists and apostles."

The opposite view is that held by the Papists, who foolishly assert that the evangelists and apostles did not write by any divine command, but were incidentally urged by some accidental circumstance originating elsewhere, or by necessity. It is, indeed, granted that we do not possess the proof of an express and outward command of God in the case of each of the sacred writings, but it is at the same time observed that the want of this is not felt where the *impulse* exists. GRH. (II, 30): "In the holy men of God, the external command and the internal impulse correspond to each other. For what else is that divine impulse than an internal and secret command of precisely the same authority and weight with one that is external and manifest?" The latter is proved (by HOLL. (81), but also in the same manner by all the earlier writers) to have existed in the case of all the books of Scripture: "1. By the general command of Christ, Matt. 28 : 19. (GRH. (II, 31): Those who were commanded to teach all nations, were also commanded to reduce their teachings to writing; for they could not teach all nations, even of the succeeding age, orally and without writing.) 2. By the impulse of the Holy Spirit, which Peter teaches, 2 Pet. 1 : 21. 3. By the divine inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, which Paul inculcates, 2 Tim. 3 : 16. 4. By the apostolic office, in which these holy men became the ambassadors of God, 2 Cor. 5 : 20. Ambas-

sadors are restricted by the commands of their sovereign. Peter, as an ambassador of God, did not undertake to preach to the Gentiles without a divine command; therefore still less would he dare to write an epistle unless commanded by God." That, however, the external instigations alluded to in the antithesis of the Papists are not excluded, GRH. (II, 33) had already stated: "The inducements to engage in writing brought to bear upon the apostles from without, do not annul the internal command, but rather confirm it, *since those circumstances were made to influence the apostles by the wonderful arrangement of divine Providence*, and to them was subsequently added the interior impulse of the Holy Spirit, urged on by which they applied their hand to the work."

[9] Hereby an inspiration both of subject-matter and of the words is asserted, from which it follows that there is absolutely nothing in the Holy Scriptures that is not inspired. These assertions are contained in the following two sentences (of HOLL., 83 and 85):

"I. The conceptions of all that is contained in the Holy Scriptures were immediately communicated by the Holy Spirit to the prophets and apostles.

"II. All the words, without exception, contained in the Holy Manuscript, were dictated by the Holy Spirit to the pen of the prophets and apostles."

These two sentences we illustrate by the following remarks of QUEN. and HOLL. In reference to No. I: 1. "In inspiration, we recognize a divine assistance and direction, which includes the inspiration and dictation of the Holy Spirit; but we deny as insufficient such a bare divine assistance and direction as would simply prevent the sacred writers from departing from the truth in speaking and writing. . . . The Holy Spirit guides others also in writing, *i. e.*, so that we observe here a difference in this respect, that the Holy Spirit so directed the inspired men, that He at the same time suggested and communicated all things to them in so far as they are recorded in Scripture."—QUEN., I, 68.

2. Inspiration embraces all that is contained in Scripture, and therefore also those things which could have been otherwise known to the apostles and prophets, because in this case it was necessary that these things should be said just at the particular time when the design which God had in view required it. HOLL. (84): "The things which were known to the sacred writers may be considered either absolutely and in themselves, or relatively, in so far as they were to be written by the purpose of God. In the former manner they were previously known by the sacred writers, but not in the latter. For, although the sacred amanuenses may have known

certain things, which are described by them before the act of writing, yet it was not, in the nature of the case, known to them *whether God desired these things to be described, or under what circumstances, in what order, and with what words they should be committed to writing.*"

3. In like manner inspiration embraces things that are not of a spiritual nature. HOLL. (83): "There are contained in Scripture historical, chronological, genealogical, astronomical, natural-historical, and political matters, which, although the knowledge of them is not actually necessary to salvation, are nevertheless divinely revealed, because an acquaintance with them assists not a little in the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, and in illustrating the doctrines and moral precepts. If only the mysteries of the faith, which are contained in the Holy Scriptures, depend upon divine inspiration, and all the rest, which may be known by the light of nature, depend merely upon the divine direction, then not all of Scripture is inspired. But Paul declares that the whole of Scripture is divinely inspired. Therefore not only the mysteries of the faith, but also the remaining truths that may be known by the light of nature, which are contained in Scripture, are divinely suggested and inspired;" therefore,

4. Even apparently unimportant matters are, none the less, to be regarded as also inspired. QUEN. (I, 71): "A matter may be of small moment, considered in itself and with reference to the estimation in which it is held by men, and yet of great importance if we regard the end and wise design which God has in view with regard to it. Many things in Scripture seem to be of small account (2 Tim. 4 : 13), in regard to which some suppose that our theory of inspiration derogates from the dignity of the Holy Spirit; but they are, nevertheless, of great moment, if we regard the end had in view (Rom. 15 : 4) and the all-wise design of God, in accordance with which these things were introduced into the Scriptures." CALIXTUS (in QUEN., I, 69) is a prominent advocate of the opposite view, viz.: "Neither is it taught in Scripture, that it is necessary to ascribe all the particulars that are contained in it to a peculiar divine revelation, but that the principal topics, those which the Scripture is mainly and peculiarly designed to teach, viz., those which relate to the redemption and salvation of the human race, are to be ascribed solely to that particular divine revelation; while in writing concerning other things, known in some other way, either by experience or the light of nature, the writers were so directed by the divine assistance and by the Holy Spirit, that they wrote nothing but what was actual, true, becoming, and congruous." The proof of plenary inspiration is drawn 1. From

2 Tim. 3 : 16. (Quen. (I, 71): "The word πᾶσα may be taken distributively, of the single books or parts of Scripture, or collectively for those parts taken as a whole, so that πᾶσα is the same as ὅλη; in either case our opinion remains true, viz., that all Scripture is inspired.") Whence the following argument of Cal. (I, 555): "If all Scripture be inspired, then there can be nothing in the Holy Scriptures that was not divinely suggested and by inspiration communicated to those who wrote. For, if even a single particle of Scripture were derived from human knowledge and memory, or from human revelation, then it could not be asserted that all Scripture is divinely inspired." 2. From 2 Pet. 1 : 21 (although Peter does not allude particularly to writing, but speaking, . . . yet by λαλίαν both speaking and writing are here implied, and both are comprehended under this term, cf. Acts 2 : 31; 3 : 24; Rom. 3 : 19; for just as the holy men of God were incited and impelled by the Holy Spirit to speak, so were they also incited and impelled by Him to write). 3. By the promise of Christ, John 14 : 26. 4. From 1 Cor. 2 : 10. We add, from Cal. (I, 556), the following additional proofs: "From the originating cause of Scripture, if indeed the sacred writers were merely the pen, the hand, or the amanuenses of the Holy Spirit; from the nature of the direction of the Holy Spirit, which is usually described as such that the Scriptures were written by His direction, wherefore Gregory the Great declared that the whole of the Holy Scriptures were nothing more nor less than a letter from God the Creator to man His creature; from the equal authority of all that is contained in Scripture. For not merely those things which directly refer to the subjects of faith and salvation are the Word of God, but everything that is found in Scripture, Rom. 3 : 2, and, for the same reason that they are called by this name, they well deserve to be regarded as the immediate Word of God."

In relation to No. II., Holl. (87): "The divine inspiration of the words known by common usage, was necessary to the proper expression of the mind of the Holy Spirit. For the prophets and apostles were not at liberty to clothe the divine meaning in such words as they might of their own accord select; but it was their duty to adhere to, and depend upon, the oral dictation of the Holy Spirit, so that they might commit the Holy Scriptures to writing, in the order and connection so graciously and excellently given, and in which they would appear in perfect accordance with the mind of the Holy Spirit." Quen. (I, 76) thus accounts for the variety of style: "There is a great diversity among the sacred writers in regard to style and mode of speaking, which appears to

arise from the fact that the Holy Spirit accommodated Himself to the ordinary mode of speaking, leaving to each one his own manner; yet we do not thereby deny that the Holy Spirit suggested the particular words to these individuals."

CAL., however (I, 574), remarks: "The Holy Spirit, Supreme Author of the Holy Scriptures, was not bound to the style of any one, but, as a perfectly free teacher of languages, could use, through any person soever, the character, style, and mode of speech that He chose, and could just as easily propose the divine oracles through Jeremiah in a highly ornate style, as through Isaiah in one of great simplicity. But He regarded not so much the ability of the writers to speak as the character of the subjects concerning which He wished them to speak; and, throughout the whole, He used His own authority (*αὐτεξουσία*) under the guidance of His unlimited wisdom. So that we need not wonder that the same Spirit employed diversities of style . . . . The cause of this diversity of style is the fact that the Holy Spirit gave to each one to speak as He pleased." Yet CAL. adds also: "Although the style of Scripture is plain and very well suited, not only to the genius of the readers and hearers, but also to the old and customary style of speech of the sacred writers, yet there may be recognized in it a condencension, *συγκατάβασις*, of the Holy Spirit; because He accommodated Himself sometimes to the ordinary method of speaking, leaving to the writers their own style of speech; but it must not be denied that the Holy Spirit breathed into them the words." The inspiration of the Hebrew vowel-points was included in this theory; conf. GRH.'s argument *ex absurdo* (II, 272): "It would follow that the Scriptures were not communicated by God through the prophets, so far as the single words are concerned, since without the vowel-points the words cannot possibly exist; therefore not all Scripture is inspired." From the theory of verbal inspiration there arose also the assertion: "The style of the New Testament is free from every trace of barbarism and from solecisms." (QUEN., I, 82.) The proof of verbal inspiration was drawn, 1. From 2 Tim. 3: 16. (All Scripture is wholly inspired; not only its meaning, or the thing signified, but also the words, as signs of things, were divinely inspired. Therefore, etc., etc. (HOLL., 85.)) 2. From 1 Cor. 2: 13; Ex. 34: 27, 28; Matt. 5: 18.

[10] *Inspiration* is, therefore, a divine agency employed in connection with the recording of the truth, and, in several respects, it differs from *Revelation.*

If we consider the latter as embracing the whole compass of Christian faith, it owes its very existence to inspiration. CAL. (I,

280): "Divine inspiration may be regarded either as the *source and efficient cause* of revelation, in which sense it is an act of God as inspiring, or as the *form* which revelation assumes, or the revealed Word." But if revelation be taken in its etymological sense, as the communication of that which was before unknown, then it differs from inspiration in the following respects: 1. The latter may contain also that which was before known, merely specifying the particular time and manner in which it is to be consummated, and, 2. The subject-matter of revelation may be communicated to man in various ways, but that of inspiration only by an immediate divine suggestion. QUEN. (I, 68): "*Revelation*, formally and etymologically viewed, is the manifestation of things unknown and hidden, and can be made in many and various ways, viz., by outward speech, or by dreams and visions. *Inspiration* is that act of the Holy Spirit by which an actual knowledge of things is supernaturally conveyed to an intelligent creature, or it is an internal suggestion or infusion of conceptions, whether the things conceived were previously known to the writer or not. The former could precede the commitment to writing; the latter was always associated with it and influenced the writing itself." Add to this the remarks: "With all this I do not deny that divine inspiration itself may be called revelation, in a certain sense; in so far, namely, as it is a manifestation of certain circumstances, as also of the order and manner in which certain things are to be written. (We must distinguish between divine revelation when by it the subject-matter itself is made known, and when it refers to the peculiar circumstances and time and manner and order in which the subject-matter is to be reduced to writing." (I, 72)) "And *when, also*, revelation concurs and coincides with divine inspiration, when, viz., the divine mysteries are revealed by inspiration and inspired by revelation, in the very act of writing. Thus CALOVIUS very properly remarks: 'That all the particulars contained in the Holy Scriptures are not, indeed, to be regarded as having been received by a peculiar and new revelation, but by the special dictation, inspiration, and suggestion of the Holy Spirit.'"

[11] HOLL. (88): "Divine inspiration, by which the subject-matter and the words to be spoken, as well as those to be written, were immediately suggested to the prophets and apostles by the Holy Spirit, preserved them free from all error, as well in the preaching as in the writing of the divine Word."

CAL. (I, 551): "No error, even in unimportant matters, no defect of memory, not to say untruth, can have any place in all the Holy Scriptures."

QUEN. (I, 80): "We are to distinguish between the *conversation*

of the apostles and their *preaching* and *writing;* or between infirmities in conduct and errors in doctrine. In doctrine the apostles never could err, after receiving the gift of the Holy Spirit, . . . but in their conduct and outward conversation they were not sinless, but, in consequence of innate original corruption, were still subject to infirmities and failings."

The more accurate development of the doctrine of inspiration begins with GRH. HUT. (*Loci Theologici* (30)) still thus briefly expresses himself in regard to it: "Although God did not directly write the Scriptures, but used prophets and apostles as His pen and instrument, yet the Scripture is not, on that account, of any the less authority. For it is God, and indeed God alone, who inspired the prophets and apostles, not only as they spoke, but also as they wrote; and He made use of their lips, their tongues, their hands, their pen. Therefore, or in this respect, the Scriptures, as they are, were written by God Himself. For the prophets and apostles were merely instruments." This contains, however, essentially everything that we have adduced above from the later theologians. It was mainly the controversy with the Roman Catholics that gave occasion for detailed specifications; for these very well knew that they would rob the Protestant Church of all its weapons, without thereby injuring themselves, if they could cast suspicion upon the true inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. Such discriminations were also called forth in part by the fanatics, who treated the written Word of God with little respect; partly by the Socinians and Arminians, who adhered to a merely partial inspiration of the Scriptures. In opposition to these, it became of great importance to the Lutheran theologians to defend with all earnestness the doctrine of the inspiration, not only of the matter, but of the very words.

§ 7. *The Attributes of the Holy Scriptures.*

If the Holy Scriptures are really the Word of God, then it follows that we are bound to yield to them implicit faith and obedience. As they are the only source of truth, they must contain this entirely and so clearly that we can really learn it from them. And they are, finally, as the Word of God, the only means by which we can attain unto faith, and, therefore, must also be able to awaken this faith in us. We ascribe to them, therefore, the attributes of *authority, perfection or sufficiency, perspicuity and efficacy.* [1]

§ 8. (1.) *Authority.*

Br.: "The authority of the Holy Scriptures is the manifest dignity that inclines the human understanding to assent to their instructions, and the will to yield obedience to their commands." We believe what the Holy Scriptures declare, simply because *they* declare it, and it is they that beget faith in us, and they are the only source from which we derive our faith. They are, at the same time, the only inspired book, and by this they are distinguisbed from all other writings. It is therefore only from them that we can learn what is true in divine things; and they furnish the means by which we can everywhere distinguish between truth and error. The authority of Holy Scripture is, accordingly, divided into: "(*a*) *Causative authority*, by which the Scriptures create and confirm in the mind of man assent to the truths to be believed. (*b*) *Normative or canonical authority*, by which authentic Scripture is distinguished from other writings and versions, and that which is true from that which is false." [2] Holl. (104.)

(*a*) *Causative Authority.* This rests upon the fact, that we acknowledge God as the author of the Holy Scriptures, [3] and this we prove by the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. [4] The proofs of inspiration are, it is true, derived in the first instance only from the Holy Scriptures themselves, and already presuppose faith in the Holy Scriptures themselves, on the part of those who admit them as evidence. But, for the Church and her members, there is no need of proof for the inspiration of Scripture, for her very existence depends upon this faith, and this faith precedes all proofs; [5] without this no article of faith could be based upon the Holy Scriptures. [6] Therefore, the proof that the Holy Scriptures are inspired, or, what amounts to the same thing, that they are of divine origin, and consequently possess full authority in matters of faith, is required only for those who are yet without the Church, or who, if within her pale, are not confirmed in the faith. But it lies in the nature of the case, that no proof can be given to those, which they cannot, in an unbelieving frame of mind, evade; for the only absolutely stringent proof lies in the fact, that the Holy Spirit bears witness in the heart of each individual, and thus convinces him of the divinity of

the Word of God, by the mighty influence which it exerts upon him; [7] but that this may be the case, it is necessary that the individual do not resist the drawings of the Holy Spirit, and before this takes place the testimony of the Holy Spirit can have no probative power for him. [8] To this experience, therefore, the individual is referred, and through it alone will he attain to absolute certainty in regard to the divinity of the Holy Scriptures. All other so-called proofs are rather to be considered as such evidences for the divinity of the Holy Scriptures as can make this probable to the individual, and invite him to give himself up to the influence of the Holy Spirit, in order to acquire for himself the same experience which the Church has gained. [9] Such evidences are of two kinds. The Holy Scriptures themselves testify in regard to this divinity, by their internal excellence and dignity (κριτήρια *interna*, internal proofs); and the effects which the Holy Scriptures have produced upon others, testify also to the same (κριτήρια *externa*, external proofs). [10] These evidences the Church holds out to each individual, and seeks by their means to induce him to yield his heart to the influence of the Holy Spirit, who will produce in him the full conviction of the divinity of the Holy Scriptures. [11]

(*b*) *Normative or Canonical Authority.* Holl. (125): "The canonical authority of Scripture is its supreme dignity, by which, in virtue of its meaning, as well as of its divinely inspired style, it is the infallible and sufficient rule, by which all that is to be believed and done by man in order to secure eternal salvation, must be examined, all controversies in regard to matters of faith decided, and all other writings adjudged." [12] Accordingly, we must acknowledge the Holy Scriptures as the only rule and guide of our life, by which alone all controversies in regard to divine things must be settled, [13] so that in no case is the addition of any other authority required, by which they may be decided. [14] But if the Holy Scriptures are thus the only judge of controversies, the question arises: How is this decision to be obtained from them? It lies in the nature of the case, that not every one can accomplish this with equal success, for certain previous conditions are required for this purpose, without which the

Holy Scriptures cannot be understood and expounded; and besides, necessary ecclesiastical order demands that, at least for the public investigation and announcement of the decisions contained in the Holy Scriptures, there should be a regular calling. Hence, it pre-eminently belongs to the Church publicly to make known, by means of her representatives (the clergy), the decision discovered in the Holy Scriptures, in reference to a contested point, [15] whence, however, it does not yet follow, that every private individual within the pale of the Church does not possess the right of private judgment. [16] If then, in any given case, the adjustment of a controversy be not attained, the fault lies not in the Holy Scriptures, but in the fact that the Holy Scriptures were not properly interpreted, or the proper interpretation was not adopted. [17] But, in every case, when such a controversy is to be decided, resort must be had to the original text of the Holy Scriptures; for, although a good translation may enable us to secure the testimony of the Holy Spirit, it is never so accurate, that we dare employ it in doubtful cases, in which often everything depends upon the most accurate investigation of the single words of the original text. [18]

[1] The *attributes* are variously enumerated by the early divines. CAL. and QUEN. add to those we have mentioned, *infallible truth, the power of interpreting itself, normative and judicial authority*, which are again by others incorporated in those we have mentioned.

Some theologians also add the following as *secondary attributes:* (1) "*Necessity;* or, that it was necessary for the Word of God to be committed to writing, in order to preserve the purity of the heavenly doctrine. (2) *Integrity and perpetuity;* or, that the Holy Scriptures have been preserved entire, and will be thus perpetually preserved. (3) *Purity and uncorrupted state of its sources;* or, that the Hebrew text in the Old Testament, and the Greek in the New, have not suffered, in all copies, any corruption, either through malice or carelessness, but have been preserved by Divine Providence, free from all corruption. (4) *Authentic dignity;* or, that the Hebrew text alone of the Old Testament, and the Greek of the New, is to be regarded as authentic, nor is any version to be counted worthy of such supreme authority. (5) The liberty of all to read for themselves."—CAL., I, 450.

[2] BR. (82): "The authority of Scripture, so far as it regards

the assent that is to be yielded to its declarations, may be viewed in a two-fold light: *first, in a strict sense, in order to cause assent to the things that are to be believed,* which right the Scriptures hold because they are the *source of knowledge* and the formal object of faith and revealed theology; *secondly, in order to distinguish by the inspired Scriptures themselves, both the true Scriptures and those other teachings,* which relate to matters of faith and practice; and this right they hold, inasmuch as *they are canonical,* or the rule and guide whereby to distinguish truth from falsehood. . . . For, although the authority of Scripture is one and the same, based upon the veracity of God and the dependence of the Scriptures upon God, through which it is appointed, both in a formal sense to produce faith and in a normal sense to examine and decide between certain Scriptures and other teachings; and as, further, the Scriptures are to be employed somewhat differently for the formal purpose of causing assent to the faith, and for the normal purpose of distinguishing truth from falsehood; thus, also, we must by all means treat distinctly of both these methods in discussing the authority of Scripture." Holl. (105): "In the former method, they (the Holy Scriptures) are employed in every language for producing faith in the mind of an unbelieving man, and for confirming it in the mind of a believer; in which respect this authority is called causative or promotive of faith; in the latter method, they are employed only in the original text, to distinguish from the actually inspired Scripture the versions of the Hebrew and Greek originals, the Symbolical Books, and all writings that treat of matters of faith and practice."

[3] Br. (80): "The authority of Scripture, viewed in itself and absolutely, or with reference to its contents, depends upon God, the sole Author of Scripture, and results from His veracity and great and infinite power." Grh. (II, 36): "Inasmuch, then, as the Holy Scriptures have God for their author, by whose immediate inspiration the prophets, evangelists, and apostles wrote, therefore they also possess divine authority; because they are inspired, they are in like manner self-commendatory, winning faith by virtue of their own inherent excellence."

[4] Br. (81): "So far as we are concerned, or that we may be convinced that the Holy Scriptures are worthy to receive faith and obedience, not only these perfections of God must be known, but also the dependence of Scripture upon God, or its inspiration by Him." Our conviction, however, rests upon the two theses: "(1) Whatsoever Scripture is recorded by divine inspiration, that is certainly and infallibly true. (2) The Holy Scriptures were recorded by divine inspiration."

[5] GRH. (I, 9): "Those who are within the Church do not inquire about the authority of Scripture, for this is their starting-point. How can they be true disciples of Christ if they pretend to call in question the doctrine of Christ? How can they be true members of the Church if they are in doubt concerning the foundation of the Church? How can they wish to prove that to themselves which they always employ to prove other things? How can they doubt concerning that whose efficacy they have experienced in their own hearts? The Holy Spirit testifies in their hearts that the Spirit is truth, *i. e.*, that the doctrine derived from the Holy Spirit is absolute truth."

[6] GRH. therefore very properly observes, that the doctrine of the authority of Scripture is no article of faith, but rather the fountain-head of the articles of faith. (I, 11): "The doctrine concerning the Canon is, properly speaking, not an article of faith, since Moses, the prophets, evangelists, and apostles did not fabricate in their writings a new article of faith superadded to the former, which they taught orally."

[7] GRH. (II, 37): "The first (testimony) is the internal witness of the Holy Spirit, who, as He bears witness to the spirit of believers that they are the sons of God, Rom. 8 : 16, so, also, efficaciously convinces them, that in the Scriptures the voice of their Heavenly Father is contained; and God is the only fit and authentic witness. To this testimony belongs the lively sense of the godly in daily prayer and in the exercises of penitence and faith, the grace of consoling and strengthening the mind against all kinds of adversities, temptations, persecutions, etc., etc., which the godly daily experience in reading and meditating upon Scripture."

QUEN. (I, 97): "The ultimate reason by and through which we are led to believe with a divine and unshaken faith that God's Word is God's Word, is the intrinsic power and efficacy of that Word itself, and the testimony and seal of the Holy Spirit, speaking in and through Scripture. Because the bestowment of faith, not only that by which we believe in the articles, but even that by which we believe in the Scriptures, that exhibit and propose the articles, is a work that emanates from the Holy Spirit, or the Supreme Cause."

HOLL. (116): "By the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, is here understood the supernatural act of the Holy Spirit through the Word of God, attentively read or heard (His own divine power being communicated to the Holy Scriptures), moving, opening, illuminating the heart of man, and inciting it to obedience unto

the faith; so that man, thus illuminated by internal, spiritual influences, clearly perceives that the word proposed to him has indeed proceeded from God, and thus gives it unyielding assent." The Scripture proof for the testimony of the Holy Spirit is deduced from 1 John 5: 6; 1 Thess. 1: 5, 6; 2: 13. To the common objection, that Theology here reasons in a circle, the following answer is returned, Holl. (119): "If I inquire, says the objector, How do you know that the Scriptures are divine? the Lutherans answer: 'Because the Holy Spirit in each one testifies and confirms this by the Scripture.' If I ask again: 'How do you prove that this Holy Spirit is divine?' the same persons will reply: 'Because the Scriptures testify that He is divine, and His testimony infallible.' To all of which we reply: We must distinguish between a sophistical circle and a demonstrative retrogression. In reasoning in a circle, one unknown thing is employed to prove another equally unknown; but in a demonstrative retrogression, we proceed from confused knowledge to that which is distinct. For the divine dignity of Scripture is proved by the supernatural effect of the Holy Spirit operating efficaciously through the Scriptures, illuminating, converting, regenerating, renewing. But, if you ask whether that spirit is divine or malignant, then we reason from the effect, which is divine and salutary, that the Spirit, who bears witness within concerning the divine origin of the Holy Scriptures, is divine, most holy, and excellent." Quen. (I, 101) further adds: "The Papists, therefore, wrongly accuse us of reasoning in a circle, when we prove the Holy Scriptures from the testimony of the Holy Spirit, and the testimony of the Holy Spirit from the Holy Scriptures. Else would it be also reasoning in a circle when Moses and the prophets testify concerning Christ, and Christ concerning Moses and the prophets; or, when John the Baptist testifies that Christ is the Messiah, and again Christ that John the Baptist is a prophet."

[8] Therefore Grh. (II, 36) distinguishes, among those who stand without the pale of the Church, two classes: "Some are *curable*, who come with minds tempered and desirous of learning; others are *incurable*, who come with minds unyielding and obstinate, and who contumaciously resist the truth, Acts 13: 46; 19: 28. The incurable, just as those who are past bodily recovery, are to be forsaken to their fate, Titus 3 : 10. The same applies to those who are within the pale of the Church, if, in the midst of temptation, they begin to doubt the authority of the Scripture."

[9] Quen. (I, 98): "Those arguments both of an internal and external nature, by which we are led to the belief of the authority

of Scripture make the inspiration of Scripture probable, and produce a certainty not merely conjectural but moral, so that to call it in question were the work of a fool; but they do not make the divinity of Scripture infallible, and place it beyond all doubt, nor do they produce within the mind an immovable conviction, *i. e.*, *they beget not a divine, but merely a human faith*, not an unshaken certainty, but a credibility, or a very probable opinion."

[10] GRH. (II, 37): "I. The *internal criteria* inherent in the Scriptures themselves, some of which are found in the causes, others in the effects, some in the subject-matter, others in incidental circumstances. Such criteria are antiquity, the majesty of the subjects discussed, peculiarity of style, harmony of all parts, dignity of the predictions concerning future events, the reality of their fulfilment, divinity of the miracles by which their doctrine is confirmed, the violence of the diabolical opposition to it, the efficacy of Scripture itself in persuading and moving to action. II. The *external testimonies* (which can be drawn from all classes of men), among which is pre-eminent the testimony of the Church, to which we may add that of the martyrs, who sealed the doctrine taught in Scripture with their blood, and also, the punishment of blasphemers and persecutors, who contumaciously opposed this doctrine."

The later divines present these proofs in substantially the same manner as HOLL. (106): "The *external criteria* (which are derived, not from Scripture, but from other sources) are (*a*) the antiquity of Scripture; (*b*) the singular clearness of the sacred writers, their desire after knowledge and truth; (*c*) the splendor of the miracles by which the heavenly doctrine is confirmed; (*d*) the harmonious testimony of the Church, spread over the whole earth, to the divinity of the Holy Scriptures; (*e*) the constancy of the martyrs; (*f*) the testimony of other nations to the doctrine contained in the Holy Scriptures; (*g*) the successful and rapid propagation of the Christian doctrine through the whole world, and its wonderful preservation during so many persecutions; (*h*) the extremely severe punishments inflicted upon the despisers and persecutors of the Divine Word." In reference to these, HOLL. remarks (109): "We premise these external criteria, in order to prepare the minds of the unbelieving for reading and meditating upon the Holy Scriptures with interest and desire . . . it is necessary that first of all unbelievers be led by external criteria to regard it as not improbable that the Holy Scriptures had their origin in God, and therefore begin to respect, read, and meditate upon them."

The *internal criteria* ("drawn from the intrinsic nature and attributes of Scripture," BR.) are: "(*a*) the majesty of God, testifying

concerning Himself in the Holy Scriptures; (*b*) the simplicity and dignity of the biblical style; (*c*) the sublimity of the divine mysteries which the Scriptures reveal; (*d*) the truth of all biblical assertions; (*e*) the sanctity of the precepts contained in the Holy Scriptures; (*f*) the sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures to salvation." In regard to these, HOLL. further adds: "These internal criteria, taken together and conjointly, constitute a stronger argument than if taken successively or singly."

[11] GRH. (I, 9): "Although the testimony of the Holy Spirit is of the very highest importance, yet we are not to make a beginning with it in the conversion of such men, *i. e.*, they are not to be commanded to wait until the Holy Spirit bears witness immediately in their hearts concerning the authority of Scripture, but they are to be directed to the testimony of the Church, which, in this respect, performs the part of a preceptor to the unbelieving disciple. Just as, therefore, it is necessary for a pupil first to believe, until he afterwards becomes able to form an independent judgment concerning the things taught, so it is necessary for an unbeliever to yield assent to the testimony of the Church, which is the first step towards ascertaining the authority of Scripture; then the internal criteria of antiquity, prophecies, etc., are to be added. Yet the testimony of the Church alone is not sufficient to convince an unbeliever of the divine authority of the Scriptures, since he may, perhaps, still be in doubt whether this be really the true Church of God. Wherefore, as it is the duty of the preceptor, not only to propose precepts, but also to corroborate their truth; so it is not sufficient for the Church to declare that these are divine Scriptures, unless it accompany its declaration with reasons. Then at length it may follow that the Holy Spirit shall bear testimony in the heart of the inquirer, and prove the truth of His words."

The testimony of the Church varies in weight, according as it is derived from the earlier or from the later Church. GRH. (I, 10): "The *primitive* Church, that heard the apostles themselves, excelled in being the original recipients of the sacred books, and in being favored with the living instruction of the apostles and with a number of miracles to prove the authority of the canon; the *next age*, in which the autographs of the apostles were still preserved, excelled the former in the more complete fulfilment of New Testament prophecies, in the abundance of versions of both Testaments into various languages, and in the testimony concerning the Holy Scriptures extracted from various writings of believers; and it excelled the age succeeding it, by possessing the autographs of the evangelists and apostles, the voice of the ancient Church, and a number

of miracles. The latest age of the Church excels both the others (although the autographs of the apostles are no more), at least in the more perfect fulfilment of prophecy."

Occasion is here taken to protest against the Romish axiom, "All the authority of Scripture depends upon the Church," and to guard against such an interpretation being put upon what has been above stated. Holl. (120): "The authority of the Holy Scriptures neither depends upon the Church for the divine, pre-eminent dignity in which its power lies; nor, in order that it may be known, does it need the testimony of the Church either, as the grand and ultimate source of proof for the divine authority of Scripture, or as the only and absolutely necessary argument." Grh. (II, 38) remarks (1): "It is one thing for the Church to bear witness to the Scriptures and their authority ministerially, and another to confer upon Scripture its authority dictatorially and judicially. From the ministry and testimony of the Church, we are led to acknowledge the authority of Scripture, but from this it by no means follows that the authority of Scripture, either in itself, or in respect to us, depends alone upon the authority of the Church; because, when we have once learned that the Scriptures are divine and contain the Word of God, we no longer believe the Scriptures on account of the Church, but on account of themselves; because, viz., they are the voice of God, which is *αὐτάλήθεια*, and hence, *αὐτόπιστος*, which we know must be believed on its own account and immediately. (2) It is one thing for us to become acquainted with the authority of the Scriptures by the testimony of the Church, and another, for the whole authority of the Scripture, so far as we are concerned, to depend solely upon the testimony of the Church. The former we concede, the latter we deny; because, beside the testimony of the Church, we have two other classes of evidence for the authority of Scripture, and in the same class, that embraces the testimony of the Church, other external evidences derived from all kinds of men may be adduced; yet, at the same time, we do not deny, that the testimony of the Church is to be preferred to all others in this class. (3) It is one thing to speak of the testimony of the primitive Church, which received the autograph of the sacred books from the apostles, and handed down a credible testimony concerning them to posterity, and another, to speak of the authority of the present Church."

Quen. (I, 93) notices, in addition, the objection of the Papists, "The Church is more ancient than the Scriptures; therefore, it has greater authority;" to which he replies: "We must make a distinction between the Word of God contained in the Scriptures, and the act of writing itself, or, between the substance of Scripture,

which is the Word of God, and its accident, which is the writing of it. The Church is prior to the Scriptures, if you regard the mere act of writing; but it is not prior to the Word of God itself, by means of which the Church itself was collected. Surely the Scriptures, or the Word of God, is the foundation of the Church, Eph. 2: 20; but the foundation is older than the building.''

[12] Holl. (125): ''The Holy Scriptures exercise their highest canonical authority, when a controversy arises concerning the truth of a doctrine, and the truth is to be confirmed and falsehood to be confuted; but the Scriptures exert their faith-producing authority, as often as the unbelieving are to be converted to the Christian faith, or the weak faith of believers is to be strengthened.''

[13] Grh. (I, 28): ''The Holy Scriptures are the rule of our faith and life; therefore, also, the judge of theological controversies.'' (I, 30): ''Add to this, that all the qualities of a rule, properly so called, belong to Scripture. For a rule should be certain, fixed, invariable, fundamental, suited to meet every case, always self-consistent. But these qualities belong neither to tradition, nor to the teachings of human reason, nor to the writings of the fathers, nor to the Pope, nor to the decrees of councils, but to the Holy Scriptures alone.'' Form. Conc. (Preface, 1): ''We teach, that the only rule according to which all doctrines and all teachers are to be estimated and judged, is none other than the prophetic and apostolic writings of the Old and New Testaments.' (Compare also the remarks of Quen. (I, 150): ''When we say that the Holy Scriptures are the only rule of faith and of life conformed to the will of God, we do not speak of every age of the Church, for there was a time when the Church was instituted and governed without the written Word of God, the time, viz., before Moses; but we refer to that age in which the first written canon was prepared, and especially to the New Testament times, in which all things necessary to faith and the worship of God have been written down, and with great care collected into the canon.'')

Holl. (125): ''As a *rule of knowledge*, it performs a two-fold function, *directive and corrective.* For it directs the thoughts of the human mind, so that they abide within the bounds of truth; and it corrects errors, inasmuch as it is properly its own rule of right and wrong. Wherefore, the Holy Scriptures are called the Canon, or rule, partly on account of their directive character, because the true faith and pure morals are learned from them; partly on account of their corrective character, since controversies in regard to the faith are decided by them, and whatever is right and godly is retained, and what is erroneous and ungodly is rejected.'

Others, as CAL. and QUEN., express this by a separate attribute, viz., the normative and judicial authority. CAL. (I, 474): "The Holy Scriptures are a rule, according to which all controversies in regard to faith or life in the Church should, and can be, decided (Ps. 19: 7; Gal. 6: 16; Phil. 3: 16); and as a rule they are not partial, but complete and adequate, because, beside the Scriptures, no other infallible rule in matters of faith can be given. All others beside the Word of God are fallible; and on this account we are referred to the Holy Scriptures as the only rule (Deut. 4: 2; 12: 28; Josh. 23: 6; Is. 8: 20; Luke 16: 29; 2 Pet. 1: 19); to which, alone, Christ and the apostles referred as a rule (Matt. 4: 4; 22: 29, 31; Mark 9: 12; John 5: 45; Acts 3: 20; 13: 33; 18: 28; 26: 22)."

[14] Hence, the two corollaries of QUEN. (I, 158, 167): "(1) It is therefore not necessary that there should be in the Church a supreme, regularly appointed and universal judge, who, seated upon a visible throne, is peremptorily to decide all strifes and controversies that arise among Christians concerning faith and religion, and orally and specifically to pronounce sentence in regard to them. We cannot acknowledge as such a judge either the Roman pontiff, or the fathers, or councils. (2) Nor is the decision concerning the mysteries and controversies of the faith to be granted to human reason, nor to an internal instinct or secret spirit."

[15] CHMN. (Trid.): "The Church has the right and liberty of deciding." GRH. (II, 359): "If the Church is 'the pillar and the ground of the truth,' and we are 'commanded to hear it' (1 Tim. 3: 15; Matt. 18: 17), then all decisions in matters of faith belong to her."

But the right which is hereby ascribed to the Church is carefully distinguished from that which belongs to the Holy Scriptures. This is usually done in the following manner: (1) The principal judge is the Holy Spirit; the instrumental judge, the Holy Scriptures; the ministerial (inferior) judge, the clergy. In regard to the latter, however ("whose duty it is to seek for the decision of the Supreme Judge as laid down in Scripture, and from this to teach what is to be done, to interpret this, and decide in accordance with it"), it is maintained 'that this judge should not pronounce sentence according to his own will, but according to the rule laid down by the Supreme Judge,' *i. e.*, according to the Holy Scriptures, which we therefore call the decision of the Supreme Judge, the rule of the inferior judge, and the directive judge (GRH., II., 366).

And QUEN. (I, 150): "An inferior decision, viz., of a teacher

of the Church, is nothing else than the interpretation, declaration, or annunciation of a divine, decisive, and definitive judgment, and its application to particular persons and things." Whence it further follows: "We are able to decide by the decision of an inferior judge, not absolutely, but if he pronounce according to the prescriptions of the divine law or the Scriptures, and in so far as he shows that he decides according to the Word of God. (Deut. 17: 10.) Wherefore, *we may appeal from this inferior judge to the Supreme, but not conversely, from the Supreme to the inferior.* The subordinate judge is, therefore, not absolute, but restricted and bound by the decisions of the Supreme Judge as recorded in Scripture. According to this distinction, the Holy Scriptures are called the judging Judge, or the Judge *ad quem* (to whom there is appeal), and the Church the Judge to be judged, or the Judge *a quo* (from whom there is an appeal)."

The Church is, therefore, it is true, *a visible judge*, but merely *discretive*, who, in the exercise of sound judgment, distinguishes truth from falsehood. She is, however, "*not a judge, specially and strictly so called*, viz., *authoritative and decisive*, pronouncing sentence authoritatively, and by virtue of the authority belonging to her, compelling the disputants to acquiesce in the whole opinion she may propose without further investigation." (Holl., 146.)

[16] Grh. (II, 359): "Whatever pertains to a spiritual person, may be regarded as belonging to all children and members of the Church. The reason of this is, that by spiritual person, we understand not merely the clergy, according to the nomenclature of the Papists, but all the children of the Church, who are controlled by the Spirit of God. Rom. 8: 9. For 'he that is spiritual judgeth all things.' 1 Cor. 2: 15."

Quen. (I, 150): "We assert that every believer, according to the measure of the gift of God, can and ought to judge, not indeed, in all controversies, but concerning the doctrines necessary to salvation, and to mark the difference between brass and beans by his own discretive judgment. Not that every one should follow his own notions, as the Papists accuse our churches of doing, but that he should submit himself to the judgment of the Holy Spirit, recorded in the Scriptures, and examine all things according to the tenor of this decision, *but leave to the learned the public decision of controversies.* 1 Cor. 10: 15; 11: 31: 1 Thess. 5: 19."

In accordance with this, a distinction is made between "the *public* and the *private* ministerial (inferior) judge. The *public* judge is the clergy; the *private*, each member of the Church, or private person."

[17] Grh. (II, 367): "We must distinguish between power and its exercise. The Holy Scriptures are indeed sufficient and adapted, by virtue of their authority, and the perfection and perspicuity of their character, to decide controversies; but, through the fault of human weakness and wickedness, it happens that this effect does not always, nor with all persons, follow their application; just as the Gospel is the power of God unto salvation to all such as believe, Rom. 1: 16, yet, at the same time, not all are actually converted and saved by the preaching of the Gospel." Br. (161): "Doubtless, all controversies that relate to matters of faith and practice, necessary to be decided and known, can, in this way, be adjudged and decided; only, when an occasion of controversy occurs, let those who are to engage in it, bring to the task minds that are pious, truth-loving, and learned. For thus, prejudice and partiality and evil feelings being laid aside, and the arguments of both sides being duly weighed, according to the rule of Scripture, it easily becomes apparent which is the true and which is the false opinion, on account of the perspicuity of Scripture, which acts in this case by virtue of its appointed office. But, as to other questions, either side of which may be held without injury to the faith, their decision ought not to be demanded, or expected, to be so clear."

[18] Holl. (125): "The *causative* authority of the faith differs from the *canonical* authority of Scripture, because the Scriptures beget divine faith, through the inspired sense, which sense of Scripture remains one and the same, whether expressed in the original idiom of Scripture, or in a translation conformed to the original text. So that the illuminating power, connected with the sense of Scripture, effectually manifests itself in the production of faith, not only by means of Scripture in the original tongues, but also through translations, provided the translations be perspicuous and conformed to the authentic text. Such is Luther's translation of the Bible, which is used in our churches by the faithful; which, when read, or heard, is as efficacious in causing assent to the faith, as if they should read the Hebrew text of the Old Testament and the Greek of the New, or hear it read and expounded by a teacher, although the words of that translation were not immediately inspired by God. But, that the Scriptures may have canonical authority, it is necessary, that not only the sense, but also the words, shall have been derived immediately from God. For to canonical and normal authority in matters of doctrine and practice, an absolute certainty and infallibility in the words themselves is necessary, which does not exist except in the original text of Scripture, for this depends immediately upon divine inspiration. Translations are

the work of men, who, in translating the Scriptures, may have erred."

§ 9. (2.) *Perfection, or Sufficiency.*

From the fact that the Holy Scriptures are the Word of God, it necessarily follows that all that is contained in them is perfectly true; from the fact that they are the *only* Word of God given to us, it further follows that, if we are at all to learn the way of life, it must be perfectly taught in the Holy Scriptures, [1] and this is what is meant by their *perfection* or *sufficiency*. Grh. (II, 286): "That the Scriptures fully and perfectly instruct us concerning all things necessary to salvation." [2] And, indeed, so perfectly must everything necessary to salvation be contained in the Holy Scriptures, whether declared in express words or to be learned inferentially, [3] that we never find occasion to make up deficiences from another source; whence, all doctrines claiming to be derived from oral tradition are to be rejected. Grh. (I, 25): "Laying aside tradition, we are to adhere to Scripture alone." [4]

[1] Holl. (173) distinguishes: "the perfection of Scripture (*a*) in reference to the subject-matter; since no inspired book, received into the permanent canon of the faith, perishes. (*b*) In reference to the form; that no error has crept into the authentic text by the negligence or perfidy of transcribers. (*c*) In reference to the end to be attained; for it sufficiently teaches man all doctrines and moral precepts necessary to salvation." Of the latter, viz., perfection as to the end to be accomplished, we are here speaking. Br. (136): "We only assert that the Scriptures are perfect in reference to the accomplishment of their end, and in this opinion we all agree. Those things are said to be perfect in reference to their end which want nothing that is necessary for the attainment of that end. But the ultimate aim of Scripture is our salvation; the intermediate, faith in Christ." Of perfection in the second sense, we have already spoken, under the head of inspiration. In reference to perfection, in the first sense, Br. (135) remarks: "We do not so much refer to the number of the books that ever were written by the sacred penmen, of which some referred to by the names of their authors or titles in the remaining books of Scripture are supposed to have perished; but we refer to the perfection of the Scriptures that remain in regard to the accomplishment of their end. Moreover, also, as to those

books which some suppose to have perished, it is to be observed that some of them have not really perished, but are still extant, though under different titles. . . . But, if some books written by the sacred penmen did really perish, yet we hold that (1) such were not written by Divine inspiration, but by human prompting; (2) they were also rather historical than doctrinal; at all events, or if it be (3) conceded that inspired books have perished, it must be maintained that the doctrines themselves are found with equal truth and fulness in the remaining books; certainly (4) that no book which once by the intention of the Holy Spirit formed a part of the canon or rule, has perished, to the detriment of the canonical Scriptures, so that they should cease to be the adequate source and rule of faith and practice."

Grh. remarks, in addition, that the Holy Scriptures are not to be regarded as perfect only since the canon of the Old and New Testament has been closed. (II, 286): "The perfection of the Holy Scriptures is to be estimated not by the number of the books, but from the sufficiency of the doctrine necessary to be known, in order to salvation. That which was written at any particular age of the Church, constituted a perfect canon, since the divine revelation was perfectly developed, so far as that age required it, in those books. Thus, when only the books of Moses were extant, the Scriptures were perfect, *i. e.*, with respect to that age of the Church, in which not many revelations had been made which God wished to be committed to writing."

[2] Quen. (I, 102): "The Holy Scriptures contain with perfect fulness and sufficiency all things necessary to be known in order to Christian faith and life, and therefore to the attainment of eternal salvation."

This Grh. (II, 286, sq.): proves. "(1) From their plain designation and title, Ps. 19: 7. (2) From their efficient original cause, viz., God, most wise and most perfect. (3) From the subject-matter. The inspired Holy Scriptures, comprehended in the prophetical and apostolical books, contain the whole counsel of God concerning our salvation, and unfold all the parts of Christianity in such a manner that nothing need be added or subtracted. This is proved by Acts 20: 27; 26: 22; 2 Tim. 3: 16, 17; Deut. 4: 2; 12: 32; Gal. 1: 8; Rev. 22: 18. (4) From their aim and effects."

[3] Cal. (I, 610): "We assert, that the Holy Scriptures sufficiently and adequately contain all things necessary to faith and a Christian life, and we think that those other things also in the Scriptures should be clearly and sufficiently considered, which,

both according to the words and according to the sense, are comprehended therein, or, as plain interferences, are drawn from those which are clearly written; so that there is no need of any unwritten tradition to supply the defects of Scripture, or to collect and deduce from it those things which are virtually contained in it; because without any tradition they may all be sufficiently obtained from Scripture alone."

GRH. (II, 286): "We by no means say that the Scriptures are perfect in such a sense that all things which are necessary to be known for faith and practice are contained in the Scriptures, literally and in so many words, but some of them in substance, others literally; or, what is the same thing, that some are contained in them explicitly and others by implication, so that by legitimate and undeniable inference they can be deduced from them." QUEN. (I, 102) thus guards against the misapprehension of his remark: "We do not say, with the Papists, that the Scriptures are perfect by implication or contain all things necessary to faith, as in a root or germ, or common source, or, as it were, in outline . . . . so that they do not themselves really contain all things, but show whence and where they are to be sought, with a reference to the Church and her traditions, from which the defects of those doctrines which are wanting may be supplied."

[4] Hereby the papal doctrine of tradition is rejected, which CHEMN. (Ex. Trid. I, 110) thus describes: "They pretend that many things necessary to faith and practice were handed down by the apostles which are not comprehended in Scripture. To this claim they add another, viz., that those things which are handed down and observed in the Roman Church, and cannot be proved by any Scripture testimony, are the very things which were orally transmitted by the Apostles and not comprehended in Scripture."

Whence HOLL. (178): "Tradition is the instruction orally given by Christ and the Apostles, which is neither substantially nor literally contained in Scripture, but by continuous succession is preserved in the Church." To which is replied: "We infer from the perfection of Scripture that it needs in no way the aid of tradition in the articles of faith necessary to salvation." (GRH. II, 307.)

Inasmuch as the word, tradition, was used in such different senses in the Holy Scriptures, and such various significations applied to it, the Dogmaticians take occasion accurately to designate the sense in which they reject tradition, and from this signification carefully to distinguish those which in a certain sense they admit. CHEMN. in Exam. Trid. I, 110 seq., marks eight different significations, viz.:

"(1) Those things which Christ and the Apostles orally delivered, and which were afterwards committed to writing by the Evangelists and Apostles, are often called traditions.

"(2) The books of Holy Scripture have been guarded by the Church during an uninterrupted series of ages and in a connected and sure succession, and they have been faithfully transmitted to posterity and handed down, as if from hand to hand, unto us.

"(3) Irenæus and Tertullian celebrate apostolical tradition . . . They do not, indeed, propose and prove any other doctrines of faith by tradition than those which are contained in Scripture; but they show, and prove also by tradition, those same doctrines which are contained in Scripture.

"(4) There are traditions concerning the exposition, the true sense or native meaning, of Scripture.

"(5) The fathers sometimes thus designate those doctrines which are not contained in so many words and syllables in Scripture, but are derived from clear Scripture testimony, by sound, certain, indisputable, and evident reasoning.

"(6) The term is applied to the universal consent of the fathers. The phrase is common, 'by the tradition of the fathers' (*patres ita tradiderunt*).

"(7) When the ancients made mention of unwritten traditions they did not understand by them doctrines of faith to be received without, over and above Scripture, even if they could not be proved by any Scripture testimony; but they spoke concerning certain rites and customs, which on account of their antiquity they ascribed to the Apostles.

"(8) Traditions relating both to faith and practice, which cannot be proved by any Scripture testimony, which nevertheless the Council of Trent commands to be received and venerated with the same reverence and pious feeling as the Scriptures themselves."

Holl. (178) accordingly divides the traditions of the Church into "ritual, historical, exegetical, evidential, and dogmatical." Only the latter class is here referred to. Holl.: "We do not disapprove of all the *ritual traditions* of the Church, but the theological rule observed by Chemn. in his Exam. Conc. Trid. must be adhered to, viz., 'Let the ceremonies in the Church be of an unessential nature, few in number, devout, and useful for edification, order, and decorum; let the observance of them be left free, so as to avoid giving offence,' and so that they may be instituted, changed, or abrogated with a reference to edification, to times, places, and persons. We admit *historical tradition*, concerning the

canon of Scripture, not as an infallible, but as a probable argument. We receive with gratitude *exegetical traditions*, if namely the interpretation of the fathers present no discrepancy with the scriptural text, the proper use of the words, the context, and the analogy of faith. We hold in high esteem *evidential tradition*, and confess with Chemnitz that we differ from those who invent opinions that find no supporting testimony in any age of the Church. We think also that *no doctrine that is new and at variance with all antiquity should be received in the Church.*" The *Symbolical Books* treat only of the ecclesiastical or ceremonial traditions. The AUG. CONF. XV, APOLOGY VIII, and FORM. CONC. X, discuss the questions: (1) Whether these are admissible, which they answer affirmatively; and (2) Whether in the Church nothing dare be taught, as nothing is believed, which is not proved by an express declaration of Scripture? which, in the light of Christian liberty, they deny.

Syncretism then gave occasion to further specifications in regard to the idea of tradition. G. CALIXTUS had said: "It should not be doubted, that from the writings of the ancient Church, which are still extant, the common belief of antiquity can be sufficiently ascertained, and that should be regarded as apostolical, which they unanimously teach and declare that they receive as apostolical." To which CAL. (I, 327) replies: "Although some innovators differ from the Papists in this, that they do not recognize any article of faith that is merely traditional and not contained in the Scriptures, or receive any doctrine as taught by the Apostles, which is not written; yet they side with the Papists in this, that they accept as the Word of God something not written and handed down by the Apostles, and wish some apostolical tradition, I know not what, handed down to us through the writings of the fathers, to be regarded as the undoubted Word of God." And, page 330, the additional statement: "Although it is not to be doubted that the Apostles taught not only by writings but also *viva voce*, and that the Word which they preached, no less than what is comprehended in the Scriptures, is to be regarded as the undoubted Word of God, yet we neither can, nor ought to, gratify the Papists by teaching that there is still extant some additional Word of God communicated by the Apostles, and handed down from them to us, which should be received as infallible and indubitable, along with the prophetical and apostolical Holy Scriptures.

§ 10. (3.) *Perspicuity.*

If the Holy Scriptures contain everything necessary to salvation, and if they *alone* contain it, they must necessarily ex-

hibit it so clearly and plainly that it is accessible to the comprehension of every one; hence the attribute of *Perspicuity* is ascribed to the Holy Scriptures. CAL. (I, 467): "Because in those things which are necessary to be known in order to salvation, the Scriptures are abundantly and admirably explicit, both by the intention of God their Author, and by the natural signification of the words, so that they need no external and adventitious light." [1] But while such perspicuity is ascribed to the Holy Scriptures, it is not meant that every particular that is contained in them is equally clear and plain to all, but only that all that is *necessary to be known in order to salvation* is clearly and plainly taught in them, [2] and that, if this be not expressed in all cases with equal clearness, it can nevertheless be gathered from a collocation of the passages bearing upon it. [3] It is also not maintained that the Holy Scriptures can be understood without the possession of certain prerequisites. On the other hand, such as the following are required, viz, proper maturity of judgment, the necessary philological attainments, an unprejudiced frame of mind in the investigation of the sacred truth, and a will inclined to embrace this truth in its purity. [4] Where these prerequisites are wanting, there can, as a matter of course, be no thorough understanding of the Holy Scriptures; but in such a case the fault does not lie in the Holy Scriptures. [5] Where these prerequisites exist, a clear and accurate comprehension of the saving truths contained in Scripture may be gained, which nevertheless, even in this case, is merely external and natural until, by the illumination of the Holy Spirit, an internal apprehension of them is effected, [6] as well as the power of heartily appropriating to one's self the saving truths contained in Scripture. [7] Finally, the perspicuity of the Holy Scriptures is not to be so understood as if the mysteries of the Christian faith were unveiled by it; on the other hand, these remain as they are, mysteries; perspicuity consists only in this, that the Scriptures make known to us the mysteries just as God wishes them to be made known. [8]

From what has here been said, it naturally follows, further, that in all cases in which the interpretation of a passage is doubtful, the decision dare never be found anywhere else than

in the Scriptures themselves, whereby the faculty of self-interpretation is ascribed to the Holy Scriptures. [9] And, in this interpretation, it is a fundamental principle, that the doubtful passages are to be explained by those that are clear. [10] Inasmuch now as all doctrines necessary to be known in order to salvation, are clearly taught in Scripture, so that we gain from them the general substance of the Christian plan of salvation; and inasmuch, further, as we can safely presuppose that the Holy Scriptures will not contradict themselves, we need only take care that we do not derive from these doubtful passages a sense that would conflict with the clearly revealed truths; we must therefore interpret *according to the analogy of faith.* (CAL.: "The analogy of faith is the consistency of the doctrine clearly revealed in the Holy Scriptures.") [11] To the interpretation of all Scripture, whether doubtful or plain, the general rule applies, that each passage contains but one original and proper sense, that, namely, which is derived immediately from the words employed (the literal sense), which is to be ascertained in every case by the use of the means above described. [12]

[1] The fullest description of perspicuity we find in BR. (138): "Perspicuity, or that those things which are necessary to be believed and done by man in seeking to be saved, are taught in Scripture in words and phrases so clear and conformed to the usage of speech, that any man acquainted with the language, possessed of a common judgment, and paying due attention to the words, may learn the true sense of the words, so far as those things are concerned which must be known, and may embrace these fundamental doctrines by the simple grasp of his mind; according as the mind of man is led, by the Scriptures themselves and their supernatural light, or the divine energy conjoined with them, to yield the assent of faith to the word understood and the things signified."

The proof, according to QUEN. (I, 121, 122): "(1) From Deut. 30: 11, 12; Rom. 10: 8; 2 Pet. 1: 19; Ps. 19: 8; 119: 105; Prov. 6: 23. (2) *From the character of Scripture:* (*a*) Because it has God for its Author, who can speak perspicuously, and does not wish to speak obscurely. He can speak perspicuously, for He formed speech and the voice. To say that He wished to speak obscurely, would be nothing short of blasphemy. (*b*) It gives wisdom to babes or the unskilled, Ps. 19: 7; 2 Tim. 3: 15. (*c*) It reveals

hidden mysteries, Rom. 16: 25; 1 Cor. 2: 9, 10; Col. 1: 26, 27. (*d*) It was given for the purpose that the will of God might here be learned, and men informed in regard to eternal life, John 20: 31; Rom. 15: 4. (*e*) Because its precepts are to be read by all, Deut. 17: 19; John 5: 39."

[2] Grh. (I, 26): "It is to be observed that when we call the Scriptures perspicuous, we do not mean that every particular expression, anywhere contained in Scripture, is so constituted that at the first glance it must be plainly and fully understood by every one. On the other hand, we confess that certain things are obscurely expressed in Scripture and difficult to be understood . . . But this we do assert, and endeavor in every way to prove, that the perspicuity of the Scriptures is of such a nature that a certain and consistent opinion can be drawn from them concerning the doctrines whose knowledge is necessary to salvation." Whence it follows (II, 329) that "the knowledge of those things, which are nowhere plainly and perspicuously revealed in Scripture, is not absolutely necessary to salvation."

Quen. (I, 118): "We do not maintain that all Scripture, in every particular, is clear and perspicuous. For we grant that certain things are met with in the sacred books that are obscure and difficult to be understood, 2 Pet. 3: 16, not only in respect to the sublimity of their subject-matter, but also as to the utterance of the Holy Spirit, that afford materials for calling into exercise the learning of the doctors during the course of a long life, and the full understanding of which is to be expected only in heaven; but that the doctrines of faith and moral precepts are taught so obscurely everywhere, that they can nowhere be found clearly and explicitly, it is this that we deny. But the articles of faith and the moral precepts are taught in Scripture in their proper places, not in obscure and ambiguous words, but in such as are fitted to them, and free from all ambiguity, so that every diligent reader of Scripture, who reads it devoutly and piously, can understand them." (Br. (140): "At least in those places where the writer professedly, as they say, treats of a particular precept of faith or morals, or where its seat is; so that there is no article of faith, or no moral precept, which is not taught in Scripture somewhere in literal, clear, and conspicuous language.")

Quen. (I, 18) distinguishes between "onomastic, chronological, topographical, allegorical, typical, prophetical (*i. e.*,, predictions, but unfulfilled) matters, and those which are historical, dogmatical, or moral. If in the former class, especially in points relating to style and order, there should occur some difficulty or obscurity,

this would still not derogate from the perspicuity of Scripture in matters of the latter class. The Scriptures give us elementary truths, containing the supreme and necessary articles of our religion. They give us sublime, mystical, onomastic truths. God chose to teach most clearly in the sacred books the elementary truths, because what is taught by them is necessary to be known by all in order to salvation. Other matters are involved in some difficulty."

[3] GRH. (II, 329): "Observe that some things in Scripture are clearer than others, and what is obscurely expressed in one passage is more clearly explained in another."

QUEN. (I, 118): "It is one thing that there should at times be some difficulty and obscurity in the statement of the mysteries of the faith and of those things that must be believed in order to salvation; and another, that this obscurity should be nowhere cleared up in the Scriptures themselves, if a comparison be instituted with parallel passages and the analogy of faith as contained in Scripture be called into requisition. Doubtless what is expressed in one place obscurely, appears perfectly clear in another; and what in one passage is hidden under tropes and figures, is elsewhere disclosed in plain and simple language; and thus upon many difficult passages of Scripture, light is thrown by others that are more clear."

[4] GRH. (II, 329): "Observe that, in asserting perspicuity, we do not exclude the godly study of the Scriptures by reading and meditation, nor the use of the aids necessary to the interpretation of the Scripture."

QUEN. (I, 119): "We are to distinguish between men who, on account of their immature age and their want of familiarity with the language in which they read the Scriptures, meet with difficulty through unskillfulness or ignorance, or who are prejudiced by preconceived erroneous opinions, and those with whom this is not the case. . . . For we presuppose a sufficient knowledge of the language, maturity of age, a mind not filled with prejudice and erroneous opinions, and also a legitimate and good translation of the original text."

BR. (146): "For he who does not attend to the words themselves, but follows his own prejudices and makes the words of Scripture conform to them, can err even in perspicuous passages and in investigating the true sense." Whence HOLL. (149): "The perspicuity of Scriptures is not *absolute*, but *dependent upon the use of means*, inasmuch as, in endeavoring to understand it, the divinely instituted method must be accurately observed. For there is required: (1) Prayer to God the Father of Lights. (2) A

knowledge of the idiom in which the Holy Scriptures are expressed, whether it be the original or in a version. (3) The attentive consideration of the expressions, of the scope, of the previous and subsequent context. (4) The laying aside of preconceived opinions and of evil feelings, of ambition, hatred, envy, boldness, etc., etc."

[5] Wherefore QUEN. (I, 118) distinguishes between "obscurity in the object contemplated and that which lies in the subject contemplating it. The Scriptures, especially in things necessary to salvation, are not obscure in and of themselves, or through a want of native clearness and plainness, but they are lucid and perspicuous. They may be obscure, however, accidentally, on account of the incapacity and blindness of the human mind, and through the malice of heretics and the heterodox, who superadd to their natural blindness a voluntary one, and maliciously close the eyes of their mind against the clearest light of Scripture. (2 Cor. 4: 3.)" As an instance of this, the controversy in regard to the Lord's Supper is cited (I, 124): "The words of the Testament are in themselves very perspicuous, but are variously interpreted; because many, neglecting the literal and proper sense, studiously seek a foreign one, and do not follow so much the teaching of Christ as the counsel and dictation of blind reason. A mistake as to the cause is therefore made when the discrepancy in the expositions is ascribed to the obscurity of Scriptures, since its cause is either the perverseness or imbecility of men. The obscurity which lies in the subject must not be transferred to the object. . . If nothing be perspicuously spoken except that which cannot be understood perversely and expounded in a bad sense, then nothing in the wide universe can be perspicuously and plainly uttered."

[6] GRH. (I, 26): "The clearness of Scripture is twofold; as Luther says, 'One kind is *external*, lying in the ministry of the Word, *the other* in the knowledge of the heart. If you speak of the *internal* clearness, no man understands a single iota in the Scriptures by the natural powers of his own mind, unless he have the Spirit of God; all have obscure hearts. The Holy Spirit is required for the understanding of the whole of Scripture and of all its parts. If you allude to the *external* clearness, there is nothing left obscure and ambiguous, but all things brought to light by the Word are perfectly clear.'"

GRH. (I, 52): "Some, who have not yet been enlightened by the Holy Spirit, may have a knowledge of the Scripture doctrines, and acquire an historic faith by the outward ministration of the Word; but an absolutely certain, firm, and saving knowledge they

cannot have without the internal illumination of the mind by the Holy Spirit." There is, therefore, a distinction made between the "*grammatical* (literal) and *external*" and the "*spiritual, divine* and *internal* sense." Perspicuity in the first sense consists, Br. (140), "in the proper selection of words, their correspondence with the things signified, and their mutual connection and arrangement, according to the common usage of language" (141): "For not only the regenerated and believers, but also the unregenerate and godless, through this clearness of the words in their natural signification, in which respect they are the same for all readers, can acquire a knowledge of the sense designed by the words. *i. e.*, a merely literal or historical, not a saving or believing knowledge." Also (144), (from the Jena and Wittenberg Opinion, in answer to Rathmann's Reply, 1629): . . . "If the Reply means to infer that no unconverted person can understand the proper sense which is contained in the words of Scripture, and expressed by them, *i. e.*, the grammatical and literal sense, unless the Holy Spirit assist with His gracious illumination, then we cannot agree with the Reply, but abide by our own opinion. . . . For the words, and whatever serves to interpret them, viz., the lexicons, dictionaries, and grammars of the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew languages, are human inventions, and belong to the gifts of nature and not to the gracious gifts of the Holy Spirit; for He was not appointed, nor was He poured out, that He might treat of grammatical rules and teach us to hunt up Hebrew roots, . . . but that He should teach us the articles of faith through the Scriptures and instruct us in the truth that maketh wise unto salvation. Many a one properly understands the words without possessing that saving knowledge of the mysteries which belongs to faith."

Cal. (I, 657): "Although the external sense of Scripture may be understood by the unregenerate, yet the saving and internal sense, joined with hearty assent, cannot be attained without the illumination of the Holy Spirit."

[7] Grh. (II, 338): "A literal acquaintance with the articles of the faith is not sufficient to salvation, but there must also be a spiritual knowledge, for the acquisition of which the internal illumination of the Holy Spirit is necessary; and this is to be obtained by humble prayer."

Br. (150): "In order that man may properly understand the plan of salvation, two things are necessary: first, that by the natural powers of his mind he comprehend those things that necessarily must be known by him in order to his salvation; and secondly, that he embrace these, thus apprehended as true and

divinely revealed, and yield to them the full assent of faith. The Scriptures, therefore, which in this matter should be as a bright and shining light, ought to accomplish these two ends: first, to represent to the mind the things that are to be known in language adapted to this end and clear, so that they may be simply and naturally apprehended; and secondly, that when the thing signified is of a more exalted nature and the mind too weak or corrupt to be able to judge correctly by the exercise of its own powers concerning that which is signified by the words, or to elicit or yield the assent that is due, the Scriptures themselves, by their own illuminative power, should enable the mind to accomplish this and bestow the faculty of apprehending and embracing the truth." The latter alone is referred to when Holl. remarks (155): "An unregenerate man, opposing the illuminating grace of the Holy Spirit, cannot understand the true sense of the sacred writings. But when an unregenerate man, in a teachable spirit, attentively reads the Holy Scriptures, or hears them expounded by the living teacher, the Holy Spirit illuminates him by the Scriptures, so that he may understand the true sense of the Divine Word and rightly apply it, thus understood, with saving effect." And although Holl. claims "for the unregenerate but teachable the prevenient and preparative grace of the Holy Spirit, that they may acquire an external and literal knowledge of the Holy Scriptures," he does not thereby mean anything more than that such grace is needed in order that they may attain to a self-appropriation of the truth of salvation; for he elsewhere remarks (158): "The words of the Prophets and Apostles may be considered either out of their proper scriptural connection, or in it. In the former case, they are analogous to human words, and can be understood by the unregenerate without the grace of the Holy Spirit; but if they be considered in their proper connection, as they are accommodated to the mysteries of the faith, and are, as receptacles or vehicles of these, really Divine words, no correct conception, conformed to the mind of the Spirit, can be formed concerning them without the preceding prevenient and preparative grace of the Holy Spirit."

[8] Holl. (149): "The Scriptures are called clear, not in respect to the subject-matter, but to the words, for even subjects that are not clear may be expressed with clear and perspicuous words."

Quen. (I, 117): "We must make a distinction between the clearness of the subjects which are revealed in Scripture and the plainness of the words by which the revealed subjects are expressed. We refer not to the former but to the latter; for we acknowledge that many mysteries are contained in the Scriptures, abstruse and

impenetrable by the human intellect, especially in this life; but we deny that they are taught in Scripture in an obscure style and with ambiguous words." Luther expresses it differently: "The things of God are obscure; . . . the things of Scripture are perspicuous. . . . The doctrines in themselves are obscure; but in so far as they are presented in Scripture they are manifest, if we are willing to be content with that knowledge which God communicates in the Scriptures to the Church."

[9] QUEN. (I, 137): "From no other source than the Holy Scriptures themselves can a certain and infallible interpretation of Scripture be drawn. For Scripture itself, or rather the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture or through it, is the legitimate and independent (ἀνυπεύθυνος) interpreter of itself."

And further, QUEN. (I, 144): "We cannot, therefore, acknowledge the harmonious opinions of the ancient teachers of the Church or the decisions of councils as a certain and unquestionable rule and measure of scriptural interpretation, nor the Roman pontiff as the supreme, infallible interpreter of the Holy Scriptures."

[10] QUEN. (I, 137): "The more obscure passages, which need explanation, can and should be explained by other passages that are more clear, and thus the Scripture itself furnishes an interpretation of the more obscure expressions when a comparison of these is made with those that are more clear; so that Scripture is explained by Scripture."

[11] GRH. (I, 53): "From those perspicuous passages of Scripture a rule of faith is gathered, which is, so to speak, a summary of the heavenly doctrine extracted from the clearest passages of Scripture. Whatever, therefore, is necessary, is clearly expressed in the Holy Scriptures, says Chrysostom. If certain things in them are very obscure, the knowledge of these is not necessary to all for their salvation; and hence, although we may not always ascertain their true and genuine interpretation, it is sufficient if, in interpreting them, we propose nothing that conflicts with the rule of faith."

(II, 424): "All interpretation of Scripture should be according to the analogy of faith. This canon is taught in Rom. 12 : 6, and signifies that the interpretation of Scripture should be instituted and carried on in such a manner as to accord with the usual line of thought which is conveyed in Scripture concerning each article of the heavenly doctrine. For, since all Scripture was given by the immediate suggestion of the Holy Spirit, and is inspired, all things in it are harmonious and perfectly consistent with each other, so that no discrepancy or self-contradiction can occur.

The articles of faith, which the apostle here means by πίστις, the knowledge of which is necessary for all in order to salvation, are taught in the Scriptures in clear and perspicuous language, of which a brief summary is contained in the Apostles' Creed, which the fathers often call "the rule of faith." Nothing is ever to be broached in the interpretation of Scripture that conflicts with this rule of faith; and hence, if we be not exactly able at times to ascertain the precise sense of any passage, as designed by the Holy Spirit, we should nevertheless beware of proposing anything that is contrary to the analogy of faith."

Grh. (I, 54) thus states all the rules that apply to the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures: "(1) Without the light of the Holy Spirit, our mind is blind so far as the understanding and interpreting of Scripture are concerned. (2) In addition to this blindness, natural to us all, some are blinded by peculiar wickedness and an unyielding obstinacy, whose eyes the Holy Spirit either has opened or has wished to open, but they have contumaciously resisted Him; neither of these kinds of blindness, however, makes or proves the Scriptures obscure. (3) Because our mind is blind, we are prayerfully to implore the light of the Holy Spirit. (4) But this illumination of the mind the Holy Spirit does not confer immediately, but by the light of the Word heard and meditated upon. (5) Inasmuch as the doctrines necessary to be known by every one in order to salvation are taught in Scripture in clear and perspicuous language, (6) the remaining passages of Scripture receive light from these. (7) For from the perspicuous passages of Scripture, a rule of faith is deduced to which the exposition of the remainder must be conformed. (8) And if we cannot ascertain the precisely literal sense of all passages, it is sufficient that in their interpretation we do not propose anything contrary to the analogy of faith. (9) Nevertheless, it is also of importance that we rightly and accurately interpret the more obscure passages of Scripture, which can be done if we apply the means adapted to remove the difficulties. (10) That we may discover these means, we must seek the causes of the obscurity. (11) Some Scripture passages are obscure in themselves, when singly considered, others when compared with other passages; if they merely seem to conflict with other passages, this obscurity may be removed by reconciling the passages. (12) Those that are obscure in themselves and singly are so either as to their subject-matter or as to their words. The obscurity in regard to the subjects discussed is removed by those settled axioms, in individual articles of belief, which are to be regarded as the unfailing guide. (13) The obscurity in regard

to the words is dispelled by the grammatical analysis of sentences, by the rhetorical exposition of the tropes and figures, by the logical consideration of the order and circumstances, and finally by an acquaintance with physical science; but the greatest assistance in all these cases is afforded by a prudent and diligent collation of Scripture passages, whenever either the same or different words and phrases are employed to express the same or different things." He illustrates the manner of making deductions from the rule of faith by the example of the doctrine of the Lord's Supper.

[12] GRH. (I, 67): "There is but one proper and true sense of each passage, which the Holy Spirit thereby intends, and which is drawn from the proper signification of the words, and only from this *literal sense* available arguments may be derived." But this literal sense may be either *strictly literal*, which the Holy Spirit intends when the words are taken in their usual signification, *e. g.*, God is a spirit (John 4: 24), or *figurative or tropical*, which is the intention of the Holy Spirit when words are used figuratively, *e. g.*, God is our shield (Gen. 15: 1), (HOLL., 91). But in this case also the remark applies, GRH. (II, 425): "All interpretation of Scripture should be literal, and there should be no departure from the letter in matters of faith, unless the Scriptures themselves indicate the figurativeness and explain it." (I, 67): "Allegories, tropes, anagogies, are not different senses but different adaptations of the same sense and subject designated by the letter. The same historical narrative may be presented in a variety of ways, and treated either allegorically, or tropically, or analogically, while the true and literal sense of the words in which the history is described remains the same." The Dogmaticians therefore assume, it is true, such a spiritual sense in certain cases, but strictly speaking this is not understood as a second sense, co-ordinate with the first, but only that the natural signification of the words, which must always be the basis of the interpretation, admits also a special spiritual application, or contains at the same time a symbolical allusion. HOLL. (91): "That is called the *mystical sense* which is not immediately signified by the inspired words, but which proceeds and is deduced from the subject signified by the inspired words. It is, however, improperly and unauthorizedly called the sense of the biblical expression, since it is not the immediate sense of the inspired words, but inasmuch as God desires, by means of the subject or fact described by those words, to present some other subject or fact to the consideration of men. *More properly, therefore, it is called the accommodation of the literal sense, or its mystical application, than the mystical sense of Scripture, e. g.*, Jonah 2: 1.

Here the prophet Jonah is said to have been three days and nights in the belly of the whale, and the literal sense is the one plainly designed by God, expressed and immediately implied by the words. When now this whole history or transaction is employed to signify the abode of Christ for three days and nights in the grave, no new sense here arises, but there is merely an accommodation and application of that historical narrative so as by it to express the fact that Christ was to be three days and nights in the grave." Hence the Dogmaticians declare against the assumption of a double sense in the prophecies of the Old Testament. Such a mystical sense may either be designed by God, or it may be engrafted upon the literal sense. Only in the former case dare it be employed in the interpretation of Scripture. CAL. (I, 664): "The mystical accommodation may either be ἐγγραφος (contained in the written Word) and divine, or ἀγραφος (superadded to the written Word) and of human invention." (HOLL.: Either innate or introduced.)

QUEN. (I, 131): "When our theological writers approve of the following scholastic axioms, viz.: 'Mystical theology can prove nothing, parabolic theology cannot be advanced in argument, solid and effective arguments for proving the doctrines of the faith and refuting errors can be drawn only from the literal sense of Scripture,' they do not exclude, but at the same time include, mystical applications of the literal sense of this or that biblical passage, made by the Holy Spirit Himself in the Holy Scriptures; yet they exclude allegorical and parabolical interpretations that men have devised and forced upon the Scriptures. For applications of the literal sense of this or that passage or sacred narrative, that are shown to exist and are explained in the Scriptures themselves, can be used in proof, just as other things that are literally expressed in the Scriptures. When, therefore, in any plain Scripture passage there is an accommodation of the literal sense to a spiritual subject, then its validity for proving or disapproving is just as great." "The mystical sense, as it may be loosely styled, is divided by the Lutheran theologians into the allegorical, typical, and parabolical. It is called the *allegorical* sense, when a Scriptural historical narrative of things that really occurred is applied to a certain mystery or spiritual doctrine by the intention of the Holy Spirit in an allegorical manner; it is called *typical* when, under external facts or prophetic visions, things hidden, either present or future, are prefigured, or especially matters relating to the New Testament are shadowed forth; and *parabolical*, when something is described as having really occurred, and yet applied to designate something else that is spiritual." (CAL. I, 665.)

The Romanists distinguish between the *allegorical* sense, the *tropological* (when the words or facts under consideration refer to something that relates to morals), and the *anagogical* (when the words or facts are used with a reference to eternal life).

§ 11. (4.) *Efficacy.*

CAL. (I, 478): "That the Holy Scriptures are living and efficacious, and a means of illumination, conversion, and salvation, prepared and vivified by Divine power."

This subject will be treated of subsequently under the head of the Means of Grace.

§ 12. *Of the Canon and the Apocryphal Books.*

The written Word of God consists of the Word of God of the *Old* and the Word of God of the *New Testament.* [1] In the collection, however, that contains both of these, we find also other writings, which we do not call the Word of God in the same sense. We distinguish these two kinds of writings in the following manner, viz.: we call the first class *canonical books, i. e.*, such as, because they are inspired by God, [2] are the rule and guide of our faith; [3] the others, *apocryphal books, i. e.*, such whose divine origin is either doubtful or has been disproved. [4] Although both kinds are found in the Bible, only those of the first class are admitted as a rule of faith, whence they are called *the Canon* (catalogue, or number, of the canonical books), while those of the other class may contribute their share to the edification of believers, but are not to be regarded as the Word of God, and from them, therefore, no proof for any doctrine of the faith is to be drawn. [5]

Whether a book is canonical or not, we are then to ascertain by the signs whereby we recognize the Word of God in general as such, as of divine origin, as inspired. [6] The testimony of the Holy Spirit is more conclusive evidence than anything else of the divine character of the contents of a book; next to this come all the other kinds of evidence which we have enumerated under the head of the Authority of Holy Scripture (§ 8, Note 10) as the external and internal criteria. [7] Among the latter, the testimony of the Church in the earliest ages in regard to the canonical character of a book is of special importance, for it is assuredly a matter of the highest moment if we know

that a book was acknowledged as canonical already at a day when its origin could be most accurately ascertained. [8] More particularly do we need the testimony of the earliest ages of the Church in deciding historical questions, as to the name of the author of a book, as to the language in which it was originally composed; [9] for by the testimony of the Holy Spirit we may indeed become assured of the divinity of a book, experiencing its power in our own hearts, but He bears no testimony as to questions of this kind.

As *canonical* books of the Old Testament we acknowledge: (1) Genesis; (2) Exodus; (3) Leviticus; (4) Numbers; (5) Deuteronomy; (6) Joshua; (7) Judges; (8) Ruth; (9) I and II Samuel; (10) I and II Kings; (11) I and II Chronicles; (12) Ezra and Nehemiah (or second Ezra); (13) Esther; (14) Job; (15) Psalms; (16) Proverbs; (17) Ecclesiastes; (18) Song of Solomon; (19) Isaiah; (20) Jeremiah; (21) Lamentation; (22) Ezekiel; (23) Daniel; (24) twelve minor prophets, Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zachariah, Malachi. [10]

As *apocryphal:* Tobias, Judith, Baruch, I, II, and III Maccabees, III and IV Ezra, Wisdom of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus or Syracides. As *appendices:* Epistle of Jeremiah, annexed to Baruch, Appendix to Daniel, Supplement to Esther, Prayer of Manasseh. (Grh.) [11]

In the New Testament we have no apocryphal books in the same sense as in the Old Testament; but still there are single books of the New Testament in regard to whose origin and authors the evidence is not in all cases equally consentaneous. A certain distinction must therefore be made between them and the others that are equally authenticated by every species of evidence; and yet this distinction, resting as it does merely upon the want of entire agreement in the evidence, whilst very important testimony of various kinds is at hand to prove their canonical authority, is not of so much importance as to prevent us from making a canonical use of these books. [12]

The books of the New Testament authenticated by all the testimonies are the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, [13] and John, Acts of the Apostles, Paul's Epistle to the Romans, his two Epistles to the Corinthians, his Epistles to the Galatians,

Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, two Epistles to the Thessalonians, two to Timothy, the Epistle to Titus, the Epistle to Philemon, the first Epistle of Peter, and the first of John.

Those in regard to which doubts are entertained by some are the Epistle to the Hebrews, the second Epistle of Peter, the second and third of John, the Epistle of James, that of Jude, and the Apocalypse of John.

[1] Grh. (II, 50): "The biblical books are distinguished into the *books of the Old and New Testaments.* The books of the Old Testament are those which were written before the appearance of Christ; the books of the New Testament, those which were written after the appearance of Christ, and addressed to the Church. It is to be observed, that the books of the Old Testament are called such, not because they do not manifestly contain anything of the substance, grace, and felicity of the New Testament promised through Christ to those believing in Him, but because they predict and prefigure that as future and to be fulfilled in due time, which in the New Testament is announced as complete. Rom. 3 : 21; 16 : 26."

Holl. (129), as to the relation between the Old and New Testaments: "The books of the Old Testament were committed to the Israelitic Church, those of the New Testament to the Christian Church, collected from all nations. Yet the Christian Church receives the canonical books of the Old Testament on account of the most admirable harmony of the prophetic and apostolic writings, on account of their great utility, and especially in obedience to the command of Christ, John 5 : 39. There is a disparity between the Old and New Testaments as to the degree of perspicuity, but not a diversity as to the object of revelation, as if in the one, things were explicitly taught as necessary to be believed, different from those so taught in the other, since faith is the same in both. Eph. 4 : 16."

[2] Chemn. (Ex. Trid. I, 85): "The Canonical Scriptures derive their eminent authority mainly from the fact that they are divinely inspired, 2 Tim. 3 : 16; *i. e.*, that they came not by the will of man, but the men of God both spake and wrote as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

[3] Chemn. (Ex. Trid. I, 81): "The Scriptures are called canonical, the canonical books, or the canon of Scripture, because they are a rule according to which the edifice of the faith of the Church is to be so constructed and framed that whatever agrees with this rule is to be regarded as right, sound, and apostolical;

and that whatever does not quadrate with it, but varies either by excess or deficiency, is properly to be regarded as supposititious, adulterated, erroneous. This canon or rule is the doctrine divinely communicated from the beginning of the world to the human race through the patriarchs, prophets, Christ, and the apostles. And because this doctrine is by the will of God contained in the Scriptures, they are hence called canonical. A canon is an infallible rule or measure which by no means allows that anything be added to it or taken from it."

[4] GRH. (II, 53): "The apocryphal books are so called ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀποκρύπτειν, which signifies concealed, either because their origin was not clearly ascertained by those by whose testimony the authority of the true Scriptures has been handed down to us (Augustine); or, because they are not read publicly in the churches as a source of proof for ecclesiastical doctrines, but merely as a means of moral improvement." HOLL. (131): "The apocryphal books are those which are found in the *volume* of Scripture, but do not belong to the *canon*, and were not written by immediate divine inspiration." This definition applies only to those which accompany the canonical Scriptures; another class consists of those "which contain fables, errors, and lies, and hence are not to be read in the churches." GRH. (II, 55): "The former kind are called apocryphal, in the sense of *obscure* (absconditi), *i. e.*, uncertain and hidden as to their origin; the other class, in the sense that they deserve to be kept obscure (abscondendi) and ought not to be read in the churches." CAL. (I, 491): "The division of the books of Scripture into canonical and apocryphal is improper and equivocal, since only the former meet the *definition* of the Holy Scriptures, the latter merely having *the name*."

[5] CHEMN. (Ex. Trid. I, 93): "Are then these books to be absolutely condemned and rejected? This we by no means demand. Of what use then is this whole discussion? We reply, That the rule of faith or sound doctrine in the Church may be certain. The fathers taught that authoritative proof of ecclesiastical doctrine was to be drawn only from the canonical books. . . . The authority of canonical Scripture alone was judged competent to decide in disputed questions; but the other books, which Cyprian calls ecclesiastical, Jerome apocryphal, they desired indeed to have read in the churches, merely however for the edification of the people, not as proof in matters of doctrine. No dogma is, therefore, to be deduced from these books which has not clear and indubitable support and evidence in the canonical books. No controverted topic can be decided by these books, if there be not other and conclu-

sive evidence in the canonical books. But whatever is said in these books is to be expounded and understood according to the analogy of those truths which are plainly taught in the canonical books."

CAL. (I, 492): "Two things are necessary to constitute a canonical book; first, inspiration, or the immediate divine impulse, which proves the document in question to be divine truth, or the very Word of God; secondly, the divine sanction (canonicatio divina), by which God constitutes His written Word the perpetual and universal rule of the Church."

HOLL. (129): "The canonical books are those whose doctrines and single words were committed to writing by the prophets and apostles, by the immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and were communicated to the Church by God, and received by her as the infallible rule of faith and morals for man who is to be saved."

[6] HOLL. (126): "We judge of the canonical authority of Scripture with reference to its doctrines, by the same proofs and arguments by which we decide in regard to its divine origin. For the Holy Scriptures are an infallible rule or canon of faith and morals, because they derive their origin immediately from God, and are designed by Him for canonical use. Wherefore, when the above-mentioned criteria convince us that the meaning or doctrine of Scripture has proceeded immediately from God, there is no need of an extended demonstration of canonical authority, so far as the doctrine of the canon is concerned."

[7] HOLL. (126): "The canonical authority of Scripture, considered as to its doctrines, is proved by external and internal criteria, but especially by the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit illuminating the minds of men, through the Scriptures attentively read or heard from the mouth of a teacher."

[8] CHEMN. (Ex. Trid. I, 85): "That this whole matter, in itself of such vast importance, might be perfectly secure against all imposture, God selected certain men to write, furnished them with many miracles and divine testimonials, that there might be no doubt that those things which they wrote were divinely inspired. Finally, these writings, divinely inspired, were at the time when they were written, by common consent, with public indorsement, presented, given, and intrusted to the Church, that she should, by all possible care and forethought, preserve them uncorrupted, transmit them thence from hand to hand, and intrust them to posterity. And as the ancient Church, in the time of Moses, Joshua, and the prophets, so also the primitive Church in the time of the apostles, could give certain testimony as to which writings were divinely inspired. For she knew the authors whom God com-

mended to the Church by peculiar evidence; she knew also what those things were that were written by them, and, from what she learned orally from the apostles, could decide that those things which were written were the very same doctrine which the apostles orally delivered. . . . The Scriptures, therefore, derive canonical authority *principally* from the Holy Spirit, by whose impulse and inspiration they were written; *secondarily*, from the writers themselves, to whom God gave clear and peculiar proofs of their truth; *finally*, from the primitive Church, as a witness, in whose day these writings were published and approved. Now this testimony of the primitive Church concerning the divine inspiration of the Scriptures has been handed down in perpetual succession to posterity, and carefully preserved in certain ancient historical records; so that the Church in subsequent ages is the guardian of the testimony of the primitive Church concerning the Scriptures. There is, therefore, the greatest difference between the testimony (1) of the primitive Church in the times of the apostles, that (2) of the Church in the first centuries, which received the testimony of the primitive Church, and (3) that of the present Church concerning the Scriptures; for if what now is and formerly was the Church, can show the testimony of those who received and knew the testimony of the early Church concerning the true Scriptures, we give our assent to her as to *a witness proving her assertions*. But she does not possess the power of determining or deciding anything concerning the sacred books of which she cannot adduce clear documentary proof from the testimony of the primitive Church."

As to the manner in which the primitive Church proceeded in this matter, CHEMN. (Ex. Trid. I, 87) thus expresses himself: "The testimony of the primitive Church, in the times of the apostles, concerning the genuine writings of the apostles, the immediately succeeding generations constantly and faithfully retained and preserved; so that when many others afterwards were brought forward, claiming to have been written by the apostles, they were tested and rejected as supposititious and adulterated, *first*, for this reason, that it could not be shown and proved by the testimony of the original Church either that they were written by the apostles, or approved by the living apostles, and transmitted and intrusted by them to the Church in the beginning; *secondly*, because they proposed strange doctrine not accordant with that which the Church received from the apostles, and was at that time still preserving fresh in the memory of all."

[9] HOLL. (126): "But the canonical authority of Scripture, in reference to the original language, or the authentic Hebrew text

of the Old and Greek of the New Testament, is indeed distinctly proved by the testimony of the primitive Church, but not by this alone." (127): "We add to the testimony of the primitive Church the testimony of Scripture, its continued preservation for the profitable use of men, and the character of its style."

The intent of this passage and the one quoted in the eighth note is the following: The internal and external criteria may indeed beget in us a human faith, but not a divine; the latter can be produced only by the testimony of the Holy Spirit. And this must not necessarily be obtained by the use of the original text: a translation will answer quite as well, since the power of the Holy Spirit lies in the sense and not in the letter of the Word. Wherefore, also, we cannot become divinely assured, in regard to the idiom in which any of the sacred books has been written, by an internal experience. For information on this point we are therefore referred to historical evidence; and the state of the case thus appears to be, that the testimony of the Holy Spirit is necessary to assure us of the divinity of the Scriptures, to which must be added historical proofs to satisfy us as to the language in which a sacred book was written, as to its author, etc. For Br. (112) thus expresses himself: "The internal illuminating power of the Scriptures is associated with the sense *in every language*, in such a manner, that it does not point out precisely the words of the original text as essentially different from other equivalent words of the same or any other language, text or version." But the other criteria, which prove the inspiration of the doctrine contained in Scripture, either do not at all relate to the material part, or the words, of Scripture, but only to the formal part, or the doctrine; or, when they do in some degree relate to the words and their connection, and are employed to prove in general that God is the author of the words of Scripture in any idiom, whatever it may be, they still cannot clearly indicate the precise words and letters in which each book of Scripture was originally committed to writing. There remains, therefore, *the testimony of the Church*, which does not, indeed, confer canonical or normative dignity upon the books of Scripture in any particular language, nor does it by its own authority induce that reception of the divine faith by which the inspiration of that idiom is believed; but notwithstanding this, inasmuch as it historically proves a certain idiom or writing to be the original of the books of Scripture, in which it received them as written by the sacred penman, thus producing a moral certainty in regard to it, it now joined with that which the Scriptures themselves teach, and with which the Holy Spirit intimately connects his own influence, holds a place

in the discussion of the faith. As an example, Holl. (127) adduces the following: "When it is asked, Was the Gospel of Matthew originally written in Greek or Hebrew? this is a question not of Dogmatics, but of history. . . . Of this fact the *Primitive* Church is a credible witness, for it fought upon earth under the banner of Christ, together with the writers then living in the flesh, and received their autographs from their own hands. . . . Thus we seek from the Jewish Church evidence for the Hebrew original of the Old Testament, and from the primitive Christian Church for the original Greek of the New."

It is still worthy of remark that it cannot be clearly understood, from the passages quoted from Hollazius and Baier, whether these theologians supposed that, as each individual can attain only by the testimony of the Holy Spirit unto divine faith in the revelation by Christ, so in like manner each individual can be convinced of the divinity of *each single book* of Scripture by the testimony of the Holy Spirit. The contrary might seem to be proved by the fact that the most of the theologians speak of the testimony of the Holy Spirit only when they are discussing the grounds upon which the authority of Scripture rests (so Grh.); for when it is asserted that each individual attains to divine assurance of the authority of Scripture only through the testimony of the Holy Spirit, this is still somewhat different from the assertion that the canonicity of each separate book must be proved in the case of each individual by the testimony of the Holy Spirit. And Chemnitz, further, does not mention, in this connection, this testimony of the Holy Spirit; but, in order to prove the canonicity of the separate books, points only to the testimony of the earliest Church, which could appeal to the indorsement of the Apostles. And, finally, in all the investigations by the Dogmaticians, in regard to the canonicity of a single book, there is never any allusion to the testimony of the Holy Spirit (Luther's well-known expression of opinion, in regard to the Epistle of James, must not here be taken into the account), but they are all conducted upon the basis of historical evidence. The true state of the case appears most probably to be, that the question whether the proof of the canonicity of a particular book is to be distinguished from the proof of the divine authority of Scripture in general, was never clearly brought home to the consciousness of our theologians; so that the passages quoted in this note, and in Note 6, are designed merely to preclude the error of supposing that the historical testimony of the Church can establish divine faith in the Scriptures in general.

[10] Many theologians divide the books of the Old Testament into *legal*, *historical*, *dogmatical*, and *prophetical*.

Quen. (I, 236): "All those books, therefore, of the Old Testament, and only those, are canonical, which (1) were written by the prophets and in the prophetic spirit, *i. e.*, by immediate Divine inspiration (Luke 16 : 29; Rom. 1 : 2; Eph. 2 : 20; 2 Pet. 1 : 19, 21); (2) and written in the original Hebrew tongue, then vernacular to the Jews, with the exception of a few sections in Daniel, Ezra, Nehemiah, and Jeremiah, that are extant in Chaldee; (3) contain infallible truth, in all points most exactly self-consistent; (4) which were divinely committed to the Jewish Church for perpetual canonical use, received by it, regarded as canonical, preserved and faithfully handed down to the times of Christ; (5) *a*, approved, cited, and commended by Christ and the Apostles; and *b*, as a canon or rule of faith and morals, transmitted unto us by the primitive Church."

[11] Chemn. (Ex. Trid. I, 91): "The reason why those books have been denied canonical authority is obvious. For some of them were written after the time of the prophets, when the people of Israel no longer had prophets, such as the ancient ones were; and they were written by those who had not the divine testimonies, as the prophets had, concerning the truth and authority of their doctrine. Some of these books, indeed, bear the names of prophets, but do not possess certain proofs of having been written by those to whom they are attributed. This is the manifest reason why they have been removed from the canon of Scripture." The most extensive investigations in regard to the separate canonical and apocryphal books of the Old and New Testaments are to be found in Grh., vol. ii, loc. i, c. vi–xi.

[12] We find that the earliest Dogmaticians insist more than the later upon the difference between these and the other undoubtedly canonical books. The most strenuous of all is Chemn. (Ex. Trid. I, 192): "I have cited the testimony of the ancients, not only that the catalogue of those writings of the New Testament may be known which have not sufficiently sure, strong, and consentaneous proofs of their authority, but more especially that the reasons may be known why there should have been any doubt concerning them. (1) Because the ancients did not possess sure, strong, and consentaneous evidence that the original apostolic Church bore testimony that these books were approved by the apostles and recommended to the Church. (2) Because it does not certainly appear, by the testimony of the earliest and ancient Church, whether these books were written by those whose names they bear; but they have been regarded as published by others under the name of apostles. (3) Since some of the ancients

ascribe some of these books to the apostles and others advance a different opinion. This matter, then, inasmuch as it was not indubitably certain, has been left undetermined. This whole controversy depends upon the sure, strong, and consentaneous evidence of the earliest and ancient Church; for, when this is wanting, the Church in after times, without the aid of clear and positive documentary evidence, can no more create a certainty out of an uncertainty than it can make truth out of falsehood." Chemnitz therefore classes those writings of the New Testament, in regard to whose canonical authority some doubts are entertained, with the apocryphal books, and applies to them all, without exception, what was said concerning such parts of the Old and New Testaments in Note 5. It is, however, not hereby denied that there may be a certain difference in value between the apocryphal books of the Old and New Testaments, but it is only asserted that these writings are not to be placed in the same category with the canonical books. For, as we see, Chemnitz insists upon the principle that only those books are to be regarded as canonical in regard to which we possess the most specific and perfectly consentaneous evidence: (1) that they were recommended to the Church by apostles, and (2) that they really are the production of the authors whose names they bear. But the theologians who immediately succeeded him began, appealing to the voice of the Church in past ages, to regard these books as canonical, although they did make some distinction in regard to them. Thus the Magdeburg centuriators (Grh. II, 184) say: "There were some writings disseminated throughout the Church during this century in the name of the apostles or their disciples, of which some were not generally received, owing to doubts in regard to them, but were afterwards received among the number of the Catholic writings, and others which were altogether rejected as apocryphal. Of the former kind are the epistle of James, etc." And Hunnius (in Grh. ib.): "We nevertheless acknowledge that the apocryphal books of the New Testament merited more favor and approbation from the primitive Church than the apocrypha of the Old Testament. Wherefore many of the Fathers, who excluded from the canon certain books of the Old Testament, excluded no book of the New Testament, but made them all canonical." If we inquire into the reason why this was done, it appears to be the following (although we find it nowhere distinctly expressed), that an absolute agreement was no longer demanded, or this circumstance was ignored and reference had merely to the second requisite mentioned by Chemnitz; and even this was not regarded as absolutely

necessary to establish the canonical authority of a book. For Mentzer already (in Grh. II, 185) says: "The books of the New Testament that are called ecclesiastical or apocryphal we receive as deserving to be regarded as canonical, and as having equal normative authority with the rest. We add, however, the qualifying term 'almost' for this reason, that in the primitive Church some persons occasionally objected to these books because it could not be certainly known by whom they were written or published." And Schroeder (also in Grh. II, 185): "There are certain books of the New Testament called by some apocryphal, but for scarcely any other reason than because it was doubted concerning them, not whether they were written by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, but whether they were published by the apostles to whom they are ascribed. But inasmuch as the doubt concerning them did not relate so much to their original Divine author, viz., the Holy Spirit, as to the writers or secondary authors, and as their authority, in the face of this doubt, was abundantly sustained by the principal and earlier fathers of the Church, they are received generally as of equal authority with the canonical. For, that a book may be regarded as canonical, it is not necessarily required that the secondary author, or writer, be manifest; it is sufficient if the prime author or dictator, viz., the Holy Spirit, be manifest; for the books of Judges, Ruth, and Esther are canonical and yet their writers are unknown" From this time, therefore, these books have been thus regarded by nearly all, as by Grh., *e. g.* (II, 186): "(1) There is, indeed, some difference to be made between the books that are contained in the New Testament. For it cannot be denied that some of them were, at times, objected to by some in the early Church. (2) These books are inappropriately called apocryphal, as we can show by a threefold argument: (*a*) Because the doubts concerning them in the primitive Church did not so much relate to their canonical authority as to their secondary author; (*b*) Because even this doubt was not entertained concerning them by all the churches or teachers, but only by some. Two manifest points of difference are therefore discernible between the apocrypha of the Old Testament and those books which some call the apocrypha of the New Testament. The authority of the former was rejected by the whole Church, but it was only some in the Church who doubted the authority of the latter; (*c*) The fathers who treated as such the apocrypha of the Old Testament did not exclude any book of the New Testament from the canon. (3) In teaching we may distinguish between the canonical books of the New Testament *of the first and second rank.* Canonical books of the

first rank are those concerning whose *authors or authority* there never was any doubt in the Church, but which by common consent were always regarded as canonical and divine. Canonical books of the second rank are those concerning whose *authors* doubts have sometimes been entertained by some persons in the Church." Precisely in the same strain QUEN. (I, 235): "We call those books of the New Testament protocanonical, or of the first rank, concerning whose authority and secondary authors there never was any doubt in the Church; and those deuterocanonical, or of the second rank, concerning whose secondary authors (not their authority, however,) there were at times doubts entertained by some. There was doubt, I say, and discussion concerning these books, yet not among all, merely among a few; not at all times, only occasionally. And these doubts had not reference so much to their divine authority or primary author, the Holy Spirit, as to their secondary authors." And HOLL. (131) at last no longer finds this distinction necessary; "since at the present time all evangelical teachers assign divine authority to these deuterocanonical books, there seems to be no occasion any longer for that distinction."

The assertion that the authority of these books had never been doubted is contradicted by BR. (120): "It cannot indeed be denied that some of the ancients did so doubt in regard to these writers, as to refuse to them the authority that belongs to inspired books;" but he also says concerning them: "They are not ignored when we are asked for the rule of faith, but they have authority in such case by common consent at the present day among Christians, especially those of our confession." He does not go into the special proof of this position, it is true, but probably for the reason that he did not regard the doubt raised by so few as of sufficient importance to make this necessary.

[13] In reference to the gospels of Mark and Luke, CHEMN. (Eq. Trid., I, 87) remarks: "That Mark and Luke, who were not apostles, were divinely called to write the gospel, Augustine thus explains, lest namely it should be thought that, in reference to the preaching and reception of the Gospel, it made any difference whether those proclaimed it who followed the Lord while here in the flesh as disciples and servants, or those who believed what they clearly learned from these; and that it was providentially so arranged by the Holy Spirit, that to some of those who followed the apostles authority was given, not only for preaching, but also for writing the Gospel," etc.

CHAPTER V.

Concerning the Articles of Faith and the Symbols of the Church.

§ 13. *What are Articles of Faith?*

THE whole subject matter of revelation naturally divides itself into single propositions, which we call articles of faith. "An article of faith is a part of the doctrine, revealed in the written Word of God, concerning God and divine things, proposed to the sinner to be believed in order to his salvation." Holl. (43)[1] Taken together, these articles form the sum of what the Christian is to believe, [2] and they are closely connected together, standing in the same relation to the general contents of revelation as the members of a body to the body itself. The articles of faith have their origin solely in the Holy Scriptures; [3] but, inasmuch as their contents embrace some truths which could not be known in any other way, and others of which some knowledge may be gained by the light of nature; and, inasmuch as all the truths contained in them are not of equal importance for our salvation, and do not stand in equally intimate connection with it, the articles of faith may be divided into,

I. *The pure articles (which are known only by divine revelation), and the mixed (which are manifest not merely from revelation, but also from the light of nature.* Br. (43). [4]

II. *The fundamental and non-fundamental.*

Holl. (46): "*The fundamental articles* are parts of the Christian doctrine so necessary to be known that, when they are not known, the foundation of the faith is not savingly apprehended or retained by man; and when they are denied by him, to that same extent it is overturned." [5]

(53): "*The non-fundamental articles* are parts of the Christian doctrine which one may be ignorant of or deny, and yet be saved."[6] But the fundamental articles are again divided into "*primary*, without the knowledge of which no one can attain unto eternal salvation, or which must be known in

order for any one to hold the foundation of the faith and secure salvation;" [7] and "the *secondary*, which one may be ignorant of, but dare not deny, much less oppose, without injury to the foundation of the faith." QUEN. (I, 243). [8]

The whole of the articles of faith the Church has collected in *the Symbols*. These contain the confession of faith which the Church has put forth at different times, and are therefore divided into the symbols of earlier and later times. [9]

[1] HOLL. (43): "The term, *article*, is derived from *artus*, and this from *arcto*. It properly signifies members of the body closely joined together, as the joints of the fingers closely cohere. Metaphorically, the word article is applied to the parts of the doctrine of faith, which are most intimately joined together." QUEN. (I, 241): "So that articles of faith are parts of the doctrine of faith, divinely revealed for our salvation, which are most intimately united to each other and to the whole, as the parts or joints of a finger, and into which the whole structure of the Christian religion may be resolved, as a finger into its joints. And their connection is so intimate that, when one is removed, the rest cannot continue sound and whole." The word is sometimes taken in a wider, and sometimes in a narrower sense. HOLL. (44): "*Collectively*, it signifies a whole head of doctrine; *distributively*, any assertion or enunciation which constitutes a part of Christian doctrine. The Christian doctrine is divided into heads or theological *loci*, and these again into certain theses. The heads of doctrine are called articles of faith, as well as the theses under the separate heads; *e. g.*, the theological locus [general topic] concerning Christ is called an article of faith, and the proposition, 'Christ, in the flesh, sitteth at the right hand of God,' is also called an article of faith." Sometimes, merely the mysteries of the faith are meant by the articles of faith. BR. (42): "It is certain that the term, article of faith, is sometimes used in a stricter sense, as accurately denoting the mysteries of faith necessary to be believed in order to salvation, namely, the pure articles, and of these the fundamental alone."

[2] QUEN. (I, 241): "The subjects with which the articles of faith are occupied are *τὰ πιστὰ*, the credenda, the *things to be believed as such*. For a distinction must here be made between the historical and the dogmatical, and between the moral doctrines, which teach what is to be done or avoided, and the doctrines of faith, which treat of what is to be believed or not believed. For although faith, generally viewed, may have respect to all that is contained in the

Word of God, whether it be of an historical or moral or dogmatical character; yet it has nevertheless a special reference to the doctrines of faith or to the things to be believed, as such."

Grh. (VII, 165): "Since those things which are propounded in the Scriptures as matters of faith, are not of one kind, but some pertain to the faith directly and *per se*, and others in certain respects and remotely, such as historical descriptions of deeds performed by the saints, so not all the matters contained in the Scriptures can be regarded as articles of faith, strictly and accurately speaking, *but only those doctrines the knowledge of which is necessary to salvation.*" . . . And, after an appeal to Thomas Aquinas: "If the Jesuits in the Ratisbon Colloquium had observed this principle of the teacher, they never would have blurted forth the assertion: 'It is an article of faith, that the dog of Tobias wagged his tail.'"

If the Dogmaticians found it necessary, over against the Romanists, to guard against too wide a use of the term, "articles of faith," they found it equally necessary, at a later day, in opposition to Calixtus, to guard against a too narrow use of the same expression. After the example of Bonaventura, he divided the doctrines into antecedent, constituent, and consequent. In the first class he included everything that man can know by means of his reason, without the aid of revelation; in the second, all in the strict sense constituting the faith, and standing in special relation to the salvation provided by Christ, and that cannot remain unknown without peril to salvation. In the third class he included all those doctrines which are derived only by inference from the special doctrines of the faith. The term "articles of faith" he applied only to those of the second class. "The constituent articles of faith are those which, in themselves and their substance, so to speak, and as divinely declared, must be known and believed, from the necessity both of means and of the command. . . . The knowledge of the antecedents and consequents is not a matter for every one, but only for the more advanced." . . . In opposition to him, therefore, the distinction was made, that everything contained in the Scriptures that refers to the faith is an article of faith. As Calixtus further maintained: "That the Apostles' Creed sufficiently comprehended all the articles of faith, so that the ignorance of other doctrines might be regarded as by no means harmful to salvation;" and: "That the Apostles' Creed was a mark for distinguishing not only Christians from the heathen, but also the orthodox or Catholics from heretics; so that whoever received the Apostles' Creed should be considered members of the Catholic Church and subjects of the kingdom of Christ, and were by no means to be condemned as her-

etics, whatever errors they might entertain,"—he is answered by the statement (QUEN. I, 30): "The Apostles' Creed is not an adequate test of the doctrines that must be believed in order to salvation, for many articles especially necessary are omitted, as: Of Original Sin, Redemption, the Personal Union, the Universality of the Grace and Merit of Christ, Justification by Faith, the Imputation of Christ's Righteousness, etc."

[3] HOLL. (44): "A true article of faith must be (*a*) revealed in the written Word of God; (*b*) have reference to the salvation of man; (*c*) be intimately connected with the remaining doctrines of the faith; and (*d*) be not apparent to unaided reason." QUEN. (I, 242): "For it is possible for doctrines to be perspicuously and plainly propounded in Scripture, while their subjects, peculiar to faith, may not be clearly apprehended, as the mystery of the Trinity, etc., etc., since by the light of nature they would never have been known; whence faith is said to be occupied with such things as are not seen. Heb. 11: 1."

In opposition to the assertion of the Socinians: "Whatever is absolutely necessary to salvation, must necessarily be with simple and entire literalness written in the Scriptures," we have the statement of CAL. (I, 804): "Although we acknowledge that those things which must be believed in order to salvation ought to be clearly taught and exhibited in the Holy Scriptures, so that they may be drawn thence by all, yet we do not admit that they are there expressed precisely, or literally, so that those things which are deduced by easy, ready, and obvious inference from the Holy Scriptures, are not to be considered as articles of faith and necessary to be believed."

[4] QUEN. (I, 242): "There are some doctrines in Scripture which are simply πιστὰ (matters of faith), and cannot be at all learned from reason, but are infinitely above it; there are also some things to be believed which, although they are revealed in Scripture and necessary to be known, are nevertheless of such a nature that even reason by the use of her own principles could attain some sort of knowledge of them; hence arise the *pure and mixed articles. The former* are derived from the Word of God alone and are simply matters of faith, as the article concerning the Trinity, etc., etc.; *the latter*, although they may be known in some degree from the light of nature, are nevertheless purely matters of faith, in so far as they are known by divine revelation; *e. g.*, that God is, etc., is known from evident proofs, and is believed on the authority of the divine revelation. Yet all such things as may be known to some extent by the light of nature, *are not matters of faith so far as they are appre-*

hended by the aid of the light of nature, but in as far as they are apprehended by the aid of divine revelation." In like manner, HOLL. (45): "No article of faith formally considered, so far as it is an article of faith, is mixed; inasmuch as all articles of faith are dependent on divine revelation, and therefore, with respect to their formal object, are not naturally apprehended."

Of the *pure articles of faith* HOLL. (45) remarks: "They treat of the mysteries of faith that transcend the comprehension of unaided human reason. Μυστήριον (mystery) is derived from μύειν, which signifies to have closed eyes, to compress the mouth, and consequently to be silent. From μύειν is formed μυέειν, which signifies to imbue any one with honest doctrine. Μυεῖσθαι is the same as to be initiated into sacred things. Ὁ μύστης is a man initiated into sacred things, who either silently hears others and learns sacred things, or who is imbued with such knowledge of sacred things, that he may teach them, and is to be heard with reverential silence. Τὸ μυστήριον, in profane authors, signifies every secret matter that dare not be rashly mentioned, but especially the sacred Eleusinian mysteries of Ceres, guarded by the strictest silence. In sacred literature, mysteries are divine and supernatural matters, unknown to unaided reason, not intuitively perceived, but divinely revealed for the sake of our salvation."

[5] QUEN. (I, 242): "The *fundamental articles*, or those that cannot be unknown, or at least not denied, consistently with faith and salvation, are those which are intimately connected with the foundation of the faith. A *foundation*, generally speaking is, as N. Hunnius defines it, 'that which is the first in any structure, which lies beneath the whole structure, and is not sustained by anything else.'" Thus the foundation of the faith is that upon which the faith, and, indeed, the whole of Christianity, as a house that is to be built and upheld, is based. And, inasmuch as a foundation is sometimes the same as a cause, a fundamental article is such a doctrine as serves to produce and establish faith and eternal salvation, or which explains some cause of faith and salvation. QUEN., according to the method of Hunnius, distinguishes a threefold foundation. "1. *Substantial*, the object upon which man rests his confidence, from the beneficial effect of which he expects eternal salvation; or, it is the proper object of faith, which is the triune God, to be embraced by faith in Christ, the Mediator. 2. *Organic*, the Word of God, which is as a seed, out of which Christians are born again; thus it is also called a foundation, inasmuch as it is a means of generating faith, and a source of doctrine which lies underneath faith, and thus is a foundation of faith. 3. *Dogmatic*, that first part of the

heavenly doctrine which is not referable to any other doctrine, but revealed for its own sake, and to which all other doctrines, as if revealed for its sake, are referred, and from which, as a sufficient and immediate cause, faith results. Hence *heresy* is not any and every error, contrary to the Word of God, but one that undermines or overturns the foundation of the faith." Holl. (46): "A foundation of the faith is either real, *i. e.*, substantial, or dogmatic, *i. e.*, doctrinal. The *substantial* foundation of the faith and salvation is Christ, since He is the meritorious cause of obtaining from God forgiveness of sins and eternal life. In 1 Cor. 3: 11, Paul calls Christ the foundation of the building; for the whole Church rests upon Christ. . . . But since the Church is the assembly of all who believe and are to be saved, it may be legitimately concluded that Christ is the foundation of faith and salvation. The *dogmatic* foundation of the faith is the collection of doctrines divinely revealed, by which Christ, the substantial foundation of the faith, and the sources and means of salvation necessarily connected therewith, are set forth. By the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Paul means, in Eph. 2: 20, the doctrine taught by them. Moreover, the apostle teaches that Christ is the cornerstone, indicating that the doctrine of the prophets and apostles is in such a sense the foundation, that it rests upon Christ Jesus, as the ultimate cornerstone and foundation. . . . The substantial and the dogmatic foundation of the faith are not two foundations essentially contradistinguished from each other, nor do they differ as to their subject-matter, but as to our method of conceiving of them, in consequence of their different connotation. For Christ is the foundation, as to the subject-matter; the doctrine concerning Christ is the foundation, as to our knowledge. But the doctrine concerning Christ is nothing else than Christ, known by the intellect, and exhibited in a written or preached form, that others may know Him."

[6] Br. (56): "*E. g.*, concerning the sin and eternal ruin of certain angels, concerning the immortality of the first man before the Fall, concerning Antichrist, concerning the origin of the soul, whether by creation or traduction." But he adds to this: "At the same time, moreover, we are to be careful in regard to this matter, lest by embracing or professing error we rashly sin against divine revelation and God Himself; especially, lest something be maintained, through the persuasion of others, contrary to conscience, whereby the foundation and the truth of one or more of the fundamental articles of the faith are overturned. For thus, as by a mortal sin, faith and the Holy Spirit may be and are entirely driven away."

[7] Quen. (I, 243): "Among these fundamental articles of faith a certain order has been established in regard to the relation which they sustain to each other, and to an intermediate as well as an ultimate end; so that some are called primary and others secondary fundamental articles, some are said to be of the first, others of the second rank."

The primary articles are subdivided. 1. By some into *constitutive* and *conservative* articles. Quen. (I, 243): "*Constitutive* fundamental articles, according to N. Hunnius, are those which constitute the very foundation of the faith, or are the immediate cause of faith, as 'God will have all men to be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth.'" The *conservative* are those which do not, indeed, immediately cause faith itself, but which are necessarily implied in the immediate cause of faith; *e. g.*, that God is true and omnipotent, etc.; where he further observes that, "for any doctrine to constitute a foundation of the faith, it is necessary that it so fully and firmly maintain all the doctrines necessary to the production of faith, that none of them be wanting, nor any other doctrine admitted which may militate, directly or indirectly, against the doctrine in question, or render it in any wise inefficient in producing faith." 2. Others divide them "into (*a*) *antecedent* articles of faith, which do not, indeed, cause justifying and saving faith, nor are absolutely and immediately necessary to its existence, but which are, nevertheless, necessary to the complete and permanent establishment of those doctrines which produce and constitute the faith, which cannot be done when these are not taught or are unknown or denied (the doctrine of the existence of a divine revelation, of the existence of God, His power, etc., etc., of the divinity of the Mediator, the sinfulness of man, the resurrection of the dead, the last judgment); (*b*), into *constituent* articles of faith, which immediately and most nearly relate to our salvation, and intrinsically constitute and cause faith (the Christian doctrines of the love which God bears to man, of the merit and universal atonement of Christ, and its application to individual cases); (*c*), into *consequent* articles of faith, which so necessarily follow established faith that, if they be not held, faith itself again is lost (the eternal duration of God, the executive justice of God, the efficacious sanctification of God, the intercommunication of attributes and operations in the person of Christ, the regal office of Christ, etc., etc.)." Hulseman (in Quen. I, 243).

[8] Holl. (51): "The *secondary fundamental articles* are those, a simple want of acquaintance with which does not prevent our salvation, but the pertinacious denial of, and hostility to, which over-

turn the foundation of the faith. Such are the parts of the Christian doctrine in regard to the characteristic peculiarities of the Divine Persons, of the intercommunication of attributes in Christ, of original sin, of the decree of election in view of final faith, of the justification of the sinner by faith alone, meritorious good works being excluded." (The latter sentence is thus further illustrated (p. 52): "The justification of the converted sinner by faith in Christ, is a constitutive fundamental article of faith. But it may happen that a sinner, acknowledging and hating his sins, may repose entire confidence in Christ as a Mediator, and yet know nothing about the exclusion of good works. Who would condemn him? But he who denies that the sinner is justified alone by faith in Christ, violates the primary fundamental articles concerning the grace of God and the merits of Christ.") The comparison of Notes 7 and 8 shows, moreover, that the Dogmaticians do not similarly divide the single doctrines of the same class. From the distinctions made in the fundamental articles there results what Holl. (53) remarks: "All the fundamental articles of faith must necessarily be known, but the grades of this necessity are different. For those articles of faith which not only enter into the very definition of saving faith, but are immediately operative in the production of faith, are the most necessary for man to believe in order to his salvation. Of the remaining articles, some are positively and directly, others negatively and indirectly, necessary to be believed. And, in reference to those who believe, the same measure of knowledge will not be required of all."

The distinction between the articles of faith, as fundamental principal and less principal, is met with already in Gerhard, who took it from the Scholastics; but in the fully developed form above cited, it first appears in N. Hunnius. Reformed theologians, in order to bring about a union of the two confessions, had denied the existence of a fundamental difference between them, and for this purpose had generalized the definition of the term fundamental as much as possible. To guard against falsely irenic attempts, Hunnius then wrote his "Careful Examination of the Fundamental Doctrinal Difference between the Lutherans and the Calvinists. Wittenberg, 1626."

[9] Quen. (I, 21): "A summary of true religion (and of the articles of faith) is contained in the Symbols, embracing the Christian faith; these are either ancient, or œcumenical, received throughout all Christendom" (Apostles' Creed, the Nicene, Constantinopolitan, Ephesian, Chalcedonic, and Athanasian Creeds), or more recent and, by reason of their less solemn sanction, particular (the

Unaltered Augsburg Confession, the Apology, the Smalcald Articles, the Catechisms of Luther, and the Formula of Concord).

In regard to the relation of the earlier to the later symbols, Holl. remarks (Comp. 7): "Those which were approved by the unanimous consent of the whole Catholic Church, viz., the three œcumenical symbols, possess far greater authority than those which have received the sanction and approbation of only a few particular churches."

As to the meaning of the word Symbol.—Cal. (I, 101): "They are called symbols because they were the tokens of the ancient Church, by which the orthodox could be distinguished from the heterodox." Holl. (54): "They are public confessions, drawn up after much deliberation and consultation, in the name of the Church, by orthodox men, with reference to certain articles of faith, so that the members of the orthodox Church might be removed from the ignorance and heretical wickedness of infidels, and be preserved in the proper profession of the faith." As there are a number of them, Hutt. (Comp. 6) remarks: "Our churches recognize many symbolical books, but only as the same kind of evidence for the doctrine of their day."

In reference to the relation sustained by the Symbolical Books to the Scriptures, cf. the Form. Conc. (Of the Compendious Rule and Guide, 7): "There is thus a very clear distinction made between the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments and all other writings; and the Holy Scriptures are acknowledged as the only judge, rule, and guide by which, as by a Lydian stone, all doctrines are to be tried and adjudged, whether they be godly or ungodly, true or false. But the other symbols and other writings . . . do not possess decisive authority, . . . but merely furnish testimony for our religion and explain it, and show in what manner at particular times the Holy Scriptures were understood and explained, in regard to controverted points, by the learned men who then lived in the Church." This relation was not discussed, however, in the works of the Dogmaticians until the time of Hutter; and the same was the case with the question as to the importance and necessity of the symbols. The relation, as it was regarded at the end of the orthodox period, is thus expressed by Holl. (56): "The Holy Scriptures and the Symbolical Books differ; because: (1) The Holy Scriptures were communicated by immediate inspiration from God to holy men of God, led by the Holy Spirit. The Symbolical Books are sacred writings, composed by orthodox men, divinely endowed with the privilege of mediate illumination (in a strict sense no symbol of the church can be called inspired). For although

these orthodox men conceived the symbol mentally and committed it to writing, by illumination of the Holy Spirit, yet they did not write by a special, extraordinary, and immediate inspiration of God, but were endowed and instructed by God through an ordinary and mediate illumination. Nor were the single words of the Symbolical Books actually dictated to them by the Holy Spirit, but by the assistance and direction of God they themselves discovered suitable words and applied them to the divine doctrines. (2) The Holy Scriptures are worthy of belief on their own account, and, to establish their authority, need no earlier source by which they may be proved. The Symbolical Books are worthy of belief because of their harmony with the revealed Word of God. (3) The Holy Scriptures, by virtue of their divine, canonical authority, constitute an infallible rule whereby true doctrines are distinguished from false. The Symbolical Books have ecclesiastical authority, and by virtue of this are called a rule, namely, with regard to the public profession of faith, by which we declare the unanimous consent of the Church in doctrine. (4) The Holy Scriptures adequately contain all that is to be believed and practiced; no Symbolical Book embraces fully all the doctrines and moral precepts (but, by reason of the time and occasion when and on account of which the Symbolical Books were written, those particular doctrines were discussed which were then controverted and chiefly assailed)." And, inasmuch as the Symbolical Books are called inspired by some theologians, Holl. further remarks (58): "The Symbolical Books are, it is true, called by some authors inspired, (*a*) by virtue of their *object*, since they contain and expound the Word of God, formerly communicated by immediate inspiration to the prophets and apostles, and elicit something by legitimate inference from the Word of God; (*b*) in view of their *mediate illumination*, for we do not doubt that God exerted a special influence upon the minds of the godly, learned men who wrote the Symbols of the Church, illuminated their minds and inclined their wills, so that they conceived and wrote most true and wholesome doctrines."

Of the necessity of the Symbolical Books (Id. 59): "The Symbolical Books are necessary, not absolutely but hypothetically, for the condition of the Church, which was induced by weighty reasons to their publication, (*a*) to establish solid, permanent, and firm concord in the Church of God, so that there may be a certain compendious form or type approved by universal consent, in which the common doctrine, which the churches of the purer doctrine profess, collected from the Word of God, may be contained; (*b*) to furnish an account of the Christian religion, if it be demanded by the civil

authority; (*c*) to distinguish the true members of the Church from her enemies, the heretics, and schismatics." In regard to *obligation to the Symbolical Books*, HOLL. remarks (59): "He who is a living member of the Church, and designs to fill the office of public teacher in it, may be bound by the superior magistrate to subscribe under oath, the Symbolical Books; in order that, as he is publicly to teach in the Church, he may be required to adhere to the universally acknowledged profession, exposition and defence of the common doctrine."

PART I.

OF GOD.

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§ 14. *Division of the Subject.*

THE chief design of the creation of man, and that of revelation also, is, that God may be known. [1] Theology, therefore, must begin with the doctrine concerning God. [2]

The doctrine concerning God may be divided into (1) The doctrine of the existence, the nature, and the attributes of God. (2) The doctrine of the particular manner in which God subsists, *i. e.*, the doctrine of God as triune. (3) The doctrine of the works of God, *i. e.*, of Creation. (4) The doctrine of the manner in which God preserves His works and cares for them, *i. e.*, the doctrine of Providence. (5) The doctrine of the angels, as the ministering beings among the works of God.

CHAPTER I.

Of God.

§ 15. *Preliminary Statement. The Natural and Supernatural Knowledge of God.*

THE full and saving knowledge of God we obtain, of course, only from revelation. But aside from this there exists a knowledge of God, for we find it even among the heathen. We can therefore distinguish a twofold source from which the knowledge of God may be derived, the one, the volume of

Nature, and the other, the volume of the Scriptures; and the knowledge of God is accordingly both *natural*, and *revealed* or *supernatural*. [3]

The natural knowledge is either *innate* or *acquired*, *i. e.*, a certain knowledge of God is inborn, and this can be expanded and further confirmed by the contemplation of the works and ways of God in nature and history. [4] The knowledge thus arising, though in itself true, may nevertheless be corrupted and changed into error through the moral depravity existing in man; [5] it is at best very imperfect, making known indeed something concerning God, *e. g.*, His existence and somewhat of His attributes and will, but this never in its entire extent, and never in such manner as to give to man an absolute certainty, so as to furnish a trustworthy guide for his faith and life; [6] much less does it suffice to secure his salvation. [7] The reason of this imperfection lies, however, in the depravity of human nature, which, since its fall, can no longer lift itself up to a perfect knowledge of God. All knowledge thus derived we must therefore regard as the remnant of a knowledge which, but for the Fall, we would have possessed in full measure. [8] It serves, accordingly, rather to awaken in us a longing after true and perfect knowledge (*cognitio pædagogica*), and in some measure to regulate our moral deportment, even before the knowledge communicated by revelation has reached us (*cognitio pædeutica*); and it can also be profitably employed along with revealed knowledge (*cognitio didactica*). [9] We still need revelation, therefore, in order to acquire full and true knowledge. [10]

[1] Grh. (III, 1): "That this doctrine concerning God is necessary, is proved (1) by the design for which man was created. Just as all things else were created on account of man, so man was brought into being in order rightly to know and worship, to love and honor God his Creator. . . . (2) By the design for which God reveals Himself. God, coming forth from the hidden seat of His majesty, not only in the creation of the world, but also and most of all in the revelation of His Word, out of His boundless goodness unto men reveals Himself, surely with no other aim than that men may rightly know God through this revelation, and may preserve and hand down to their posterity the true doctrine concerning God, free from any intermixture of error and in its integ-

rity." [MEL. begins his *Loci* of 1542: "For this end man was created and redeemed, that he might be the image and temple of God, to proclaim God's praises."]

[2] GRH. (ibid.): "As the Holy Scriptures are the only source of knowledge in Theology, so God, boundless in goodness, supreme in power, is the only and absolute source of existence, not only with reference to the Holy Scriptures themselves (in which the Word of God or the divine revelation is contained), but also with reference to the divine works concerning which Theology treats. The centre of all Scripture, the nucleus of Theology, the end and aim of our knowledge and desire, all these are one and the same. We pass, therefore, in convenient order, from the article concerning the Scriptures to the article concerning the Nature of God and the Divine Attributes."

QUEN. (I, 250): "The chief end of man and of all Theology is God, and the knowledge, worship, and enjoyment of God; with the doctrine concerning Him, therefore, we properly begin, when Theology is treated after the manner of a practical discipline."

HOLL. (187): "As Theology is a practical science, we are first of all to treat of its design. But as the aim of Theology is twofold, in part objective, that is, the infinitely perfect and supremely beneficent God, and partly formal, that is, the beholding and beatific fruition of God; so the objective end of Theology, namely, God, who thoroughly satisfies the desire of man, is first to be considered."

[3] GRH. (I, 93): "Two things lead to the knowledge of God: the creature and the Scripture (Augustine)."

HOLL. (188): "The knowledge of God is sought both by the light of Nature or Reason, and by the light of Revelation."

[4] QUEN. (I, 251): "The *natural knowledge of God* is that by which man, without any special revelation, may know of himself, though very imperfectly, by the light of Nature and from the Book of Nature, that there is some supreme Divinity, that He, by His own wisdom and power, controls this whole universe, and that He has brought all things into being."

GRH. (I, 93): "*Innate knowledge* is that common conception concerning God engraven and impressed upon the mind of every man by Nature, and hence from the womb, as though from principles born within us or κοιναῖς ἐννόιαις (which are nothing else than certain remains and ἐρείπια of the divine image, sparks and scintillations of that clear light which shone with full splendor in the mind of man before the fall), which also embrace some knowledge of God; as, that He is one, good, etc." (III, 42): "These scintillations

therefore we refer to that internal Book of Nature, to which also belongs the book συνειδήσεως, the internal testimony of conscience, which the scholastics call συντήρησις; for from principles born within us there arises in the heart of every one this practical syllogism: 'He who leads an impious life shall experience the wrath and punishment of a divine judge.' The reason of this lies in that which is by nature engraven upon all, *i. e.*, that there is a God, that God is to be worshiped, that God is the avenger of crimes. The conscience of the guilty adds: 'I have led a wicked life.'"

(Id., III, 42): "*Natural knowledge* is acquired by the human mind from the external Book of Nature, *i. e.*, from the contemplation of the divine effects and ways, by the exercise of its natural powers." As such effects of the divine agency, GRH. enumerates (I, 94): "(1) The creation of things visible. (2) The variety, beauty, and order of created things. (3) The supporting, governing, and preserving of created things. (4) The profuse bestowment of the various gifts which minister to the necessities of man and other living beings. (5) The notice and retribution of the avenging eye and hand of God. (6) The working of miracles. (7) The foretelling of future events. (8) The periodical overthrow of kingdoms. (9) The nature of the human mind. (10) The fragments of natural knowledge, and among these the distinction of good and evil. (11) The terrors, gnawings, and stings of conscience. (12) The series of efficient and final causes."

[MEL. (Loci, 1542) cites as proofs of the Divine existence: 1. The Order of Nature, which could not have arisen or be maintained by accident, or have arisen from matter. The perpetuity of species, *e. g.*, that men are born of men, and cattle of cattle, is cited as one illustration. 2. The nature of the human mind. A senseless and irrational thing cannot be the cause of an intelligent nature. 3. Moral distinctions made universally by men. These could not have originated from matter. 4. The universality of the testimony to God's existence. 5. Terrors of conscience, implying a Supreme Judge. 6. Organization of political society, which could not have arisen accidentally, but points to a divine mind, implanting within man the capacity and laws of order. 7. The series of efficient causes implying a First Cause. If the series were infinite, there would be no order among the causes, and none would necessarily cohere. 8. Final causes prove a designing mind. Everything in Nature is arranged with reference to an end.]

[GRH. (III, 4) recapitulates proofs of philosophers and scholastics: 1. The series of moving objects in this world implies a First Mover. 2. The order of efficient causes implies a First Cause. 3.

The different degrees of good imply a Supreme Standard. 4. The direction of all things, even those that are irrational, towards a certain end. 5. The natural inclination of all men to believe that there is a Governor of the Universe, whom they call God. This is illustrated by the fact that, in sudden dangers, when men recognize the impotency of human aid, they instinctively resort to prayer.]

Quen. (I, 253): "The natural knowledge of God is twofold; partly ἔμφυτος, or by nature impressed upon the minds of men in their very origin, *innate and implanted*, by which men recognize God through certain principles born within them, as it were by certain fragments and remains of the divine image, without any research or operation of the mind; partly ἐπίκτητος, or *acquired*, because it is evolved through the inborn principles of nature through a process of reasoning and the accurate contemplation of created things, or gathered from the works of God in creation and those traces of divinity which are scattered throughout the universe. The former is called subjective; the latter, objective. The former all men, even infants, possess; but the latter is not found in all. *The former* is propagated by generation; the latter by the instruction of others, or also by personal culture and investigation. The former may be called *constitutional* knowledge, for it belongs to us after the manner of a constitutional tendency, even before the use and exercise of reason; the latter, *actual*, because it exerts itself and is obtained by reasoning and research." Compare also the remark of Grh. (III, 46): "Finally, we observe, that when Ostorodus says that men do not obtain whatever knowledge they have of God or of divinity from nature, or from the contemplation of created things, but alone by hearing and from the teaching of others, the word, "hearing," is ambiguous. For if Ostorodus means that for all knowledge of God there is required a special manifestation of God through the Word, this we totally deny; but, if by the word, hearing, be understood the doctrine and precepts derived from our ancestors, who followed nature alone as a teacher, then we say that this, no less than the principles connate with us, and also the contemplation of created things, belongs to natural knowledge. But, although the arguments are distinct by which we demonstrate as well the innate as the acquired natural knowledge of God; yet, when the Photinians deny both, it is sufficient for us to prove against them that there is some natural knowledge of God, from whatever source derived, whether from natural instinct, or intuition, or the instruction of others, who have followed Nature alone as a teacher."

Cal., in opposition to the Socinians, thus sums up the proposi-

tions in regard to the natural knowledge of God: "(1) That man, destitute of the revealed Word of God, can attain, by the use of sound reason, to some knowledge concerning God, His being and His general will or providence. (II, 61.) (2) That not only the faculty or the power of knowing God, but also a certain knowledge of God, belongs to us by nature. (II, 73.) (3) Although there does not belong to man a knowledge of God before the use and exercise of reason, so far as concerns a distinct notion or mental conception, yet we think it cannot be denied that there exists in man a certain disposition, or a kind of constitutional tendency, a certain τελείωσις of intellectual power left in man after the Fall, by the use of which man can, to some extent, recognize God without the help of a teacher. (II, 80.) (4) That it is known to man, not only naturally, but also *per se*, that there is a God." (II, 86.)

The proof for the existence of an *innate knowledge* is drawn from Rom. 1: 19, and 2: 14, 15; also from the following reasons: "(1) From the connate distinction between good and evil that is stamped upon the minds of all; (2) From the dread of a supreme divinity naturally springing up in the hearts of men; (3) From the terrors of an evil conscience and the cheerfulness and security of a good conscience; (4) From the torments of conscience on account of a crime committed. . . . (5) From the unanimous consent of all nations; (6) From the secret inclination of all to some form of religion; (7) From moral precepts drawn from the light of nature." (Quen. I, 253.)

The *acquired knowledge* is proved from Rom. 1: 20; Acts 17: 27.

[5] Quen. (I, 253): "That the natural knowledge of God is true, is evident from this, that the apostle expressly calls it ἀλήθεια, Rom. 1: 18 sq., and with the addition, ἀλήθειαν τοῦ θεοῦ, v. 25, as that which springs from original truth; where, nevertheless, we must distinguish between the natural knowledge of God, considered in and through itself, and in so far as it has united with it imperfection, corruption of reason, and a proclivity to various errors. Viewed in the former light it is true, viewed in the latter it is *mingled through accident with falsehood.*"

[6] Cal. (II, 47): "The imperfection of the natural knowledge of God as to those things which are revealed in nature, and its nullity as to the supernatural mysteries of faith."

Quen. (I, 253): "The natural knowledge of God is imperfect mainly in two respects: (1) as regards its *object*, this being either altogether unknown (and here belongs the Gospel, which is a mystery hidden from the ages), or not fully known (and here belongs the doctrine of the Law, which man knows from natural

sources only in part); (2) As regards its *subject*, either not recognizing God with sufficient constancy, or sometimes doubting concerning Him in consequence of congenital corruption."

CHMN. (*Loci*, I, 20): "The natural knowledge of God either amounts to nothing, or is imperfect, or languid. It *amounts to nothing*, since all philosophy knows nothing whatever of the gratuitous promise of the forgiveness of sins; for the Son of God has revealed this to the Church from the bosom of the Eternal Father, John 1: 18; Matt. 11: 27; 1 Cor. 1: 21; 2: 7. It is *imperfect*, for the heathen know only a small portion of the Law; but of the inner worship of the First Table, reason neither knows nor determines anything for certain. Heathen philosophers teach of only external and civil topics, mingling with them many foolish paradoxes, concerning which there is among them no agreement. It is *languid*, for although the fact that God exists and requires obedience is impressed upon men's minds, nevertheless, the assent to this is not only feeble, but is often shaken by horrid doubts. An apt illustration is found in the Tusculan Disputations, where Cicero, discussing with Antony the immortality of the soul, says: 'Read diligently Plato's treatise concerning the immortality of the soul. Nothing will be left for you to desire.' 'This I have done frequently,' Antony replies; 'but, somehow or other, as long as I read I assent, but whenever I lay aside the volume and begin to reflect concerning the immortality of the soul, all my assent glides away.'"

In regard to the substance of what is known by the light of nature, QUEN. (I, 255): "The controversy here is not whether man, naturally or without revelation, can recognize τὸ τί ἐστι, what and who is the true God, according to all the peculiarities of the divine nature; and whether he can naturally fully understand His providence and His special will in the government of the Church and in the eternal salvation of men: for all these things are to be sought only through the revealed Word. But the question is *whether man can naturally know* τὸ ὅτι, *whether God be*, and *in general recognize* what that Divine Being is, who is the cause of all things in nature, who is just, good, holy, is to be worshiped, etc.; and so, whether man without a revelation can have any adequate knowledge concerning the true God or any true conceptions concerning God, although in particular he may apply them improperly, as *e. g.*, to that which is not truly God."

With the last remark from Quenstedt compare the statement of Gerhard (I, 96): "We must distinguish between the conception of God, derived by the heathen mind from the contemplation of

His creatures, and the application of that conception; the former is legitimate, the latter is far from being so. For, although they derive the conception of eternal power and divinity . . . from the Book of Nature, yet they do not rightly apply it to the one Jehovah, . . . but they ascribe the same to irrational animals, serpents, reptiles, etc.; and inasmuch as they of their own accord devise a method of worship, they thereby worship the imagination of their own hearts and not the true God."

Through the light of nature man attains, therefore, only "a *partial knowledge concerning the power, wisdom, goodness and providence of God.*" GRH. (III, 60): "Man has been deprived of the knowledge of God, so far as the *integrity of natural knowledge* is concerned, for the greater part of it has been obliterated from his mind by sin; so far as its *purity* is concerned, for the knowledge yet remaining is very much obscured; and, *in view also of the peculiar wickedness of certain persons.*"

[7] QUEN. (I, 261): "The natural knowledge of God is not adequate to secure everlasting life, nor has any mortal ever been redeemed, nor can any one ever be redeemed, by it alone. Acts 4: 12; Rom. 10: 18; Mark 16: 16; Gal. 3: 11; Eph. 4: 18; Gal. 4: 8; Eph. 2: 12."

MEL. (I, 9): "Although, in some way, the human mind comes to the knowledge of the fact that God punishes the guilty, nevertheless concerning reconciliation it knows nothing without the revelation of the divine promise."

[8] QUEN. (I, 254): "We must distinguish between the natural knowledge of God, viewed in its original integrity, and the same in its fragmentary remains; the former is a perfect θεογνωσία, constituting a part of the mental condition of our first parents, as graciously created; the latter, on the other hand, is a partial and imperfect knowledge of God, still inherent in our corrupt nature since the Fall. It is as it were a little spark of primeval light, a small drop from a vast ocean, or an atom of the ashes of a splendid house in ruins."

[9] CHMN. (Loci, Part I, 21): "The reasons why God imparted the external knowledge of Himself to the minds of all men are: (1) For the sake of external discipline, which God wished to be exercised by all men, even the unregenerate; (2) that God might be sought after (Acts 17: 27–30); . . . (3) that He might render men inexcusable (Rom. 1: 20)."

CAL. (II, 40): "The use of the natural knowledge of God is (1) *Pædagogical*, for seeking after the true God, who has manifested Himself through the Scriptures in the Church; (2) *Pædeutical*, for

directing morals and external discipline both within and without the Church; (3) *Didactic*, because it contributes to the exposition and illustration of the Scriptures, if it be rightly employed." (Also II, 51): "The use of this doctrine (*i. e.*, the topic concerning the natural knowledge of God) is that we may understand whether we can by nature know anything of God, or what and how much we can thus know; lest we either deny those things which are naturally manifest, or ascribe too much importance to them: also, that we gratefully recognize this manifestation and cultivate this natural knowledge as the Book of Nature is daily unfolded, and do not suppress it, or abuse it, but duly unite the Book of Nature with the Book of Scripture, and finally be confirmed and stimulated by the teaching and example of those who have applied themselves to the study of truth and virtue as here exhibited and illustrated."

[10] QUEN. (I, 268): "The *supernatural or revealed* knowledge of God is that saving knowledge of the triune God and of divine things, drawn from the written word of God, which has flourished from the beginning of the Church and was ordained for human salvation."

CHMN. (Loci Th., I, 22): "The saving knowledge of God through which we obtain eternal life, is that revealed through the Word, in which God makes known Himself and His will. To this revelation, God has bound His Church, which knows, worships, and glorifies God only as He has revealed Himself in this Word, so that in this way the true and only Church of God may be distinguished from all heathen religions."

§ 16. (1.) *The Certainty of the Divine Existence.*

Although the divine existence is postulated in the natural human consciousness, which furnishes many proofs of it, [1] yet we become perfectly certain of it only through revelation. [2]

§ 17. (2.) *The Essence of God.*

Our *knowledge of the essence of God* (*quid sit Deus*) is also mainly derived from revelation, for the Holy Scriptures give us in His names, attributes, and works a description of God Himself. [3] And with the knowledge thus derived we must be satisfied, for we know concerning the essence of God nothing more, and nothing more specific, than what the Holy Scriptures teach. We acquire, indeed, from this source no

adequate and complete knowledge of the essence of God; for this transcends our powers of comprehension, and for this reason the Scriptures declare the incomprehensibility of the divine essence. (1 Tim. 6: 16; 1 John 3: 2; Rom. 11: 33.) But we may very well be content with the knowledge imparted to us through the Holy Scriptures, as we nevertheless learn therefrom as much about God and His essence as is needful for our salvation. [4]

From what has been said, it is manifest in what sense God may be defined. He cannot be literally defined, *i. e.*, we cannot express in words what God is as to His essence, what He is in Himself, because no adequate conception can be formed of Him; but a definition of God, in a wider sense, may nevertheless be given, in so far, namely, as, upon the authority of the Holy Scriptures, a description of God may be presented, according to which we can most clearly distinguish between Him and other essences. [5]

Upon the authority of the description of God given in the Holy Scriptures, we can thus define Him as *an Infinite Spiritual Essence.* [6]

[1] See above, § 15, Note 4.

[2] Grh. (III, 40): "To some it may seem that this question in the Church is superfluous, since it is known and conceded by all that God exists, and there is no people, however barbarous, that denies that God exists, and that He is to be worshiped (though it may not know how to worship Him), and so the knowledge of God is naturally innate in all. . . . But, nevertheless, we must prove that God exists, (1) for the confutation of those who deny that there is a God; (2) for the confirmation of our faith (. . . in great and severe temptations, says Chemnitz, we are all either Epicureans or Stoics; our mind must therefore be established by the consideration of the arguments which prove that there is a God, and that He exercises a providential care over human affairs); (3) for the perfecting of natural knowledge (. . . since the natural knowledge of God is imperfect and languid, and so must be confirmed, widened, and deepened from the Word divinely revealed.")

[3] Cal. (II, 110): "That God exists, special scriptural statements testify, especially those which communicate His names, words, and works."

GRH. (III, 14): "To synonymics belong the names of God, in the exposition of which the principal part of the doctrine concerning God consists, because our theology in this life is almost wholly grammatical, whence whatever we may know concerning God is called a name of God. . . . The names of God are general or special. In a general and wide sense, *a name of God is whatever is predicated of God;* thus the term was employed by the ancients, who, under the designation of names, embraced also the attributes or characteristics."

QUEN. (I, 268): "In determining the question what God is, we must first consider the *divine names*, some of which, either in view of their etymology or from the manner in which they are used in Scripture, indicate the essence of God, and are commonly called essential, as Jehovah, Jah, Elohim; others are derived *from the divine attributes*, as when God is called omnipotent, just, wise; others *from the divine works*, as when He is called Creator, Preserver, etc."

[4] CHMN. (Loci Th., I, 24): "As we are not to think of God otherwise than as He has revealed Himself in the Word He has given, these questions (concerning the essence and the will of God) have certain prescribed limits, within which the human mind, contemplating God, must confine itself. For dangerous errors have arisen on this subject, for no other reason than because the point of view was not rightly taken, or because human curiosity in this discussion wandered farther than was meet." . . .

SELN. (I, 53): "It has been said that we ought to be content with the descriptions of God which are given by God Himself."

ID. (I, 51): "Hilary says: We understand that only that is to be heartily believed concerning God, in reference to which He Himself authoritatively testifies that it is to be believed concerning Him. What, therefore, God is absolutely, and what is His nature and substance, we know that no one can state, imagine, comprehend, or declare by an essential definition, either by any dialectic reasoning or by the keenness of the human intellect. For, since neither eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor have entered into the heart of man the things which God has prepared for those that love Him, how much less can the dulness of the human mind grasp God Himself? Whence many are accustomed to say, that it is easier to define what God is not, than what He is."

Thus GRH. says (III, 15) of the divine majesty: "The variety of divine names expresses the divine majesty. For since, in consequence of its infinite perfection, the divine majesty cannot be fully recognized by us, therefore so many divine names are given

in the Scriptures, that from these we may be led to something like a suitable recognition of the divine majesty."

Br. (173): "It must be confessed that in this life we may not have a specific, proper, and adequate conception, well-defined and clear, of the divine esseuce; for we know but in part."

[5] Thus already Chmn. asks (Loc. Th., I, 25), after the example of the Scholastics: "If a definition must explain the nature of the thing defined so as to lead the mind, as it were, into the very thing itself, how then can God be defined?"—and answers; "The reply is easy: It is indeed true, concerning our knowledge of God in this life (1 Cor. 13: 12), that 'we see through a glass, darkly;' and so in the definition it is said, 'He is of immense wisdom and power,' *i. e.*, God is greater than we can imagine or declare. . . . But, in examining the definition we do not scrutinize those mysteries of the essence and will of God which He wishes us to be ignorant of; but we gather a brief statement from what God has Himself revealed to us in His Word concerning His essence and will. And, since God surely wishes to be recognized and worshiped as He has revealed Himself, that description of God is to be held, to which the mind reverts in prayer; for adoration is nothing but a confession, whereby we ascribe to the essence addressed in prayer all the attributes comprised in the definition. There is, therefore, a name of God occult and hidden, which is not to be searched out. There is, however, also a name of God made known that He wishes to be recognized, spoken about, praised, and worshiped."

Grh. (III, 70) therefore distinguishes: "(1) Between a perfect definition, which exactly conforms to the accuracy of logical rules, and a description drawn from the Scriptures. (2) Between knowledge and comprehension. That is comprehended which is perfectly known; that is perfectly known which is known so far as it can be known. We know God, indeed, but we do not comprehend Him, *i. e.*, we do not perfectly know Him, because He is infinite. Here we must note, however, that *the knowledge of God derived from the Word is called perfect*, as well by reason of its end, for it is sufficient for salvation, as by way of comparison with natural knowledge, which is very obscure and imperfect. (3) Between the knowledge of God in this and in another life. . . . The latter, or intuitive definition is the most perfect of all, for we shall then see God in the future life, face to face. . . . (4) A nominal definition may be given, but not an essential one."

Cal. (II, 142) distinguishes in the same way between a definition rigidly taken and a definition broadly applied.

GRH. (III, 68) proves the inadmissibility of a definition in the strict sense: "(1) *From the want of a genus.* That of which there is no true and proper logical genus cannot be defined, because the genus is an essential part of a definition. But God has no true and proper logical genus; because, if there were such a genus, that would be in the same terms essentially and equally predicated of God and of creatures, which cannot be done, because God as the Creator and the creature are separated from each other by an infinite interval, and there is nothing that can be equally predicated of both. (2) From *the divine perfection.* God is the supreme Being, so He has nothing beyond Him; but whatever is properly defined is defined through something going before. . . (3) From *a sufficient enumeration.* If God may be properly defined, that would be either an essential or a causal definition. Essential it could not be, because that consists in genus and specific differentia. But God has no name of the same genus with other beings, nor is His most simple essence composed of genus and differentia. Neither can it be a causal definition, since God is the cause of all things, but of God there is no cause."

[6] This position is taken by Calovius, Quenstedt, Koenig; while others, as Baier (173), Hollazius (229), thus define: "God is a spiritual Being, subsisting of Himself; or, more concisely: God is an independent Spirit."

The individual terms are explained as follows:

(1) BR. (172): "By the term *divine essence* is meant that which is first thought of in God, and through which God is adequately distinguished from all other things, and which, in our mode of conception, is the root and source of all the perfections which, as attributes, are ascribed to God."

(2) QUEN. (I, 284): "The term *spiritual essence* is a common conception. For the term essence is common to God and creatures, but belongs to God originally and independently, to creatures secondarily and by way of dependence. And the term *spirit* also is analogically predicated of God and angels, and also of the souls of men." (The difference that is observed when these two terms are predicated of God and of creatures respectively, is still more accurately indicated in the statement: "Essence, substance, spirit, and consequently the remaining attributes which are ascribed at the same time to God and to creatures, are predicated of God and of rational creatures not *συνωνύμως*, univocally, nor *ὁμωνύμως*, equivocally, but *ἀναλόγως*, analogically, so that they belong to God *πρώτως* and absolutely, to creatures *δευτέρως* and by way of dependence, analogy being properly thus employed with reference to an intrinsic

attribute. The term *univocal*, properly and strictly speaking, belongs to such things as have the name and the thing denoted by that name equally in common, no inequality interfering on account of the dependence of the one upon the other; *equivocal*, to such as have a common name but not the thing signified by the name; *analogical*, to such as have both the name and the thing designated by that name, but unequally, when the name and the thing belong to the one πρώτως and absolutely, but to the other δευτέρως and by way of dependence.") (Id., 293.)

(3) "But the predicate *infinite* expresses the peculiar conception; for by this God, as an infinite Spirit, is distinguished from angels and the souls of men, or finite spirits, and by this infinity of His own, God transcends all the bounds of being, so that He cannot be limited by time or place or any other thing, but, considered simply in His own nature and essence, He is of Himself and absolutely infinite. Nor do we speak of God as compounded, when we form both a common and a peculiar conception concerning Him. For that is a distinction of the reason only, and not a real one. (God is infinite, not by virtue of quantitative extension, since He is devoid of all quantity, but by virtue of essence and perfection.)"

The *independence* is thus explained by Br. (173): "For, as by this, God is adequately distinguished from all other things, so there is nothing that you can earlier conceive of in God, as a peculiar and specific conception, than this, that He is not from another, and so exists of Himself and necessarily. Proof-texts: Isaiah 44: 6, compared with Isaiah 41: 4; Rev. 1: 17."

The more popular definition of God (*definitio Dei nominalis*) is: "By the term, God, is understood the first Being, because He is of Himself and is the cause of all other things, and because He preserves and governs all things;" concerning which Holl. remarks (187): "All men in the present life discover in themselves that they do not and cannot otherwise conceive of God than as related to created things, as the first Being, because from Him is the cause of all other beings, and He preserves and governs all; or as the Being most excellent of all, than whom nothing can be, or be thought of as being, better or more perfect."

The earliest theologians, who did not as yet treat of the attributes as a special topic, embrace them all, together with a notice of the Trinity, in the definition of God. Thus Mel. (Loci Theol., I, 13): "God is a spiritual essence, intelligent, eternal, true, good, pure, just, merciful, most free, of vast power and wisdom, the eternal Father who begat the Son, His own image, from eternity, and the Son, the co-eternal image of the Father, and the Holy Spirit, pro-

ceeding from the Father and the Son." Later theologians also regard it as necessary to incorporate at once the Trinity in the definition of God. Thus CAL. says (II, 282): "Those who do not include a statement of the three persons in the description of God do not present that doctrine in a form at all genuine or complete, since without these it does not yet appear what the true God is." Compare, per contra, § 19, preliminary note.

§ 18. (3.) *The Attributes of God.*

The doctrine of the attributes of God comprises only the more specific description of the divine nature, as the same is set forth in the Holy Scriptures. [1] The attributes are, therefore, not to be considered as something supplementary to the essence of God, which may be laid aside without detriment to the substance of God; [2] but in them we describe the divine essence only according to its special features, because we cannot otherwise conceive of it (they are thus variously characterized on account of the feebleness of our conception). Hence it also follows that the attributes are to be regarded as unchangeable and permanent. [3]

We acquire our knowledge of the divine attributes, in general, only from the Holy Scriptures, as has been already said, and yet these are here taught, either only by way of popular representation, or without any design of aiding us in constructing a systematic doctrinal statement of the divine attributes. To accomplish this, we must have recourse to other expedients. A correct and exhaustive arrangement of the divine attributes we may, however, attain, if, starting out with the proposition that God is the Most Perfect Essence, we endeavor to enumerate all His perfections; inasmuch as the attributes of God are nothing else than the description of this most perfect Essence. These perfections we ascertain in a threefold way:

1. By ascribing to God, in the highest sense, all the perfections which we can discover in His creatures, inasmuch as no perfection can be wanting to God of which we find creatures possessed.

2. By removing from our conception of God all imperfections which we observe in creatures, as nothing in any wise imperfect can be ascribed to Him, and by attributing to Him all the opposite perfections.

3. By ascribing to Him all the perfections which necessarily must have belonged to one who was able to create and accomplish what God has done. It is, therefore, by the way of *eminence*, [4] of *negation*, [5] and *causality*, [6] that we arrive at a comprehensive knowledge of the divine attributes.

The attributes found in this way may be variously classified; usually they are divided *either* into negative and positive (Holl. (237), "the former being those by which the imperfections found in creatures are removed from God; the latter, those by which perfections are simply affirmed concerning God;" *or*, into such as describe God as He is in Himself and such as describe Him in His relation to the world). Therefore, *a.* Attributes ἀνενέργητα, quiescent (which, viz., have no specific reference to certain acts), or immanent, which describe the divine essence absolutely and in itself, without reference to an operation, and so directed towards no act; *b.* Attributes ἐνεργητικὰ, or operative, and exerting themselves outwardly, having reference to other things, which describe the divine essence relatively, with reference to an operation, and so are recognized as ordained for certain acts. [7] We follow the former division, and arrange the attributes of God, therefore, in the following manner:

Br. (174): I. The Negative are: unity, simplicity, immutability, infinity, immensity, eternity.

1. "*Unity;* the attribute of God, by which we conceive the divine essence to be absolutely single; not only undivided, but also indivisible and incommunicable by any multiplication of Himself." Holl. (238.) "Unity is ascribed to God, as well *absolutely*, *i. e.*, that the divine essence is undivided; as *exclusively*, *i. e.*, when we recognize God as one, beside whom there is none other. Deut. 6: 4; 4: 35; 2 Kings 19: 19." Br. (175). [8]

2. "*Absolute Simplicity*, by which God is truly and really uncompounded (not compounded of matter and form, of integral parts, of subject and accident, of nature and subsistence). Ex. 3: 14." (Ibid.) ["Spirituality, John 4: 24, is comprised in Simplicity." Quen. I, 286.]

3. "*Immutability* consists in this, that God is liable to no change, either as to existence (inasmuch as He is immortal

and incorruptible. Rom. 1: 23; 1 Tim. 1: 17, 6: 16), or as to accidents (James 1: 17), or as to place (Jer. 23: 24), or as to will or purpose (Numb. 23: 19: Prov. 19: 21; Mal. 3: 6)." Br. (176). [9]

"*Immutability* is the perpetual identity of the divine essence and all its perfections, with the absolute negation of all motion, either physical or ethical." Quen. (I, 288).

4. "*Infinity*, because the essence of God is contained within no bounds (either of time, of place, or of anything else). Ps. 145: 3." Br. (177).

5. "The *Immensity* of God consists in this, that the divine essence cannot be measured by, or included within, any local limits. Jer. 23: 24; 1 Kings 8: 27." Br. (178).

"*Immensity* is the interminable ubiety, by virtue of which God cannot but be everywhere, in His own essence, or it is the absolute interminability of the divine essence. It flows from infinity, which, with respect to time, is eternity, and, with respect to space, is immensity." Quen. (I, 288). From this there follow: *a*, the power of being illocally present, absolutely everywhere; *b*, the (ubiety and) omnipresence, by virtue of which God is actually present to all His creatures." [10]

6. The *Eternity* of God, absolutely so called (for it does not signify merely a very long time), indicates that the existence or duration of God is permanent, without any beginning or end, without succession or change. Ps. 102: 27; 90: 2; Gen. 21: 33; Isaiah 40: 28; 1 Tim. 1: 17; Rev. 1: 4 and 8, 11: 17; 16: 5." Br. (185).

II. The Positive Attributes. Br. (174): "Life, knowledge, wisdom, holiness, justice, truth, power, goodness, perfection."

1. *Life.* Quen. (I, 289): "The attribute, by which the divine essence always shows itself active." [11]

2. *Knowledge.* Quen. (I, 289): "By which He, through one simple and eternal act of the intellect, knows all things whatever that have been, are, and shall be, or even in any way can be. Nor only absolutely, but also that which is conditionally future or possible. 1 Sam. 2: 3; 1 John 3: 20; 1 Kings 8: 39; Ps. 7: 9; 34: 15; 139: 1; Pr. 15: 3." [12]

3. "The *Wisdom* of God signifies that most accurate judg-

ment of God, by which He knows how to dispose and ordain all causes and effects in a most admirable manner for the attainment of His end. Job 12: 13; 28: 20; Rom. 11: 33." Br. (191).-[13].

"The Omnisapience of God is that, by which He most thoroughly penetrates all those things which infinitely surpass the reach of human and angelic judgment." Quen. (I, 290).

4. "*Holiness*, by which He, conformably to His own Law, desires all things that are right and good. Deut. 32: 4; Ps. 92: 15; Lev. 11: 44; 1 Pet. 1: 15." Br. (200). [14]

"The holiness of God is the supreme purity in God, absolutely free from all stain or vice, and requiring due cleanliness and purity in creatures." Quen. (I, 292).

5. *Justice.* "The supreme and immutable rectitude of the divine will, demanding from rational creatures that which is right and just." Quen. (I, 292).

"Justice is a divine attribute ἐνεργητικὸν, by virtue of which God wishes and does all those things which are conformed to His eternal Law (Ps. 92: 15), prescribes suitable laws to creatures (Ps. 19: 7), fulfils promises made to men (Is. 45: 23), rewards the good (Rom. 2: 5–7; 2 Thess. 1: 6, 7), and punishes the wicked (Ps. 119: 137; Rom. 1: 32; Acts 17: 31; 2 Thess. 1: 6; Rom. 3: 8, 25)." Holl. (268).

6. "*Veracity*, by which God is unfailing in speaking the truth and keeping His promises. Numb. 23: 19; Heb. 6: 18; Deut. 32: 4." Br. (202).

7. *Power.* "The divine attribute by which God can accomplish everything that can possibly be done without implying an imperfection in God." Holl. (272).

"Power is that by which God independently, through the eternal activity of His own essence, can do absolutely everything that does not involve a contradiction. Matt. 19: 26; Luke 1: 37; 18: 27; Eph. 3: 20." Quen. (I, 293). [15]

8 and 9. "*Goodness* belongs to God, not only *absolutely and in itself*, which is His very *perfection*, or the essence of God, since He contains within Himself all perfections (Matt. 5: 48; Luke 18: 19), either formally or by way of eminence; but also, *respectively* or in relation to creatures, to whom God is good, since He efficiently produces every created good (Acts 17:

25, 28; James 1: 17; 1 Cor. 4: 7), and this according to His own perfection, as the ideal or pattern of created perfection; and it attracts also, and excites to the love and desire of Himself as the chief good." Br. (205). [16]

[1] Quen. (I, 284): "Attributes are nothing else than inadequate conceptions of the divine essence, involving in part the essence itself of the object, and inwardly designating the same. Inasmuch as our finite intellect cannot adequately conceive of the infinite and most simple essence of God by a single adequate conception, therefore it apprehends the same by distinct and inadequate conceptions, inadequately representing the divine essence *which inadequate conceptions are called the affections and attributes of God;* affections, because they designate the divine essence; attributes, because they are attributed to the same by our intellect."

Holl. (234): "The attributes of God are called perfections, because they most perfectly declare God's essence."

[2] Chmn. (Loc. Th. I, 29): "An accident does not belong to God. . . . By an accident, that is meant which can either be lost, or can be added to a substance before existing, or can depart while the substance itself remains."

Cal. (II, 221): "The attributes are by no means accidental, but, on the part of the object, they are the essence of God itself, regarded under various modes or respects of consideration, since essentials are usually referred to by that name. For if they were accidents, they would add a new entity or perfection, and the essence of God would not of itself be complete. If they were to belong to God in the manner of accidents, God's essence would not be altogether immutable, because liable to accidents."

Quen. (I, 296): "Before any operation of our intellect, divine attributes are truly and properly in God; yet they are not accidents, nor are they predicated of God in the manner of inherence or composition." And this is further explained by the following: (I, 297): "The divine attributes do not denote anything superadded to the divine essence, but are only inadequate conceptions of an infinitely perfect essence. The divine essence is like a boundless ocean of all infinite perfections, which the human intellect has not the ability to exhaust, by one single conception, and, therefore, by means of various conceptions, draws drop by drop, as it were, something from that infinity." (Ibid.) "The divine attributes imply the divine essence itself, which we apprehend now with this and then with another perfection, as if we would distribute the essence itself into a number of conceptions, representing the same

essence inadequately, inasmuch as our finite intellect cannot at the same time distinctly recognize its infinite perfections."

Hence follows the proposition (GRH. III, 84): "The *divine attributes, considered in and of themselves, are really and absolutely one with the divine essence.*" CAL. (II, 222): "If they really differed from the essence after the manner of accidents, a composition in God would be predicated; and since, by nature, accidents come after essence, former and latter in the order of nature would have a place in God, both of which are contrary to the faith. If they were to be actually distinguished, they would not be predicated in the abstract of God, who in the abstract is said to be truth, life, love. If God's power were to differ from His essence, God would not be *αὐτεξούσιος*, *i. e.*, powerful in Himself, but on account of the power superadded to His essence."

There is, indeed, a certain difference between essence and attributes, otherwise they would not be separately treated. This distinction is thus stated by QUEN. (I, 300): "The essential attributes of God are distinguished neither from the divine essence nor from each other really, or from the nature of the object, as matters altogether diverse, or as two or more different objects or diverse modes of one and the same simple object, but they are so distinguished *only to the reason.*"

A distinction from the nature of the object, would occur if the objects were different, as body and soul; but a distinction from reason occurs, when anything is only conceived of as distinct, although it is not distinct in fact. HOLL. (235) expresses this distinction thus: "Divine attributes are distinguished from the divine essence and from each other not nominally, nor really, but formally, according to our mode of conceiving, not without a certain foundation of distinction." To wit: not "*nominally*" because "divine attributes imply distinct conceptions, therefore they differ more than nominally" nor "*really*," because "the divine essence is most simple, destitute of all real composition" but "*formally*," etc., "because we form single conceptions of the operations of the single attributes, although they do not exist separately in the divine nature."

[3] GRH. (III, 84): "The attributes exist inseparably in God; for, as it is impossible that the essence of an object be separated from the object itself, so also the attributes cannot be separated from God, since they are the very essence of God."

[4] HOLL. (190): "*By way of eminence*, according to which whatever we discover in creatures to be especially perfect, we ascribe in the most eminent manner to God, by virtue of the very

familiar principle in nature: 'Whatever exists in an effect, pre-exists in the cause.' From which we infer that all perfections which are in creatures, are in the Creator, either formally or by way of eminence. For indeed, in creatures, such perfections shine forth absolutely, as involve in their formal conception no imperfection, but are better than the creatures themselves. Thus we notice in men, the most eminent of visible creatures, the power to understand and to will, wisdom, goodness, justice, etc. These perfections exist formally, and, indeed, in the most excellent manner, in God."

While here perfections are ascribed to God which in a certain sense can be predicated also of a creature, GRH. (III, 86) appends the twofold remark: (1) That we must be careful to observe that they belong to man only secondarily, but to God originally. . . . "Of God they are predicated essentially, ἐξοχικῶς, and, therefore, altogether in a peculiar way; of certain creatures only accidentally and through a participation and resemblance: of God they are predicated in the abstract; of creatures, only in the concrete. The goodness of God not only belongs to God essentially, and is itself the essence of God, but also is the cause and rule of goodness in man." (2) That those attributes which in the case of man express an affection, when ascribed also to God do not indicate a weakness or mutability like that of the creature, in accordance with the principle (ibid): "Whatever things are transferred from creatures to God must first be freed from all imperfections, and then only, as that which is perfect, are they to be ascribed to God." (I, 110): "Nor do those affections which Scripture ascribes to God prove any mutability of the divine essence; for those things which are spoken of ἀνθρωποπαθῶς, must be understood θεοπρεπῶς."

CHMN. (Loc. Th., 29): "It is objected that some things are affirmed of God with respect to time: as, 'the Word was made flesh,' and became for us a Creator, an aid in times of trouble, and a refuge. Therefore, all this is predicated of God accidentally. Cyril replies: 'With respect to creatures, some things are affirmed of God under the limitations of time; and these are affirmed accidentally,' not because anything happens, with change, to God's substance, but as an accident of the creature in which the change occurs."

[5] HOLL. (191): "*By way of negation*, according to which we remove from God whatever implies imperfection in creatures, and ascribe to Him an opposite perfection, according to the self-evident principle of nature, that there is no defect in that which is supremely perfect. Relying upon this principle of nature, we call God in-

dependent, infinite, incorporeal, immense, immortal, incomprehensible."

[6] Holl. (190): "*By way of causality*, according to which we recognize from the effects an efficient First Cause; from creatures, a Creator; and from the most beautiful and wise government of this universe, a most excellent, most powerful, and most wise Preserver and Governor. Here an argument is derived from the very evident axiom: An effect is proved from the cause, and its perfection." N. B. Except in the writings of Grh., we find the method adopted after the time of Dionysius only incidentally noticed, it is true; and Holl. mentions it barely as that by which we can acquire a natural knowledge of God: but we may with good reason assign it this place; for, although it is not questioned that we obtain a clearer and more comprehensive knowledge of the divine attributes from revelation than natural knowledge teaches, yet we cannot believe ourselves limited, with regard to the divine attributes, to the Holy Scriptures in such a way as only to have the single attributes enumerated for us out of the Scriptures, but we must rather be able from them to form for ourselves such a conception of the Divine Essence that we may from it deduce the attributes; and thus, from the standpoint of revelation itself, this threefold way of *eminence* can be evolved.

[7] Grh. (III, 85) enumerates still other distributions: "(1) Some attributes are predicated *at the same time of God and of creatures*, such as those by which things are signified which in creatures are accidents, but in God are substances, as when God is said to be good, wise; but others are predicated *of God alone*, as those by which things which belong to God alone are explained, as when He is said to be eternal, infinite. (2) Some attributes are attributes to God *properly*, as that He is good, wise, etc.; others *improperly and figuratively*, when, by anthropopathy, human members and affections are ascribed to Him. (3) Some are affirmed of God *in the abstract*, as when He is said to be life, goodness, truth; others *in the concrete*, as when He is said to be living, good, and true. (4) Some are *internal*, as infinity, eternity, spirituality; others are *external*, and these are either *inimitable*, as omnipotence, etc., or *imitable*. (5) Some belong to God *from eternity*, as that He is infinite; others belong to Him *in time*, as that He is the Creator and Preserver, yet these, as relative terms, do not prove any change made in God Himself in time, but denote that a new work has been produced by Him, and that a change has been made in creatures."

Those Dogmaticians who divide the attributes into immanent and externally operative, usually cite a greater number. Calov. (II,

223, seq.) thus enumerates them: "I. The *immanent* attributes pertain either to essence, or infinity, or spirituality. To the essence belong God's perfection (and thence, majesty and happiness), unity (and thence, simplicity), truth (and thence, immutability), goodness, holiness. To infinity belong immensity, eternity. To spirituality, immortality, life (intellect, will). II. To the attributes *exerting themselves outwardly* belong omnipotence, omniscience, grace, justice, truth, omnipresence."

[8] Holl. (238): "God is said to be *one*, not in kind, but in number, since He is a being entirely alone, not only in Himself undivided, but also indivisible, because of the entire simplicity of the divine essence, as there is no composition in God."

Grh. is the only one of the Dogmaticians who considers unity as not an attribute, but as a characteristic, of the divine essence. For the relation of the unity of God to the Trinity, see § 19.

[9] Grh. (I, 124): "But did the work of creation change God, or make Him changeable? By no means; for in time He did that which, from eternity, He had decreed in His immutable will."

[10] Grh. (III, 122): "The immensity and essential omnipresence of God is thus to be understood (1), that God is present to all things, not only by virtue and efficacy, nor only by sight and knowledge, but also in His entire and individual essence, *for He is immense and infinite, not only in power and knowledge, but also in essence;* (2), that God is everywhere present, not συνεκτῶς, so as to be comprehended, but συνεκτικῶς, so as to comprehend and contain all things; not περιεκτῶς and περιγραπτῶς, but περιεκτικῶς. The Scholastics say that God is everywhere, not locally or by way of circumscription, . . . nor definitively, . . . but repletively;* yet this must not be understood in a gross and corporeal manner, that God fills all places just as a body which fills its own place in such a manner as to hinder another body from beihg located in the place which it occupies, but in a divine manner, that God, being confined to no place because of the immensity of His essence, contains all places; (3), that God is everywhere present, not by the multiplication of His essence, for He is ὅλως ὅλου τι, a most simple being, and, therefore, whatever He is He is entire, neither by the division of His essence, . . . nor by extension and rarefaction, . . . nor by commingling; . . . (4), that God is, by His essence, everywhere present, not subjectively, as an accident inheres in a subject, because God is neither composite, nor can He admit of composition, . . . but that He is effectively present as the source and cause of the thing which He effects; for God is not contained in a place, but rather gives to place and

*See Appendix II, under *Circumscriptio.*

the things that are in place their own existence. The presence is (*a*), illocal; (*b*), indivisible; (*c*), incomprehensible to our reason; (*d*), effective and operative; (*e*), containing within itself all things, like a most minute point.

Holl. (275): "God's omnipresence is a divine ἐνεργητικόν attribute, by virtue of which God is present to all creatures, not only by the nearness of His substance, but also by His efficacious working. The divine presence, according to the Scriptural idiom and its complex meaning, implies two things (1), ἀδιαστασία, or the substantial presence of God with creatures; (2), ἐνεργεία, or effectual operation. Therefore, two things are here to be proved: (*a*), that God, with respect to His substance, is everywhere present; (*b*), to a full and accurate definition of the divine presence, the effectual operation also of God as a definitive part is required by the light of the Holy Scripture."

[11] Quen. (I, 289): "God is *life* (1), essentially, for He is αὐτόζωος, having life ἐν ἑαυτῷ (John 5: 26), *i. e.*, in Himself and of Himself, by His own nature and essence; (2), ἐνεργητικῶς, effectively, because He is to all the cause and origin of life, or He is the life of all that live, not formally, but causally. (Acts 17: 28; Deut. 32: 39.)" This is negatively expressed by immortality. 1 Tim. 6: 16, and incorruptibility, Rom. 1: 23; 1 Tim. 1: 17.

[12] Quen. (I, 289): "Although the knowledge of God is one and simple, and cannot be separated into parts or species, yet, with respect to objects, a manifold distinction is generally observed. This distinction is (1) into *natural*, or that of simple intelligence, and *free*, or that of sight. The *former*, which is called also abstract and indefinite, is that by which God knows Himself, and not only those things which are, which have been, or are about to be, but also all possible things, viz., those which can happen and exist, although they never will happen or exist; yea, He is acquainted even with those things which are impossible. The *latter*, viz., the knowledge of free vision, which is called both intuitive and definite, is that by which God regards all things as present, sees Himself in Himself, and all other things which at any time have existed, or now exist, or will truly exist, both in Himself, as in the universal cause, and in their proximate causes and in themselves. The Scholastics add a third, and name it *mediate*, according to which they say that God is acquainted with those things which can exist, with the condition interposed that it is limited to that which the creatures, if created with certain conditions, would be free to do, or would be allowed to effect. Natural knowledge precedes every free act of the will. Free knowledge is said to follow a free act of

the will. Mediate knowledge is said indeed to precede an act of the will, yet in such a manner that it sees something as future only on the hypothesis of such will.

[13] Br. (191 and 192) discusses the topic of *the will of God*, not as a separate attribute, as many Dogmaticians do, but as supplementary to the attribute of wisdom; and from the will of God deduces the attributes of holiness, justice and truth.

Holl. (261): "The will of God is the divine essence itself, conceived of under the mode of power, seeking the good and shunning the evil that is known by the intellect."

The nature of the divine will is more particularly described as follows:

Br. (193): "The will of God is distinguished into natural and free. According to the *former*, God is said to will that which He is not able not to will. According to the *latter*, He is said to will that which He was able also not to will, or to will the opposite. According to the former manner, He is said to will Himself; according to the latter manner, created things."

Holl. (262): "You say: The necessity to will and love Himself seems to be an imperfection in God, both because it is like the mode of operation of natural agents, which is imperfect, and also because freedom is a greater perfection than necessity. Reply: Necessity in acting is threefold. One kind is *violent*, which is from without. A second is *natural*, which is, indeed, from within, yet is inanimate or at least irrational. Both are imperfect. A *third is natural, vital, and in the highest degree voluntary.* This is a great perfection, and such a necessity to will and love exists in God in respect to that which is a supreme and infinite good. Yea, this necessity is more perfect than the freedom to which it is opposed."

Br. (194): "The free will of God is distinguished as: (1) efficacious and inefficacious. That is *efficacious* by which God wills something to be effected. *Inefficacious* is that by which something in itself pleases God, although He does not intend to effect it. The efficacious will again is divided into *absolute*, by which God wills something without a condition; and *conditional*, by which He wills something under a condition; (2) *absolute*, by which He wills that something be effected by His own absolute power, or by His power as not bound by second causes; and *ordinate*, by which He wills that something be effected by His own ordinate power, or by His power as bound to second causes and to a certain order of means appointed by Himself; (3) *first or antecedent*, by which He wills something from Himself alone, or entirely from His own inclination, without any regard being had to the circumstances; and *second*

or consequent, by which He wills something with a consideration of the circumstances, or in consideration of a cause or condition, regarded with respect to the creature for which He wills something."

Br. (198): "A distinction of the divine will also occurs, into *a will of the sign and of the purpose*. The *former* is meant when the name, will, is ascribed to an effect or object of the divine will, namely as a sign of a will in God.* The *latter* denotes the *act itself* of the divine will, by which it wills anything. Whence it is manifest that the distinction is analogical. But we must take care not to imagine such a *will of the sign* as to conflict with *the will of the purpose* which *the sign, according to the plan*, ought to signify."

[14] Holl. (246): "God is holy, (1) *independently* and by His essence: creatures dependently and through a quality superadded to the essence; (2) *immutably*, inasmuch as the holiness of God cannot fail, or undergo a change like that of a creature, James 1: 17; (3) *efficiently*, because He is the author of all holiness, 1 Thess. 5: 23; (4) *by way of example*, since the holiness of God is the model of all holiness, which the holy sons of God perpetually contemplate and imitate. This imitation the Heavenly Father demands of them, Lev. 11: 44; cf. Lev. 19: 2; 1 Pet. 1: 16; (5) *objectively*, because the holiness of God must be sacredly recognized and celebrated by us, Is. 6: 3."

[15] Quen. (I, 293): "The objects of the divine omnipotence are not only such things as God wills to do, but also such as are in any way possible, and, therefore, all those things which do not involve contradiction, as (1) such as have no mode of existence. Thus God is unable to render a deed undone; (2) such as imply a fault or defect, as to be able to lie, to sin, to die. For to do such things is not a proof of power, but of impotence. The *potentia* of God is not separated from divine *potestas*, *δύναμις*, from *ἐξουσία*,† as the Calvinists wish; for, although these can be distinctly conceived of, and among other things outside of God have frequently been separated, yet in God they are most intimately joined, and are one and the same thing."

"Although divine power is *unique*, yet because of its different relations, it can be distinguished into *absolute*, by which God can most absolutely effect whatever can exist; and *ordinate*, which the accustomed government of the universe displays. By the *former*, God can frame a new world, from the stones raise up children to

[*As illustrations, he cites Matt. 6: 15; 12: 50, and especially 1 Thess. 4: 3.]

† ["*Potentia* denotes a merely factitious power, which can be exerted at will, like *δύναμις*; *potestas*, a just and lawful power, with which a person is intrusted, like *ἐξουσία*."—*Doederlein's Latin Synonyms.*]

Abraham (Matt. 3: 9); the *latter* preserves the order established in nature. By this absolute power God can do many things, which, nevertheless, He does not do by His ordinary power."

[16] Holl. (245): "The goodness of God is the conformity of the divine essence to the divine will." It has been distinguished into essential goodness, or perfection, and moral goodness, or holiness.

CHAPTER II.

Of the Holy Trinity. [1]

§ 19. *The Doctrine is a Mystery.*

THE Holy Scriptures declare that God is but one, and yet they also ascribe Divinity to three, viz., Father, Son, and Spirit; and thus we learn from them that *there is one God, but that this one God is Father, Son, and Spirit.* Here a proposition is stated which is altogether beyond the grasp of reason; the doctrine it contains belongs therefore to those we designate as mysteries. [2] Concerning this mystery the Holy Scriptures alone can give us any information, therefore upon them alone this doctrine is based. [3] But the Holy Scriptures do not unveil for us this mystery; they rather reveal the doctrine as a mystery, and it is therefore to so great an extent a mystery, that we here upon earth can never attain to a perfectly correct conception or comprehension of it, [4] and at best can only approximate this by analogies drawn from the sphere of human knowledge. [5] Therefore the Church desists from any attempt to fathom this mystery, but applies in this case most rigidly her rule of extracting the substance of her faith alone from the Holy Scriptures. She simply assigns to herself the task of most carefully collecting and arranging the subject-matter of what the Scriptures teach in regard to this mystery, and is the more urgently impelled to do this, because the matter in hand is one of no less importance than to learn what conceptions God wishes us to form concerning Himself. [6] Therefore she demands of every one, who wishes to belong to the Church, that he believingly accept this revelation contained

in the Holy Scriptures. [7] The Church, when she sets forth this doctrine, is moreover fully justified in the use of such terms as do not occur in the Holy Scriptures; for, inasmuch as the opponents of this doctrine, when it was stated only in the terms employed in the Holy Scriptures, perverted the meaning of these and gave them a different interpretation, the Church was compelled more specifically to explain in what sense these scriptural expressions, taken in their connection, are to be understood; and this, of course, had to be done in terms which were not contained in the Scriptures, for their very purpose was to explain the sense in which the Church understands the statement of the Scriptures. [8] And this explains why it is that the doctrine of the Trinity only gradually assumed the form in which the Church now sets it forth, and how ungrounded is the inference that the doctrine is not fully indorsed by the Holy Scriptures, and that it was not from the first believed by the Church. [9] And, finally, the Church, in using these terms, neither presumes that she has unfolded the mystery, nor does she intend that these expressions are to be taken precisely in the sense in which they are generally used; for, inasmuch as we have here to do with a doctrine that is entirely beyond the reach of reason, the terms that are applicable to other things are inadequate, and the Church therefore still always thus explains the particular sense in which she wishes these expressions to be understood. [10]

The Church arrives at the doctrine of the Trinity by observing that in the Holy Scriptures, on the one hand, the unity of God is taught; and on the other, Divinity is ascribed to three, Father, Son, and Spirit; that, accordingly, a certain distinction is recognized in God, and a plurality in Him is indicated. [11] These predicates concerning God, contained in the Holy Scriptures, of *unity*, *plurality*, and *diversity*, the Church combines in the formula:

The one divine essence subsists in three persons; or (what is the same thing),

In the Deity there are three persons and one essence; or,

God is one in essence, but the same God, one in essence, is threefold in person.

The doctrine of the Trinity, therefore, is that in which a peculiar and incomprehensible application of the term three to the divine persons is taught, but in such a manner that not anything composed of three, but three persons of one essence are postulated. God is triune, therefore, because, in essence one, He has three modes of subsistence. [11]

The meaning of this formula is further explained by the Church as follows:

(1) *The unity therein expressed is that of the divine essence.* [13] This unity of essence is, more specifically, a *numerical unity*, *i. e.*, it is of such a nature that it can be predicated only of one. Hence, it follows that when it is said that the Father, Son, and Spirit are one, these three are not to be designated as three Gods, each having a special divine essence (Symb. Athanas.: *Non tres Dii, sed unus Deus*); and that we are not to associate with the word *being* [*Wesen, essentia*] exactly the same signification that it has when applied to man (*essentia hominis*), for that is just the difference between the essential nature of God and that of man, *i. e.*, that God's nature is one numerically, and that of man is one in kind. [14] Father, Son, and Spirit are, therefore, God in such a sense, that entire divinity is predicated of each of the three; the one and undivided *essentia* is ascribed to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The *one and undivided divine essence is entire in each* [14] (tota in singulis), whence it further follows that, as in God there is no objective distinction between nature and attributes, divinity as well as all its attributes must be ascribed to each of these three. [16]

(2) A plurality in God, and, therefore, a certain distinction between Father, Son, and Spirit, is indeed clearly taught in the Holy Scriptures, but this is (*a*) *no plurality of essence* (*pluralitas essentialis*), as has already been shown; further, it is (*b*) *no plurality of accidents* (*pluralitas accidentalis*), *i. e.*, personality is not something added to the being of God, as a special peculiarity or characteristic, for the principle applies to God · *In Deum nulla accidentia cadunt.* [17] (§ 18, note 2.) Plurality may perhaps be best described as a *pluralitas hypostatica seu personarum*, [18] *i. e.*, as one, according to which each of the three persons is to be conceived of as a self-subsistent subject; which statement, however, must be at once qualified by the

remark that we are to stop with this, and dare not press the analogy of the word any further. For there is always this difference in the word person when used with reference to God or man, respectively, that in the latter case it signifies a self-subsistent subject, which has its *own* essence, while in the Trinity there is only one undivided essence, of which all the three persons of the Godhead partake. [19] In this sense, therefore, we are to distinguish in the one divine essence three persons, and the distinction between them is to be described as a *true* and *real* one. [20] Hence it follows, however, that to each of these there belong certain peculiarities distinguishing it from the others (a *hypostatical character* or personal peculiarity (*nota, notio, relatio*), showing a distinction of persons in a common identity of essence). Such peculiarities we recognize in the various statements made in the Holy Scriptures concerning the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. These statements are of a twofold character; they either indicate the inner differences that exist in the persons themselves, and describe, in this case, the special mode of subsistence of the single persons (τρὸπος ὑπάρξεως, the peculiar method of subsisting, through which and by reason of which each person is distinguished from the other), or they describe the special relation which the single persons hold to the world. Hence we have to distinguish the internal and external peculiarities (*proprietates, notiones*), to which there are also corresponding acts by which the individual persons are related to themselves or to the world (*opera ad intra, internal acts,* which God performs without any creature, *within* himself—*opera ad extra, external acts,* when God effects something in creatures, *without* his own essence). [21] Through these declarations of the Holy Scriptures we learn the peculiarities that constitute the distinction between the several persons. Yet we must not fail to observe that it is the internal characteristics and the internal acts corresponding to them, as described in the divine Word, that reveal to us more clearly the distinction of persons; for only the internal works (*opera ad intra*) are *to be regarded as such acts as proceed from one particular person, to the exclusion of the others,* while the outward works (*opera ad extra*) are those from which, although predicated directly of one person, the others are still

not absolutely excluded. The reason of this, however, lies in the fact, that the *opera ad extra* are outward operations, which must always be considered as proceeding from the essence of God; hence, also, in every such operation all the three persons must participate, at least in some way, as the essence of God, which is common to all three, is only one. Whence follow the propositions: "The opera ad intra are divided, [22] the opera ad extra are undivided." [23] CHEMN. (Loc. Th., I, 40).

The *personal peculiarities*, moreover, according to the Holy Scriptures, are five: ἀγεννησία (the not having been begotten) and *paternity* in the Father—*active procession* (spiratio) in the Father and the Son—*sonship*, in the Son—*passive procession* in the Holy Spirit. [24]

The *personal acts*, or inward operations, are two: (of the Father) *generation* (of the Father and Son), *spiration*.

The *opera ad extra* are three: of the Father, *creation;* of the Son, *redemption;* of the Holy Spirit, *sanctification*.

From the peculiarities and acts mentioned in Scripture, according to which the begetting of the Son is ascribed to the Father, and the sending of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son, it follows, finally, that we are to assign the first place to the Father, the second to the Son, and the third to the Holy Ghost. [25]

The Church indicates both, viz., the *unity* and the *distinction*, by the term ὁμοουσία, which it predicates of the three persons. [26] From this unity there is just as legitimately derived the περιχώρησις (immanentia, immeatio, circumincessio, inexistentia mutua et singularissima) [the mutual and most peculiar inherence], by which one person in virtue of the unity of essence is within another (John 14: 11; 17: 21), through which term the error is precluded, of regarding the three persons as subsisting separately alongside of one another; as also the *equality* (so that no one person is greater or less than another, and that the Father cannot properly be called God, by way of eminence (κατ' ἐξοχήν), or be said to be greater than the Son by reason of the mode of subsistence). [27]

The predicates which are to be ascribed to the three persons may accordingly be thus classified:

Holl. (301): "I. *God the Father* [28] is the First Person of the Godhead, neither begotten nor proceeding, but from eternity begetting the Son, the substantial image of Himself, and with the Son from eternity breathing forth the Holy Spirit, creating, preserving and governing all things, [29] sending His Son as the Redeemer, and the Holy Spirit as the Sanctifier of the human race."

"II. *The Son of God* [30] is the Second Person of the Godhead, begotten of the Father from eternity, [31] of the same essence and majesty with the Father, who with the Father from eternity breathes forth the Holy Spirit, and in the fulness of time assumed human nature in His own person, that He might redeem and save the human race." Id. (305).

"III. The *Holy Spirit* is the Third Person of the Godhead, of the same essence with the Father and the Son, who from eternity proceeds from the Father and the Son, [32] and in time is sent forth [33] by both, to sanctify the hearts of those who are to be saved." [34] Id. (329).

[1] The doctrine concerning the Trinity can properly be treated of as distinct from that concerning God in general, for we should first discuss the essence and attributes of God in themselves, and then the particular manner in which this essence subsists and thus becomes common to three.

Quen. (I, 284): "The consideration of God is twofold, one absolute, another relative. The *former* is occupied with God considered essentially, without respect to the three persons of the Godhead; the *latter*, with God considered personally. The *former* explains both the essence and the essential attributes of God; the *latter* describes the persons of the Holy Trinity, and the personal attributes of each one."

Cal. (III, 1): "The doctrine of the divine persons follows the doctrine of the divine attributes. This doctrine explains the mystery of the Holy Trinity, in order that we may know who is the one, true, and eternal God, whether, as He is one in essence, He is so also in person, or not; and who these divine persons are, who are to be regarded as the one, true God; namely, that according to the Catholic faith, they are Father, Son, and Holy Ghost."

[2] Chmn. (Loc. Th., I, 33): "The things that are declared concerning the Trinity of persons in the most holy Godhead are wonderful and far above all comprehension of creatures."

Grh. (III, 220): "The mystery of the Trinity can in no way be clearly proved *a priori* from natural reason, nor ought such an attempt to be made." . . . (III, 221): "To learn a doctrine that has been placed far above all comprehension of human reason, human reason cannot be led, from its own principles; for otherwise it would not be above reason. But such is the doctrine of the Trinity, as is inferred from Matt. 11: 27; 16: 17; John 1: 18, etc." . . . (Ibid.): "The question concerning the one and triune God is, What is God, in Himself? To this man cannot rise by the strength of His own reason."

Kg. (30): "Its sublimity is such that it is *ὑπὲρ νοῦν, ὑπὲρ λόγον, καὶ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν κατάληψιν* (above thought, above speech, and above all comprehension), and therefore, from reason, it neither can nor ought to be attacked, or refuted, or demonstrated, whether *a priori* or *a posteriori*." Quen. (I, 318): "Yea, not even the possibility of this mystery can be obtained from the light of nature, since to reason, consulting its own principles, it seems absurd and impossible."

Grh. (III, 229): "Such is the nature and character of the mystery of the Trinity, and of other mysteries properly so called, that they transcend the comprehension of reason, *i. e.*, that reason, without the revelation of the Word, cannot attain to the knowledge of them, and that even when the revelation of the Word has been given, reason cannot and ought not to affirm, from its own principles, anything whatever concerning them. Therefore also, in these mysteries, it ought not to oppose its own reasonings to the heavenly truth."

The question, *How, then, must the testimonies be judged which have been produced from heathen writers, for constructing the mystery of the Trinity?* is thus answered (Grh., III, 227): "(1) In some there are only similar things, but not the same with Christian doctrine. They agree with us in words; they differ from us in the explanation and meaning of the words. (2) Others teach the same things, but have derived them (*a*) partly from the reading of the Holy Scriptures; (*b*) partly from conversation with Hebrews; (*c*) partly from the revelations of oracles and the Sibyls."

[3] Grh. (III, 217): "From the proper and only source of theology, viz., from the Word of God, the confirmation of this mystery must be derived."

Kg.: "The source (*principium*), therefore, through which this mystery becomes known, and ought to be framed, is divine revelation alone, communicated to us in the Scriptures both of the Old and of the New Testament."

[4] This is implied already in the statement contained in Note 2, viz., that this doctrine cannot be proved from reason by an *a posteriori* argument. Grh. (III, 233): "The mysteries of faith are above reason, not only in such a sense and respect that reason, without the revelation of the Word, cannot aspire to their knowledge, but also that even with the revelation of the Word, reason still cannot, in any manner, comprehend the same; because in 1 Cor. 2: 14, not only the knowing, but also the receiving, of spiritual things is denied the natural man, and if reason were to judge concerning these things, it could judge only that they are folly."

[5] Hfrffr. (44): "Is it possible, nevertheless, for this plurality of unity to be, in any wise, adumbrated by certain analogies or most rude outlines? In the entire universe, nothing can be found to express the mystery of the adorable Godhead. For God, the Creator, surpasses creatures by immense intervals of degrees; yet, in order that we may be able even to stammer something concerning so great a mystery as this, and to raise up and excite our thoughts to the adorable sublimity of the same, pious antiquity has attempted to illustrate so great a matter by analogies derived from creatures." (47): "Yet, in all these analogies, the points of unlikeness are greater than those of likeness; for there is nothing in heaven or in earth which can express the nature of the infinite God, nor is there any voice or reason that can adequately explain so great a mystery."

Grh. (I, 209): "We must make a distinction between a class of *a posteriori* declarations and proofs, by which this mystery, first revealed in the Scriptures, is in a manner explained and shown to be not absurd; and, on the other hand, accurate *a priori* demonstrations, according to which we absolutely deny that this can be investigated or proved by us." The Church Fathers sought for traces of the Trinity in the creature, and found what they regarded as *reflections* of it (*imagines*), in intellectual and rational creatures, and *traces* of it (*vestigia*), in irrational creatures. As to the arguments thence derived, Grh. says (III, 224): "(*a*) They only illustrate, they do not prove; (*b*) there is in them more unlikeness than likeness; (*c*) they are derived *a posteriori*, not *a priori;* they are not the parents, but the offspring of thought; (*d*) we must use them prudently and cautiously; (*e*) they cannot be presented against an adversary, they can delight a believer." Accordingly, the question "*Whether Thomas Aquinas was right in saying that what the Christian faith declares of the Trinity could be proved from natural reason to be not impossible,*" is thus answered, "Among Christians, instructed in the Word of God, and embracing by faith the mystery of the

Trinity, this can be proved by means of natural reasons; but among the heathen, ignorant of the Trinity, and among heretics, obstinately denying it, it can scarcely be proved; for the fact that they pronounce it absurd and impossible, occurs because they presume to judge of this mystery from the principles of reason, without the light of the heavenly Word."

QUEN. (I, 318): "These natural agreements, and the analogy of created things to this mystery of faith, do not generate faith, but only human opinion."

[6] CHMN. (I, 33): . . . "Because we must think of God as He has revealed Himself, we believe, acknowledge, confess, and call upon three persons." . . . Although the Trinity is a mystery beyond the reach of reason, yet we learn through it what conceptions God wishes us to form concerning Him. MEL. (Loc. Th., I, 19): "The Church acknowledges God as such an eternal and omnipotent Creator as He has revealed Himself to be, and, although we cannot thoroughly understand these mysteries, yet in this life, God wishes this our knowledge and worship of Him to be begun and to be distinguished from that which is false; and in His Word He has propounded, by infallible testimonies, a revelation, in which we, as the unborn infant in the maternal womb, drawing nutriment from the umbilical vessels, might sit inclosed and draw the knowledge of God and life from the Word of God, in order to worship Him as He has made Himself known."

[7] KG. (30): "The necessity of believing this doctrine is such that it not only cannot be denied, but even cannot be ignored by any one without a loss of salvation. John 17: 3; John 5: 11, 12; 1 John 2: 23; John 5: 23; 2 Thess. 1: 8." More detailed, GRH. (III, 209): "It is necessary for all who are to be saved, to know and believe the mystery of the Trinity: (*a*) we exclude from men who are to be saved, not only those who deny, but also those who are ignorant of the Trinity . . . (*b*) we do not require of all members of the Church an equal degree of knowledge, since the light of spiritual knowledge and faith is brighter in some and more obscure in others; (*c*) nor do we require of those who are to be saved a perfect and full comprehension and an intuitive knowledge of this mystery, since we cannot attain this in this life . . . but we assert only this, that for the catholic faith, necessary to all who are to be saved, not a confused and implied, but a distinct and explicit knowledge of the three persons of the Godhead is required." The reason (III, 210): "Whoever is ignorant of the mystery of the Trinity does not acknowledge God as He has revealed Himself in His Word, and is ignorant of the definition of

God given in the Scriptures. The mystery of the Trinity being ignored or denied, the entire economy of salvation is ignored or denied." (211.)

[8] CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 36): "Even in ancient times it offended many that the Church, in speaking of the article of the Trinity, was not content with the simple peculiar phraseology which the Son of God Himself employed when revealing the doctrine concerning God, and which the Holy Ghost followed in the prophets and apostles; but that it introduced into the Church foreign appellations from the irreligious schools of the heathen . . . and the orthodox fathers were oppressed with great hatred by the heretics on this specious pretext, viz., that the Church ought not to believe concerning the inaccessible light of the Godhead otherwise than as the Godhead Himself, coming forth from the hidden abode of His majesty, has manifested Himself; neither ought it [the Church] to speak otherwise, but that it should imitate the language of the Holy Ghost, and, therefore, express also the very words in just so many syllables and letters. For neither ought the weakness of the human mind to assume this to itself, viz., in regard to these mysteries placed above and beyond the sight of human intelligence, to hope to be able to speak more becomingly and skilfully than the Son of God Himself, who alone knows the Father, and has revealed to us what we know of God, or the Holy Ghost, who alone knows the things which are of God (1 Cor. 2: 10), and searches also the very depths of God. . . . Both Arius and Sabellius had a specious pretext: 'We speak of divine mysteries in no other way than God Himself speaks in Scripture. Moreover, we have been cast out of the Church for no other reason than that we were not willing to mingle philosophy with the doctrine of the Church, *i. e.*, we are not willing to confess one essence and three persons, because Scripture is ignorant of these heathenish appellations.' We must consider whence, with what purpose, and for what reasons, these foreign terms were received; and, in order that we may understand the entire matter better, let us observe two things: 1. What Cyril says with very great force, that, although these terms are not found in Scripture, with such a meaning, yet, that the things themselves, which the Church understands and signifies by these terms, have been expressly laid down and revealed in Scripture. 2. That the Church departed from the simple usage of Scriptural words, not from any wanton affectation of novelty, but as Augustine elegantly and truly says, that,, by the necessity of speech, these terms were acquired from the Greeks and Latins, because of the errors and snares of heretics. . . . The

Church would have preferred to use such simplicity of speech, so that, as it believes, so it might also speak, viz., that there is one God, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. *But contests of heretics arose, attacking partly the unity of God, and partly the Trinity, yet so artfully that when they confessed that there is one God, they understood it as though there were a plurality of gods, nevertheless called one God, just as the heart of believers is called one, Acts* 4: 12 . . . *Because, therefore, the heretics spake with the Church, and yet believed differently, and by means of forms of expression, resembling the truth, as Nazianzen says, spread poison secretly among the inexperienced, who suspected no evil when they heard these men speak in the very same words which the Church uses; the men of the Church endeavored to find in Scripture terms by which they might draw forth from ambush the lurking heretics, so as to prevent them from deceiving by ambiguous phrases the unwary.* And because Scripture thus speaks, 2 Peter 1: 4; Gal. 4: 8, they said that there is one divine nature. But this term they corrupted by sophistries, and by distinguishing between God and nature, as when it is said that God and nature have done nothing in vain. Likewise, in 1 John 5: 7, it is written: 'There are three,' etc. And because in the words of Baptism it is said: 'Baptizing them in the name of the Father,' etc., they said that there are three names . . . Sabellius received this, but understood that one and the same person is τριώνυμος [possessed of three names], just as one and the same man has a *prænomen*, a *nomen*, and a *cognomen* . . . Afterwards it began to be said that there were not only three names, *but also three peculiar significations of the names.* Sabellius conceded also this, but in this sense, viz., just as the soul has three powers, each one of which has its own peculiarities, and yet there is only one soul. And thus, the heretics who certainly did not believe aright concerning these articles of faith, spake in the very same words in which the Church spake, and, by this deception, instilled their poison into many unwary ones, who feared no evil, because they heard the same words that are recorded in Scripture, and are proclaimed in the Church. What was the Church to do under these circumstances? It is very certain that it was her plain duty to defend against heretics that faith concerning the article of the Trinity which the Holy Ghost revealed in the Scriptures. But this could not be done in the words of Scripture, because of the petulance of heretics, who cunningly evaded all the words of Scripture, so that they could not be convicted and held fast, and who meanwhile led captive, by this artifice, the minds of the simple. *Therefore, it was necessary to seek for such terms as might express, in some other manner, the facts delivered concerning this article, in Scripture; so that heretics*

might not be able, by a deceitful interpretation, to elude them . . . Because, therefore, in God there is a divine nature, common to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost and entire in each, and nevertheless, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are distinguished by certain properties, in such a manner that the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father, and the Holy Ghost is neither Father nor Son, etc.; the Church, on the maturest consideration, has transferred these terms (*οὐσία; ὑπόστασις*) from the common usage of speech to the article of the Trinity, on account of, as Augustine says, the artifices and errors of heretics, in order that thus even the more simple might be able to observe the rule of Athanasius: 'Neither confounding the persons, nor dividing the substance.'"

[9] Chmn. (Loc. Th., I, 33): "Neither is it something new, devised by the Council of Nice (as some blasphemously assert that the doctrine of the Trinity was first framed in the Councils of Nice and Constantinople), while, before that, the Church piously believed that there was one God. But we solemnly declare that it is the most ancient and constant harmonious testimony of the Church from the very beginning."

[10] Grh. (III, 236): "Do terms derived from the ordinary usage of language, and adapted to this mystery, retain in this application in every respect the same signification? Reply: By no means, but the Church presents them with the right to its citizenship, and uses them in a peculiar signification."

Chmn. (Loc. Th., I, 38): "As the Church speaks of subjects of which reason is ignorant, it also employs these terms in a sense somewhat different from that in which they have commonly been used."

[11] A general survey of the doctrine is presented by Baier (208) under the following heads:

"I. That the Father differs really from the Son, the Son from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both; so that one is in fact Father, another Son, and another Holy Ghost. (Christ says that the Father is other than Himself, John 5: 32, 37, and that the Holy Ghost is other than Himself and the Father, John 14: 16. The same is manifest from the names of the Father and the Son, and that the former is described as begetting, and the latter as begotten, Ps. 2: 7; John 1: 14, 18; 3: 16. The Son was sent from the Father, John 16: 36; Gal. 4: 4. The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, John 15: 26; is sent by the Father, John 14: 26, and by the Son, 15: 26.)

"II. That not only the Father, but also the Son and Holy Ghost, are true and eternal God."

"III. That the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not three gods, but one God."

Grh. (I, 194): "The general theory will be comprised under the following heads: (1) That there is one undivided essence of these three persons. (2) That these three persons are truly and really distinct from each other. (3) That they are distinguished by their own personal properties."

[12] We must carefully distinguish *triune* from *threefold*, which signifies: composed of three. Grh. (III, 254): "We say that God is triune, but we are forbidden, by the Christian religion, to say that He is threefold."

[13] Essence: οὐσία, also substance, φύσις, nature. Grh. (III, 251): "Moreover, they preferred to use the name essence rather than substance (*a*) to indicate that God is an οὐσια ὑπερούσιος [an essence superior to essence], not included in the categories among which substance is first; (*b*) because God, unlike the essences of created things, does not exist beneath (*substat*) accidents, but His attributes are His very essence; (*c*) because the name *substance* is ambiguous, for it is sometimes put for οὐσία, and sometimes for ὑπόστᾶσις."

Holl. (284): "The word essence, οὐσία, is not indeed found in Holy Scripture in just so many letters, but nevertheless is derived from it by easy inference. For (*a*) in the Old Testament God is called יְהוָה *essentiator;* therefore he has an essence, and that, too, an independent essence, etc.; (*b*) in the New Testament God is named ὁ ὤν, Rev. 1: 8, from which οὐσία, or essence, is derived; (*c*) a synonym of divine essence is φύσις θεία, divine nature, 2 Pet. 1: 4."

[14] Grh. (III, 239): "A great, yea an infinite distinction presents itself in the predicates, when I predicate of three human individuals, humanity, or human nature, and when I predicate of the three persons of the Godhead, a divine nature, or essence. The *essence of men* is a universal term, which does not actually exist *per se*, but is only inferred in thought and conceived of by the intellect. *But essence, in that which is divine*, is not an imaginary something, as genus or species, but actually exists, although it is communicable." Chmn. (Loc. Th., I, 39): "Therefore the Church understands by the term essence not a universal term, as philosophers name human essence, but a divine nature truly existing, which is communicable and common to three persons, and is entire in each. *But what this is with respect to the definition of the matter, I say is not known, unless we say that the attributes given in the definition of God are the very essence of God.*" "*The essence with respect to divine persons* (*a*) is not a species, because the persons of the

Trinity do not share essence in the manner that individuals share a common nature, which diffuses itself in no way beyond that of which it is a part, as it were; as, man is a species of animal, and Peter is an individual of the human species. (β) It is not predicated of many individuals differing in numerical essence, as three men are said to differ in number. (γ) It is not predicated in the plural form of individuals, for the three persons are not three gods or three divine essences, as Peter, Paul, etc. (δ) Neither does it belong to either more or less than three persons; while human essence is not restricted to a determinate number of persons. Of a man I cannot say that all humanity is in him, but of a person of the Godhead I can correctly affirm that all the fulness of the Godhead is in Him. The reason rests upon the infinity of the divine essence. In three human individuals the essence is one, not in number, but one only in species; but in the three persons of the Godhead, there is an essence one in number and absolutely undivided. Human persons are distinguished by substance, time, will, accidents of mind and body, etc. Thus, the substance of Peter is different from that of Paul; . . . but in the Trinity persons are not thus distinguished, for the Son is ὁμοούσιος, ὁμοιώνιος, συναΐδιος with the Father. . . . Of human persons it cannot be said that the one is in the other; but of Himself and His Father, Christ says (John 14: 10): 'I am in the Father,' etc. Of human persons it cannot be said that, because of their common nature, where the one person is, there also is the other; because they are locally distinct: but of Himself and the Father, Christ declares (John 8: 29): 'The Father hath not left me alone.' Of human persons it cannot be said that, because of their common nature, he who honors the one honors also the other, nay rather one can be honored while the other is treated with contempt; but of Himself and the Father, Christ says (John 5: 23): 'He that honoreth not the Son, honoreth not the Father that hath sent Him.'"

[15] Grh. (I, 194): "The essence of the three persons of the Godhead is one and undivided. . . . For, if there are three persons of the Godhead, and, nevertheless, the true God is only one, it follows thence that there is one essence of the three persons of the Godhead. If there were one essence of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost, one of the two alternatives would undoubtedly follow, viz.: either that there is not one true God, or that the Son and Holy Ghost are excluded from the true Godhead."

Grh. (III, 238): "The word (οὐσία), used of God, signifies an essence common to the three persons of the Godhead, one in num-

ber and undivided, which does not exist partially in the three persons, so that a part of it is in the Father, a part in the Son, and a part in the Holy Ghost; but, because of infinity and immateriality, is entire in the Father, entire in the Son, and entire in the Holy Ghost."

Chmn. (Loc. Th., I, 43) cites as different modes of expression employed with reference to the unity of God, the following: "One and indistinguishable nature; one and the same substance; simple, one and undivided divinity; one and indifferent essence; in essence there is unity; there are three persons, co-eternal and co-equal; three persons, of one substance and inseparable equality, one God; the divinity of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is one; their glory, equal; their majesty, co-eternal; in this Trinity nothing is before, nothing after, nothing greater or less, but the entire three persons are co-equal and co-eternal to each other. John 10: 30: 'I and my Father are one,' viz., in essence, will, power, and work." On the other hand, he notes as *false*, the expressions: "In essence, He is singular; there are three, eternal, immense, etc.; three Gods, three Lords; essence is distinguished into Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: in divinity, there is before and after, that is greater and less."

[16] Grh. (III, 257): "There are three, to each of whom belongs the name of Jehovah and God, and, likewise, truly divine attributes, works, and glory, viz., the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost." Therefore, essence is thus defined: Br. (217): "By the name, essence or *οὐσία*, there is meant the divine nature, as it is absolutely in itself, all of which, *with its attributes*, is most simply one and singular, and, thus, also of the three persons the essence is only one; so, indeed, that there is also one intellect of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, by which they understand; one will of the three, by which they wish; and one power, by which they operate outside of the divine essence."

Quen. (I, 321): "The divine essence itself is that pertaining to God, by which God is what He is."

Holl. (284): "The essence of God is God's spiritual and independent nature, common to the three divine persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost."

[17] Hfrffr. (48): "Plurality in the unity of divinity is not accidental, for God is most absolute and simple, and no accidents occur in Him. Therefore, since there are no accidents, no plurality can arise hence."

[18] Hfrffr. (48): "Plurality in unity of the divinity is *hypostatic*, i. e., *of persons*, for the essence, indeed, of the divinity

is one, but the persons are plural; and, therefore, in the mystery of the divinity there are, indeed, distinct persons, but not distinct things. For the person of the Father is one, and the person of the Son, another, and the person of the Holy Ghost, another; yet they are not different things, but the essence of all the persons is one."

By *person*, ὑπόστασις, there is understood, "an individual, intelligent, incommunicable substance, which is not sustained, either upon another or from another." Thus Chmn., (Loc. Th., I, 39). This definition is thus explained by Seln. (I, 76): "A substance is said to be *individual* and peculiar, in order to distinguish it from accident, and to remove the error of those who have thought that person signifies only a distinction of employments. It is said to be incommunicable, on account of the distinction of persons, because the Father does not communicate His hypostasis to the Son, or Holy Ghost, but each person has His own peculiar subsistence and being; although essence itself is said to be communicable" ("the subsistence of one person cannot be communicated to another person, for the reason that each person possesses a peculiar and ultimate act of subsistence, so that it cannot be farther determined by another person.") Holl. (284): "*Not sustained by another*, excludes the opinion of those who think that as there are two natures in Christ, so also there are two persons."

Holl. (284): "*An intelligent suppositum:* a stone, a tree, a horse, are, indeed, called *supposita*, but not persons, because they are without intellect."

A still more accurate distinction is made between *person, regarded materially, or in the concrete*, and *person, considered formally, or in the abstract.* Holl. (ib.): "A person, considered *materially*, is an intelligent *suppositum.* But a *suppositum* is a ὑφιστάμενον, or a subsistence, singular, incommunicable, not sustained by another (a singular *subsistence*, not a singular *substance;* for person, considered in the concrete sense, is not a substance, but a ὑφιστάμενον, a singular subsistence, which consists of substance and an ultimate mode of subsisting. We call a person a singular ὑφιστάμενον, and *not an individual;* because the latter implies a logical reference to a particular species, which is predicated of the individual. But God is not predicated of the divine persons, under the mode of species, nor do these differ in essences, diverse in number, just as do individuals). But *formally or abstractly* considered, a person is an independent and communicable subsistence of singular, complete, and intelligent substance."

The meaning of this distinction will be more clearly apparent

from the definitions of ὑπόστασις that we shall presently cite from QUEN.: In the latter case, that is made particularly prominent which constitutes the one person a person, in distinction from the other; while, in the former case, the intention is not so much to indicate this distinction as rather to assert the personality of the Divine Esssence. The term, person, is employed *abstractively*, if I say the Father is ἀγέννητος, for then I mention that which distinguishes Him from the other persons; it is employed *concretively*, if I say the Father is almighty; for in that case it is, indeed, also asserted that God is a person, and the hypostatical character of the person is asserted also in the word Father, yet in the statement I am more concerned to assert something concerning the Divine Essence, and not so much concerned to give prominence to the personal distinction.

The term ὑπόστασις is employed in doctrinal writings as synonymous with person, but strictly speaking there is still a difference between them. HOLL. (285): "According to the testimony of Damascenus, the Fathers called the same thing hypostasis and person. Nevertheless, person differs from hypostasis, in this, that hypotasis is common to an intellectual nature, and to one destitute of reason; but person is affirmed only of an intellectual nature."

QUEN. (I, 320): "Ὑπόστασις is received either in the concrete, or materially, when it implies, at the same time, an object itself and the mode of the object, and marks an essence, distinguished by a hypostatic character, *i. e.*, a person, in the sense in which Christ is said to be χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως Θεοῦ, Heb. 1: 3; or, abstractly and formally, when it designates personality or substance itself, which is an act, mode, or ultimate degree, in which an intelligent nature subsists completely and incommunicably. In this signification the word ὑπόστασις is not employed in Scripture, yet can be correctly inferred from its material signification; but, in this mystery, ὕπαρξις is the same as ὑπόστασις."

The Greek and Latin Fathers did not at once agree in the usage of the terms here employed and in the distinction between ὑπόστασις and οὐσία. It was only from the time of Athanasius that the expressions were uniformly used in the sense above given.

BR. (216): "Although the Greeks and Latins contended for awhile with each other (for the former thought that by the name, person, there was designated among the Latins an occupation or external habit, and on this account, three persons did not imply or express the real distinction of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; but the Latins thought that ὑπόστασις, in the nominative case, denoted the essence itself, so that if three ὑπόστασεις are admitted, three

essences must be affirmed), nevertheless, afterwards, when they understood each other better, it came to pass that the Greeks spoke of τρία πρόσωπα, and the Latins of three hypostases."

[19] Chmn. (Loc. Th., I, 39): "Thus, in the Church, the term ὑπόστασις, or person, is used in a different sense from the usage of common speech. Among men we know what a person is; among angels we understand what it is. Peter, Paul, and John are three persons to whom one human nature is common. But they differ very much, (1) in substance, because one entirety is distinct from another (*totus a toto*), (2) in time, (3) in will, (4) in power, (5) in work. . . . But in the Trinity, persons are not thus distinguished, as an angel from an angel, and a man from a man (nor do they differ in time, will, power, work; but, in the persons of the Trinity, there is co-eternity, one will, one power, one working). Likewise, in creatures, it does not follow that where one person is, there, because of their common nature, the others also are. And this distinction must necessarily be observed; for the mystery at which even the angels are astonished, would not be so great, if the one essence were three persons, in the manner that Michael, Gabriel, Raphael are three persons, to whom one angelic nature is common and equally belongs."

In reference to the two terms, "essence" and "person," Chmn. remarks (Loc. Th., I, 39): "These are grammatical observations, not idle exhibitions of acuteness; but if they have no other, they yet have this use, that, with the foundations thoroughly known, we can speak very cheerfully with the Church for the sake of harmony. But, if any one would cavil that the terms essence and person are not sufficiently peculiar to designate this hidden mystery of unity and Trinity, he has this reply that Augustine gives: 'Human language labors from its absolutely great poverty. Nevertheless the term, "three persons," has been adopted not for the purpose of expressing this, but so as not to keep altogether silent concerning it. For, by this term, the eminence of an ineffable matter cannot be expressed.'"

[20] Chmn. (Loc. Th., I, 39). "The persons of the divinity do not differ essentially as in creatures, where each one has his own peculiarity, nor is there only a distinction of reason therein as Sabellius wished; but they are really distinguished, nevertheless in a manner incomprehensible and unknown to us."

Quen. (I, 326): "They are distinguished really, *i. e.*, they are distinct from each other, even when all operation of the human intellect ceases."

[21] Chmn. (Loc. Th., I, 42): "The persons are distinguished,

not only by interior, but also by exterior marks, derived especially from revelation and their benevolent works in behalf of the Church."

[22] QUEN. (I, 414): "Personal *divine actions ad intra* are those which are limited to God Himself, in such a manner that they, nevertheless, as a source of action, pertain to the divine essence, not in so far as it is common to all three persons, but as it has been determined by certain hypostatic characters and properties. Hence, these personal works *ad intra* have been divided, *i. e.*, they are not common to three divine persons, but are peculiar to only one person or to two persons."

As, in Note 20 above, the question was concerning the distinction between the single persons, so here the question is concerning the distinction between essence and person.

QUEN. (I, 326) answers: "A divine person is distinguished in one way from essence, and in another way from another person; from the *former* not in fact but in thought, with its foundation in fact; but from the latter actually, even when all operation of the human intellect ceases." The former distinction is a distinction "not actually, or from the nature of the thing itself, nor modally, but in thought, which is proved as follows: for, if the relation of paternity, filiation, and procession were really distinguished from the divine essence, then something real would be superadded to it, and in the divine persons which are constituted by these relations, and, therefore, in God Himself, there would be a real compounding." (I, 327). . . "Thus divine essence and relations are actually one thing, and the former is separated from the latter in thought and the apprehension of the mind alone; or, in other words, by our mode of conception, yet in such a manner that the foundation and occasion of the distinction exists in fact."

(Id.) (328): "The true and real distinction of the divine persons does not introduce a division or multiplication of the divine essence. For God is not divided into three persons, but the three persons, distinct from each other, undividedly share the essence, one in number undivided and infinite, in such a manner that each person has the same essence, without its multiplication or division. For, in this mystery, several persons are considered hypostatically, not several things essentially. But these three really distinct persons are and remain *ὁμοούσιοι*."

[23] QUEN. (I, 415): "*External actions ad extra, or emanent and transient actions*, are those which both relate to an object outside of God, and are performed outside of God, producing or leaving an effect outside of God."

Grh. (I, 199): "These works are *undivided*, because in them the three persons are together and work together. . . . In God there is so great unity, and so great power of one and the same essence, that to individual persons individual and peculiar works, which are wrought separately in creatures, ought by no means to be assigned;" whence follows the statement: "By one person, named in works *ad extra*, the entire Trinity is meant." Quen. (I, 328): "The reason of this rule is the unity of the divine essence, the common participation in the power to act, the equality of the operations, and the identity of the works of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and, hence, there then follows an equality of denomination. Nevertheless, this clause must be added to the rule of Augustine: 'The order and distinction of persons being preserved;' for, inasmuch as the Father has an essence from Himself, therefore He also acts of Himself, the Son acts and works from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both. John 5: 19."

By the addition of this clause: "the order and distinction of persons being preserved," the canon, "the works *ad extra* are undivided," is more accurately defined; for the Dogmaticians do not wish directly to call in question the statement that even in the works *ad extra* the distinction of persons may be recognized. Not without reason, do they believe that in the Scriptures a work *ad extra* is ascribed to the one person and not to another; and the difference which, notwithstanding all the oneness of essence, is yet indicated in the order which is assigned in the Scriptures to the single persons, and in accordance with which the Father is placed first, the Son second, etc., seems to them to indicate also a difference in the order and in the manner in which the single persons work. So Chmn. already states (Loc. Th., I, 42): "Works *ad extra* are considered, as Luther has remarked, in a twofold manner: First, *absolutely*, and thus they are without distinction, and are called works of the three persons in common. Secondly, *relatively*, when they are considered in the order in which the persons act, or with reference to what is the property of each person, and which person acts immediately." *The order in working and the relation* in which the three persons stand to a work *ad extra*, the Dogmaticians find most clearly stated in Rom. 11: 36, where they refer the ἐξ to the Father, the διὰ to the Son, and the ἐν to the Holy Ghost. Chmn. (Loc. Th., I, 42): "For, as the apostle speaks of works *ad extra*, he makes mention of one eternal essence; to Him be honor, not to them. And, nevertheless, as the essence is one, without confusion of persons, it performs works *ad extra*, common to the three persons, without confusion, but implying a distinction of per-

sons, 'of Him, and through Him, and to Him.' . . . In fine, as we believe that there is unity of essence, and, nevertheless, ought not to admit a confusion of persons, we must understand also the rule, that *works ad extra are common to the three persons, yet in such a manner that the distinctions and properties of the persons be not confounded.*" The Dogmaticians remark, in general, that sometimes in the Scriptures there is predicated of one person an attribute or an act, from which, however, the other persons are by no means to be excluded, inasmuch as this attribute or act pertains to the Divine Essence and does not peculiarly belong to the one person. Whence they draw the inference that nevertheless this attribute must pertain to the one or to the other person in a more eminent sense, either because it belongs more especially to the one or the other person, in accordance with the order which we assign to the three persons, or because in a certain sense it more especially belongs to the mode of existence (τρόπος ὑπαρξεως) of a particular person. The Dogmaticians say, in this case, that this occurs through appropriation. Grh. (I, 203). "Hence certain essential attributes are appropriated by the ecclesiastical writers to each person, although, because of the identity of essence, the essential attributes are common to the three persons." Thus there is specially appropriated to the Father, power; to the Son, love; to the Holy Spirit, wisdom.

Still another case is mentioned by Quen. (I, 415): "Personal actions *ad extra* are, in a certain respect and manner, also essential or common to all three persons, viz., *by reason of efficiency or source, and inchoatively;* but they are personal or peculiar to any one divine person *by reason of their end, or terminatively*, because they are terminated in a certain person. Thus, the Spirit appeared only in the visible form of a dove. The voice from heaven, 'This is my beloved Son,' belonged to the person of the Father alone, and the Son of God alone appeared under the form and habit of man, in the time of the Old Testament, and in that of the New Testament was born of the Virgin Mary, and was made flesh. But, nevertheless, the entire Trinity was operative, with regard to that flesh of the Son alone, and that voice of the Father alone, and that form of a dove of the Holy Ghost alone."

[24] The Dogmaticians in part distinguish also between the *hypostatical characteristics or personal qualities* and the *personal notations.* By the former, they understand those peculiarities which one person possesses having distinct reference to another, and by the latter, the marks by which, in general, one person can be recognized as distinct from another. Thus Quen. (I, 330): "Some

personal properties are *absolute*, which have no relation to another person; such a property is ἀγεννησία, and the not being born (*innascibilitas*), with respect to the Father, likewise the not being breathed (*inspirabilitas*), with respect to Father and Son. Other personal properties are *relative*, which have respect to another person, and constitute an order of things producing and being produced, of which there are only three; paternity, filiation, and procession."

Holl. (285) distinguishes: "*Personal properties, i. e.*, relations founded upon a personal act, constituting a person in the being (*esse*) of a certain person, and, by relative opposition, introducing a distinction from another person" (of such he enumerates three: paternity, filiation, and procession), and "*personal notations, i. e.*, modes of recognizing the divine persons and distinguishing them *ad intra.*" These, taken in a wider sense, and constitutively of each person, in the being (*esse*) of such person, comprehend the personal properties, and as such are regarded the five enumerated in the text. More strictly taken, however, or significatively, *i. e.*, such as do indeed describe the divine persons and indicate the distinction between them, but still do not constitute a person, in the being of such person, they are distinct from the personal properties. Of these there are two, viz., ἀγεννησία and *spiratio activa.*

[25] Quen. (I, 327): "From the real distinction of persons, arises their order, both in subsisting and in operating. Nevertheless, we must distinguish between the order of nature, of time, of dignity, of origin, and of relation. Among the divine persons, there is not an order of nature, because, they are ὁμοούσιοι [consubstantial]; nor of time, because they are co-eternal; nor of dignity, because they have the same honor. *But there is among them an order of origin and relation*, because the Father is of no one, the Son is of the Father, and the Holy Ghost is of both. An order among the divine persons in subsisting is proved from the procession or emanation of one person from the other. For if the Father proceeds from no one, but has His essence of Himself, as the fountain and source of the Holy Trinity, and the Son has His essence of the Father by eternal generation, and the Holy Ghost has the same of the Father and the Son, by eternal procession, it follows *that the Father is the first, the Son the second, and the Holy Ghost the third person*, and this order, both fixed in nature itself and unchangeable, is clearly shown in the formula of baptism. Matt. 28: 19." Concerning the order in working, which is recognized in the use of the diacritical particles ἐξ, διά, ἐν, we have already spoken in Note 23.

[26] Grh. (III, 243): "The term ὁμοούσιος embraces both ideas,

viz., that the Son is of a distinct person from the Father, and that He is of the same essence with the Father."

(Id.): "For the Father and the Son are not ἑτερούσιοι of different or diverse essence; they are not συνούσιοι, as men who have one common essence, nor only ὁμοιούσιοι, of like substance, but ὁμοούσιοι, having the same essence, eternity, will, work, power, and glory."

[Chmn. (I, 43): "By this term, the unity of the essence is signified, viz., that there is one eternity, one will, a common operation, and equal glory, and, at the same time, the distinction of persons is indicated."]

[27] Quen. (I, 328) further adds, as a consequence of ὁμοουσία: "The most perfect communion of all essential perfections, and the identity both of the divine works *ad extra* and the mode of action, so that they do the same things and in like manner; John 5: 19, although not in the same order." Concerning the latter, see below.

In the περιχώρησις the Dogmaticians usually also distinguish "π. *essentialis*, the absolutely unique immanence of one divine person in the other," and "π. *personalis*, that inmost and ineffable permeation, by which the divinity of the λόγος intimately permeates, inhabits, and perfects the assumed human nature." The discussion of the latter does not belong here.

[28] Holl. (301): "The name, 'Father,' is received here not οὐσιωδῶς, or *essentially*, but ὑποστατικῶς, or *personally*. The name, Father, *essentially taken*, belongs not to the first person alone of the Godhead, but to all the divine persons equally; inasmuch as, received in this sense, it introduces a relation to creatures, of whom God is said to be the Father, both on account of creation, as the angels are regarded sons of God, Job 38: 7, and on account of regeneration and adoption, as converted and regenerate men, by means of the merit of Christ, apprehended by faith, have obtained this ἐξουσία, power or dignity, to become the sons of God, John 1: 12. But *personally received*, the name, Father, is peculiar to the first divine person, and introduces a relation to the consubstantial Son, whom He begat from His essence, as His image, whose ἴδιος πατήρ, own Father, He is called, John 5: 18."

[29] Quen. (I, 332): "The *characteristic of the Father ad extra* is manifested in the work of creation, preservation, and of the government of this universe. For the work of creation is ascribed to the Father, in a peculiar manner, in the Holy Scriptures and the Apostles' Creed, *i. e.*, not exclusively, nor ἐξοχικῶς, or only particularly, much less as a principal cause, so that the Son is only an instrument, but on account of personal order, because the Father, through the Son and Holy Ghost, has created, preserves, and gov-

erns all things, Gen. 1: 1, 2; Ps. 33: 6; John 1: 3, and because to God the Father power is ascribed, which especially shines forth in creation."

[30] QUEN. (I, 332): "The *second person* is the Son of God, not by *υἱοθεσία*, or gracious adoption; nor on account of gracious and glorious union with God, and love—for thus all the pious, the blessed, and the holy angels are sons of God; nor on account of His wonderful conception by the Holy Ghost in the womb of the Virgin Mary, as the Socinians wish, but through and on account of a true, peculiar, essential, most singular [unparalleled] and inexplicable eternal generation, and thus is the Son of God properly, incommunicably, and alone. In a few words: He is the Son of God, not *χάριτι*, or by grace, but *φύσει*, or by nature, John 1: 14, 18."

HOLL. (305): "Hence, the Son of God is called His own, Rom. 8: 32; the only begotten, John 1: 14; existing in the bosom of His Father, John 1: 18; the image of the invisible God, and the firstborn of every creature, Col. 1: 15; the brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of His person, Heb. 1: 3."

[31] For this reason, according to HOLL. (322), there is ascribed to the Father, as a hypostatical characteristic, *eternal active generation*, and to the Son, *filiation*, or *passive generation*, "by which the Son of God is produced by the Father, as His substantial image, really and literally, yet in a manner hyperphysical and inexplicable, by an eternal communication of one and the same essence."

More detailed description of *generation*. HOLL. (322–325): "The generation of the Son of God is not *improper*, *metaphorical*, or *accidental* (as is the regeneration of sinful men), but *proper*, *true*, and *substantial*. Proof: *a*. He would not be God's own Son, if His generation were improper or metaphorical; *b*. God the Father, in producing His Son, communicated to Him His essence in such a manner that He is His image; not *physical* ('which occurs, in matter and out of matter, in time, having relation to that which is before and after, and is an essential change from that which has no being into a being.' QUEN. I, 385), *but hyperphysical* ('which occurs from eternity, without any succession of time, matter, and change, and which consists alone in the communication of essence.' QUEN. I, 385); not *temporal*, *but eternal*. Proof: *a*. From passages of Scripture which testify that the Son is eternal; *b*. From the relation between the Father and the Son. The first person is the eternal Father, therefore the second person also is the eternal Son; *c*. Because, otherwise, the essence of the Father would be affirmed to be changeable, if, in time, He had begun to beget the Son. Furthermore, from Ps. 2: 7: The act of generation is described by the

'to-day,' which is employed concerning an internal divine act, a generation such as is only during 'a divine to-day,' and, therefore, excludes the flow of time, separates from the past and future, and denotes a perpetual now, or a day of immutable eternity; *not external, but innermost* (because God the Father produced His own Son, not *ad extra*, but begot Him within His essence; nor is the Son separated from the Father, as happens otherwise, but remains in His Father's bosom, John 1: 18; nor is the Son only in the Father, but the Father is also in the Son by the inmost communion and mutual περιχώρησις); *not voluntary, but natural and necessary*, (but, if the generation of the Son of God were called forth by an act of the will, and were free, and were not necessary or natural, the Son would not be equal and ὁμοούσιος to the Father, for He exists necessarily and cannot not be. Here it is well to observe that God the Father, not being constrained, and, nevertheless, not by the purpose of His free will preceding generation, but from the necessity of His nature, which is yet entirely removed from all constraint, begat His Son by a most perfect generation . . .)."

Concerning the *eternity of generation*, QUEN. (I, 330) says further: "This generation of the Son does not occur by derivation or transfusion, nor by an action which may begin or cease, but it occurs by an unceasing emanation, like which there is nothing to be found in nature. For God the Father from eternity begat, and always begets, and never will cease to beget His Son. For, if the generation of the Son should have an end, it would also have a beginning, and this would not be eternal. Nevertheless, this generation cannot be said, for this reason, to be imperfect and successive, for the act of generation in the Father and the Son is considered perfect in work and constant in operation." The consequence of *passive generation*, is the *passive sending forth*. QUEN. (I, 338): "The consequence of this passive generation is the passive sending of the Son of God into the flesh, which is not accurately the incarnation of the same, for they differ as former and latter, He having been first sent and, afterwards, made of a woman, Gal. 4: 4."

NOTE.—"The sending forth of the Son of God (1) *is not a local and separative removal*, as though He had been locally removed from the highest heaven to the lowest earth, and had been separated from His Heavenly Father. For this conflicts with the infinite and intimate identity of the persons of the Father and the Son; (2) it is not an *imperious sending forth*, but one of free consent, and therefore proves, between the one sending and the one sent, no inequality, such as the Arians once attempted to derive thence, and as the Socinians at the present day maintain. In divine things a sending

forth does not remove equality of persons, but only presupposes an order of origin. (3) *The sending forth is not constrained*, but is spontaneous, John 4: 34; 5: 30; (4) it is not *accurately incarnation itself.* For the sending forth preceded incarnation, and the latter is the goal of the former, since the Son was sent forth in order to become man."

According to GRH. (I, 288), the difference between *to beget* and *to create* is: "*To beget* is, from one's own substance, to produce something similar according to essence. *To create* is to make, out of nothing, something different from the substance of the Creator." QUEN. (I, 330) says, indeed: "Although this generation is most peculiar and most true, yet the mode itself of generation is unknown to us and ineffable," and yet he attempts, as follows, to form at least an approximate conception of it: "This divine generation, however, can be adumbrated by the similitude of rays of the sun, flowing from the solar body with a perpetual dependence. For, as the sun is not older than its rays, nor the one begetting prior, in time, to the one begotten; so, the eternal Father, from eternity, generated the Son; and, just as the sun has, from the beginning, generated its own rays, and even now begets them, and will continue to generate them, and nevertheless, it cannot be inferred thence that the generation of the rays of the sun is not yet perfect, so also, from eternity, God has begotten, and always begets, and will never cease to beget His own Wisdom, and, nevertheless, it cannot on that account be said that the generation of the Son is not yet perfect. The Holy Ghost, Ps. 2: 7, seems to intimate this. In these words, the generation of the Son is expressed in the preterite in such a manner that, nevertheless, it is said to occur to-day, because the generation of the Son is present, and will never cease. Yet there is this great distinction between the two: the sun is a substance, but the rays are an accident; whereas the substance of the Son is the same with the substance of the Father."

[32] The hypostatic character of the Holy Ghost is "*passive spiration, or the proceeding of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son, i. e.*, the eternal origin of the Holy Ghost, by which He is sent forth, within the bosom of the Godhead, by the Father and the Son, by the communication of an essence numerically one and the same, as the common breath of both." HOLL. (337.) QUEN. (I, 343): "The origin of the Holy Ghost, by which, within the Godhead, He receives, through an ineffable procession, from the Father and the Son, an essence the same in number."

HOLL. (337): "It is called passive spiration, not *physically*, as though it implied passive power or imperfection, *but grammatically*,

because the Holy Ghost is said not to breathe, but to be breathed. Nor are active and passive spiration two spirations, but the spiration is one and the same, which, with respect to the source breathing and producing, is called *active spiration*, and with respect to the end attained, is called *passive*. In other respects, the emanation of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son is most absolute."

"The spiration here understood is *not external*, like the breathing of Christ upon His disciples, John 20: 22, but *internal and immanent*, since it occurs within the *very* bosom of the Godhead; *not transitory and evanescent*, as is that of breathing men, *but eternal and permanent*, because the Holy Ghost proceeds from eternity, as the breath of the Almighty, Job 33: 4, and the spirit of the mouth of the Lord, Ps. 33: 6; *not an accidental but a substantial spiration*, for in God there is no accident, nor can the Holy Ghost, as a divine person and substance, be produced by an accidental act."

An analogy for the conception of the procession was sought by some of the Dogmaticians in the going forth of the word from the mouth, and in our spirit. Grh. says, however, concerning the former (I, 321): "Our word proceeds in such a manner from the heart, that there is an evanescent sound, but the Holy Ghost so proceeds that there is a subsisting person." Of the latter (ibid.): "The spirit of God is ἀσώματος, of altogether the same nature and essence with Himself, but our spirit is corporeal, because an exhalation from the most refined and subtle portion of the blood, and not at all of the same nature with the soul."

Proof of *the procession from Father and Son*, Holl. (337): "Holy Scripture teaches in express words, that the Holy Ghost proceeds from God the Father. John 15: 26. That He proceeds from the Son of God is correctly inferred from the name, the Spirit of the Son (Gal. 4. 6), from the ὁμοουσία of Father and Son (John 16: 15), from His reception of omniscience from the Son (John 16: 13, 14), from the apocalyptic vision of the river proceeding from the throne of the Lamb (Rev 22: 1), from the sending of the Holy Ghost from the Son (John 15: 26), from the breathing of Christ upon His disciples (John 20: 22), and from the order and distinction of the divine persons."

[33] The consequence of the procession is the *temporal sending forth of the Holy Ghost*. Quen. (I, 331): "The sending forth, in time, of the Holy Ghost upon and to the apostles and other believers, is the manifestation, or consequence and effect, of the eternal procession. The latter is eternal and necessary; the former is gracious, intermitted, and free, and likewise conditionate;

nevertheless this sending forth is not local, and does not introduce an inferiority, because it is not ministerial and servile."

[34] The scriptural proof we give partly according to GRH., and partly according to QUEN. and HOLL.

In the Old Testament GRH. finds indicated: "Where God is spoken of, I. a plurality of persons, and II. when by name, a Trinity of persons."

I. The *plurality* is shown (I, 186 seq.):

(*a*) By those passages which employ the plural term, Elohim, concerning God . . . Gen. 20: 13; 35: 7; Deut. 5: 26; Josh. 24: 19; 2 Sam. 7: 23; Job 35: 10; Ps. 149: 2; Is. 44: 2; 54: 5; Jer. 10: 10; 23: 36, where observe that this plural word is not only construed with a singular verb in very many passages of Scripture (to denote the unity of the divine essence), but even is sometimes joined with a plural verb and adjective (to make known more clearly the plurality of persons).

(*b*) By the passages in which God speaks of Himself in the plural number, Gen. 1: 26; 3: 22; 11: 7; Is. 6: 8.

(*c*) By the passages in which God speaks of God, and the Lord of the Lord; for there, in like manner, plurality of persons is signified. Gen. 19: 24; Ex. 16: 7; 34: 5, 6; Numb. 14: 21; 2 Sam. 5: 24; 7: 11; Ps. 45: 7; 110: 1; Jer. 23: 5, 6, 33. 15; Dan. 9: 17; Hos. 1: 7; Zach. 2: 8, 9.

(*d*) By the passages in which mention is made of the Son of God; for it is necessary that He be also true God. Ps. 2: 7; 72: 17; Prov. 30: 4. Finally, there are to be referred hither all the testimonies of the Old Testament in which Jehovah is said to send an angel, to whom the name Jehovah or divine works are ascribed; for then by the name angel is meant the Son of God, who, with the Father and the Holy Ghost, is true God. Ex. 23: 20, 21.

II. The *three persons in one essence*, are proved (I, 190 sq.):

(*a*) From the passages in which three persons of the Godhead are distinctly enumerated. Gen. 1: 1, 2; Ex. 31: 1, 3; 2 Sam. 23: 2; Ps. 33: 6; Is. 42: 1; 48: 16; 61: 1; 63: 7; Hagg. 2: 5.

(*b*) From the passages in which the name of Jehovah and God is thrice repeated in one connection; for there, according to the corresponding mode of revelation of the Old Testament, three persons of the Godhead are implied. Numb. 6: 23–26; Deut. 6: 4; Ps. 42: 1, 2; 67: 6, 7; Is. 33: 22; Jer. 33: 2; Dan. 9: 19

(*c*) From the Trisagion of the angels. Is. 6: 3.

(*d*) From the passages in which God speaks concerning God, and the Lord concerning the Lord, as above. I, c.

But of the Old Testament proof-passages for the Trinity, GRH.

(III, 218) says in general: "1. We do not say that in the Old Testament and the New Testament there is the same clearness and evidence of the testimonies concerning the Trinity; because the clearer revelation of this mystery was reserved for the New Testament. 2. Nor do we wish that, in a discussion with an obstinate adversary, a beginning be made with the more obscure statements of the Old Testament. But we only assert that from the Old Testament some testimonies, in constructing the doctrine of the Trinity, both can and ought to be cited, since God always from the beginning revealed Himself thus, in order that the Church at all times might, in this manner, acknowledge, worship, and praise Him, namely, as three distinct persons in one essence."

In the New Testament there is shown, I. The Trinity of persons in God; and, II. The true divinity of each person.

I. *The Trinity of persons.*

QUEN. (I, 324 seq.): "The Holy Trinity is proved in three ways: (1) From 1 John 5: 7. (2) From the wonderful theophany at the baptism of Christ, where three persons of the Godhead are manifested. Matt. 3: 16, 17. (3) From the solemn formula of baptism given by Christ. Matt. 28: 19. But we cannot be baptized εἰς ὄνομα of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, unless the name of these three, as equal in authority, dignity, and essence, be invoked over us. Hence, we argue: He to whose faith, religion, worship, and obedience we are bound, is true God."

II. The *true divinity of each person.*

1. (QUEN. I, 329): "The *Deity of the Father* is proved (1) by the names peculiar to the true God alone; (2) by attributes, *e. g.*, eternity, infinity, omniscience, omnipotence, etc.; (3) by works truly and purely divine; (4) by truly divine worship."

2. (I, 332 sq.): "The *Deity of the Son* is proved:

I. *From His names.* Some names are essential, others personal. Those are essential which express the divine nature and essence of Christ. Personal names are those which designate His person.

(1) Divine essential names: In the Old Testament, Christ, the branch of David, is called Jehovah, our righteousness. Jer. 23: 6. He is called Jehovah, whom Jehovah anointed, Is. 61: 1, 8; Adonai, Is. 6: 1–3, cf John 12: 41. In the New Testament, the Son of God. (*a*) He is called God absolutely, without any limiting or alienating condition. John 1: 1; 20: 28. (*b*) To the divine names, the words are added, by which the incarnate Son of God is designated. Thus Paul, Acts 20: 28. The same apostle, 1 Tim. 3: 16; Heb. 2: 14; John 1: 14; 1 John 4: 2, 3. (*c*) To the divine names, epithets are annexed, by which He is declared to be

supreme God. For (*a*) Christ is named by St. John the true God and eternal life, 1 John 5: 20. (*β*) By St. Paul, the Son of God is called the great God. Tit. 2: 13. (*γ*) By the same apostle, Christ is named God over all, blessed forever, Rom. 9: 5. He is called the Lord from heaven, 1 Cor. 15: 47; He is said to be Lord of all, Acts 10: 36, and therefore Lord of heaven and earth, which is the description of the true God, Matt. 11: 25; Lord of lords and King of kings. Rev. 17: 14; 19: 16.

(2) Divine personal names: Christ is called in Holy Scriptures, (*a*) God's own Son, Rom. 8: 32; having God as His own Father, John 5: 18. (*b*) The only-begotten Son of the Father, John 1: 14. (*c*) The Son existing in the bosom of the Father, John 1: 18. (*d*) The first-begotten Son, Heb. 1: 6. (*e*) The Son above angels, Heb. 1: 5. (*f*) The Son equal to God the Father, John 15: 17, 18.

II. *From Divine Attributes.*

For the Son of God is: (1) Eternal, Col. 1: 17; Heb. 13: 8; John 1: 1, 14; Rev. 1: 8. (2) Infinite and omnipresent, John 1: 48; Matt. 18: 20; 28: 20. (3) Immutable, Ps. 102: 27; Heb. 1: 12. (4) Most holy, Dan. 9: 24. (5) Omnipotent, Rev. 1: 8; John 10: 28. (6) Omniscient, John 21: 17; 2: 25. (7) Most happy and *αὐταρκέστατος* [perfectly self-contented], John 16: 15. (8) Most glorious, 1 Cor. 2: 8; John 17: 5.

III. *The Divine Works* of the Son, proving His deity, are either *ad intra*, as the active procession of the Holy Ghost, and the sending of the same (elsewhere discussed); or *ad extra*, since in the Scripture divine works *ad extra* are ascribed to Christ, the Son of God. From them His true deity is effectually proved. Moreover, there is ascribed to Him: (1) The creation of the world, Gen. 1: 2; Ps. 33: 6; 102: 25; Prov. 8: 30; John 1: 3; Col. 1: 16; Heb. 1: 10. (2) The preservation and governing of all things, John 5: 17; 1 Cor. 8: 6; Heb. 1: 3. (3) The working of miracles, Ps. 72: 18. (4) The redemption of the human race, Hos. 13: 14; Zach. 9: 11. (5) The preservation and protection of the Church, Matt. 16: 18. (6) The raising of the dead, Job 19: 25; John 6: 39, 40; 11: 25. (7) Salvation, Matt. 1: 21.

IV. The final argument for the deity of Christ is derived from His divine worship and honor. These are ascribed to Him (1) in general, John 5: 23; (2) specifically, Is. 45: 23; Phil. 2: 10; John 14: 1; Matt. 28: 19."

(3) (I, 340): "*The Deity of the Holy Ghost* is proved:

I. From His divine names. For He is distinctly called Jehovah, 2 Sam. 23: 2, רוּחַ יְהוָה the Spirit of the Lord spake by me, cf. v.

2, and Acts 1: 16; Is. 1: 21; Ez. 1: 3, etc., with Zech. 7: 12; Luke 1: 70; with 1 Pet. 1: 11; 2 Pet. 1: 21; Is. 6: 8, 10, with Acts 28: 25, sq., etc., etc., θεός, Acts 5: 3, 4; 1 John 5: 7, 9, etc., etc., κύριος, 2 Cor. 3: 17; 1 Cor. 12: 4, 5.

II. From essential divine attributes ascribed to Him; namely, Eternity, Heb. 9: 14. Omnipotence, Is. 11: 2. Luke 11: 20; 1 Cor. 12: 11. Omniscience, 1 Cor. 2: 10–12. Goodness and mercy, Neh. 9: 20; Ps. 103: 11. Omnipresence, Ps. 139: 7.

III. From His divine works, such as the creation of the universe, Gen. 1: 2; Job. 26: 13; Ps. 33: 6. Preservation, Job 33: 4. The working of miracles, Acts 10: 38. Add to these, works of grace and justice, of which Scripture speaks frequently.

IV. From divine worship, such as (*a*) Adoration, Is. 6: 3; Acts 28: 25 and 26. (*b*) Invocation, 2 Cor. 13: 13; Rev. 1: 4. (*c*) Faith in the Holy Ghost, Matt. 28: 19."

CHAPTER III.

Of Creation.

§ 20. *Creation a Divine Work.*

THE doctrine of the Divine works follows next in order to that of the existence, essence, and attributes of the triune God. The first outward work of God (*opus ad extra*) is the creation of the world. [1] Concerning this creation the Holy Scriptures teach us:

(1) That it is a work of God, which He accomplished without the co-operation or assistance of any creature, [2] of His own free will, [3] and solely by means of His omnipotent creative Word; [4] a work of the one true God, and, therefore, of the Triune God. [5]

(2) As God is, in the true sense of the word, Creator of the world, this fact excludes every conception of a material existing from eternity out of which God only made, prepared, or fashioned the world; on the contrary, the material itself, of which the world consists, was created by God. This is expressed in the proposition, that *the world was created from nothing,* which is intended to mean that there was nothing in

existence which God made use of in forming the world, but that everything that exists was first called into being by Him. (2 Macc. 7: 28; Rom. 4: 17; Heb. 11: 3; Is. 41: 24; Prov. 8: 22.) [6]

(3) As a specific beginning of creation is taught in the first chapter of Genesis, this at once excludes the conception of a world existing from eternity. [7]

(4) The world, if we mean by this term its entire construction and arrangement as existing at the end of the six days of creation, came into being, according to the narrative in Genesis, not at once, but gradually ("during a period of six days God made all things which He created and made, observing an admirable order"). The manner of their production (*ordo creationis*) is described in the first chapter of Genesis, and from this account we can distinguish: (*a*) The creation of matter; (*b*) The separation of the different kinds of materials created from nothing; (*c*) The arrangement of the rude masses and their construction into the form in which they appeared at the end of the days of creation. [8] We can thus also distinguish between *immediate* and *mediate* creation; the former being the creation from nothing, and the latter the arrangement of the previously created materials. [9]

(5) The first and highest aim of creation is *the glory of God*, for God wishes to be recognized and revered as the great God that He is. (Ps. 19: 1; Prov. 16: 4.) But, among all the creatures that have been called into being, man holds the highest place, and for his sake everything else in the world has been created; therefore, as the *intermediate aim of creation*, we are to regard *the use and benefit of man.* (Gen. 1: 28.) [10]

(6) If the world is thus entirely the creature of God, it follows, finally, as is indeed expressly stated, Gen. 1: 31, that everything in the world was very good, and that, therefore, everything evil that is now in it must be regarded as having entered subsequently. [11]

This is all comprehended in the definition: "Creation is an act of God, who is one and alone, and an undivided work of the three persons of the Godhead, by which the Father, through the co-eternal Son, in the co-eternal Holy Spirit, of his own free will, in six distinct days, formed all things, visible

and invisible, not out of some materials co-existing with Himself from eternity, but from nothing, for the glory of His own name and the benefit of man; and all things that God made are very good." (GRH. IV, 51.) [12]

[1] The distinction between works *ad intra* and *ad extra*, which we discussed in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity, is not introduced by some of the Dogmaticians until they treat of the present topic.

QUEN. (I, 415) divides divine actions *ad extra* into: "actions of power, as the creation and preservation of the world;" "actions of mercy, as the redemption, calling, regeneration, conversion, and salvation of the human race;" and "actions of justice, as the resurrection of the dead, the final judgment, and the damnation of devils and the wicked."

Concerning the connection of the doctrine of the creation with that of the Trinity, CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 112): "Thus far, in the article of the Trinity, God has been described as He is in His secret nature, and mention has, indeed, been also made of the works of God, but, especially, of those which divinity works within itself, apart from every creature. But God, who has made darkness His hiding-place, and who dwells in inaccessible light, coming forth from His secret abode, has manifested Himself, also, in works *ad extra*, . . . and, because the first manifestation *ad extra* was made in the work of creation, the article concerning the creation immediately follows."

[2] CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 115): "Creation is an action of the one God. This is said, because of those who have proposed a number of sources. It is, likewise, an action of God alone, which neither ought to be, nor can be, ascribed to any creature (Mal. 2: 10; Job 31: 15; 1 Cor. 8: 6; Is. 45: 6, 7; Job 9: 8.)" This statement, at the same time, excludes the opinion of those "who add to God, in the work of creation, the co-operation of nature, in accordance with what occurs in things already framed and set in order" (CHMN. (I, 116)), as well as the view of those, also, "who have divided the work of creation between God and the angels" (GRH. IV, 7).

CALOV. (III, 897): "In the primeval creation there was no instrumental cause or means, because God created all things by the Word."

[3] QUEN. (I, 417): "Neither was there any antecedent cause, except the purpose of God alone, communicating Himself, not from the necessity of nature, but *from the freedom of His will.*"

CALOV. (III, 896): "The impelling cause of creation is the immense goodness of God, prompted by which, as He wished to communicate the highest good, He most freely communicated Himself."

HOLL. (357): "Creation is a free, divine action, because God framed the universe, not induced thereto by necessity, as though He needed the service of creatures (since He is absolutely independent, αὐταρκέστατος), but freely, as He was able to create or not to create and to frame sooner or later, in this or in another manner."

[4] Hence creation is also described as "not successive, *but, with respect to every individual being created, instantaneous, for God framed everything, not by any movement or laborious exertion*, but when He said, 'Let there be light,' immediately there was light."—HOLL. (ib.).

CALOV. (III, 900): "The action is not properly successive, but instantaneous; for the individuals, which God created, He created in an instant, without movement or succession, although, if these be regarded collectively, the creation was completed in six days (νυχθήμερα); not that He devoted those entire days to creation, but that He created something in the moments of each day."

[5] CALOV. (III, 889): "The efficient cause of creation is God, one and alone."

GRH. (IV, 4): "But that one true God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; therefore, in Scripture, the work of creation is ascribed to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Of the Father it is affirmed, 1 Cor. 8: 6. Of the Son, John 1: 3; Col. 1: 16. Of the Holy Ghost, Job. 26: 13; 33: 4; Ps. 104: 30. We conclude, therefore, that creation is an undivided action of the one and true God alone, viz., of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost." If nevertheless creation, in a special sense, is called the work *ad extra* of God the Father (compare the section on the Trinity, note 29), this is done only by way of appropriation (same section, note 23).

HOLL. (352): "In Holy Scripture and the Apostles' Creed the work of creation is ascribed, in a peculiar manner, to God the Father: (*a*) Because of the order of working; for this reason, that what the Father has of Himself to do and to create, the Son of God and the Holy Ghost have of the Father. (*b*) Because, in the work of creation, God the Father, by His most efficacious word of command, manifested His own omnipotence, Gen. 1: 3. (*c*) Creation is the first divine work *ad extra*, and therefore, by appropriation, is affirmed of the First Person of the Godhead."

CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 115): "We must not dispute too curiously concerning the distinction of persons in the work of creation, but let us be content with the revelation, that all things were created

by the eternal Father, through the Son, while the Holy Ghost hovered over them, Rom. 11: 36. *But these things are not to be construed into an inequality of persons*, as the Arians blasphemously assert that the Son was God's instrument in creation, just as the workman uses an axe. For the prepositions (ἀπο, διά, ἐν) do not divide the nature, but express the properties of a nature that is one and unconfused." So also Holl. (353): "The three persons of the Godhead are not three associated causes, not three authors of creation, but one cause, one author of creation, one Creator. Although they are three distinct persons, yet they influence the work of creation with one power. If they were to influence it with a diverse power of working, they would be associated causes."

[6] Quen. (I, 417): "There was no material of creation *out of which* (*materia ex qua*), with respect to things created on the first day. For they were created on the first day, *not from any pre-existing material, whether eternal or created before, but were made from purely negative nothing.* When it is said that the works of the first day were created 'from nothing,' *the particle 'from' does not designate the material out of which, but excludes it.* For, by 'from nothing,' there is nothing else denoted than the starting-point (*terminus a quo*); *i. e.*, the nothing, from which all things are said to have been made, has respect not to the material, but only to the starting-point, and ought to be understood of the order of creation; and the particle 'from' can be correctly translated by 'after,' so that the sense may be: After nothing, as the starting-point, something was made."

Chemn. (Loc. Th., I, 115): "That the 'material from which' was not from eternity, but all things were created from nothing; *i. e., although things did not exist, they began to be when God spake.* . . Moreover, it is said that they were created from nothing, not as we commonly say, 'they contend about nothing,' *i. e.*, about a trifling matter; but as when something is made, springs up, and comes into being, and there is not anything out of which it may be made."

Grh. (IV, 7): "They occasion the madness of the Stoics, who devised two eternal principles, νοῦς καὶ ὕλη, mind, or God, and matter, which they imagined was, during the ages of eternity, a confused chaos, and, at a certain time, was at length brought into form by mind."

In connection with this doctrine, the Dogmaticians call attention also to the difference in the meaning of the words *create, beget,* and *make.* See above, § 19, note 31. From the distinction between create and beget, arises the proposition (Holl. (356)): "God did not create this visible world *from His own essence*, nor did He, as it

were, diffuse this into parts, so that every creature may be said to be a particle of God."

Calov. (III, 899): "Creation does not consist in emanation from the essence of God, nor in generation, nor in motion, or natural change, . . . but in outward action, by which, by means of infinite power, things are produced from nothing."

[7] Quen. (I, 421): "The world neither has been from eternity nor could it have been created from eternity." Proof (ibid. 422): "(*a*) From the history of creation; (*b*) from the end and destruction of the world; (*c*) from the eternity peculiar to God alone; (*d*) from the manner of its production, viz.: because all things were created from nothing, it follows that the material from which (*materia ex qua*) was not from eternity." While it is thus asserted that the world could not have been created from eternity, we still dare not express ourselves in such a manner as though the world had been created at a particular time, since we cannot conceive of a time as having existed before the world.

Concerning this point, the Dogmaticians usually express themselves as follows: Hfrffr. (67): "Moses (Gen. 1) replies, saying: That this mechanism of the world was not always, or from eternity; but that, in its coming forth, it depended upon a certain beginning of time; so that, since, in the infinite ages of past eternity, there was no world, God caused the world to come forth *in that definite beginning of time.*" Calov. (III, 901): "The creation of things did not occur from eternity, but *in that beginning in which all time began to flow.* Hence, creation began, not properly in time, but in the first instant and beginning of time. This is called the beginning of the way of the Lord, Prov. 8: 22, before which, as there was no way, no outward action, no work, so also there was no time, no period, no age; for as the ages began to be framed by the Word, Heb. 11: 3, so also the creation of all ages began, 1: 2."

The question, "Why God did not create the world sooner, and what He did whilst alone and unemployed in that eternity," is repulsed as "a question of madmen curiously inquiring into such things as have no profit." (Hfrffr. (69.))

[8] Hfrffr. (72): "From Gen. 1: 1, sq., it appears that, in the creation of the world, there was a three-fold operation of the Creator: (1) First, indeed, He created; *i. e.*, although there was no matter before, He produced from nothing that crude and confused corporeal mass which Moses has designated by the names, heaven, earth, and water; (2) Then, during the first three days, He divided these three bodies; (3) At length, during the second period of three days, He completed everything with its garniture."

Quen. (I, 417): "The action of creation comprises three steps: (1) The production, on the first day, of the crude material, which was the germinal source, as it were, of the entire universe; (2) The distinction and disposition of simple creatures during the first three days: for, on the first day, He separated light from darkness; on the second, by interposing the firmament, the waters beneath from those above; and, on the third, the earth from the waters; (3) The furnishing and completion of the world, which was brought to perfection in the second period of three days; for, on the fourth day, He furnished the heavens with luminaries; on the fifth, the water with fishes, and the atmosphere with winged creatures; and, finally, on the sixth, the earth with animals, and, at last, with the chief of all animate beings, viz., with man."

The later Dogmaticians usually treat of man, as the last of created beings, in a separate section, which they place before that of *Providence.* But we think we can appropriately here insert the essential features of the topic in the following propositions:

(*a*) As to his position in the world, the remark of Quen. (I, 511): "God, to give, as it were, the last touch to the work of creation, framed the most noble of creatures, for whose sake he had produced all the rest, viz., man."

(*b*) Definition, Holl. (406): "Man is an animal, consisting of a rational soul and an organic body, framed by God, and endowed at the first creation with God's own image, in order that he might sincerely worship the Creator, live a godly life, and attain eternal happiness."

(*c*) The first man was Adam. Quen. (I, 543): "Adam, framed by God on the sixth day of the first hexahemeron, is the first of all men, and the parent of the entire human race, throughout the whole globe, 1 Cor. 15: 45, 47; Gen. 2: 5. (The antithesis of Is. Peyrere, the founder of the Pre-adamites (1655), who says that: 'The Gentiles are diverse from the Jews in race and origin; the Jews were formed by God in Adam, the Gentiles were created before, on the same day as other animate beings. The origin of the *latter* is described in Gen. 1, that of the former in Gen. 2 . . . The Gentiles are many ages before the Jewish nation, and, by race and nature, diverse from the same, and survivors of the Noachian flood of the Jews.' Likewise, that 'the epoch of the creation of the world should not be dated from that beginning which is commonly imagined in Adam, but must be sought for still further back, and from ages very remote in the past.')" Br. (239): "Moreover, in the beginning, God framed *only one individual, namely a male; woman* He *afterwards* produced from the rib of her sleeping husband, Gen. 2: 22."

(*d*) Of the mode of production, QUEN. (I, 512): "It consists in this, that God made man (*α*) with singular deliberation, taken concerning this work, Gen. 1: 26; (*β*) immediately, with His own hands, so to say; (*γ*) ornately and elegantly; (*δ*) successively (Gen. 2: 7, 21: 22), first (with respect to Adam) forming the body, and then breathing into it a soul."

(*e*) Of the internal, constitutive principles of man. QUEN. (I, 513): "They are the *material* and the physical *form*. The *material* is an animate organic body, before the Fall impassible, and not mortal. Gen. 1: 26; Wis. 2: 23. The physical *form* is the soul, before the Fall illumined with great light of concreated wisdom and knowledge, Col. 3: 10. Therefore, it is pure, and entirely destitute of any sinful stain, Eph. 4: 24." The spirit is thus not enumerated as the third essential part of man. In reference to the passages cited as favoring that view, it is remarked by QUEN. (I, 518): "(1) In such passages Holy Scripture does not understand by spirit, a spirit differing substantially from the human soul, but a superior part of the soul. (2) It distinguishes between, on the one hand, *spirit taken for an essential part of man*, which thus used is the same as soul, and is not distinguished from it; and, on the other, *as employed for spiritual gifts and those of sanctification*, which are conferred by the Holy Ghost upon believers, or for the grace of the Holy Ghost and His operation, viz., the qualities and gifts of the Holy Ghost in regenerate man." [GRH. XVII, 80. "That there are but two parts of man, is proved by (1) Man's creation, Gen. 2: 7. (2) His redemption. For Christ's redemption had to do with man in his entire being, consisting only of soul and body, Gal. 3: 13; 4: 5; Luke 19: 10. (3) His renewal and sanctification. (4) The Incarnation of the Son; for He assumed soul and body. (5) The death of man, Ecc. 12: 7; Acts 7: 59. (6) The resurrection of the dead, 1 Kings 17: 21. Opponents of our view urge passages of Scripture in which the spirit is distinguished from the soul, Luke 1: 46; 1 Thess. 5: 23; Heb. 4: 12. We reply that the term *spirit* is sometimes put exegetically for the soul itself, since the soul is a spirit, Gen. 2: 7; 46: 27. Some understand by *spirit*, 1 Thess. 5: 23, the mind or intellect, by *soul*, the will and affections.]

(*f*) The question, "Whether human souls are created daily by God, or are propagated *per traducem*," is answered thus by QUEN. (I, 519): "The soul of the first man was immediately created by God; but the soul of Eve was produced by propagation, and the souls of the rest of men are created, not daily, nor begotten of their parents as the body or souls of brutes, but, *by virtue of the*

divine blessing, are propagated, per traducem, by their parents." Quen. (I, 520, sq.) adduces the proof: "(1) from the primeval blessing of God; Gen. 1: 28, cf. 8: 17; 9: 1. (2) From God's rest and cessation on the seventh day from all work, Gen. 2: 2. (3) From the production of the soul of Eve, Gen. 2: 21, 22. (4) From the description of generation, Gen. 5: 3. Just as after the Fall Adam begat a son in his own likeness, after his image, not only with respect to body, but also with respect to soul, so also the rest of men. (5) From Gen. 46: 26. (6) From the following absurdities, (*a*) if it be affirmed that souls are created immediately by God, either original sin would be altogether denied or God could not be vindicated from injustice, both of which are absurd; (*b*) it follows that man does not beget an entire man, or an entire composite being, but only that part of it which does not give form * to man; that He does not beget man, for man without form, *i. e.*, soul, is not man. . . . (7) From Ps. 51: 7." Cf. also the following observations of Quen. (I, 519): "(1) We distinguish between the *simultaneous* creation of all souls, at the origin of the world, and the *daily* creation which occurs now, as often as men are begotten. (2) As human reason, not enlightened by Holy Scripture, knows little that is certain concerning the departure of the human soul from the body, and its condition after its departure, so also it can define nothing certain concerning the origin of the human soul in or with the body. (3) We distinguish between traduction, or the propagation itself of the soul, and the mode of traduction or propagation. That the soul is propagated by parents procreating children, and that souls are not immediately created or infused by God, is sufficiently manifest from the Holy Scriptures; but the mode has not been defined, and, therefore, we refrain from its determination and definition." Grh. IV. 278: "1. Since the image of God, which was the righteousness, holiness and perfection of the concreated human soul, was propagated by generation, the soul itself must be thus propagated. 2. Original sin. . . . 3. The force of the words. Gen. 1: 28. That this was not destroyed by the Fall is proved by Gen. 5: 3. 'Adam begat a son,' etc., *i. e.*, 'flesh of flesh,' John 3: 6, by which term not only the body is meant, Gal. 5: 20. The corrupt image of Adam, therefore, is to be sought not in the body alone of his sons, but in the entire man. . . . 5. God did not create a soul for Eve, but transferred it from

* [The word "form" in this connection is used in the scholastic sense of the term, viz.: "Form is the essence of the thing, from which result not only its figure and shape but all its other qualities." (Fleming's Vocabulary.) See also Glossary at the end of this volume.]

Adam to Eve, and thus Eve derived her soul from Adam. For as the entire soul is in the entire body, and is entire in every part thereof, the rib of which Eve was formed was animated, and therefore she received a soul, not by inspiration or new creation, but by propagation from Adam. Eve's posterity, as animated, are begotten of animated parents," etc. . . . The explanation of the mode of propagation is most difficult. 1. Some say that the souls of children are enkindled from those of parents as a torch from a torch, flame from flame. 2. Some, that the soul of the child is propagated from that of the parent, not separately, but that the whole is begotten of the whole; the seed being animated, but not that of either parent separately, but only in the union ordained of God for this purpose. 3. Some, that besides its form, prepared for an organic body, it has a divinely implanted force whereby it can produce a soul. 4. Some, that the soul of the mother can produce the soul of her offspring by growth, in the same way in which she produces new matter for nourishment. 5. Others attempt to reduce the contrary opinions of creation and propagation to harmony in this way: There is a two-fold production: one with respect to the power of nature, called *generation;* another, with respect to the absolute power of God, called *creation.* Creation, thus taken, is divided into that which proceeds from nothing, and is creation, properly so-called, and that which proceeds from a substance, yet neither necessarily nor with natural power, but in obedience to command. This presupposed, they maintain that God creates a new soul not of the souls of the parents, which, since it thus derives its material from Adam, participates in his guilt. . . . We leave the mode to be investigated by philosophers; but, meanwhile, the propagation itself must not be denied, because the mode of the propagation is not manifest.

Of the *body*, Holl. says further (411): "(*a*) The body is a true part of man, without which he is not a true and entire man." (412): "(*b*) The human soul has not been cast by God into the body as into a foul prison, by which it is hindered from being able to elevate itself and fly upward to the knowledge, love, and worship of God." (The antithesis of the Mystics.) Of the *soul*, Holl. (409): "*The soul is said to have been breathed into man by God, but not from God.* For God did not, from His own substance, breathe into man a soul." (417): "The human soul neither emanated from the divine essence, nor by spiritual regeneration and mystic union with the triune God does it return or flow back to the divine essence." Hence, Br. (237): "God created man, producing his body from the earth, but his soul *from nothing*, and joining it to the body."

[9] Quen. (I, 417): "All things were created from nothing, nevertheless some *immediately*, viz., the works of the first day, and others *mediately*, viz., by means of the material which God had before created from absolutely negative nothing, viz., the works of the succeeding five days." (Ibid. 418): "The *former* is of the highest order, and is creation, primarily or properly so-called, through which God, without the intervention of another, acted immediately upon nothing, by calling forth from it that which has a real and positive essence; but the *latter* is creation of the second order, secondarily and less principally, yet properly so-called, by which God produced something from a material pre-existing, but crude and altogether confused."

[10] Quen. (I, 418): "*The ultimate end of creation* is the glory of God. For in and through creation God manifested (*a*) the glory of His goodness by sharing His goodness with creatures; (*b*) the glory of His power, by creating all things from nothing; by His will and Word alone; (*c*) the glory of wisdom, which shines forth from the multitude, variety, order, and harmony of things created, Ps. 19: 1."

Grh. (IV, 4): "In order that God, who is invisible by nature, might be known also from things visible, a work was wrought by Him, to manifest the workman by its visibility."

Quen. (I, 418): "*The intermediate end of creation* is the advantage of men. For God made all things for the sake of man, but man He made for His own sake, Ps. 115: 16."

[11] Chemn. (Loch. Th., I, 116): "To the definition of creation this also belongs: that all things which God made are very good, Gen. 1: 31; Wis. 1: 13, 14."

Quen. (I, 418): "From this statement we exclude the defects of nature, which began only after man's fall."

Calov. (III, 902): "Well-pleasing to God are the consequences of creation, the rest from the work of creation, as well as the power and dominion exercised over creatures."

[12] Quen. (I, 415): "Creation is an external action of the triune God, whereby, to the praise of His name and the advantage of men, in the space of six days, by the command alone of His most free will, He omnipotently and wisely produced from nothing all things visible and invisible."

Br. (248): "Creation is defined as an action *ad extra* of the triune God, whereby God, impelled by His goodness, produced this world and all things that are therein, first, indeed, as simple bodies, from no pre-existing material; then out of simple bodies, as a crude and confused material, He produced mixed bodies; nay,

even independently of all material, He produced immaterial substances, so as, by the direction alone of His will, to frame with power each of these, according to the idea of His mind, and in the space of six days to complete the entire work, to the glory of His wisdom, power, and goodness, and to the advantage of men."

CHAPTER IV.

Of Providence.

§ 21. *The Doctrine taught by both Reason and Revelation.*

"GOD is not a workman who, when he has completed his work, leaves it to itself and goes his way" [Augustine]; but, having created the world, He sustains it and continually cares for it. [1] Therefore the Holy Scriptures never speak of the creation without at the same time alluding to the superintending care that is exercised over the world; and in this very fact the Christian finds the highest consolation, that he is permitted to regard God as continually present in the world, caring for the greatest just as for the least, and hindered by nothing in the exercise of His care. This consolation we may, indeed, in part derive from the contemplation of the world by the light of Nature, and from observing the course of its affairs; but it is only the certainty which Revelation communicates that establishes us immovably in this confidence. [2]

The Providence of God [3] specially manifests itself: I, in His preserving what has been created in the world; II, in His coöperating with all that occurs; and III, in His leading and directing everything in the world. The doctrine of Providence is accordingly divided into the doctrines of *Preservation*, *Concurrence*, and *Government* [4] (Conservatio, concursus, gubernatio.)

I. "*Preservation is the act of Divine Providence whereby God sustains all things created by Him, so that they continue in being with the properties implanted in their nature and the powers re-*

ceived in creation" (Holl., 441). The world would fall back again into nothing if God did not continually uphold, not only the various species of creatures and the individuals in them, but also the existing order of arrangement and coöperation which He has assigned the whole; [5] for created things have no power of subsistence in themselves, but have it only so long as God imparts it to them. [6] We distinguish, therefore, between *creation* and *preservation* only in our conception; in God we must regard one as implying the other: therefore, *preservation* is also designated as *continued creation.* [7]

II. *Concurrence.* [8] The doctrine of Divine Providence implies far more than merely that God creates and upholds the world. If this were all, then we would have to refer all the changes and transactions that occur in the world entirely to creatures, and God would have no further share in all this than merely to give to His creatures the ability thus to act. But God is to be regarded as, in a far higher sense than this, present in the world. The Holy Scriptures teach us that He is an active participant in all that transpires in the world; that nothing that occurs could take place without Him and His active co-operation; that, therefore, every single effect, change, or transaction in the world comes to pass only through the influence of God. In this, God is not, indeed, as in creation and preservation, the sole cause of that which happens; for God has given to living creatures a will that is to be employed in actions, and has imparted even to inanimate things a power which we are to regard as the efficient cause of changes. God's Providence can, therefore, by no means be so regarded, as if He alone were the author of all that is done; for, in that case, this will, which we must assume in the case of living creatures, would not have justice done to it, and the power that belongs to inanimate things would not be called into exercise: yet God is nevertheless the co-operative cause of all that occurs. In all transactions, therefore, that proceed from a creature, the creature itself is just as much a cause as God is; He, on the other hand, is always to be regarded as co-operating: every change, effect, or transaction that occurs is, accordingly, to be referred at the same time to both, to the creature and to God. [9] This is expressed in the doctrine

of the *concurrence. Concurrence, or the co-operation of God, is the act of Divine Providence whereby God, by a general and immediate influence, proportioned to the need and capacity of every creature, graciously takes part with second causes in their actions and effects.* (HOLL. 442.) [10.] While it is certain that God is to be regarded as co-operating in everything that occurs, [11] it is no less certain that the manner of His co-operation differs very greatly, varying with the nature of the co-operating causes (the *causæ secundæ*) and with the necessities of the case. God co-operates, for instance, in one way when the action is to proceed from inanimate nature, and in a very different way when the *second cause*, with which He co-operates, is one endowed with freedom. [12] Also, God has one way of co-operating with good deeds and another with those that are evil. [13] The general co-operation of God is, moreover, always to be regarded as immediate, [14] but at the same time also as of such a kind that the effect is not already predetermined (not a previous but a simultaneous concurrence, not predeterminating but mildly disposing), since in that case the effectual participation of the *second cause* would be excluded and its liberty infringed. [15]

III. "*Government is the act of Divine Providence by which God most excellently orders, regulates, and directs the affairs and actions of creatures according to His own wisdom, justice, and goodness, for the glory of His name and the welfare of men.*" (CAL., III, 1194.) [16] God actively participates in actions for the express purpose of directing the whole world according to His own purposes. As, therefore, *preservation* has reference to the existence and continuance of created things, *government* has reference to the actions that proceed from these creatures. God inclines and leads them according to His will so as to accomplish His designs: and this government of God extends over the whole as well as over each single part, over the great as well as over the small. [17]

Inasmuch as God, however, allows men in their freedom to have their own way, as we have already seen under the doctrine of *concurrence*, this marks distinctly the character of His government; for He governs in such a manner that this liberty is not restricted. Hence, much is done that would not be done if so wide a range were not allowed to human liberty;

and, according to the different conduct of men, whom God will not hinder in the exercise of their liberty, God is determined in employing different methods of directing the world for the accomplishment of His designs. This different method is described in the expressions, *permission, hinderance, direction, and determination.*

(1) Much is done that cannot at all be said to meet the special approbation of God; but God permits it, suffers it to occur, because He does not choose to enforce His own preference by doing violence to or prohibiting human liberty, and therefore seeks to accomplish His aims in some other way (permission). [18]

(2) Thus God often is content with merely hindering the accomplishment of what would be contrary to His purposes (hinderance). [19]

(3) He knows, too, how to sway the freely performed actions of men, after they have been permitted by Him to occur (whether they be good or evil), in such a way that they must be subservient to and in accordance with His own purposes (direction). [20]

(4) As, finally, He is Himself the source from which proceeds all power and ability to act, so He knows also how to attain His own ends by withholding the necessary power, or by holding this within certain limits which it dare not transcend, when men are about to act contrary to His will (determination). [21]

Of *Providence* in general, as comprehending preservation, concurrence, and government, we have yet to remark:

(1) That it affects everything, but not uniformly; on the other hand, everything is affected by it just in proportion to the relative importance of its position in the world. And, as man occupies the highest place in the world, Providence has special reference to him; most specifically, however, it is exercised with reference to the godly, as God's chief purpose in regard to man is his salvation. [22]

(2) The providence of God ordinarily employs second causes, and thus accomplishes its designs; but God is by no means restricted to the use of these second causes, for He often exercises His providence without regard to them, and operates thus contrary to what we call the course of nature, and hence arises the difference between *ordinary* and *extraordinary* providence. [23]

(3) Finally, divine providence is exercised differently with reference to that which is evil and that which is good. [24]

"*Providence is the external action of the entire Trtnity,* [25] *whereby* (a) *God most efficaciously upholds the things created, both as an entirety and singly, both in species and in individuals;* (b) *concurs in their actions and results; and* (c) *freely and wisely governs all things to its own glory and the welfare and safety of the universe, and especially of the godly.*"

[1] GRH. (IV, 52): "God, the Creator of all, did not desert the work which He framed; but, by His omnipotence, up to the present time preserves it; and, by His wisdom, rules and controls all things in it."

[2] GRH. (IV, 52): "Scripture joins both, viz., that the faithful heart must believe that God is both Creator and Provider, Job 12: 9, 10; Acts 17: 24, 25, 28; Ps. 121: 2. The perverse imagination, that God has left creatures to only their own governing, covers human minds with great darkness, and produces horrible doubts. The very object which is preserved and governed as Nature, is a witness to Divine Providence. If you be a disciple of Nature, you will find that provision is made for the most trifling and insignificant objects, as well as for the most noble; that upon all are conferred those things which are necessary for attaining their end; that all continue steadfastly in a fixed and wonderful order; that those things which act without sense or thought nevertheless attain their end; that objects conflicting with each other are so governed that, by breaking the strength of one another, they profit the world by their opposition. *But the knowledge of Divine Providence, sought from the Book of Nature, is weak and imperfect,* not from the fault of Nature itself, but from that of our mind; but *more certain and perfect is the knowledge of Divine Providence which is sought from Scripture.*"

[The arguments from Nature are thus enumerated by HUTT. (218): "1. *The order and perpetual effect of Nature,* as the fixed and perpetual movement of heavenly bodies, the fertility of the earth, the constant flow of streams, the perpetuation of distinct species of animals and plants. 2. *The condition of the intelligent human mind.* For what is irrational can never be the cause of an intelligent nature. 3. *The distinction between what is honorable and dishonorable,* which could not originate from accident or from matter. 4. *Natural knowledge,* which even in its obscurity, since the Fall, convinces man that there is a Divinity who controls and governs all things. 5. *Terrors of conscience* in the minds of the guilty on account of crimes

they have committed, even when there are no human courts for them to fear. 6. *The wonderful preservation of civil society*, and especially the Church, amidst the rage of the world and the devil. 7. *The series of efficient causes* proceeding not *ad infinitum*, but to a First Cause, upon which all depend. For if the progress were infinite, there would be no order of causes, and they would not necessarily cohere. 8. *The most useful ends of all things.* 9. *The prophecy of future events.* The force of all these arguments is to prove not so much that there is a God, as that, by His command, the world was established in the beginning, and that even now all its parts are ever administered by Him."]

[3] QUEN. (I, 527): "Providence is so named from *providere*, and denotes the act of foreseeing and cherishing anxious care concerning objects pertaining to self."

"The term *Providence* (πρόνοια) does not occur in the canonical books in the sense in which it is here employed, but only in Wis. 14: 3. But synonymous with it are the expressions: Seeing, Gen. 22: 8; 1 Sam. 16: 1; Ez. 20: 6; ordination, Ps. 119: 91; preservation, Ps. 36: 7; διοίκησις, Wis. 12: 18; διακυβέρνησις, Wis. 14: 3; πρόταξις, Acts 17: 26."

Scriptural Proof. HOLL. (424): "All Scripture is nothing else than a brilliant mirror, from which, in whatever direction you turn, the ever watchful eye of providential direction clearly shines forth." Hence, in Ps. 121: 4, God is called the Keeper of Israel. (*a*) *Preserving Providence* is proved from Ps. 36: 6; (*b*) *Co-operating Providence* from Acts 17: 27, 28; (*c*) *Governing Providence* from Jer. 10: 23; Prov. 20: 24.

[4] Providence is divided into these three parts, so far as it is a work of God *ad extra*. Before it becomes such, however, certain acts must have taken place in God Himself, viz., a foreknowledge of that upon which His providential care is to be exercised, and a purpose to exercise this care. If we take both of these into the account, Providence may be divided, HOLL. (424): "(*a*) into πρόγνωσις (foresight or foreknowledge): (*b*) πρόθεσις (the purpose or decree of God); and (*c*) διοίκησις (the actual preservation, co-operation, or concurrence and governing, with respect to things created)." BR. (303): "Opinions vary, inasmuch as some contend that, by the name, Providence, there is meant not so much the immanent acts of the divine mind and will, as the outward act of preserving and governing. Some indeed teach that, by this name, an immanent act is denoted, and they believe that it pertains formally to the intellect, and, by way of consequence, to the will; others *vice versâ*. Nevertheless, it is easily perceived that this entire contro-

versy is not so much concerning the thing itself, as concerning the terms employed. For all concede that to Providence, regarded in its *wide* sense, there belongs both προγνωσις, or an intellectual act, by which God sees beforehand what will be beneficial to creatures; and προθεσις, or the act of the will, by which He wills to ordain and dispose the things which He foresees to be advantageous; as well as διοικησις, or the preservation itself (concurrence), and the government of creatures. Meanwhile, if we pay attention to the force of the words, Providence seems to denote not so much external acts of executive power, as God's care of His creatures, and, therefore, acts of His intellect and will, whence these outward acts proceed: but the order of internal acts is undoubtedly this, that the act of intellect precedes, and the act of the will, or the purpose to confer, according to the suggestion of the intellect, those things which are profitable to creatures, follows; although it does not follow Providence itself so as, together with the previous act of the intellect, to intrinsically constitute it. But if the *usus loquendi* be considered, it must be acknowledged that, to the acts of preservation (concurrence) and governing, which are the effects, signs, and marks of Providence, the name of Providence itself, according to an ordinary metonymy, is not unfrequently ascribed."

Holl. (421 and 422): "The providence of God, with respect to προγνωσις καὶ πρόθεσις, is an internal act* of the divine intellect and will; with respect to διοίκησις, an external action *Strictly speaking*, the providence of God is a divine action *ad extra;* for it is occupied with creatures, and thus is directed to that which is outside of God. In this stricter sense, the actual providence of God is only the preservation, co-operation with, and government of creatures; but foreknowledge, and the decree concerning the preservation and governing of things, are presupposed as acts of the divine intellect directing, and of the will commanding."

With reference to foreknowledge it is remarked: (*a*) That the expression *to know beforehand* only inaccurately describes God's knowledge of everything, since the knowledge of God is not mediated by a succession of time and of thought, as ours is, but is rather intuitive, by virtue of which He sees everything, the past, the present, and the future at once, as it were in a mirror. Grh. (IV, 66): "In our knowledge there is a two-fold activity of thought. In the first place, only according to succession, since, when we understand anything in an act, we turn from it to under-

*["Action and act are not synonymous. *Act* does not necessarily imply an external result, *action* does. We may speak of repentance as an *act;* we could not call it an *action*."—*Fleming's Vocabulary of Philosophy.*]

stand something else; secondly, there is another activity of thought, according to causality, since, by means of premises, we come to the knowledge of conclusions. Neither of these belongs to God: not the first, because He sees all things in one, *i. e.*, in Himself, just as we see many things at the same time in a mirror; nor the second, because this presupposes a first, and because such a process is from that which is known to that which is unknown, whereas God already sees the effects in Himself as a cause." QUEN. (I, 539): "Πρόγνωσις, or foreknowledge, is ascribed to God only anthropopathically, since it is properly the foreknowledge of future things; but to God there is nothing future, but all things are present, not indeed actually by way of existence, but objectively, and therefore He foresees nothing, but sees all things most absolutely in a perpetual, abiding, and immutable now, so that in God there is rather παντεποψία than πρόγνωσις."

(*b*) The question, "Whether foreknowledge bring necessity to things foreknown, or whether it be certain that things are foreknown by God in such a manner, that now, by some necessity, they cannot occur otherwise?" HUTT. (Loc. Comm., 256) answers thus: "Neither harmonizes with the truth. For every object is foreseen or foreknown by God as it is in its own nature, and according to its results, *so that this foreknowledge depends upon the event, but the event does not depend upon the foreknowledge.* As Jerome infers: 'The foreknowledge of future things does not make that which God knew would take place immutable; for, because of God's knowledge of future things, it is not necessary for us to do that which He foreknew, but what we will do according to our own will He knows as future.' Thus a solar or lunar eclipse does not occur because foreknown and predicted long before by mathematicians, since it would have occurred from natural causes, even though no mathematician should have foreknown or predicted it; so, also, what God has foreknown or foreseen is not immutable, or of fatal necessity, for the reason that He has foreknown or foreseen it, but it is immutable because man's will, freely doing this or that, has not changed, since it it would change, this also God would foreknow." . . . Still further: "It is one thing when I say that with respect to divine foreknowledge, something is immutable or occurs necessarily; but another thing, when I say that a thing is immutable because of God's foreknowledge, or, what is the same, that foreknowledge brings necessity to things foreknown. The former assertion is orthodox, but the latter is not; inasmuch as the latter expression names a cause, on account of which the matter cannot be otherwise, but the former denotes only the truth and

certainty of the divine foreknowledge, and means nothing else than that God, as omniscient, knows already from all eternity what issue everything would have. In this respect it is said correctly: 'Things foreknown occur in that manner in which they have been foreknown, and not causally with respect to foreknowledge, as though this caused things foreknown to occur in this manner and no other,' but only conditionally, in so far as God knew matters in no other way than as they would occur from their own causes, and indeed freely. Therefore, when something occurs now in this manner, it is correctly said, with respect to divine foreknowledge, that it could not have occurred in another manner, according to the well-known rule: 'Everything that exists, exists necessarily, when it exists.'"

[Hutt. illustrates: "I see that Peter is limping. As I see it, it must be so, for my vision is not deceived; and since it is actually occurring, it cannot be otherwise, but must be. Nevertheless, my seeing Peter limp cannot be said to cause him to limp, for he is not impelled by my vision, and no necessity of limping is imposed upon him, since he would limp even though not seen by me, and he would be able not to limp, if the natural cause were otherwise: but if this were otherwise, I would also see it. In the same way, we do nothing that God has not foreseen, and yet this foreknowledge of God is not the cause of our actions."]

Grh. (IV, 69): "If you do not yet fully perceive the subject, thus regard it: The foreknowledge of God does not bring immutability to objects *a priori*, but only *a posteriori; i. e.*, when God knows that a thing is, it is necessary for it to be. Nevertheless, in the meanwhile, a thing by its own nature, and with respect to its own cause, could be otherwise, and then God would have foreknown it otherwise. Things either present, or past, or future, do not depend upon knowledge; but knowledge depends upon the thing and event which is foreknown as just such as it is, so that if it would not have been, that fact also would have been foreseen by God."

Related thereto is the question: "Whether the divine foreknowledge rests upon a previous decree?" which Holl. (432) answers thus: "The foreknowledge and decree of God concerning future things are eternal and simultaneous on the part of God; but, according to our mode of conception, the foreknowledge of God precedes the divine decree."

[5] Holl. (441): "God preserves species and individuals. *Species* He preserves by keeping the essences of objects from destruction, and imparting to them constancy. *Individuals* He pre-

serves, by substituting new individuals in the place of those that perish, so that the essence of species may remain constant."

CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 125): "It is the office of Providence to watch over and aid the order which it has given to nature, so that every substance has its becoming strength, motions, and actions."

[6] GRH. (IV, 83): "Created things subsist not of themselves, and from their own strength, but God upholds all things by the word of His power, Heb. 1: 3; Col. 1: 17; Acts 17: 28."

HOLL. (441): "Divine preservation is an act not merely *negative or indirect*, for it does not consist in the fact that God does not wish to destroy or annihilate the things that He has framed, but to leave to them their strength, as long as they can flourish and endure from the energy given to them by creation; but it is a *positive and direct* act, by which God, through a true and real influence, enters in a general way into the efficient causes of the objects that are to be preserved, so that in their nature, properties, and strength, they continue and remain."

[7] QUEN. (I, 531): "God preserves all things by the continuance of the action by which He first produced them. For the preservation of a thing is, properly speaking, nothing else than a continued production of it, *nor do they differ except by a designation derived from without.*" HOLL. (441): (Creation and preservation) "are distinguished by different connotatives. For creation connotes that the object had not existed before; preservation supposes that the object had existed before. Creation gives a beginning of being; preservation, a continuance of being."

[8] The Dogmaticians do not all assign this place to the doctrine of the divine concurrence; the earlier, as GRH. and CAL., and among the later BAIER, following CAL., divide the subject of Providence into only preservation and governing, and discuss the doctrine of the concurrence only in a supplementary way.

HOLL. (440): "Some theologians think that the acts, to the exercising of which, with respect to creatures, Divine Providence is limited, are two, preservation and governing, which latter is said to signify both the general concurrence with second causes, Acts 17: 25, 26; and the special direction of the action of created things." 1 Kings 18: 44; Judges 16: 28, 29; Gen. 17: 16, 17, 19; Deut. 28: 23.

From the time of QUEN., it became customary to enumerate three acts of providence. Practically it matters little what division is adopted, yet the latter division has this in its favor, that the manner in which God exercises providence is at once included in the doctrine of providence. It is then declared: 1. That the

world cannot exist without God's upholding activity. 2. That God is present in the world in such a manner, that nothing, either great or small, happens without His active co-operation. 3. That He is present in the world in such a manner, in order that He may direct everything in it according to His own purposes."

[9] QUEN. (I, 531): "God not only gives and preserves to second causes the power to act, but immediately influences the action and effect of the creature, so that the same effect is produced not by God alone, nor by the creature alone, nor partly by God and partly by the creature, but *at the same time by God and the creature*, as one and the same total efficiency, viz., by God as the universal and first cause, and by the creature as the particular and second cause." The action of God and the action of man are simultaneous actions. QUEN. (I, 545): "In reality, the influence of God is not one action, and the operation of the creature another; but the action is one and indivisible respecting both, and dependent upon both, upon God as the universal cause, upon the creature as the particular cause. As an act of writing, the same in number, depends upon the hand and the pen, and one part does not depend upon the hand and the other upon the pen, but each part entirely upon the hand and entirely upon the pen; so God's concurrence is not prior to the creature's own action by the priority of causality, since it is, in fact, entirely the same action. Hence God, just as also the second cause, produces the entire effect, which comes to pass by an exterior action of God, inwardly included in the action of the creature, one and the same with it."

As scriptural proof, the following passages are cited: Job 10: 8; 38: 28; Is. 26: 12; Phil. 2: 13; especially Acts 17: 28: "In Him we live, and move, and have our being." QUEN. (I, 532): "'We have our being' in God as the one preserving; 'in Him we move,' *i. e.*, all our actions and movements we perform by His concurrence, so that without His concurrence we can neither raise a finger, nor produce even the least movement."

If, thus, every change, effect, or act which comes to pass is ascribed at the same time both to God and to the creature, the Dogmaticians inquire whether we do not encroach upon the doctrine of Providence; or whether, if we maintain the integrity of this doctrine, we do not exclude the co-operation of the creature and all its free movements. HUTT. (Loc. Com., 228) thus states the objection: "If all things are subject to divine government, they either can occur otherwise than God decreed from eternity to govern them, or they cannot occur otherwise; if the former, Divine Providence will be deceived; but if the latter, Divine Providence

will certainly bring necessity to things foreseen, and, in consequence, all contingency will be removed. But both are absurd; therefore, the universal, and, indeed, effectual, Providence or government of all things will scarcely be able to stand firm." The very purpose of the term *contingency* is to designate the free movement of the creature.

"That," says Hutt. (256), "is defined as contingent which, when it comes to pass, is neither impossible nor necessary, but has a cause which, from its own nature, could act otherwise, such as the human will; or, as others . . . define it, 'that is contingent which, by its own nature, can either be or not be, which can be constituted either in this or in another manner, or which can happen or not happen, and, before it happens, can be prevented from happening; when, indeed, it does happen, it has a cause which, by its own nature, could act otherwise, and whose contradictory would not be impossible.' As an example . . . the betrayal by Judas was a contingent event, for Judas could have abstained from that crime, and not have betrayed his Master; so that when he actually betrayed Him, there was, nevertheless, in him a cause, which, by its own nature, could have acted otherwise, *i. e.*, it could have restrained him from that deed."

The answer to the above objection he then introduces by means of two distinctions (228): "The *first* distinction is this: Everything mutable and immutable is described in two modes: in one mode, when anything by its own nature, *per se*, absolutely has been so composed, that it either can or cannot be constituted otherwise; in another mode, when something is either mutable or immutable, not *per se*, but by way of accident—not absolutely, but conditionally. As an example: God is immutably good and wise, *per se* and absolutely. Angels, likewise, are also immutably good and wise, but not *per se* or absolutely, but by way of accident; in so far as, without doubt, they have already been so confirmed in good as no longer to be able to fall. So, too, as an example of mutability: Adam was mutably good before the Fall, for if he had not been such, he would not have been able to fall; but because he could have remained good if he had wished, this mutability in him is very correctly stated to have existed not absolutely and *per se*, but only from the condition of his will. Since the Fall, all believers are in like manner mutably good, not absolutely and *per se*. For in the state of corruption it could not occur otherwise, because their goodness is mutable. The *second* distinction is of that which is necessary, or, in other words, of necessity. For in our theology . . . there is a twofold necessity constituted, of which the one is

absolute or simple, *i. e.*, necessity of consequence (*consequentis*), or constraint (*coactionis*), the opposite of which is undoubtedly simply impossible. The other is conditionate, *i. e.*, necessity of the consequent (*consequentiæ*), or condition.* That is absolute by which objects are so constituted that nothing whatever in them can be changed, as are those things which are predicated of the essence of God and His attributes. But that is conditionate by which any object indeed has a cause, on account of which it cannot now be changed or be otherwise constituted, but by its nature, nevertheless, is mutable, and could be changed or be constituted altogether differently."

Then HUTT. answers the first question, "May Divine Providence be deceived?" as follows: "These two distinctions being presupposed, to the latter member of the disjunctive, the categorical and affirmative answer is given, that those things which have been foreseen by God cannot be otherwise constituted, or, as is the same, they are not mutable, except relatively and with this condition, namely, that these things are constituted immutably, not absolutely or *per se*, or, in other words, by absolute necessity, but only by accident, or from the condition of the objects foreseen. For God foresaw how everything would be and would result, from its own causes, whether natural or voluntary, and in this respect the Providence of God cannot be deceived. But if from their nature they would have been otherwise, God would have foreseen this also, and thus His Providence would not have been deceived. In this respect it is most correctly denied that things foreseen could be constituted otherwise than as they have been foreseen."

The second question, "Does Providence, therefore, bring necessity to the things foreseen, and, as a consequence, is contingency removed?" HUTT. thus answers: "A reply is most correctly made by another distinction. But if, indeed, pure or absolute necessity, or *necessitas consequentis*, be understood, it is absolutely denied that Providence brings necessity to things foreseen. For thus no place would be left any longer for natural causes, nor any liberty of the human will. Nevertheless, that both are subordinate to the Providence of God, and can exist, together with it, without

* ["The scholastic philosophers have denominated one species of necessity, *necessitas consequentiæ*, and another, *necessitas consequentis*. The former is an *ideal* or *formal necessity*, the inevitable dependence of one *thought* upon another by reason of our intelligent nature. The latter is a *real* or *material necessity*, the inevitable dependence of one *thing* upon another because of its own nature. The former is a logical necessity, common to all legitimate *consequence*, whatever be the material modality of its objects. The latter is an extra-logical necessity, . . . wholly dependent upon the modality of the *consequent*." (Sir William Hamilton's *Discussions*, etc., p. 144.)]

contradiction, we have clearly demonstrated in the question immediately preceding. But if the other necessity be understood, which is that of condition, or *necessitas consequentiæ*, we very freely concede that things foreseen by God's Providence are in necessary dependence; *because, namely, God foresees these things not otherwise than as they would result from their causes, therefore they result also just as God has foreseen them.* Nor, on the other hand, does it conflict with that which by way of consequence is inferred; *therefore all contingency is removed.* For inasmuch as this necessity of consequence belongs to such things as are, by their own nature, mutable, and could be changed and be otherwise constituted, this necessity and contingency can undoubtedly exist at the same time as subordinates, although in a different respect; viz., a necessity, in so far as a thing has a cause, because of which it can no longer be changed or be otherwise constituted, but a contingency, in so far as the thing itself by its own nature so exists that it could be otherwise constituted. Thus, the betrayal of Judas, with respect to Divine Providence, is said to be necessary by necessity of consequence, because God undoubtedly foresaw from eternity that Judas, from intended malice and with fixed purpose, would betray Christ; but contingent, in so far as he was able to resist the wicked desires of his will and not to betray Christ. Nevertheless, if Judas would have resisted the temptation, God would also have foreseen this from eternity, and thus (by his not betraying) the Providence of God could not have been deceived." The proposition, therefore, stands thus: "A contingency of human affairs and actions can exist most surely, without impairing or diminishing the Providence of God, for the reason that this contingency is not opposed to Divine Providence, but is subject or subordinate to it. For, as the Providence of God governs and determines things one and all, so also does it govern and determine contingent actions. For hence it comes to pass that God does not suffer the wicked to rush on whither they would otherwise tend according to their free will, but He fixes limits to the extent to which He will slacken the reins to their lust. Hence, also, God frequently, by the power exercised through His Providence, casts chains and restraints upon the wicked, in order that they may be forced to desist from their undertakings, and altogether abandon the deeds which their unbridled lust would otherwise perpetrate. Esau, the brother of Jacob, who had taken measures to slay his brother, etc., can be given as an example. But even when there is no such hindrance, and God permits those things to occur which the will of the wicked devises, yet there nevertheless shines forth even thence the singular skill of Divine

Providence, which derives even thence the means to inflict deserved punishments upon the wicked, and to subvert them, and knows how to change even their worst designs to the advantage and welfare of the godly. Of this, the history of Joseph and that of the passion of Christ supply us with examples most worthy of note."*

[10] QUEN. (I, 544): "The question in this place is not whether God communicates and preserves to second causes the power to operate, for this mode of concurrence ascribes to God no more than that He preserves the existence of objects and their power to act, which He gave them in the beginning; but the question here is, whether *God immediately influences according to the requirement of each, the action, and with the action the effect, as such, of the second causes.*" QUEN. (I, 544) thus defines the terms *causa prima et secunda:* "*The first cause* is that which is entirely independent, but upon it all other things, if there be any, depend; this is God. A *second* cause is that which recognizes another cause prior to itself, upon which it depends; such are the efficient created causes, which, although they operate through primary and relative virtue, nevertheless depend upon the first cause, as for their existence, so also for their operation. For existence, I say, because without His preservation they could exist in operating not even for a moment, and because without the co-operation of the same they could neither operate nor, in operating, produce their effects."

QUEN. (I, 532) justly remarks: "With the divine concurrence with respect to the object there coincide the divine omnipresence, which is an act of Divine Providence, and formally and definitively, viz., in the Biblical sense, denotes both the substantial, illocal, incommunicable, illimitable presence with creatures, which the Scholastics, in the description of the concurrence of God with creatures, call the *immediatio suppositi*,† and His efficacious and omnipotent working, which they here call the *immediatio virtutis*, Gen. 1: 2; Ps. 139: 7; Jer. 23: 23, 24; Wis. 1: 6, 7, 8; Acts 17: 27, 28; Col. 1: 17."

[11] QUEN. (I, 531): "*The objects of the concurrence are all the actions and effects, as such, of second causes.* It is only the *general* and *indeterminate* concurrence that is here discussed, *i. e.*, it is here merely in general asserted that no action is accomplished without the co-operation of God; but the character of this concurrence is not here taken into the account. It is, therefore, indeed, readily granted, but not here specially developed, that the concurrence may

* [Compare a chapter from Gerhard, translated in *Evangelical Review*, vol. xviii., 310.]

† [See list of Scholastico-Dogmatic terms in Appendix, under *Subsistentia.*]

be 'a *special* or *gracious* concurrence, by which God is present to all believers meditating, writing, and doing holy, honorable, and useful things, by supplying the occasion, inciting, moving, aiding, approving, etc.;' also 'a *most special* and extraordinary concurrence, peculiar alone to the holy writers of the Old and New Testaments, which embraces a supernatural and extraordinary illumination of the mind, and likewise a peculiar movement, suggestion, inspiration, impulse, and dictation of the Holy Ghost for writing or speaking such a thing and not something else.'" (Ib. 543.) Thus Holl. (443) distinguishes also between "natural actions" and "supernatural actions" of man: "Some can be elicited by man in his natural strength; others transcend man's natural strength." The latter he does not here discuss. In relation to the natural acts, however, he remarks: "With natural acts God concurs, indeed, by a general concurrence, but not exclusively; for extraordinarily, under that general influence, there is also a peculiar influence contained, conferring a more intense strength to act and a more powerful movement upon one creature rather than another."

[12] Quen. (I, 545): "With second causes, God concurs according to the need and requirement of each, *i. e.*, when, as often as, and in the manner that, the cause, according to the condition of its nature, demands this concurrence. For God does not change the nature of the agents or the manner and order of their action, but He permits natural agents to act naturally, free agents to act freely. . . . With second causes God concurs according to their nature, by operating conformably to His most sympathetic, universal disposition, freely with the free, necessarily with the necessary, feebly with the feeble, vigorously with the vigorous." Holl. (444): "With necessary agents God concurs *uniformly*, *e. g.*, with fire, in order for it to burn, with the sun, in order for it to shine. With free agents God concurs variously, leaving to them their free decision and the free power to choose this or that; for the order that God has once established He does not easily change, Ps. 119: 90."

[13] The most difficult problem in the science of Theology is that of exhibiting the method of the divine concurrence in the evil actions of men, without at the same time in any wise throwing the blame of the evil upon the first cause, *i. e.*, upon God. The Dogmaticians employ for this purpose the two formulæ: "God concurs in producing the effect, not the defect; God concurs as to the materials, not as to the form." The former of these is intended to teach that God has indeed furnished the power through which the action *could* have become a good one; but that, if on the part of

man this has not been employed for such purpose, the blame for that does not fall upon God. The other formula is intended to teach that the power, the ability in itself considered, with which an action can be accomplished, is indeed to be ascribed to the divine co-operation, while the application of it, and the direction which is given to this power, is allotted to human freedom, and is accordingly to be imputed alone to man. One of these formulæ we find employed by QUEN., the other by HOLL.

QUEN. (I, 545): "We distinguish between the action and the ἀταξία of the action; between the effect and the defect. The Supreme Being concurs with the actions and the effects, but not with the ἀταξία of the actions; for, although the universal cause influences the entire action of the particular causes, yet indeed, of the ἀταξία and evil, as such, if it inhere in an action, there is no other cause than a creature, inasmuch as in acting it departs from its own rule and the order of the First Agent, viz., God, and applies the divine concurrence otherwise than it should. Hence we say in the thesis that God influences the actions and effects, as such, of second causes, *i. e.*, as the actions and effects are, in their entity or essence, to the exclusion of the idea of the defects and faults, which have no entity, and originate from a deficiency of action in the causes. In short, God enters into sinful actions, with respect to their entity and natural form (*species naturæ*), and not with respect to their deformity and moral form (*species moris*). He also concurs in disgraceful acts, and is inwardly present to them, yet in such a manner as not to be defiled, inasmuch as spiritual substance is liable to pollution no more than is the sun." (HUTT. (234): "God, as the universal cause, affords only this, viz., that you are able to act, but the fact that you act wickedly proceeds from a particular cause, viz., your perverse will.")

HOLL. (443): "*With the formal* ἀνομία or ἀταξία *of actions morally evil*, God undoubtedly does not concur by any positive influence, because wickedness is a defect and privation, not proceeding from God the Most Perfect, in whom no defect can occur, but from a human will failing in its action. But God concurs *with the remote, not with the proximate material of actions morally evil.* The *former* is an indeterminate act; the *latter* is an act determinate and applied to a prohibited thing. When, for example, Eve extended her hand to the forbidden fruit, two acts were present: (1) the extension of the hand; (2) the extension applied to the forbidden fruit. The former act is said to be the remote material; the latter, the proximate material. With the latter, God does not concur, because His concurrence is general and indeterminate; and, therefore, the deter-

mination to this or that object is not from God as from the first and universal cause, but from the second and particular cause." With respect to the concurrence of God with actions morally good, HOLL. (443) distinguishes between the physical and moral concurrence. "*Physically* (God) affords a general concurrence with moral actions, by sustaining strength of mind and body, adapted to act. *Morally*, He concurs, by commanding and promising."

[14] HOLL. (443): "God concurs with the actions of creatures by the immediateness of His power and being. He concurs by the immediateness of His being (*immediatione suppositi*), because God, by His substance, is especially near to creatures operating, inasmuch as He fills all in all. Jer. 23: 24. He concurs, also, by the immediateness of His power (*immediatione virtutis*), by His efficacious influence on the action of the creature, and by immediately and proximately affecting the result, in that He 'worketh all in all.' 1 Cor. 12: 6. A person is said to act *immediately*, either exclusively or inclusively. *Exclusively*, when he acts alone; *inclusively*, when any one attains proximately an action and result by the co-operation of others with him. God's immediate influence upon the actions of creatures is not exclusive, as though creatures were excluded from the action, or were inoperative. Every creature does its own part: but God, together with the creatures acting, affects the action and result immediately and proximately by His own influence."

[15] HOLL. (445): "Those who teach a previous concurrence, are guilty of a contradiction with respect to what succeeds. For if God concur, He does not precur; if He co-operate, He does not pre-operate. A premotion is an antecedent act; but concurrence is not antecedent, but occurs when the action itself is produced. If divine concurrence were to predetermine free agents to action, they would act necessarily, not freely."

QUEN. (I, 544): "Second causes or agents, whether natural or free, have not, for the eliciting of an action, the need to be excited by a previous impulse, in the manner in which a pick, a hammer, or an axe receives a previous motion from the workman, as they either have a power for operating that is peculiar to themselves and innate, as fire, or they are the power itself of action, as heat; yea, if created things could in no way exert themselves without that previous excitation, it would follow that their will is excited also to vicious actions."

[16] QUEN. (I, 533): "Governing is an act of Divine Providence, by which God symmetrically arranges each and every creature, in its peculiar strength, actions, and suffering, to the

glory of the Creator and the good of this universe, and especially to the salvation of the godly."

[17] CALOV. (III, 1196): "As Preservation is most particularly occupied with the essences, strength, and faculties of men, and of other objects, especially those that are permanent, so Governing is occupied pre-eminently with the actions and sufferings of all men and things. . . . But this governing is not only universal, but extends also to individual actions, and moderates and directs them all. Prov. 24: 12; Jer. 16: 9."

The difference between the Christian and the ante-Christian doctrine of Providence is stated by CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 129) as follows: "It is well known of what nature the dogma of Epicurus was, who altogether did away with Providence, viz., that God, who is supremely happy, is not affected with the care of governing inferior things, because such an occupation would interfere with His happiness, and would not be worthy of His divine excellence. Therefore, he concedes that in second causes there is a certain strength, according to which, when an application of an agent to that which is passive occurs, an action and change ensue; but he denies that this action is controlled and governed by God. Yea, he says that God does not care; but, just as atoms floating in the sun are turned about without order, and by chance, so that the same atom which has been before in the upper part is now in the middle, and afterwhile will be at the bottom, if the chance should so carry it, so Epicurus imagines that second causes fluctuate, by chance and without order, and that results are indeed produced from the application of sufficient causes, but says that the application itself of the causes does not occur by means of the government and control of God, but as the chance may have happened."

The Christian doctrine of Providence, therefore, excludes every conception of a blind necessity as well as of a mere chance. HOLL. (437): "We are not to maintain a *stoical fate*, by which all things occur from absolute and inevitable necessity; nor the *more rigid astrological fate*,* by which even the free acts of the human will depend upon the influence of the stars, and are determined thereby." But he nevertheless admits "a *Christian fate*, which is the necessary connection of causes and effects, of extrinsic necessity, in so far as it has been infallibly foreknown by God, established by an absolute or conditionate decree, and governed by divine direction agreeably disposing it." In Christian fate there is therefore admitted a necessary connection of cause and effect, but one of such

* ["Astrological fate is either the *more rigid* or the *milder* . . . The *milder* is that which occurs without impairing human liberty." (HOLL., 443.)—TR.]

a character that the influence of God upon the effect that is to be produced is not thereby excluded.

(Id. 440): "*Fortune*, which is an accidental event, accompanying a result intended by a cause acting freely, does not exist with respect to the omniscient and most wise God (Wis. 14: 3), but only with respect to ignorant man."

[18] QUEN. (I, 533): "Permission is an act of governing Providence, by which God does not employ hindrances which no finite agent can overcome, or knows how to overcome, in order to restrain rational creatures, inclining of their own accord to sin, from an evil forbidden by the Law, but, for just reasons, permits them to rush into sins, Ps. 81: 12; Acts 14: 16; Rom. 1: 24, 28." HOLL. (449): "Divine permission is not (1) kind indulgence, as though God simply does not care when men commit crimes; nor is it (2) a mitigation of the Law, as if to grant men license to sin; nor (3) is it weakness in God, or a defect of knowledge, as though He willed or approved evil, or a defect of power, as though He could not check sin; nor (4) does it make God an unconcerned witness of sins, who neither forbids sins, nor fixes a limit to wickedness, nor restrains crimes by punishment. But it is (5) a negative act, consisting of the denial or suspension of an insuperable hindrance. God, indeed, could check or restrain the sinner by means of the interposition of a forcible or insuperable obstacle; but the most holy Divinity has the very best reasons for permitting sin. Meanwhile (God), by a legal impediment, restrains the will of man sinning, and continually invites the sinner to repentance by exhibiting rewards and penalties." Also the following discriminations. QUEN. (I, 533): "God indeed permits, but He does not will, that which is permitted, which occurs not, indeed, while God absolutely wills that it should not be, *i. e.*, while He restrains and hinders, yet, nevertheless, while He does not will it, Ps. 5: 4; 1 John 3: 8. God's not hindering is not willing, but is His permitting, and, at the same time, also, His being averse to, those things which He permits, in so far as they seriously displease Him." GRH. (IV, 88): "God does not will sin, and yet does not prevent it, which is permission. But, although He may permit sin willingly and not reluctantly, nevertheless His permission and His will have respect to diverse objects; the permission is occupied with the sin itself, but the will with the useful end, which God, in His wisdom, knows how to bring forth from it."

[19] QUEN. (I, 534): "Hindrance is an act of governing Providence, by which God limits the action of creatures according to His judgment, so that they do not produce the result, which

otherwise they would effect, either by a natural or a free power to act."

[20] QUEN. (I, 534): "Direction is an act of governing Providence, by which God so regulates the good actions of creatures, that they tend and are led to the object intended by God (Acts 4: 28), but directs the evil actions to a certain end prescribed by Himself, yet not considered by those who sin, and frequently contrary to their intention. Thus 1 Sam. 9: 17; 10: 21; Gen. 37: 7; 50: 20."

[21] QUEN. (I, 534): "Determination is an act of governing Providence, by which God has appointed to the strength, actions, and sufferings of creatures, certain limits within which they are restrained, both with respect to time and with respect to greatness and degree, Job 1: 12; 2: 6; Ps. 124: 2."

[22] CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 127): "Although the Providence of God extends to all creatures, yet it has its grades. For it is especially intrusted with the government of the human race, 1 Cor. 9: 9; Matt. 10: 31; Rom. 8: 20. In the second place, although the Providence of God maketh the sun to rise, and sendeth rain upon the just and unjust, nevertheless there is a peculiar and pre-eminent relation of a special Providence towards those who are members of the Church, 1 Tim. 4: 10; Ps. 33: 13, 18, 19; 100: 3."

BR. (308): "Divine Providence has also, with respect to the acts towards which it is directed, its own grades, and, above other creatures, relates to men, but, in the human race, especially to believers, Rom. 8: 28." Hence the division "into *general* and *special* Providence. The *former* is that by which God preserves and governs the entire earth, and whatever is contained in its circuit. The *latter* is that by which God most kindly regards, most tenderly cherishes, and most agreeably rules both the Church Militant, or the assembly of believing men, and the Church Triumphant, or the choir of angels and elect men." HOLL. (448).

QUEN. (I, 529) distinguishes between the general and the special object of Providence. The general object consists of all things in general which exist, Heb. 1: 3; Wis. 8: 1; 12: 13, 15. The special object is partly primary, and partly secondary. The *primary object* consists of angels and men, and, indeed, all of these in general, Acts 17: 28; Matt. 5: 45 (p. 530). Its object, in the most special sense, consists of godly and believing men, Deut. 32: 9; Ps. 4: 3; 33: 18; 37: 18, 25; 73: 24; 77: 20; 91: 11; Heb. 1: 14; Matt. 10: 31. All other created things, without even the least exception, are *secondary objects*, Deut. 25: 4; 1 Cor. 9: 9; Job 39: 1; Ps. 147: 9; Prov. 6: 8; Matt. 6: 30; 8: 31; 10: 29, 30; Luke 12: 6.

As man is the centre of the entire creation, and thus also of Divine Providence, the Dogmaticians discuss at length the relation in which Providence stands to the origin, the progress, and the end of human life.

Quen. (I, 529): "God controls the life of men partly in its *entrance*, by forming and preserving men in the maternal womb (Job 10: 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12; Ps. 139: 13, 15, 16; Acts 17: 25); and by bringing them forth from the womb (Job 10: 18; Ps. 22: 9, 10; 71: 6); partly in its *progress* (Deut. 30: 20; Job 10: 12; Ps. 56: 8; 37: 23, 24; Job 34: 21; Prov. 16: 3; 21: 1; Ps. 139: 2; Matt. 6: 25; 10: 30); partly in its *termination* (Job 14: 5), so that the appointed course of life is either attained (Gen. 47: 29; 2 Sam. 7: 12), or shortened (Ps. 55: 23), or prolonged (Isa. 38: 5), or doubled (renewed after death) (1 Kings 17: 22; 2 Kings 13: 21; Matt. 9: 25; Luke 7: 15; John 11: 44; Acts 9: 40; 20: 12)."

Concerning (1) Holl. (427): The *entrance* of human life embraces both its formation and preservation in the womb of the mother, and its being brought forth from the womb." Thereupon Br. remarks (309): "For this reason it is correctly stated that God has respect not only to the universal, but also to the particular cause, and supplies the defect of second causes, or, at least, directs and governs them in acting. This, indeed, *some* explain so as to affirm, on the one hand, that when the wonderful variety, and connection, and structure of the members of the body are considered, an efficient particular cause acting with knowledge is required; and, therefore, that another and more sublime virtue than that which is in the seed (commonly called *δύναμις πλαστική*), and which cannot be conceived of unless as belonging to God Himself, concurs with a special influence. On the other hand, also, when the immateriality of the soul is considered, and the fact, therefore, that it must be produced independently of the subject, or from nothing; and that such a production demands an infinite power of action, and is, therefore, peculiar to God alone; they infer that, for the production of the human soul, God affords a special and determinate influence. But *others*, although they believe that the human body and soul are alike produced by the parents themselves as second causes, with the concurrence of God as the universal cause, nevertheless regard the acts of protection afforded in the production and the birth of man, against various calamities and dangers, as many eminent proofs of peculiar divine care and favor; in addition to universal, they ascribe to God also a special or particular concurrence, and refer thither the passage, Job 10: 8–11."

Concerning (2) Holl. (427): "God controls the *progress* of life,

by granting the means of supporting life, Ps. 145: 16; directing our steps, *i. e.*, by leading our designs, which have been begun and performed, to their desired results, Ps. 37: 23; by bringing to nought the snares or repelling the open violence of enemies, Ps. 3: 7, 8; by fitting and calling us to a certain mode of life, Jer. 1: 5–7."

Concerning (3) Br. (312): "Divine Providence respects the *termination* of human life, not only so far as by a common law there is given to every one his own constitution, by virtue of which he can, with the general concurrence of God, attain a certain space of life (the natural limit of life, Ps. 90: 10); but also as to some men life is prolonged beyond that boundary (2 Kings 20: 1, 6) to which they would come by the strength of nature: others the end of life threatens sooner (Ps. 55: 23; 102: 24) than it should according to the course of nature (*terminus abbreviabilis*)." (Id. 313): "Divine Providence, moreover, changes the natural limit of human life (*the preternatural or hyperphysical limit of life*), both with respect to the godly (*the limit of grace*), and with respect to wicked men (*the limit of wrath*)." (Id. 314): "To the godly God prolongs life, either as a reward of their odedience (Ex. 20: 12; Prov. 3: 1, 2; 4: 10), or for the public good (2 Cor. 1: 8; Phil. 2: 27, 30). To the same class He shortens life, partly to prevent them from being corrupted by the wicked examples of others (Wis. 4: 10, 11), partly that they may not see the coming evils, and be distressed (2 Chron. 34: 28; Is. 26: 20; 57: 2)." "God, by a just judgment prematurely breaks the thread of life of the wicked, when He either Himself sends deadly disease or death upon them (Deut. 28: 21, 22; Gen. 38: 7, 10; 1 Sam. 25: 38; Jer. 28: 15, 16), or gives the command to inflict death (Gen. 9: 6; Ex. 21: 12, 14; 22: 18; Lev. 18 and 20), or allows them to suffer disease or suffer violent death by intemperance (2 Kings 8: 15), or other crimes (2 Sam. 18: 14; 17: 23)." (Id. 315): "And thus it is also evident, that it is not absolutely necessary that every man should die at that very time, and by that kind of death by which he does die; or, in other words, that this has not been absolutely and immutably decreed by God, apart from or previous to any regard to causes or circumstances to be found outside of God. For, otherwise, the prayers and vows of the godly, and divine promises and threatenings, would be vain. The hyperphysical or divine limit is always hypothetical, including the condition of piety or impiety, or of the contempt of means."

[23] Chmn. (Loc. Th., I, 128): "That God has not been bound to second causes in such a manner as to do nothing else than as second causes excite Him, but that, beyond the customary order of second causes, and contrary to the common course of nature, He

wills and is able to aid the Church, and to punish the wicked, so as either to hinder, change, mitigate, or intensify second causes."

QUEN. (I, 535): "*Providence* is *extraordinary* when God operates either without means, or beyond or above means, or contrary to means and their nature, or, what is the same, above and beyond the order instituted by Himself, *e. g.*, Ex. 34: 28; 1 Kings 19: 8; Is. 38: 8; 2 Kings 6: 6, etc. (all miracles are effects of the extraordinary providence of God). *Providence* is *ordinary* where God carries on His works through ordinary means, viz., through the established and accustomed course of nature."

[24] HOLL. (448): "*Providence with reference to good*, is that which by preservation maintains, by co-operation promotes, and by governing directs the good of creatures to the praise of the divine glory. *Providence with reference to evil*, is that by which God is occupied with moral evil, not as an indifferent observer, but as the most just Judge, and, therefore, by acts preceding, attending, and following sin, exercises justice tempered by grace." In the discrimination here made, the different relation in which God stands to the good and the evil is explained essentially in the same manner as in the doctrine of the divine government (comp. notes 18–21). The difference consists only in this, that here the more general conception of Providence is assumed, which embraces both government and preservation.

As acts of Providence preceding sin, HOLL. (448–450) has enumerated: "Foresight, aversion to the sin foreseen, and hindering." As acts attending: "Support of the nature acting wickedly, concurrence with the remote material of a vicious action, permission of the ἀταξία adhering to the sinful action, limiting determination of the sin, direction to a good end." As acts following: "Imposing of the divine penalties, Isa. 34: 8, remission of sins."

[25] CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 125): "Providence is a general action of God, by which He is present with His creature, sustaining and preserving it, as long as He wishes it to be preserved, and preserves the order of His work appointed by Himself, not by any fatal necessity, but as a most free agent; so that, for the sake of men, He controls all things, and moderates, changes, and hinders many things with respect to second causes."

GRH. (IV, 136) thus summarily states the whole doctrine of Providence: "The action of Divine Providence is either eternal, viz., πρόγνωσις καὶ πρόθεσις, or of time, viz., the preservation and governing of things created; and this, too, either ordinary, through means, or extraordinary, without means, or contrary to means. Both are occupied with all things, especially with human nature,

in the preservation and governing of which the life and actions of men come forth. Either the entrance, or the progress, or the termination of life, is regarded. Some actions are good, and that, too, either civilly or spiritually; others are evil. How the action of Divine Providence concurs in all these, we have explained by certain aphorisms."

CHAPTER V.

Of Angels.*

§ 22. *When were they created?*

CERTAINTY in regard to the existence of angels we attain only through revelation; for reason can at best make their existence only possible or probable. [1] They are, indeed, not referred to in the history of the creation; nevertheless we know that they are beings created by God, and we have reason to believe that they were not created before, nor after, but within the six days of creation; yet we know nothing further as to the day upon which they were created. [2]

The Holy Scriptures furnish us with more specific information, both in regard to the nature of the angels and their moral condition.

I. The Nature of Angels.

The Holy Scriptures represent the angels as, indeed, finite, because created, but intelligent and spiritual, therefore incorporeal beings, which, without needing a body, nevertheless have a personal subsistence. (Quen. I, 444): "*The angels are spiritual substances* (Ps. 104: 4; Heb. 1: 14), *i. e., without any bodily form (whether gross or refined), finite, complete, and thus real persons* [hypostases]. [3] *Angels are, further, intelligent substances, and very capable of becoming well acquainted both with themselves and with other things.*" They were originally created by God in order to promote His glory and to serve Him. [4]

*The doctrinal writers differ from one another in assigning a place for this topic. Some, as Quen. and Holl., place it next in order to that of Creation, others to that of Providence. Cal. (IV, 2) thus expresses himself in regard to the place which should be assigned to it: "The discussion concerning angels may be presented either in connection with the works of creation, as is commonly done, when it prefaces the doctrine of Divine Providence; or, it may be presented in connection with the topic of Divine Providence, inasmuch as this embraces also the angels, and besides, *employs them, as its ministers, in the government of men*, both to bless and to punish them. The latter place seems the more appropriate since, under the head of the creation by God, one cannot so suitably treat of the apostasy of angels, or of the establishment of the good angels in truth and concreated holiness: these matters more appropriately belong to the topic concerning the Providence of God."

From this description of their nature, and of the design of their creation, as given in the Holy Scriptures, there follows the series of attributes which we are to ascribe to them, and whereby we become better acquainted with their nature. [5]

From the nature of angels as *spiritual* beings, there follow:

1. The attributes of *indivisibility*, *invisibility*, *immutability*, *immortality*, *eternal duration*, *illocality*, *definitive ubiety*, and *agility*. For purely spiritual beings can neither be divisible nor visible (*indivisibilitas—invisibilitas*); [6] not physically changeable, for only that which is material is subject to such a physical alteration and development (*immutabilitas*); [7] not mortal, for only that which is corporeal is perishable; they, however, in duration are imperishable (*immortalitas—duratio æviterna.*) [8] Further, they are not present at any particular place in such a manner as to occupy there a portion of space; and yet they are not everywhere present as God is, but are always present only at one particular place, yet in such a manner that they can be at any place they may choose, even the smallest, because they have no body that can occupy space (*illocalitas—ubietas definitiva*). [9] Finally, as they are not restricted in their movements by space and time, they can move with amazing celerity (*agilitas*). [10]

2. As *intelligent* beings, the angels possess the attributes of knowledge and freedom of the will, and, in view of the service for which they are designed, the attribute of power. God has therefore bestowed upon them reason, [11] and free will, [12] and great, though not unlimited, might and power. [13]

II. The Moral Condition of the Angels.

The Holy Scriptures divide angels into good and evil, assuming thus a difference in their moral condition. This could not, however, have existed from the beginning; for, as everything that at the creation proceeded from the hand of God was good, the angels must have been good also; at that time, therefore, we must assume that the moral condition of all of them was equally good. The difference in this respect must have arisen subsequently. We must distinguish, therefore, the original condition and that which was consequent upon this (*status originalis et originalem secutus*).

The original condition was one in which all the angels were equally good, righteous, and holy, endowed by God with wisdom and with the ability perfectly to perform the will of God, [14] yet with such freedom of the will, also, that the possibility of disobedience towards God and of apostasy was not excluded. [15] With these gracious gifts the angels were endowed by God, in order that by the proper use of the same they might attain to the end for which they were created, namely, the beatific sight and enjoyment of God; the original condition is therefore called the *state of grace*. [16] As, however, some of the angels made a bad use of the liberty that had been granted to them, the original condition ceased, and there arose that difference of moral condition in consequence of which the angels became divided into two classes, the good and the evil, the former entering into the *state of glory*, and the latter into the *state of misery*. [17]

A. THE GOOD ANGELS.

From the time when the angels separated into two classes, a change took place also in those who did not become disobedient towards God. For, because they remained faithful to God and true to that which is good, they have, as a reward for this, been so confirmed in that which is good that they can no longer be in danger of falling, and that even the possibility of their sinning no longer exists. Br. (267): "*Those are called good* (angels) *who have persevered in the goodness or righteousness and holiness in which they were created, and have been confirmed by God in that which is good, as a gracious reward for their obedience, so that they can no longer lose this goodness, or sin, or become evil.*" [18] Thus the good angels have, at the same time, reached the goal for which they were originally created by God, for they have attained to the enjoyment of beholding God, and so have entered upon the state of glory. [19] The enlargement of all the powers originally bestowed upon them is merely a consequence of this condition. [20] If they were wise before (in the state of grace), they are now still more so, because they now see God; [21] if they were holy before, they are now still more so, in such a sense that there is not now even a possibility of their sinning. Their liberty is, however,

not hereby lessened, but increased, for they do right not by compulsion, but from an inner free impulse. [22] And so, too, their power has been magnified; for they are now able to overcome the evil angels who were formerly as mighty as they. [23]

The *employment* of good angels consists (*a*) in worshiping God and (*b*) serving Him in the world by protecting and watching over the pious, as well as by punishing and restraining the wicked. QUEN. (I, 450): "The duties and works of the good angels are to worship and praise God, Ps. 103: 20; 148: 2; Is. 6: 3; and to execute His commands, Dan. 7: 10; as well by punishing the wicked, Gen. 19: 13; 2 Kings 19: 35, as by guarding and protecting the godly, Ps. 34: 7; 91: 11, 12; Heb. 1: 14." [24]

For these services, which they render to men, they deserve our gratitude, but every species of worship or adoration addressed to them is wicked and superstitious. [25]

The Scriptures give us some intimation of a diversity of rank among the angels, without, however, giving any specific information on the subject. [26]

B. THE EVIL ANGELS.

They are thus designated on account of their disobedience toward God, and the evil disposition remaining in them since the Fall. [27] HOLL. (396): "The evil angels are those who did not persevere in concreated wisdom and righteousness, but of their own free will turned away from God and the rule of right, and became the perpetual enemies of God and men, to be plagued with eternal torments." In what this disobedience toward God consisted, cannot with certainty be learned from the Scriptures, but it is highly probable that pride was the sin through which they fell away from God. [28] The cause for this sin lay entirely in their will, with which they of their own accord turned away from God, and it was in no sense owing to any outward necessity or any defect in their nature. [29] How many of them thus apostatized from God, at what time, and whether all at once—concerning all this we have no certain information in the Scriptures. We know only this, that their apostasy preceded the fall of man, and that one evil angel stands at their head, as their leader and chief. [30]

As, however, the obedience of the good angels was followed by a reward, so the fall of the wicked angels was followed by a punishment on the part of God, namely this, that those who once apostatized from God remained forever rejected by Him, and accordingly have been transferred from the state of grace, in which they hitherto stood, into a condition of the greatest misery (*status miseria*); but they have to expect still heavier punishments at the judgment day. [31]

And as, in the case of the good angels, their transfer into the state of glory was followed by an enlargement of the powers originally conferred upon them, so the transfer of the wicked angels was likewise followed by a diminution of the powers originally conferred. They retain, indeed, those gifts and powers that are inseparable from their nature, but their knowledge is no longer, as in the state of grace, a source of blessing, but greatly obscured, and hence they think perversely about God and divine things. [32]

But the wicked angels make it their work to detract to the utmost from the glory of God and to hinder men in their attempts to secure their temporal and eternal welfare. [33] Yet they cannot, even in this way, with all their malice, entirely avoid serving God, for He makes use of them to punish the wicked and to chasten the godly for their own good. [34]

Definition.—Quen. (I, 455): "Angels are finite spirits, complete, intelligent, endowed with great power and originally created by God in righteousness and holiness, for the glory of God and the service of man; of whom some by their own free will fell from their Creator and from concreated perfection, and were consequently deprived not only of the favor and felicity which they had, but also of the beatific vision of God which they might have been able to enjoy, and were cast into infernal fire for perpetual torment without any hope of pardon. The rest, however, continued in their original condition, and were so established by God in that which is good that they neither wish nor are able ever to lose it or fall away from it, and are enjoying God eternally."

[1] Quen. (I, 443): "That angels really exist is taught both by express declarations of Scripture, Ps. 104: 4; Heb. 1: 14, and by the description of various apparitions, Gen. 18: 2; 19: 1, sq. The

existence of angels is demonstrated, not so much by probable arguments derived from philosophy, whether by the graduation of existences and the link needed for the completion of the universe (because there are creatures (1) merely corporeal, such as stars, stones, etc.; (2) partly corporeal and partly spiritual, as man; (3) purely spiritual, as angels), or by human testimony, or by various experiences, as by one indisputable argument, namely, the clear and oft-repeated assertion of the Scriptures."

Br. (251): "It is scarcely possible that the existence of angels can be clearly demonstrated from the light of nature, although probable reasons may be assigned for it."

As to the meaning of the word, Quen. (I, 442): "The name *angel* does not describe the nature of the being, but its office, and signifies one sent, a legate, a messenger. Hence *Augustine:* 'Do you ask for the name of their nature? It is spirit. Do you inquire concerning the name of their office? It is angel.' The word angel etymologically signifies messenger. But by the universally received usage and style of Scripture language it designates a nature and a specific creature." Yet because the word is originally nothing more than a designation of office, it is used in the Scriptures with reference also to the Son of God, as the uncreated Angel. Is. 63: 9; Mal. 3: 1; Gen. 48: 16, seq. Also with reference to men, Mal. 2: 7; Rev. 1: 20; Mal. 3: 1; Mark 1: 2; Matt. 11: 10; Luke 7: 27.

[2] Chmn. (Loc. Th., I, 122): "Since Moses does not describe the creation of angels, many curious inquiries have arisen, as, *e. g.*, When were they created? . . . But, as the Scriptures do not state the precise time and day of the creation of angels, we gladly remain in ignorance of that which we neither can nor ought to know. It is enough, therefore, for us to know (1) that the angels did not come into existence of their own accord, nor were begotten from the substance of God, but were created; (2) that the angels did not exist from eternity, nor indeed before that beginning when all things which are in heaven and earth, visible and invisible, began to be. For to have been in the beginning can be said of Him alone through whom all things were made, and who is eternal. John 1: 1–3."

Quen. (I, 459): "The angels were created by God (Col. 1: 16; Ps. 104: 4; 103: 20) in time, along with this visible world, or within the period of the original six days; but on what day or at what time they were produced, we confess that we are willingly ignorant." The proof is thus stated by Br. (252): "They were not created *before the heavens and the earth*, for these were created in the beginning, and so were the first among all created things; see

Gen. 1: 1. And besides it is well known that the eternity of God is described by His existing before the foundation of the world. See Ps. 90: 2; Is. 48: 13. Moreover, they were created *not after but within the six days*, for after that interval God rested from the ordinary work of creation. That the angels were created *before man* is usually proved from Job 38: 7. And some believe that we are to understand also from this passage that the angels were created upon the first day; namely, because when God founded the earth then the angels are said to have praised God. But these matters are not altogether clear; although we do not deny that the angels are intended by the term 'sons of God' in chapter 1, v. 6, and we say that their beginning was contemporaneous with the origin of other creatures. Perhaps, also, as we know that man was created after the other creatures that were intended for his advantage, so also it may be correctly inferred that the angels who were to minister unto man (according to Heb. 1: 14) were created before man. Yet it is not necessary that we understand the angels to be intended by the terms heaven or light, in Gen. 1, metaphorically interpreted."

[3] The angels are called "complete substances, or substances subsisting *per se*," because they do not need a body in order that in conjunction with it they may constitute a person. Holl. (378): "The human soul is an incomplete spirit, designed in itself and by its very nature to enter into the composition of an entire man. Hence also a separated soul has a natural propensity and inclination towards a body, with which as a component part it constitutes a complete man; but angels are not naturally designed to constitute a unit in themselves, along with a component part, but they have an essence terminating in itself. Wherefore the soul is an incomplete spirit, and angels are complete spirits." Thus the following distinction can be made between angels and men, that the former are complete spirits and the latter incomplete spirits; while the difference between God and the angels is, that He is an uncreated and infinite spirit, while they are created and finite spirits. Br. (254): "As the angels have a spiritual essence in common with God and the human soul, so they differ from God in that their essence is not *infinite*, but *finite*, and from the soul of man in that their substance is complete."

The proof that angels are complete substances is drawn by Quen. (I, 444): "(1) From their names, for they are called guardians, Dan. 6: 22; principalities, powers, Col. 1: 16; gods, Ps. 82: 6; sons of God, Job 2: 1; men of God, Judges 13: 6. (2) From their personal actions, such as to minister, to stand before the Lord, to appear, to speak, etc., which surely cannot be attri-

buted to the inspired movements of men or to the mere actions of God. (3) From the fall or ruin of some angels, and the perseverance of the good ones in the truth. (4) From what is ascribed to them, viz., knowledge, desire, power." This proof is regarded by the Dogmaticians as highly important, over against those who deny the personality of the angels. QUEN. (I, 444): "This ground is to be held against the Sadducees of old, who thought that angels were certain movements or affections excited in men; also against the Anabaptists, who foolishly imagined that angels were merely the actions of God, punishing crimes or rewarding good deeds; also against David George, the heresiarch of the last century, who confounded angels with the thoughts of the human mind."

[4] CAL. (IV, 23): "The purpose for which angels were created was, with respect to God, His praise and the execution of the divine will (Job 38: 7; Ps. 103: 20; 104: 4); with respect to themselves, the eternal enjoyment of God; with respect to man, service, for which they were specially and divinely destined, inasmuch as God created all things for man, and made the angels His servants at their very creation, Ps. 104, in order to use their ministry especially, for man and his salvation. Heb. 1: 14."

[5] The most of the Dogmaticians divide the attributes of angels into negative and affirmative. As the former class, they enumerate indivisibility, invisibility, immutability, immortality, illocality. As the latter, knowledge, freedom of the will, power, eternal duration, definitive ubiety, agility. Instead of following this merely external method of arrangement, we prefer treating these attributes, after the example of CAL., BR., and others, in the order corresponding to the nature of angels; but we enumerate them, nevertheless, after QUEN. and HOLL., as they are less extensively treated by CAL. and BR.

[6] QUEN. (I, 445): "The *indivisibility* of an angelic substance is owing to its incorporeity or immateriality, for what is not made of matter, is no quantity, nor has it parts outside of parts, and consequently is not divisible into quantitative parts."

Id. (I, 446): "*Invisibility* is a consequence of spirituality; for a spirit cannot be seen by bodily eyes, hence also the angels are enumerated among invisible beings (ἀόρατα). Col. 1: 16."

[7] The *immutability* of angels is restricted, as one that is not such absolutely, but comparatively and relatively. HOLL. (382): "God alone is absolutely immutable, the angels are immutable only relatively; because they are *not subject to physical mutations*, which are peculiar to natural bodies. For the angels do not beget,

nor are they begotten; they are neither increased nor diminished; they neither grow old, nor decay; nor do they proceed upon foot from one place to another. Yet they are not beyond the reach of every kind of change, for they vary the where of their presence (*suum ubi*), they rejoice, are sad, love, or hate; *these are moral changes.*"

[8] (*a*) When *immortality* is ascribed to angels, this is intended to express that there is nothing in them, as incorporeal beings, who for this reason are not subject to change or decay, that could occasion their death; but it is not meant thereby to deny that God has power over their life also.

CAL. (IV, 24): "Although they may be remanded again into nothing by God, through His absolute power, by whom they were created from nothing, and may thus be called corruptible, as God alone is incorruptible, and as He alone has immortality, 1 Tim. 6: 16; yet they are free from physical corruption, nor have they any internal principle of corruption, because they are altogether destitute of matter, and so by nature are incorruptible and immortal." HOLL. expresses this by means of the distinction between *incorruptibility in a physical and in a metaphysical sense:* "Inwardly (*ab intra*), they are *physically* incorruptible, because they have not in themselves an internal principle of change or corruption, which is matter. Nor has any physical body such power as to corrupt a spirit or an angel *outwardly* (*ab extra*). But if corruptible be used in a *metaphysical* sense, of something that can be reduced to nothing by absolute divine power, then the angels are corruptible, because if God would so command they could return to the nothing from which they arose." Wherefore, other Dogmaticians suggest, instead of the term corruptibility, the expression annihilability. Further, the angels do not possess the principle of immortality of themselves, but it has been graciously given to them by God; whence HOLL. (382) thus further distinguishes: "The angels are immortal and incorruptible not independently, originally, and in consequence of an eternal essence, for thus God alone is immortal; but they are immortal dependently, participatively, and through the grace of God, who creates and preserves them."

(*b*) QUEN. (I, 446): "*Endless duration* is attributed to angels, as the mean between eternity and time. Eternity is that which belongs to God alone, and is without beginning or end. Time, which belongs to corporeal creatures, has both beginning and end. But endless duration has a beginning, yet is without end." CAL. (IV, 28): "The created duration of things indestructible in their nature is distinguished from time, and is called endless duration [sempi-

ternity] (*ævum*) by philosophers." Endless duration then practically expresses no more than immortality; the difference seems to consist only in this, that the same conception, viz., that of continuing forever, is deduced in the one case by the negation of matter, and in the other by the negation of time. The angels are immortal, for they have no matter which is subject to change or decay; they are imperishable as to their duration, for their existence is not measured by time.

[9] The angels, as incorporeal beings, occupy no space, and hence are *illocal*. QUEN. (I, 446): "The angels are not in a place by circumscription, as natural bodies, because they are spirits, but they rather co-exist with a corporeal place or with a body." Yet they are not omnipresent, but always present only at a particular place. This latter idea is expressed by the attribute of *alicubitas* (*being somewhere*). QUEN. (I, 446): "There is attributed to them ποῦ or *ubi* (a somewhere), in which an angel definitively is. For angels are in a certain space by designation, or definitively, *i. e., their substantial, not merely virtual, presence is limited* (definitur) in a *certain space*, so that they are *there, and not in other spaces, and much less everywhere;* and, because an angel is devoid of parts, the whole angel is not only in the whole place, but the whole angel can exist in every part of the place, even the very least, yea, in a point." The manner in which the being somewhere (*das Irgendwosein*) is predicated of angels, of God, or of physical bodies, is described by the following distinctions: *Of the angels*, it is said that "they *are somewhere definitively* (*in ubi definitivo*), since they at their own pleasure limit a certain space for themselves, in the whole of which they wholly are, and wholly in each part of the space, because their essence is indivisible." *Of God*, it is said that "He is *somewhere repletively* (*in ubi repletivo*), since He fills all in all." *Of physical bodies*, it is said that "they *are somewhere circumscriptively or occupatively* (*in ubi circumscriptivo seu occupativo*), because they occupy a space commensurate with themselves, and are circumscribed by the surrounding air." HOLL. (384): "But the angels are not *somewhere repletively*, because they are not everywhere, like God; nor are they *somewhere occupatively*, since they do not occupy a space commensurate with the peculiarity of their spiritual nature. For measure depends upon quantity, and an angel is devoid of that."

[10] HOLL. (384): "Wonderful is the agility and velocity of angels, so that without local motion, which is a quality of bodies, and thus also without a succession of parts, which they do not have, they are able to change the where of their presence with extreme celerity. Yet it does not appear that angels are entirely de-

void of motion, since they are sometimes here and sometimes elsewhere. And, although the motion of angels is extremely rapid, yet it is not instantaneous, because space, in which they move, is extended and continuous, and cannot be traversed by any creature in an instant."

[11] "That the knowledge of angels is great and superior to that of all men, because joined with the knowledge of the Son of God; and yet that it is not infinite, since they are ignorant of the day of judgment," is deduced from 2 Sam. 14: 20; Mark 13: 32. In imitation of the Scholastics, some of the Dogmaticians attempt more particularly to describe the kind and the measure of the knowledge possessed by the angels. Thus QUEN. (I, 445): "The angels do not know all things at once by one intellection, but as distinct and through different conceptions; not merely by a simple apprehension, but also by synthesis and analysis; and also by reasoning and inferring one thing from another. *They know God*, but they do not comprehend Him, because of the infinity of the divine essence, and the finitude of the angelic intellect." (BR. (255, 256): "They know God only abstractively, *i. e.*, *a posteriori*, and from created things: yet more perfectly than our abstractive knowledge.) "They know *the thoughts of men*, not *a priori* and distinctly, but *a posteriori* and confusedly, by signs, effects, and mental conditions. As to *future contingencies*, they can infer future events by the consideration of causes, and this with the greatest quickness, yet only with probability and in the main." The knowledge of angels is described as "a *natural* knowledge, which is common to both good and evil angels on account of their identity of nature; a *revealed* knowledge, which was common to them all before the fall of some of them; a *beatific* knowledge, which belongs only to the angels that are confirmed in that which is good." (BR. (255).) Many of the Dogmaticians, however, refrain from all specific distinctions in regard to the kind and the degree of this knowledge. GRH. (IV, 22): "For what can we, mere worms creeping upon the earth, assert, in this darkness of our mind, concerning the understanding of the celestial spirits, when we cannot so much as exactly comprehend our own understanding? It is better therefore to render devout thanks to God for the ministry of angels, which He daily grants us, than curiously to scrutinize beyond the limits of the Word these mysteries and unrevealed matters."

[12] HOLL. (382): "The will accompanies the intellect; liberty accompanies the will. The angelic will is free, as well with respect to immanent acts, of choosing or refusing this or that object, as

with respect to different external effects, while it freely does now this, now that."

[13] HOLL. (382): "The power of angels is great, but finite. (1) *It is great*, for they are called 'mighty in strength' [R. V.] Ps. 103: 20; strong men armed, Luke 11: 21. They are able (*a*) to move bodies by transferring them from place to place, Matt. 4: 5, 8; Acts 8: 39; (*b*) to destroy bodies, 2 Kings 19: 35; (*c*) to assume bodies and to join them, not essentially indeed or personally, but accidentally, to themselves, and to guide them as a helmsman guides a ship; (*d*) to speak with God, with angels, and with men. *They speak with God*, by directing their thoughts to God, while they adore and praise Him; *they speak with angels*, freely impressing upon them intelligible conceptions; *they speak with men*, by means of an audible and distinct sound formed in the air in imitation of the human voice." (QUEN., I, 446: "That speaking is done by means of a sound formed in the assumed bodies." But he prudently adds: "Here to be willing not to know, what the best Master does not wish to teach, is learned ignorance.") "(2) *It is finite;* angelic power is not infinite. For, since infinite power is peculiar to the Creator, it is not communicable to a mere creature. Whence it happens that angels are not able (*a*) to create; (*b*) to beget; (*c*) to change substances; (*d*) to perform true miracles, Ps. 72: 18; (*e*) to cure all diseases; (*f*) to raise the dead."

[14] QUEN. (I, 446): "As to their original state, all angels were in the beginning created by God equally righteous, good and holy, to glorify God and render Him a holy service."

This is proved: (*a*) By the general statement appended to the narrative of the creation, Gen. 1: 31. (*b*) From John 8: 44. (*c*) From Jude 6, where the fall of the angels is described both negatively and affirmatively. (*d*) From 2 Pet. 2: 4."

HOLL. (385): "The grace spoken of bestowed (1) on the part of the intellect, a certain habitual intellectual light or concreated knowledge for the recognition of God and of His will; (2) an habitual holiness of the will, by which the angels were able in the state of probation to begin and to end all their actions conformably to the eternal law of God."

NOTE.—It is further remarked that they were created in great numbers; how great these were is not known by us. QUEN. (I, 446): "Because the angels were not to be multiplied as men by procreation, but were created at once by God, so there was a certain number of them from the beginning, which, as it was not increased in the course of time, nor will be increased, so also it will

never be diminished. But how great that number is the Scriptures do not teach, and there is nothing further revealed concerning it to us than that it is great, Dan. 7:10; Matt. 25:31; Heb. 12:22."

[15] Holl. (385): "Perfect righteousness was concreated with the angels, but it was not inamissible or incapable of being lost. For the will of the angels in the state of grace was not fully fixed upon perpetually loving and choosing the good; but God granted to them liberty of will and a concreated propensity towards the good, so that there was in them, not a very near, but a very remote capacity to sin, consisting in the negation both of impeccability and of the inamissibility of the concreated blessings."

Quen. (I, 447): "The fall of certain angels did not occur in consequence of any concreated inclination or proclivity to evil, but through the abuse of internal liberty, *i. e.*, certain angels fell while no intrinsic principle was inclining or determining them to a fall, while no external motive for falling was constraining or necessitating them; but because they had not yet been confirmed in the Good, and were indifferent to good and evil, they abused their liberty, and with perfect freedom left their own place."

N. B.—The whole context shows that Quen.'s phrase, "indifferent to good and evil," is not meant to express indecision in regard to good or evil, but only the capacity to choose the one as well as the other; and that the phrase is selected with special reference to the subsequent condition in which the good angels are described as confirmed in that which is good.

[16] Holl. (384): "The original state is the state of grace, which all the angels possessed in the original creation *through the grace of the omnipotent Creator*, and in which they were created equally wise and holy, and were placed *upon the way to eternal happiness.*" Cal. (IV, 57): "Before they were confirmed in the Good, they were on the way to happiness; but they had not yet reached *the goal itself*, namely, happiness."

[17] Quen. (I, 447): "With regard to their subsequent condition, some of the angels continued in their concreated goodness, truth, and holiness, and were confirmed in it by God; but others, by sinning through their own free will, fell away from their Creator. And hence arose the distinction between the good and the evil angels."

The condition of the good angels, after that period, is called the state of glory, and that of the evil angels the state of misery. Holl. (384): "The *state of glory* is that in which the angels who continued in concreated wisdom and holiness, having been admitted to the unobscured vision of God, perpetually enjoy His

boundless goodness. Matt. 18: 10; Ps. 16: 11. The *state of misery* (2 Pet. 2: 4) is the most lamentable condition of those angels who of their own accord fell away from God."

[18] Holl. (386): "The good angels are those who continued in concreated true wisdom and holiness, and are so illumined by God with the light of glory and so confirmed in the Good that, free from the danger of sinning, they clearly behold God and perpetually enjoy His goodness." Quen. (I, 447): "They are called good angels, not so much on account of their entitative, metaphysical, or transcendental goodness, which belongs to all angels, even the evil (for, in as far as they have existence, in so far also they are good); nor only on account of their concreated good habit, for in this respect also they were just like the evil angels, who also equally had the same at first; but also on account of their good deeds, or their obedience yielded to God and their perseverance in the Good, and, finally, on account of their confirmation in the Good. The formal reason, therefore, why they are denominated good angels is, because they persevered in the truth and goodness in which they have been created, and are now so confirmed in it that they never will either wish or be able to fall from it."

[19] Three things, therefore, according to Cal. (IV, 55), are to be predicated of the good angels: "(1) *Persistence and continuance in concreated truth and holiness.* (2) *Divine confirmation in the Good*, which signifies an eternal, immutable persistence in the blessings bestowed in creation, strength in the Good, or the gift of absolute perseverance, and the great increase of those blessings. Hence arises impeccability." Quen. (I, 448): "Good angels are so confirmed in the Good that, as before they were only able not to sin, now they are altogether unable to sin. Matt. 18: 10; 6: 10; 1 Tim. 5: 21; Luke 20: 36; Gal. 1: 8." Holl. (386): "In the state of the way [when upon trial] the angels *were able not to sin*, *i. e.*, there was not in them a very ready capacity or propensity to sin, yet there was in them a remote capacity to come short of their duty. In the state of glory the angels *are not able to sin*, *i. e.*, there is in them neither a near nor a remote capacity for coming short, but a sinlessness (*ἀναμαρτησία*); their impeccability is immutable and their holiness inamissible. (3) *The eternal judgment of God*, which properly is *the state of glory*, for which ultimately, or as a final goal, all the angels had been created. For they were all originally created alike. But when some fell away from God and deprived themselves of that glory, forsaking their own habitation (Jude 6), the rest, who remained in the truth, alone enjoyed the *beatific vision of God, or the state of eternal happiness*, who 'always behold the face of God

the Father in heaven,' Matt. 18: 10, and are thus called angels of light, 2 Cor. 11: 14; elect angels, 1 Tim. 5: 21; whence also holy men who are to be in the state of glory are called ἰσάγγελοι, equal to the angels. Luke 20: 36." The Dogmaticians usually represent the confirmation in the Good as a consequence of the reception into the state of glory. Br. (269): "After they (the good angels) had steadfastly exhibited to God their obedience in the state of probation, while other angels had fallen away, it pleased God to fill them with the light of glory, so that they were able clearly and intuitively to recognize God (for this is to see the face of the heavenly Father). But this vision of God was followed by a most intense love, by which the will of the angels cleaves to God in such a manner that it cannot be turned away from Him. And thus was effected their confirmation in the Good, or the determination of their will towards the Good; so that, whatsoever they do, they do with reference to God as the infinitely perfect and perfectly known Good, without any blemish, without any defect."

Holl. (386): "He who clearly beholds God, the chief Good, cannot but burn with perpetual love towards Him, for he beholds nothing in Him but what is good and to be loved; but he who perpetually loves God cannot sin." Id.: "The good angels, then, are confirmed in the Good when the light of glory is infused into them by God, so that their confirmation in the Good is practically nothing else than the infusion of the light of glory, in which they intuitively recognize God." That the angels, after having once been admitted into the state of glory, cannot possibly sin, is inferred principally from Luke 20: 36. Quen. (I, 448): "Those who are to be blessed in eternal life are called 'equal unto the angels.' Now, we are sure we shall never lose that celestial felicity; therefore, much more are the angels thus assured, to whom we shall be like." Quen. (I, 448) appears to regard the confirmation in the Good not so much a consequence of the enjoyment of God, as rather to be assumed at once along with it: "The angels always behold the face of the Father in heaven, which beatific vision of God presupposes the confirmation in the Good, excludes all sin, and introduces impeccability, *i. e., it makes angels and men happy, confirmed in the Good and impeccable.*"

This introduction to the state of glory is described, indeed, as a reward which the good angels receive from God, but yet only as one that proceeded from the free grace of God; at the same time it is described as having been determined upon from eternity, but not by an absolute decree.

Holl. (387): "The glory of the angels who are confirmed in the

Good is to be attributed not to an absolute divine decree, nor to the merit of Christ, nor to angelic merit, but to the most liberal goodness of God, who remunerates the persevering obedience of the angels far beyond their desert."

[20] Quen. (I, 448): "It is to be observed in general, that now, in consequence of and after this confirmation, there are greater excellences and perfections in angels than before the confirmation."

Holl. (388): "The angels acquired through the gift of confirmation more excellent knowledge, more perfect holiness, more perfect freedom, greater power, more complete concord."

[21] Quen. (I, 448): "As to the intellect of the angels, it shines no doubt with more illustrious radiance, since they have reached the goal and are enjoying the beatific vision of God, in which there is fulness of joy, Ps. 16: 11; and hence they are called angels of light, on account of the greater light of knowledge, 2 Cor. 11: 14." But here also the limitation is appended: "Although the intellectual power of the good angels is very great, it is nevertheless finite (Mark 13: 32; 1 Pet. 1: 12), and circumscribed within its own limits. Their intellection is capable of grasping very much (multiscia) but it is not omniscient; neither is it able to anticipate future events, nor has it an *a priori* consciousness of the recesses of the heart or of human thoughts."

[22] Cal. (IV, 60): "(1) *Holiness*, not only that by which they were marked as holy when in the state of grace; but being more perfect now in holiness, they are confirmed in the Good and established in the state of glory. From the more perfect knowledge of God there has resulted a more perfect love of God, and so also a more perfect holiness; and, since they are always (διὰ παντός) illuminated by the most glorious light of the knowledge and holiness of God, Matt. 18: 10; 2 Cor. 11: 14, they rejoice in perfect holiness as that of the finally blessed. . . . *But this holiness of theirs is not essential; for God alone is essentially holy; but it is accidental*, because they were able to lose it. Job 4: 18." (2) Quen. (I, 449): "This confirmation in their original state did not deprive the good angels of their freedom, nor did they cease for this reason to have a free will; but they rather attained in this way to greater freedom. For they have (*a*) freedom from compulsion, as they do not perform good works compulsorily, but freely and of their own accord. They praise God and serve Him freely, not by compulsion, although they are not able not to praise Him and do His will; (*b*) freedom of exercise, which is sometimes called freedom of contradiction, which signifies that when any one has an object proposed to him, he can choose it or not choose it, can act or not act. The

good angels have also (*c*) the freedom of a certain specification; that, namely, which consists in freely choosing or not choosing between this or that good thing in particular. For, although the freedom of specification, which is called also the freedom of contrariety, implies indifference as to one of two opposite things, a good and an evil, yet the good angels do not have freedom as to contrary acts, so as to be able to do good and evil, but they are able to will and to do only good, and thus the freedom of contrariety does not belong to good angels; nevertheless they have the freedom of contradiction, by which although they necessarily choose the good, as to the quality of the act, yet they are able freely to choose this good, and not to choose another good, to do this good and not to do another good. Yea, the freedom, not to be able to sin, not to be able to refrain from doing good, is the very highest kind, which very highest grade of freedom God, the most free of all, enjoys."

[23] QUEN. (I, 449): "The power of the good angels is very great. For, though they were endowed with great strength at their creation, they have acquired still more, since they have been advanced into the state of glory, and by it are enabled to overcome the power of the devils. Hence they are called 'those that excel in strength.' Ps. 103: 20." But here also the limitation: "Although the power of the good angels is great, it is yet finite and subordinate and subject to the divine power and will."

[24] AP. CONF., p. 224, 8. Comp. also p. 117. HOLL. (390): "The holy angels perform their works and duties by *standing before God* (with a most joyful psalmody (ψαλμωδία) they sing the praises of God; with the most humble worship (λατρεία) they revere and adore God; with the most prompt service (λειτουργία) they execute the will of God), by assisting godly men, and by resisting devils and wicked men."

More specifically BR. (272) (in imitation of the earliest Dogmaticians, viz., CHMN., GRH.): "The good angels perform various functions in their happy life, some of which pertain to their own happiness (for their happiness does not consist in idleness, but in part itself signifies a certain activity (ἐνέργεια): in part, besides, admits various functions, to be performed by those who are happy); others are ministerial, by which the angels serve God and Christ, the God-man (Heb. 1: 6; Matt. 4: 11), and promote human salvation." Id. (274): "The functions of the latter kind have respect partly to individual godly men, partly to guardianship of the hierarchical estates and the promotion of their advantage. The angels minister to *godly individuals* when they sustain them in the begin-

ning of life and in infancy (Matt. 18: 10); when they render service to those of maturer years in any honest calling (Ps. 34: 7; 91: 11, 12; Matt. 1: 19, 20; 2: 13, 19; Acts 10: 3, 7; Rev. 1: 1; 22: 6, 16; Dan. 6: 22; Acts 12: 7; 5: 18, 19; Luke 1: 13, 30, etc.); and, finally, when they are present with the dying, Luke 16: 22."

Ap. Conf. Art. xxi, 8: . . . "We freely grant that the angels pray for us. For we have the testimony of Zech. 1: 12, where the angel prays, 'O Lord of hosts, how long wilt thou not have mercy on Jerusalem, etc.?'"

Br. (276): "It belongs to the office of the angels, *with reference to the ecclesiastical estate*, to promote the ministry of the Word; and especially, to this end, they were present as servants at the promulgation of the Mosaic Law (Deut. 33: 2; Gal. 3: 19); they announced the incarnation of Christ (Luke 1: 26; 2: 9); they resisted the introduction of idolatry into the Church (Jude 9); and likewise are present in sacred assemblies (1 Cor. 11: 10; 1 Tim. 5: 21)."

(Ib.): "*The political estate* the angels serve by preventing the bonds of the government from being sundered (Dan. 10: 13), by assisting and defending the magistracy and its officers (Dan. 6: 22), by warding off dangers and destroying wicked enemies (2 Kings 19: 35; Is. 37: 36)."

Id. (277): "*The domestic estate* they serve by promoting the marriage of the godly (Gen. 24: 7), by keeping watch over the household (Job 1: 10; Ps. 34: 7), by guarding the pledges of domestic love, the children (Matt. 18: 10)."

(Ib.): "Finally, there will be a special duty of the angels, which they will perform on the last day, when they will accompany Christ coming to judgment, and announce His arrival with the sound of trumpets (Matt. 25: 31; 1 Thess. 4: 16). They will collect human beings from all parts of the world (Matt. 24: 31; Mark 13: 27), and will separate the godly from the wicked (Matt. 13: 41); they will place the former at the right hand of Christ (Matt. 25: 43), taking them up to meet Him in the air (1 Thess. 4: 17), and the latter, placed at the left hand of the Judge (Matt. 25: 33), they will then quickly cast into hell (Matt. 13: 42, 50)."

The Dogmaticians acknowledge that they have no definite answer to the question, whether every one have his own so-called guardian angel. Br. (274): "This is certain, that the guardianship of any man is not in such a way assigned to a particular angel that he is deprived of the aid of the rest. But it still may be asserted with probability, that one angel is appointed for the protection of each godly person, and that in extraordinary cases many angels are sent to the help of single individuals."

[25] Ap. Conf. P. II, Art. II: "Although the angels in heaven pray for us. . . . yet it does not hence follow that they are to be invoked, adored, etc., by us." Br. (278): "On account of these perfections which we discover the angels to possess, and because they favor and assist us very greatly, it is also becoming that we praise and love them, and take heed lest we offend them by evil actions. But it is not becoming in us to direct our prayers to the angels. For that is either impious and idolatrous (namely, if we address religious prayers to them with the belief that they can bestow upon us spiritual gifts), or it is at least useless and ill-advised."

Holl. (392): "Angels are not to be religiously adored or invoked."

[26] Holl. (392): "There is no doubt as to the existence of a certain order among the good angels, but what or what manner of angelic order that is, we think no one can know in this life. Proof: (*a*) From the general rule, according to which God wishes everything in the Church Militant to be done decently and in order, 1 Cor. 14: 40. There is no doubt, therefore, that there is a certain order among the blessed angels, and that the more perfect as the Church Triumphant is more splendid than the Church Militant. (*b*) From the different designations of the celestial spirits, Eph. 1: 21; Col. 1: 16; 1 Thess. 4: 16, and Jude 9. The different names imply a distinction among the angels. (*c*) From analogy. There is an order among the wicked angels; therefore also among the good. The former is proved by Luke 11: 15, where Beelzebub is called the chief of devils, and Matt. 25: 41, where mention is made of the devil and his angels."

[27] Quen. (I, 450): "Angels are called evil, not because of their essence, for in respect to their essence they are good, and were created along with the rest of the angels in truth, holiness, and righteousness; but (1) in respect to their evil conduct, viz., their malicious defection and apostasy from God; (2) in respect to the habitual wickedness, or the horrible depravity of their nature, which was consequent upon that conduct; (3) in respect to their perseverance and persistence in incorrigible wickedness; and (4) on account of their evil doings, for they perpetrate only evil."

[28] Quen. (I, 452): "It does not appear what exactly was the first sin of the evil angels. The temptation, however, with which Satan attacked and overcame our first parents, Gen. 3: 5, and his character and his perpetual effort to transfer the glory of God to himself, Matt. 4: 9 [1 Tim. 3: 6], render probable the opinion of those who think that it was an affected resemblance to the Deity (*deiformitas*) or an affectation of superior pre-eminence (ὑπεροχῆς)."

[29] Quen. (I, 452): "The generic form of the diabolical fall consisted in the free and spontaneous turning away from God and the rule of right. For they were able to persevere in truth and concreated holiness and not fall away from it; they were able by the grace of creation to keep the rule of right; of their own accord, therefore, and freely they sinned, by the abuse of the freedom that was bestowed upon them. For they did not sin through any defect or impotence of nature, but from pure malice and contumacy, and by the spontaneous abuse of the will conferred upon them."

[30] Quen. (I, 452): "Those who fell were individual angels, whose number is not mentioned in the Scriptures; that they were many, however, we infer from the multitude of demons, Mark 5: 9; Luke 8: 30."

Id. (I, 453): "In what order the wicked angels sinned, whether all at once, whether one after another, or whether first one fell and by his example and persuasion induced others to apostasy and the fall, concerning this the Scholastics dispute, but ἀτερ γραφῆς, with no scriptural ground for their opinions."

Holl. (399): "It is probable that the wicked angels fell under the guidance of a certain leader or chief, whom the Scriptures call Satan and the devil, John 8: 44; Luke 11: 15, who by his example or persuasion drew many angels into the fellowship of his crime. Rev. 12: 4."

As to the time of the fall: Holl. (Ib.): "They fell, not within the six days of creation, but after they were ended (Gen. 1: 31); before the fall of our first parents, in the second week of the foundation of the world, but upon what day it is uncertain."

[31] Br (280): "The crime having been committed, all those angels lost the grace that had been concreated with them, and so fell into the most horrible misery without hope of restoration."

Cal. (IV, 318): "The punishment of the wicked angels is partly the eternal desertion of God, whence they can never be converted; partly, rejection to infernal torments to be endured forever."

Holl (403) more specifically distinguishes the punishment of loss from the punishment of the senses: "*The punishment of loss*, which is also designated as privative, is the most lamentable casting away of grace and glory. *The punishment of sense* consists of the positive torments which the demons have been keenly enduring ever since the fall, and the still greater ones which they will undergo on the day of final judgment. (2 Pet. 2: 4; Jude 6.)" Br. (288): "The punishments which are inflicted upon the wicked angels will be eternal. Matt. 25: 41–46; Mark 9: 43."

To the question, "Why may not the wicked angels be restored

to favor?" GRH. (IV, 34) answers: "It is better to proclaim the wonderful philanthropy and mercy of the Son of God towards the fallen race of man, by which on our account and for our salvation He descended from heaven and became man, not taking on Him the nature of angels but the seed of Abraham (Heb. 2: 16), than to scrutinize beyond due limits the causes of that most just judgment, by which God delivered the angels who had fallen away from Him to be cast in chains of darkness into hell, to be reserved for judgment." The reason for their eternal rejection is usually found in the greatness of their crime. HOLL. (398) indicates the atrocity of their crime: "(*a*) From the person offended, who is God, the most kind and mighty Creator of the angels. (*b*) From the helps, by the aid of which they were able to turn aside the evil. For the intellect of the angels was resplendent with an extraordinary light of knowledge, and their will was distinguished by perfect holiness. (*c*) From the mode of sinning. For the angels sinned, not through infirmity or inadvertence, but in the full possession of their intellect, with deliberate design and the voluntary abuse of their free will, no one instigating them."

[32] QUEN. (I, 454): "The evil angels did not lose, through their fall, their natural knowledge, or that which they had by the light of nature; for they know God and other supernatural things after a certain manner. But that knowledge of supernatural things is joined, 1, with great hatred and murmuring against God; 2, with jealousy, envy, and rage against good angels, godly men and saints in heaven; 3, with ignorance, doubt, error, and forgetfulness. Matt. 4: 6; John 13: 2; 1 Cor. 2: 8. Yet they have altogether lost the knowledge derived from the light of grace." HOLL. (399): "The evil angels know God, but they dreadfully shudder at this divine knowledge." BR. (280): "Their intellect is deprived, not only of the light of grace, but also of the light of glory; and, being fixed upon the contemplation of the divine wrath and their own misery, it is as it were blunted, and wants a sound judgment concerning the doing of that which is good. (Besides, the corruption of the diabolic intellect can be shown from the fact that Satan so studiously sought to accomplish the death of Christ, not thinking that he was thereby bringing the greatest adversity upon himself. But the natural knowledge that remains in the wicked angels adds no happiness to them, rejected as they are by God.)" Their further gifts are thus described, HOLL. (399): "*Their will*, inclined to evil, does not rejoice in that liberty which implies indifference to good or evil, or to many things that are good, but their freedom is exercised with reference to particular evils. *Their power* is, indeed,

more than human, but is restrained by the divine power, so that without the permission of God they can accomplish nothing." Quen. (I, 454): "From divine revelation they sometimes certainly know future contingencies, Job 1: 12; 2: 6; 1 Kings 22: 22. And some things they know with a measure of probability by their natural sagacity."

[33] Holl. (400): "The doings of the wicked angels are of various kinds, but they are all directed to the injury of the divine glory (Rev. 12: 7), and to the temporal as well as eternal ruin of individual men, and of the ecclesiastical estates." Specifically (403): "The evil demons are assiduously plotting to disturb, overturn, and totally destroy the *ecclesiastical estate* (by scattering heresies, Matt. 13: 27 and 28; by hindering the efforts of godly ministers of the Church, 1 Thess. 2: 18; by averting the minds of hearers from the meditation and practice of the divine Word, Luke 8: 12; by exciting persecutions against the kingdom of Christ, Rev. 12: 7), *the political estate* (1 Kings 22: 21; 1 Chron. 22: 1), and *the domestic estate* (by alienating the minds of married persons, as the devil was a murderer from the beginning, who delighted in sowing contentions, John 8: 44; by lying in wait for the children and possessions of parents, Job 1: 11–19)."

Among the evils that are inflicted upon individual persons by the evil spirits is to be especially reckoned corporeal and spiritual possession. The general description of this we cite from Quen. (I, 456): "It is an action of the devil, by which, through the permission of God, he instigates men to sin, and occupies and torments their bodies, that they may throw away their eternal salvation. Through the former, viz., the instigation to sin, there originates *the spiritual possession;* through the latter, viz., his occupation of human bodies, there originates *the corporeal possession. The former* is meant when it is said that the devil possesses and fills the minds and hearts of the wicked, enters into them, and works in them, Acts 5: 3; Luke 22: 3; John 13: 2; 2 Thess. 2: 9; Eph. 2: 2. *The latter* is meant when the devil immediately and locally exists and operates in a body, and controls it for the time being. Matt. 4: 24; 8: 16 and 28; Mark 7: 25; 9: 17; Matt. 12: 22; 15: 22; Luke 4: 33; Acts 8: 7; 19: 13."

[34] Br.: "Meanwhile God Himself uses the ministry of evil spirits for chastening the godly in this world (*e. g.*, Job), and for punishing the wicked, as well in life (Ps. 78: 49) as after death. (Matt. 18: 34.)"

PART II.

OF MAN.

§ 23. *General Statement.*

IN the first part we treated of God in general, and of the works that He has made; we now proceed to treat of Man, for whose sake the world was made, and for whose redemption Christ appeared. Here we are to describe his moral condition, *i. e.*, the condition in which he now is, and because of which he needs redemption. [1] Inasmuch, however, as his present moral condition cannot be described without first explaining how it came to be, since it is no longer the original condition in which he was created, the description of the moral condition in which man now is must be preceded by the description of his original condition. [2]

The second part, therefore, falls into two divisions: I. The State of Integrity; II. The State of Corruption.

CHAPTER I.

Of the State of Integrity.

§ 24. *State of Integrity Defined.*

"THE state of integrity is the original condition of man, created after the image of God, in goodness and rectitude." Quen. (II, 2.) The first condition of man is thus designated, because in it he was entirely uninjured and incorrupt in all his endowments, powers, and attributes. [3] This

condition is more specifically described by the expression, "*the image of God in which man was created*," Gen. 1: 26, 27; 5: 1; for man is distinguished from all other creatures in this, that he was made after the image of God. [4] This expression denotes, in general, a resemblance to God, which has its ground in this, that God took Himself, so to speak, as a pattern and archetype according to which He created man. [5] The passages, Col. 3: 10 and Eph. 4: 24, teach in what particulars that resemblance to God consists, by which man's original condition is described. [6] In these, the apostle states that mankind, whom he presupposes to have lost the image of God, must be renewed again in the same; and, inasmuch as he describes the new condition as that in which mankind are renewed by the power of the Holy Ghost, in true righteousness and holiness, we see that he means by the image of God (Gen. 1 and 5) the peculiar spiritual and moral perfection of man's original condition. [7] Quen. (II, 9): "The image of God is a natural perfection, consisting in an entire conformity with the wisdom, justice, immortality, and majesty of God, which was divinely concreated in the first man, in order that he might perfectly know, love, and glorify God, his Creator." [8] Accordingly, man in his original condition possessed:

(1) Wisdom and the power to understand perfectly, according to the measure of his necessities, things divine, human and natural. [9]

(2) Holiness and freedom of the will, according to which man loved God and that which is good, and possessed the power to live, in all respects, in conformity with the will of God. [10]

(3) Purity of the natural affections, and the perfect harmony of all his powers and impulses. [11] Holl. (470): "The perfections constituting the image of God were an intellect excelling in knowledge, perfect holiness and freedom of the will, absolute purity of the sensuous appetites, and the most harmonious agreement of the affections with the decision of the intellect and guidance of the will, in conformity with the wisdom, holiness, and purity of God, as far as was consistent with the capacity of the first man."

These spiritual and moral excellences, thus described, are the true reason why man is called the image of God. [12] They are also summed up in the expression "original righteousness." [13] With these there are yet connected, as a natural consequence from them, corporeal excellences, and a peculiarly exalted position in relation to the external world, [14] viz., (*a*) corporeal impassibility and immortality, for neither suffering nor death could touch man thus spiritually and morally endowed; and (*b*) external dominion over the other animals (Gen. 1: 26–28), for in this also does the exalted dignity of the likeness to God manifest itself. Holl. (475): "The less principal perfections included in the image of God, are the immunity of body, infected with no stain of sin, from passions, its immortality, and complete control over sublunary creatures, especially beasts." [15] Man, thus created, could not but rejoice in unalloyed happiness, to which also his residence in Paradise, "a most pleasant habitation," contributed its share. [16]

All these excellences we must designate as *natural* to man in his original state, not indeed in the sense that if he lost them he would no longer be the same being; but yet in this sense, that they were created along with him, and that they cannot be separated from him without making his whole condition different from what it formerly was. This is expressed in the statement, that the image of God is a natural perfection, and not an external, supernatural, and supplementary gift. [17] This condition, with all its excellences, man would also have propagated to his posterity (by natural generation, Gen. 5: 3; Rom. 5: 12), had he not fallen. If we inquire concerning supernatural gifts, of which man, in his original condition, was a partaker, they can be more easily enumerated, viz.: "The supernatural favor of God, the gracious indwelling of the most holy Trinity, and the enjoyment and delight thence derived;" for these gifts are to be regarded, in a certain sense, as peculiar additions and consequences, flowing from man's happy and morally good condition. [18]

[1] Quen. (II, 1): "The subject of Theology is man, who fell into misery from his original happy state, and who is to be brought back to God and eternal salvation. The discussion here is not of

man *as to his essence*, and as he is a creature, . . . but as he is such or such a creature; and *in regard to his state*, which before the Fall was innocent and most happy, but after the Fall corrupt and most miserable."

[2] Holl. (461): "Concerning the Fall of man, the condition from which (*terminus a quo*) as well as the condition into which he fell (*terminus ad quem*) is to be considered. The condition from which he fell, is the state of innocence or integrity. The misery of fallen man cannot be accurately measured, unless the happiness which preceded it, and of which man, alienated from God, deprived himself, can be exactly estimated. For the loss of anything is understood from previous possession of it, and the magnitude of an evil is estimated by the good which has been lost." The various conditions of man, Cal. (IV, 385) enumerates in the following order: "The states of man, which come to be considered in Theology, are diverse. One before the Fall, which is called the *state of innocence;* one after the Fall, which again is divided into a state of sin without grace, which they call a *state of sin or corruption*, and a state of sin under grace, through a gracious renovation commenced in this life, and to be completed in the next: whence the *state of grace* in this life is called the *state of renovation*, to which the *state of glory* succeeds in another life. . . . Moreover, although God desires the renovation of all men, and the Scriptures and Theology have been directed to this point, yet many are not renewed, and these, consequently, after this life, are compelled to undergo another state, viz., that of eternal condemnation. Thus, if all the conditions of man are to be regarded, five states may be assigned to him, viz., of nature innocent, corrupt, renewed, glorified, and condemned; or a state of *innocence*, of *misery*, of *grace*, of *eternal glory*, and of *eternal shame*. The Papists err, who invent yet another state, which they call that of the purely natural (*purorum naturalium*);' which is nothing more than a mere figment of the Scholastics; since, indeed, a man never did exist, nor could exist, with the simple negation both of innocence and grace and of sin and misery, who was neither just nor unjust, and who neither pleased nor offended God." In the topic which is under discussion by us, only the first two states are considered, for the subject of Theology is only "man in a state of sin, who is to be restored to salvation."

[3] Cal. (IV, 389): "It is called a state of integrity, because man in it was upright and uncorrupt (Eccl. 7: 29) in intellect, will, the corporeal affections and endowments, and in all things was perfect. They call it also the state of *innocence*, because he was innocent and holy, free from sin and pollution."

[4] Br. (289): "It is evident that there are other creatures which are called very good, and, though created according to a certain form, agreeably to the divine intellect, yet not in the image of God."

[5] Holl. (462): "The formal requisites of an image, generically considered, are: (1) Resemblance, or agreement with the model or prototype; because it is the property of an image to represent that of which it is an image; but this cannot be done without resemblance; (2) Origin, or the process by which the image is made after the model, because the image was made to imitate the prototype, for the sake of representing it." The difference, according to Holl. (Ib.), between a vestige (*vestigium*) and an image, is expressed in the following manner: "An image clearly represents that of which it is an image; a vestige obscurely points to that of which it is a vestige. In all creatures are seen the vestiges of divine power, wisdom, and goodness; but in unfallen man the image of God shone forth with full splendor." Holl. (464): "דְּמוּת is the archetype, like which anything is made, as is indicated by the prefix כ. But צֶלֶם is the ectype in which the express resemblance is seen. Hence the meaning of the words: 'Let us make man in a condition which may be determined according to our perfections and bear our likeness.' Cf. Dan. 10: 16. But in another passage, Gen. 5: 3, דְּמוּת denotes the ectype, and צֶלֶם the archetype, as the former is connected by the ב, and the latter by the כ." Yet Br. (290) remarks concerning this general definition of image: "The image of God in man ought not to be referred to all things which are in God; neither can it be so referred; nor is it in man in the same degree of perfection in which it is in God." Concerning the meaning of the words צֶלֶם and דְּמוּת Holl. (463) further says: "In the original (Gen. 1: 26) two words are employed, viz., צֶלֶם image, and דְּמוּת likeness, not that they are expressions for different things and that image denotes the very substance of the human soul and likeness its accidental perfections or attributes (as some of the Papists say), but that the latter may be exegetical of the former, and that *image may be designated as most like or very similar.*" [Teller adds the following note to Holl. (462): "An image, properly so called, is that in which there is seen an agreement with another, from which it so derives its origin that the properties of the former appear in the latter. Hence there are three things, properly speaking, which are required in an image: (1) An archetype. (2) An ectype. (3) An agreement between the two. An agreement alone is therefore insufficient, but origin is especially necessary, and that in such way that express properties of the archetype are conspicuous."]

[6] It is well known that the expression, "image of God," is employed in a variety of significations, and therefore we must ascertain from other passages in what respect man can be said to be like God. In the following passages, CAL. (IV, 572) furnishes the proper rule according to which we can discover the resemblance which we are considering: "Inasmuch as the conformity of man to God, as an archetype, is found to be manifold, and, in respect to this conformity, the image of God is variously defined by different persons, the following rule should be particularly observed, lest we should here depart from the proper sense of the Scriptures: *That the conformity of man to God refers to the image of God, which, having been impressed upon our first parents in creation, and having been almost entirely lost through transgression, is to be restored by renovation in this life, and, chiefly, in blessed regeneration for the life to come.*" This rule points to the passages, Col. 3 and Eph. 4, from which we learn that the likeness to God, which we are here discussing, must consist of spiritual and moral attributes. Therefore, the image of God, which is ascribed to man in his original state, is described as "*accidental*, the accidental (mutable and amissible) perfections of which are conformed to the infinite perfections of God, according to the measure of human capacity." HOLL. (462). Through this definition the *accidental* image of God is distinguished (1) from the *substantial* image of God, which is Christ, according to 2 Cor. 4: 4; Col. 1: 15; Heb. 1: 3; and by which the sameness of the *essence* of the Father and the Son is pointed out. HOLL. (462): "The substantial image is the eternal Son of God, because He exhibits in Himself the entire essence of the Father, being distinguished from Him by the mode of His subsistence." (2) This definition shows that the advantages of man's original condition, whether of the body or of the soul, do not make up his being itself, but that they consist of attributes which are, indeed, intimately united with it, but yet, when they are removed, the being of man remains unaltered. According to the position above assumed, CAL. proceeds: "Whence it is clear that the conformity to God which is found in the substance of the soul, or of the body, does not belong to the image of God, which is described in the language of the Scriptures: because *the substance of the soul, or of the body, was not destroyed by the Fall, neither is it restored by renovation.*" QUEN. (II, 17): "We must distinguish between the substance of man, or the matter itself of which he is composed, and that which, as if something following, adheres most closely to the substance of man, and nevertheless, as to its accidents, perfects it internally; or, we must distinguish between nature itself and its qualities, or perfections in the quali-

ties: the image of God indicates the latter, not the former. In short, the image of God is not man, but in man, *i. e.*, it is not substantial or essential to man, but accidental. In opposition to the views of the followers of Flacius, who maintain that the image of God was the substantial form itself of the first man, and the very essence of the rational soul, which was entirely lost in the fall of Adam."

A distinction is made, also, in the "accidental" image of God "*understood generically and figuratively*, or *specifically and literally*." In the former sense, the resemblance of man to God is asserted "on account of a certain analogy or similarity to God." (Holl. (463): "The substance itself of the human soul, exhibits certain things that are θεία or divine, and stands related to the Divinity as to a model. For God is a spirit, immaterial, intelligent, acting with a free will, etc. These predicates can, in a certain manner, be affirmed of the human soul.") In this sense, however, man did not lose it through the Fall, and, therefore, it can be affirmed of him also after the Fall, Gen. 9: 6; James 3: 9. Only in this latter sense, is the term employed while we treat of the state of integrity. Quen (II, 17): "The image of God, specifically understood, is not to be sought for in those things which yet remain in man since the Fall, and which are truly in man unregenerate. Because the image of God, having been lost through the disobedience of the first Adam, must be restored by a new creation, through the obedience of the Second Adam." Consequently, in the topic now under discussion, we understand by the image of God "only those gifts and graces granted to man in his first creation and lost by the Fall, *i. e.*, the integrity and rectitude of all the powers concreated with the first man."

[7] Grh. (IV, 242): "In the following passages (Col. 3 and Eph. 4) the phrases '*after the image of God*,' and '*after God*' are synonymous. There is exhibited in these a description of the new man, who is called new, not by reason of a change of essence, but on account of new qualities, the knowledge of God, righteousness, and true holiness. *The image of God consists in that in respect of which man was made after God, and is renewed after the image of God;* but he is renewed in respect of the knowledge of God, righteousness, and holiness, etc., and in these particulars he is made like God, in the image of God. Therefore, the primeval image of God in man consists of these things.

[8] Br. (293): "The divine image, in the *special* acceptation of the term, implies certain accidental perfections, created in the intellect and will of the first man, conformable to the perfections

which are in God, and bestowed upon men for the purpose of directing aright, and perfecting their actions, in order that they may attain the ultimate end."

Grh. (IV, 248): "This is the description of the image of God in the first man, given in the Scriptures, namely, that it was righteousness and true holiness, by which are meant the highest rectitude, integrity, and conformity to the divine Law, of all the powers of soul and body—the highest perfection, innocence, and purity of the whole man, which his nakedness and his dwelling in Paradise prove."

[9] Br. (293): "In respect of intellect, God bestowed upon the first men, in imitation of Himself, as of a model, a certain wisdom, *i. e.*, a certain habitual enlightenment or perfection of intellect, so that they attained a high degree of knowledge in things divine, human, and natural, and that which was sufficient for their primeval state." The proof of this, according to Quen. (II, 5) appears: "(1) from Col. 3: 9, 10; (2) from the acts of Adam, which are: (*a*) an appropriate application of names, Gen. 2: 19, which was not only grammatical as to the nomenclature of the animals, but even highly logical as to the most correct definition; (*b*) his recognition of Eve, Gen. 2: 23; (*c*) prophecy, or a prediction concerning the perpetuity of the conjugal relation, Gen. 2: 24."

The nature and extent of this wisdom are more particularly defined in the following, Br. (294): "The intellect of man understood the essence and will of God, so far as it was necessary to attain this end, viz., that the intellect might prescribe the worship that should be rendered to God, or so far as was essential to right and holy living." This wisdom is described as "of such a nature that it could still be increased in the course of time, and not as so perfect and comprehensive that it could extend to the knowledge of the free decrees of God, or that it implied a perfectly accurate knowledge of all natural things."

Quen. (II, 6): "This knowledge of Adam was excellent, full, perfect, and such as no man since the Fall can acquire, either from the volume of Nature or from that of Scripture. When, therefore, the inquiry is made, whether the intellect of the apostles, after the reception of the Holy Ghost, was superior to that of Adam before the Fall—the reply is: We must distinguish between the knowledge of divine things and the mysteries of faith, and *the perfect and complete knowledge of all things natural and useful to man.* In reference to the former, we can believe that the apostles possessed greater knowledge than Adam, because, after the advent of Christ, these things were known more fully and distinctly than before.

In reference to the latter, Adam excelled all men, and therefore also the apostles, both extensively or in compass, and intensively or in mode or depth of knowledge; and that too, derived, not from probable reason or inferences, but from the proper causes of each thing, and also by the tenacity and unchangeableness of his knowledge. Hence it is evident that the knowledge of Adam was finite and *limited*, because he knew not the secret decrees of God, nor the thoughts of the heart, nor future contingencies, nor the number of the stars. This knowledge also, which was concreate with Adam, could have been *perfected* more and more, and admitted of augmentation, if you regard the perfection of the degree of knowledge, both by revelation, or a more extended knowledge of God in supernatural things, and by his own experience and observation in things natural."

Holl. (471): "The knowledge of Adam was truly excellent, and sufficient for his primeval state; but it was *not the intuitive knowledge of God.* For the clear vision of God is not given on earth, but is promised to be given in heaven. 1 Cor. 13. 12; 1 John 3: 2."

[10] Br. (294): "In regard to the will, spiritual strength was bestowed by God upon man, or an habitual inclination and prompting to love God above all things, and to do all things according to the direction of an intellect rightly illuminated; but to avoid what it judged should be avoided, and to govern the lower powers of his nature, lest they should in some way break forth into inordinate and sinful acts."

Quen. (II, 6): "The perfection of the will of the first man, therefore, consisted (1) in a natural inclination to that which is good, which altogether excluded every proximate power of erring; (2) in a free and unhindered volition of good, and the execution of that volition: and thus there was in him a holy freedom of the will, and a free holiness which excluded all sin. But his will was free in such a way that it inclined only to good, and was not prone to the choice of evil or the neglect of good; whatever occurred afterwards, happened through an unfortunate abuse of the freedom of the will." But "holiness in the first man did not introduce absolute impeccability, but only a relative freedom from sin in his will."

[11] Holl. (474): "There were in the first man the most exact harmony and wonderful agreement of all the higher and lower powers of his nature. For reason most promptly obeyed the divine law, the will reason, the sensuous appetite the will, the affections the appetite, and the members of the body the affections."

Br. (295): "For this reason it is that our first parents, in the state of integrity, knew not that they were naked, neither blushed; *i. e.*, their sensuous appetites (although an object were present which could entice them) were not influenced, even in the least degree, by any inordinate affection. Gen. 2: 25."

Holl. (474): "There is an antithesis of the Papists and Socinians, ascribing to our first parents a concreated rebellion of the sensuous appetite against the judgment of sound reason."

[12] Br. (296): "This wisdom, righteousness, and holiness of the first men so express the idea of the divine image, that it is from them only, speaking in the abstract, that man can be called the image of God."

[13] The expression, "*original righteousness*," was the one more frequently employed, in the earliest systems of divinity, to point out man's original condition. Ap. Conf. (I, 17): "Original righteousness implies not only an equable temperament of the bodily qualities, but also these gifts, viz., a more certain knowledge of God, fear of God, confidence in God, or a certain rectitude and power of attaining them. And this is proved by the Scriptures, when they say (Gen. 1: 27) that man was made in the image and likeness of God, which is nothing else than this wisdom and righteousness embodied in man, which might apprehend God, and in which God might be reflected, *i. e.*, these gifts were bestowed upon man, viz., the knowledge of God, the fear of God, confidence in God, and like blessings. Paul also (Col. 3, Eph. 4) shows that the image of God consists in the knowledge of God, righteousness, and truth."

Chmn. (Loc. Th., I, 227): "*Original righteousness* was not only the receiving, but also the rectitude and soundness, of all the powers." It consisted not only in an equable temperament of the body, but especially in the rectitude of the powers of the soul. It comprehended not only the second table of the Law, but also the first. Nor did it consist only in external actions, or the inferior powers of man. This is, in substance, all that the earliest divines say concerning *the state of integrity*. The view which has been given in the text belongs to a later period.

Concerning the expression, *original righteousness*, Calov. remarks in addition (IV, 598): "It is called *righteousness*, not as this virtue is distinguished from others (which is called *particular righteousness*), but as *general righteousness*, in the common acceptation, which, however, is here understood in a higher sense, *comprehending not only all moral, but also spiritual virtues*, not merely those which relate to the will, but those also which have respect to the intellectual

powers; for by this term is now meant, according to the use of theological writers, that universal and exceedingly delightful agreement, συμφωνια, in the first man, of mind, will, and heart, with the intellect, will, and heart of God. Nor is this term improperly used; for that original perfection of nature is called *righteousness*, both in respect of its essence, because we are indeed accustomed to call that righteous, which by its own nature is true, perfect, right, sound, and incorrupt, and also in respect of its efficiency, because it made man righteous in the sight of God, *i. e.*, innocent, acceptable, and holy. Righteousness is called *original*, because it was first of all in man, and because from the beginning he possessed it after the manner of a concreated habit; also, in order that the righteousness of man's original and first state may be distinguished from moral, imputed, and imperfect righteousness, from that which is perfected in another life, and from every other kind whatsoever; and, finally, because it must needs be transmitted to posterity by natural generation, inasmuch as in a state of innocence men would obtain this natural perfection with their origin, just as now, in a state of sin, original sin is propagated, and from that very propagation is called *original*." Calov. (IV, 597) defines *original righteousness* to be "a habit of wisdom created in the mind, and of perfect holiness and purity in the natural desires and heart, in virtue of which our first parents, by natural illumination, knew the truth, even that which was spiritual, without error and doubt, and were freely inclined, by natural propensity, to that which is good, and promptly, without any struggle of internal affections, accomplished what they wished."

[14] Many divines include these excellences in their definition of *image;* yet they make a distinction between "*the image partly* received (μερικῶς), which denotes knowledge and original righteousness, and *the image wholly received* (ὁλικῶς) which embraces all things that complete the image of God." The excellences of the first class they call "*the principal perfections, whose seat is the soul;*" those of the second class are called "*the less principal, whose seat is the body.*" The latter class Quen. (II, 7) divides into *those which are within man and those which are without him.* If these excellences are included in the definition of the *image of God*, then the following is of value in reference to the difference between *the image of God and original righteousness*, Quen. (II, 3): "The image of God and original righteousness differ as the whole and a part. The image of God includes as well the principal as the secondary conformity with God; but original righteousness is ordinarily received as embracing only the principal conformity."

[15] (*a*) Holl. (475) proves *impassibility* in the following manner: "Painful and destructive sufferings are the punishment of sin (Gen. 3: 16; Sirach 38: 15); wherefore the first man, being without sin, was free from its bitter suffering."

Quen. (II, 7) remarks on this point: "The first men in the state of innocency had a body incapable of suffering, inasmuch as it was not exposed to those things which could have injured their natural disposition and contributed to the death and corruption of the body. Such things were: a freedom from all injuries arising from pain and trouble, special protection against rains, winds, heat, diseases, etc., and other inconveniences, which now, since the Fall, are innumerable (Gen. 2: 25). Meanwhile, however, if man had remained in his integrity, physical changes would not have been wanting, such as generation, nutrition, etc., and he would have needed food and drink for his sustentation."

(*b*) *Immortality.* Quen. (II, 7): "It is proved from Gen. 2: 17; Rom. 5: 12; 6: 23."

We must distinguish (1) between the *immortality* which denotes absolute freedom from the power and act of dying (and thus God is immortal, and angels, our souls, and the bodies of the redeemed and the damned), and (2) the *immortality* which denotes a freedom from the proximate power of dying and the natural tendency to death, and, at the same time, from the act of dying, in such a manner, however, that death could happen upon a certain proposed condition; and such was man's immortality in his state of integrity. We must make a distinction between *absolute freedom from death*, which will exist in another life, and a conditional or decreed freedom, which existed in the first state of man (viz., as long as he should not sin), and which did not exclude but included the use of food and drink, and especially the eating of the tree of life, by which means our first parents were enabled, in a natural way, to perpetuate life. It is one thing *not to be able to die*, and another *to be able not to die*, and still another *not to be able not to die*. The last belongs to all sinners, the second to Adam in his state of integrity, and the first to the blessed." (II, 8.)

(*c*) *Dominion.* Holl. (475): "(*a*) God granted to the first man *dominion* over sublunary things, extending over seas and lands, but not over the stars of heaven, except as far as he converted their influence to his own advantage. (*b*) That *dominion* was not absolute and direct, but relative and useful, which denotes the inhabiting of the earth, with the use of its fruits. (*c*) *Dominion* is received either in its etymological signification *for the right and power of ruling*, or *formally for actual ruling*. In the former sense, it is the *less*

principal part of the image of God; in the latter it was an *external accident*, or *addition, to that image.*"

Br. (297) cites some more corporeal excellences, viz.: "But God bestowed upon man in respect of his body also a certain image of Himself, inasmuch as not only the perfections of the soul expressed themselves through the external acts of the body, but, in addition, the members themselves, of the organic body, have a certain analogy to the divine attributes, viz.: the countenance, erect towards heaven, furnishes a semblance of the divine majesty; but particularly the immortal body, or that which could endure forever and remain free from every corruption, bears, according to the intention of God, a resemblance to the divine immortality." Yet Baier perceives that not all these excellences were lost by the Fall, and reckons them in part, therefore, as belonging to the *image of God* generically received.

[16] Therefore the original condition of man is called a most happy one. Quen. (II, 2): "The happiness of it appeared (1) from the condition of the soul, which was wise and holy; (2) from the condition of the body, which was beautiful, not susceptible of suffering, and immortal; (3) from the condition of life, which was happy and blessed; (4) from the condition of his habitation, which was most pleasant, truly a garden of pleasure, called Paradise."

Grh. (IV, 247): "Hence it happened that man, joyful, blessed, and contented, delighted in God, his Creator, there being in him neither fear, nor terror, nor sadness."

[17] Br. (296): "Therefore also this divine image was a natural endowment, or it belonged naturally to man, so that he might rightly perform his connatural acts; since, in the absence of this, his nature would not have been pure, but impure."

Holl. (477): "The image of God did not, indeed, constitute the nature of the first man, after the manner of an essential part; nor did it emanate from his nature, *per se* and necessarily, as if properly inseparable from it: yet it was natural to the first man, because by creation it began to exist with his very nature, and thus both belonged to him and was deeply impressed in him, and also thoroughly perfected his nature in the state of integrity, so that he could attain his end; it could be propagated, also, to posterity by natural generation."

The different significations in which the word *natural* is used are, according to Quen. (II, 9), the following: "Anything is said to be *natural* (1) by constitution (*constitutivè*), viz., that which constitutes a nature itself, and is either the nature itself, or an essen-

tial part of it, as soul and body; (2) by sequence (*consecutive*), viz., that which follows nature, and flows essentially from its form, as the faculties of the soul, teachableness, etc.; (3) subjectively (*subjective*), viz., that which adheres most closely to nature as a natural property; (4) by way of perfecting (*perfective*), viz., that which perfects and adorns it internally; (5) by way of transfer (*transitive*), viz., that which is propagated naturally along with the nature to others. When we say that primeval righteousness was natural or connatural to Adam, we do not understand the word *natural* in the *first or second sense, but only in the third, fourth, and fifth*, viz., *on account of a natural inhesion, perfection, and propagation.*"

Original Righteousness is, therefore, not a supernatural gift, for "that is supernatural which does not belong to nature from its origin, but by special grace is superadded by God to supply its imperfection." If original righteousness, then, were said to be a superadded gift, that would conflict with Gen. 1: 31.

Holl. (478): "Antithesis of the Papists, who maintain that the image of God was a supernatural gift superadded to man for the purpose of supplementing his connatural imperfection, as a wreath or garment adorns a man externally, and as the rein restrains the horse. But as the nature of man and of the horse remains incorrupt when the garment and the rein are removed, thus they suppose that the nature of man was not corrupted by the Fall, the image of God having been removed, but that it remained upright."

Together with this assertion is also rejected the other concerning the *status purorum naturalium.* (See Note 2.)

[18] On this point the Dogmaticians are not agreed. Grh., Cal., Quen., and others call the gracious indwelling of the Trinity, etc., a supernatural gift; others, as Holl., understand this also as a natural gift. Holl. (484): "There are, indeed, some theologians of great reputation who think that the grace of God and the indwelling of the most Holy Trinity were supernatural to the first man. Yet, if we consider (1) that the nature of the first man never was nor ever could be upright without the indwelling and sanctification of the Holy Spirit, and (2) that original sin, which came into the place of the divine image after the fall of Adam, introduced into fallen man not only corporeal but also spiritual death (which consists in the deprivation of the mystical union of the soul with God), we agree with those authors who decide that divine grace and the indwelling of the most Holy Trinity were not supernatural, but natural, to the first man."

On the other hand, Holl. (ib.) points out as supernatural gifts "extraordinary revelation and that which is connected with it (viz., positive law and supernatural strength to fulfil it)."

CHAPTER II.

Of the State of Corruption.

"The State of Corruption is that condition into which man voluntarily precipitated himself by his own departure from the chief good, thus becoming both wicked and miserable." Quen. (II, 48).

THIS state was brought about by sin, and we have, therefore, here to treat: (1) Of sin in general. (2) Of the particular sin by which this state was brought about, as well as of the state itself. (3) Of the actual sins proceeding from it; and finally, (4) Of the powers yet remaining in man after the Fall, or, of the question to what extent man yet possesses freedom of the will.

§ 25. *Of Sin in General.*

According to 1 John 3: 4, sin is every deviation from a law of God (Holl., 488: "Sin is a deviation from the divine Law"), whether that law be written in our hearts, or be communicated externally by positive precept. [1] It can proceed only from a being endowed with reason and free will. But from this general conception of sin it does not, therefore, necessarily follow, that every such act as may be a deviation from the Law of God must be performed with the consciousness and purpose that such a deviation from the Law of God shall take place. [2] God is in no sense the author of sin; He did not create sin in man, since of all that was created, it is said that it was good (Gen. 1: 31): neither did He decree that at any particular time man should become a sinner. He has neither urged man on to that which is sinful (James 1: 13), nor did He approve of sin when it entered. Much rather does He hate it at all times (Ps. 5: 5; Zach. 8: 17; 1 John 2: 16.)[3] The origin of sin lies, therefore, only in the will of the creature who, of

his own accord, departed from God, and acted in opposition to the divine command. [4] And here Satan made the beginning, and then led man also astray to sin. [5]

The immediate consequence of sin is that the sinner, who broke the commandment which he was bound to obey, incurred guilt which deserves punishment. HOLL. (502): "The consequence of sin is responsibility for guilt and liability to punishment." [6] The punishment is partly temporal, partly eternal.

[1] BR. (388 sq.): "By the Law is to be understood the eternal and immutable wisdom and decision of God concerning those things which belong or do not belong to a rational creature, as such, united with His will, that they may or may not be done."

[2] HOLL. (497): "A sinner is a rational creature, endowed with a free will, and subject to the divine Law, who departs from it, by doing what it forbids, and neglecting what it enjoins." (501): "That which is voluntary (το ἑκούσιον), does not enter into the definition of sin generically considered. Sin is called *voluntary*, either *subjectively*, as far as it inheres in the will, or *effectively*, according as it proceeds from a deliberate volition. Not every sin is voluntary in the latter mode. Sin is called voluntary, either *formally*, which is committed by one's own volition, or *virtually*, which was voluntary in the root and stock of the human race, from which it has been propagated to posterity, whose will would have been the same as that in Adam, had they lived at the same time with him" [*i. e.*, sin may be voluntary, when not volitionary]

[3] MEL. (Loc. Th., 56): "God is not the cause of sin, nor is sin a thing contrived or ordained by Him, but it is a horrible destruction of the divine work and order."

CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 146): "The explanation also must be noted, of what is intended when it is said that God is not the cause of sin, viz., that He neither desires or approves of sin, neither does He influence the will to sin. For some understand that He is not the author of sin in such a sense, as in the beginning to create it, or to have it in Himself, or to produce it through Himself, but that men sin nevertheless by the will of God, and that God produces sins not only permissively, but also efficiently, in men and by men; yet He is not, in their view, therefore to be called the author of sin. Therefore is added, as if for the sake of explanation: 'author and cause of sin.'"

QUEN. (II, 49): "God is in no manner the efficient cause of sin. Neither in part nor in whole, neither directly nor indirectly,

neither accidentally nor *per se*, whether in the form of Adam's transgression or in that of any other sin, is God or can He be called, the cause or author of sin. God is not the cause of sin, (1) physically and *per se*, because thus the evil or sin has no cause; (2) not morally, by commanding, persuading, or approving, because He does not desire sin, but hates it; nor (3) by way of accident, because nothing can happen to God either by chance or fortuitously. This conflicts with the divine wisdom, prescience, goodness, holiness, and independence, as is proved from Ps. 5: 5; 45: 7; Is. 65: 12; Zach. 8: 17; 1 John 1: 5; James 1: 13, 17."

How God stands related to sin was shown in the discussion on the doctrine of concurrence.

[4] QUEN. (II, 49): "Whatever want of conformity to Law (ἀνομία) there ever is in a rational agent must be ascribed to the free will of the creature itself, as being spontaneously deficient in acting. Ps. 5: 5; Hos. 13: 9; Matt. 23: 37. A rational agent, or creature, which possesses reason, and the power of knowing those things which the Law given either commands or forbids, is properly said to be the cause of sin, viz., the will of the devil and of man. But this rational agent ought to be viewed, not in respect of any real influence, but in respect of a deficiency; for sin has rather a deficient than an efficient cause." *

[5] CONF. AUG. (19): "Concerning the cause of sin, they teach that, although God creates and preserves nature, yet the cause of sin is the will of the wicked, namely, the devil and impious men, which without the assistance of God turns itself away from God."

CHMN. (Loc. Th., I, 148): "The devil is the first author of sin: (1) because by his own free will he himself turned away from God; (2) because he is the cause of sin in the human race in this way, that he deceived and seduced Eve in the state of integrity, so that she departed from God."

[6] HOLL. (502): "Guilt is a moral foulness or deformity, resulting from an act inconsistent with the Law, and unworthy of a rational creature, and inhering in the sinner as a shameful stain. *Responsibility for guilt* (*reatus culpæ*) is an obligation, by which man, on account of an act inconsistent with the moral Law, is held, as if bound, under sin and its blemish, so that in consequence of this act, the sinner is regarded and pronounced detestable."

"The *divine punishment* is a grievous evil by which God, the offended Judge, punishes the guilt before incurred and not yet forgiven, so as to display His justice and majesty, and vindicate from contempt the authority of the Law. *Liability to punishment*

* Cf. Chap. IV, Note 13.

(*reatus pœnæ*), is an obligation by which the sinner is held bound, by God, the offended Judge, to endure the punishment of the unforgiven guilt. Guilt differs from punishment. The former precedes, the latter follows. Guilt deserves punishment; punishment is due to guilt, and is, as it were, its wages. Rom. 6: 23. Guilt proceeds from the will; the will of the sinner revolts from punishment. The sinner contracts guilt by his acts; he endures punishment by suffering."

§ 26. *Man's First Transgression, and the State thereby produced, viz., Original Sin.*

It was the first of the human family who committed the first sin. These, seduced by Satan under the form of a serpent, of their own free will, transgressed the prohibition of God (Gen. 2: 16, 17) to eat of the tree of knowledge. [1] Holl. (507): "The first sin of men is the transgression of the Law of Paradise, by which our first parents, having been persuaded by the devil, and having abused the freedom of the will, violated the divine prohibition concerning the not eating the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and brought down upon themselves and their posterity, the divine image having been lost, a great guilt, and the liability to temporal and eternal punishment." [2] In consequence of this transgression, our first parents burdened themselves with a guilt which deserved punishment; therefore also God immediately inflicted upon them (Gen. 2: 17) the punishment threatened in the event of transgression. [3] The consequence of their sin then was, that their whole relation to God, and their corporeal, spiritual, and moral state, were changed. The state of righteousness, above described, ceased to exist, and, in its place, was introduced a state of moral depravity, [4] which must therefore be transmitted to all their posterity, since they who are begotten after the common course of nature cannot be introduced into a different state from that of their parents at the time when they beget them; so that the first sin, in its results, affects not only our first parents, but also all their posterity. [5] Since, therefore, they incurred the divine wrath by reason of sin, so also are all mankind, descended from them, in a similar state; and that, too, for two reasons: first, because the state of depravity, which they have derived from their first

parents, renders its subjects the objects of God's wrath; [6] secondly, because all the descendants of Adam are represented and contained in him, as the representative of the human family—therefore, that which was done by Adam can be regarded as the act of all, the consequences of which also must be borne by all, so that Adam's sin also is imputed to his posterity, *i. e.*, it is regarded as their own sin, because they are all represented in Adam. [7] The state of depravity which followed Adam's transgression, and which now belongs to our first parents, as well as to all their posterity, is designated by the expression *Original Sin.* [8] Holl. (518): "*Original Sin is the thorough corruption of human nature, which, by the Fall of our first parents, is deprived of original rightcousness, and is prone to every evil.*" [9] According to its single parts, it is described, (1) as the lack of the Original Righteousness, which ought to exist in man; (2) as carnal concupiscence, or inclination to evil. [10] In the place of original holiness and purity, there came directly the opposite, a state thoroughly sinful and desirous of that which is evil, which in itself is sin, so that, in consequence of this constant propensity to evil, and not originally on account of actual transgressions proceeding from it, man is an object of the divine displeasure. [11] This depraved state, then, is not only the foundation and fountain of all actual transgressions, but also has, as its consequence, the wrath of God and temporal and eternal punishment. [12]

Concerning this state, finally, it must be asserted, that it is natural to us in that sense in which this is said of original righteousness in the state of integrity. Were this state different, man would not cease to be man, and hence it does not constitute man's essence, but is connected with the essence, or the nature of man as he is now born, and that too in the most intimate and inseparable manner; and as no man is now born, except in that depraved state, so also this state can never be lost by man, as long as he lives on the earth. Man, when he becomes a partaker of the Holy Ghost, can indeed refuse obedience to his evil propensity; and, when redemption through Christ is apprehended by faith, he is also freed from the consequences of sin, *i. e.*, the wrath of God and punishment; but yet the evil inclination to sin always remains in him. All

this is expressed in the adjuncts of *original sin*, which QUEN. thus enumerates (II, 62):

1. *Natural Inherence*, Heb. 12: 1; Rom. 7: 21, which, therefore, is not a substance, but an accident. [13]

2. *Natural transmissibility*, Gen. 5: 3; Job 14: 4; Ps. 51: 6; John 3: 6; Eph. 2: 3. [14]

3. *Duration* (a tenacity or obstinate inherence during life, Rom. 7: 17; Heb. 12: 1). [15]

[1] QUEN. (II, 51): "The first sin in the human race is the voluntary apostasy of our first parents from God their Creator, by which, having been seduced by the devil, they transgressed, of their own accord, both the general divine and internal law impressed upon their mind, and the particular external prohibition concerning the not eating of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Concerning the existence of this sin, the history contained in Gen. 3, does not permit us to doubt. By Paul it is called the transgression of *Adam*, Rom. 5: 14, because he transgressed the divine precept by eating of the forbidden fruit. The Fall is ascribed to Adam by way of eminence, both because he was the head of the woman, and also because he was the beginning and root of the human race, from whom, as the source, sin descended to posterity. For a like reason it is called a transgression by *one*, Rom. 5: 15, 17, and 18, where by one man the Apostle understands Adam particularly, so, however, as not entirely to exclude Eve." [HUTT. (312): "It is noteworthy that the Apostle does not say 'of (*ex*) one man,' but 'by (*per*) one man,' thus implying that the principal efficient cause was Satan."] Hence arise the following definitions:

QUEN. (II, 51): (*a*) "*The external first and principal* (but remote) *cause of this sin is Satan*, acting here, not by internal impulse, nor by external violence (for each is repugnant to the integrity of the state in which man was originally created), but by mere external moral suasion. John 8: 44; 2 Cor. 11: 3; Rev. 12: 9.

(*b*) "The *instrumental cause* is a true and natural serpent, but possessed by the devil, Gen. 3: 1, 14 (not a mere serpent, but one possessed by the devil, as is manifest from the conversation and discourse with Eve, and also from the punishment, Gen. 3: 15. For the bruising of the serpent's head by the seed of the woman, which was to follow, has respect, not to a natural, but to the infernal serpent)."

(*c*) "*The internal and directly efficient cause* is the intellect and

will of the first man, not from any internal defect therein, which could not exist in an unfallen state, but by way of accident, in consequence of his wandering and departure from God, through seduction from without. (Man did not fall in consequence of any absence or denial of any special grace, nor from the presence of any internal languor and natural defect, but through the accidental abuse of his liberty, while his will yielded to the external persuasion and seduction of the devil, and interrupted the gracious influence of God.)"

(*d*) The *order* and *mode* of the *seduction* are the following: HOLL. (511): "Eve was first and immediately seduced by the devil (HOLL. (505): Eve sinned first, not because she was more feeble in intellect than Adam, but because she was more yielding in will), while Adam was drawn mediately, and by the persuasion of the woman, into the same sin, and thus the fall of Adam is referred also to the devil, as the first author of sin." In reference to the passage, 1 Tim. 2: 14, QUEN. remarks (II, 53): "These words are not to be understood of the seduction simply, but of the mode and order of the seduction; seduction is either external, through the address of the serpent from without, or internal, through the suggestion of Satan from within. In the former sense Eve only, and not Adam, was seduced."

(*e*) The *particular sinful acts* which the transgression involves are: HOLL. (510): "(*a*) on the part of the intellect, a want of faith (*incredulitas*), (Eve hesitated between the Word of God, Gen. 2: 17, and the word of the devil, Gen. 3: 4); (*b*) on the part of the will, selfishness and pride, Gen. 3: 5; (*c*) on the part of the sensuous appetite, an inordinate desire for the forbidden fruit, Gen. 3: 6, from which came forth the external act forbidden by the law of Paradise."

[2] HOLL. (509): "Our first parents, in their Fall, *immediately* violated the positive law given in Paradise, forbidding to eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowlege of good and evil; *mediately* and really by their disobedience they broke through the restraints of the entire moral Law. The intention of the positive Law was a trial or test of obedience, which, as due to God, the whole moral Law demands. But he who fears not to transgress one precept of the Law, will not blush to violate the remainder, since they have the same author and the same obligatory force."

[3] HOLL. (512, 513): "The consequences of Adam's fall are guilt and punishment. Punishment, like an inseparable companion, follows closely upon guilt. God, in His holiness, has threatened death to man, if he transgresses the Law which was given

him. Gen. 2: 17. By death was meant spiritual, corporeal, and eternal death. *Spiritual death*, the root of all evil, is the immediate consequence of the first sin. For, as soon as man turned his heart away from the divine Law, he deprived himself of spiritual union with God, who is the life of the soul, and thus, having been deserted by God, he died spiritually. This spiritual death brought with it the loss of the divine image, the entire corruption of the whole human nature, and the loss of free will in spiritual things. *The death of the body* follows spiritual death, or the death of the soul, including all the diseases and miseries by which man is surrounded from without. Whither also are to be referred the severe and burdensome labor which must be constantly endured by the man, Gen. 3: 17, and the painful throes of parturition in the woman, Gen. 3: 16. *Although our first parents did not suffer the death of the body as soon as they fell, nevertheless from that time they became subject to death, since this is the wages of sin*, Rom. 6: 23. *Eternal death* is a perpetual exclusion from the beatific enjoyment of God, united with constant and most excruciating torments, which, by the force of the threatening annexed to the divine Law, Adam and all his posterity must have suffered, unless Jesus Christ, the Redeemer of the human race and the Restorer of the lost image of God, had interposed."

[4] Chmn. (Loc. Th., I, 227): "For this, too, is the misery of Original Sin, that not only the image itself of God was lost, but also the knowledge of God was nearly extinguished." Kg. (80): "The effects of the first-sin, *in respect of our first parents*, are: the total loss of the divine image, some fragments, indeed, or vestiges remaining; the most profound depravity of the whole nature; exposure to punishment expressed in the penalty annexed to the law of Paradise; the griefs and miseries of this life; and finally death itself."

[5] Grh. (IV, 315): "We must not regard the sin of our first parents and its consequences, as if they had respect only to them, and did not in any way affect us; because afterwards Adam begat a son, in his own image and likeness, Gen. 5: 3. As he was, such also did he beget his children, despoiled of the image of God, destitute of original righteousness, subject to sin, to the wrath of God, to death and damnation. Adam lived, and we all lived in him. Adam perished, and we all perished in him. As when parents lose the possession of a feudal benefit, the male children also lose it, because the parents received it not only for themselves, but also for their children; so also our first parents, having been created in the image of God, had received those gifts which

were bestowed by the goodness of God, like a deposit, to be faithfully guarded for themselves and their posterity; thus also, by sinning, they lost them, not only for themselves, but for all their posterity."

Holl. (523): "Our first parents are the proximate cause of this original blemish, from whose impure nature the original stain has flowed into our hearts. Everything follows the seeds of its own nature. No black crow ever produces a white dove, nor ferocious lion a gentle lamb; and no man polluted with inborn sin ever begets a holy child."

[6] Br. (403) says, referring to Rom. 5: 12: "Therefore we must say that all sinned in one, inasmuch as, he having sinned, it came to pass that all who should be naturally descended from him would necessarily be born with sin, and thus every one on account of his own sin would become, in his very birth, liable to death, see Eph. 2: 3; so that, when all men are said to be children of wrath, the cause of this guilt is taken for granted, namely, because all by nature are sinners. For to be a son of wrath is the same as to be liable to divine wrath, and worthy of punishment, on account of the violation of the Law, to be inflicted by God, the vindicator of the Law. Therefore, one could not be by nature a child of wrath, unless he were polluted by sin in his own nature or by the corruption of his nature." But Br. also adds (414): "It is not necessary, neither, perhaps, is it wise, that we should pryingly inquire how God could so impute the sin of our first parents to their posterity, not yet in existence, that they should for this reason necessarily be born destitute of original righteousness, and sinners. For it is enough that the fact (τὸ ὅτι) is revealed, although the explanation of it (τὸ πῶς) be unknown."

Grh. (IV, 316): "Therefore that sin (of Adam) is not in all respects foreign to us, because Adam did not sin as a private man, but as the head of the whole human race; and as human nature was communicated through him, so also natural corruption was similarly propagated" . . . (327): "Because, therefore, all who are born in the natural and common course of generation are under sin, so also all are by nature children of wrath, liable to death and damnation; for it is not possible that God should not be angry at sin."

[7] Holl. (513): "*The first sin of Adam, since he is regarded as the common parent, head, root, and representative of the whole race, is truly and justly imputed by God, for guilt and punishment, to all his posterity.*" By the sin that is imputed to us is understood (Quen., II, 111): "That disobedience by which the first parents of the

human race turned themselves away from God," etc. Therefore, also, it is said (II, 53): "Not only our first parents were the subject of the first sin, but also all their posterity to be propagated by natural generation. For Adam and Eve were substitutes for the whole human race, inasmuch as they ought to be regarded as both the *natural* (*i. e.*, seminal) and also the *moral* source of the human race, namely, of the entire progeny in nature and grace. Hence the apostle properly says, Rom. 5: 12, ἐφ' ᾧ, *in whom*, viz., in the first man, all sinned, or *in that*, because that, one sinned, all sinned, viz., in Adam, who represented the persons of all his posterity; and v. 19, 'by one man's disobedience many were made sinners.' That is to say, we have been made sinners through the sin of Adam, not by mere interpretation, nor even by limitation, but by the imputation of real guilt, and the propagation of natural depravity, and the participation of an actual crime. And thus the proximate cause why, when the first man sinned, all his posterity sinned, is the existence of the whole human species in the person of our first parent, Rom. 5: 12. For our first parents were then considered not only as the first individuals of the human race, but also as the true root, stock, and source of the whole human race, which in them could both stand and fall. Hence we are said to have been in the loins of our first parents." Id. (II, 111): "The first sin is considered—I. With regard to Adam himself, who by one transgression involved all his posterity in crime, in guilt, in punishment; in so far, namely, as his will was the interpreter of the wills of all of them who, as the Scriptures say, were in his loins, whose own act the sin interpretatively is, so that they are born with the absence of the perfection that should exist. The will, I say, of Adam, as the source and root of the human race, was considered as ours, not formally, but interpretatively. For the first man had the wills of all his posterity gathered up, as it were, in his own will; whence, for himself and all his posterity, he declared his will and that of his posterity against the Law that had been given. II. With regard to God, as the Judge who, according to His mighty power, justly punishes the crime against the divine majesty also in the posterity, namely, those fallen in Adam, by the want, in so far, of original righteousness, and thus most justly imputes to them the sin of Adam unto condemnation." Quen., however, distinguishes between immediate and mediate imputation (II, 114): "The first Adamitic sin is immediately imputed to us so far as we existed already in Adam. But the sin of Adam is mediately imputed to us, viz., as original sin is mediately inherent in us, so far as we are regarded in our own persons and individually. For

no one is considered as a sinner by God and to no one is that first act imputed, except to him who descends, contaminated with original sin, from that same Adam."

The word *to impute*, QUEN. explains thus (II, 111): "The word imputation in this place is received not physically, for implanting or inserting, but relatively, for estimating. In the Hebrew language it is explained by חָשַׁב, in the Greek by λογίζεσθαι, and in the German by *zurechnen;* as if you would say, in computing, that you set something over to some one, or in counting or calculating, that you assign something." Imputation is proved from Rom. 5: 12, 14, 19. The common explanation of the first passage is: "in whom, viz., Adam, all have sinned." But QUEN. remarks (II, 58) that "it makes little difference whether you translate ἐφ' ᾧ, *in whom*, or *on which account*. For, if it is retained as causal, it confirms our view. For thus we argue: They who die, die because they have sinned. But all mankind die, even infants and those not yet born. Therefore, they die because they have sinned." "But infants and those not yet born, die either on account of some fault (*delictum*) of their own or of an actual transgression; therefore, on account of the actual transgression of another, *scil.*, of Adam, who tainted them with his own stain. But if the other signification be received, *i. e.*, (*in quo*) relatively in Adam, as root, fountain, cause, head, it is again proved that Adam's sin is imputed to all." In reference to Rom. 5: 19, QUEN. remarks (II, 113): "As we are made righteous by the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, so were we made unrighteous by the disobedience of Adam."

In order to express himself with entire accuracy, QUEN. remarks, in addition (II, 53), that the phrase, "the fall of Adam," is taken in different senses. The one sense is, "Specifically a transgression in relation to the forbidden tree," and therefore it is, "Formally considered, the sin of the individual Adam;" in this case we say, "The Fall becomes ours by imputation only." The other sense is, "That also which flowed from this transgression, viz., the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of the whole nature;" and then we must say, "It passes over to posterity, not only by imputation, but also by natural generation." We remark, in addition, that the doctrine of the imputation of the guilt and punishment of our first parents was fully developed only by the later Theologians, from about the time of CALOVIUS, but an intimation of it appears in the FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., I, 9): "That fault or liability, whereby it comes to pass that we all, because of the disobedience of Adam and Eve, are under God's abhorrence and are by nature children of wrath."

[8] The Scholastics distinguished "original sin originating," from "original sin originated." QUEN. (II, 115): "Active, or *originating* original sin, is that vicious act which our first parents committed, by transgressing the paradisaic Law, which act, indeed, has not passed over to their posterity, nor is it found in them, except by imputation only. However, it gave origin to the deep corruption of man, which is called passive or *originated* original sin, which is a vicious *habit*, contracted by Adam through that actual transgression of the divine Law, and propagated to his posterity." The word is here used in the latter sense.

HOLL. (518): "In *ecclesiastical* phraseology, not *biblical*, this sin, derived from the fall of Adam, is called original, and indeed, not in respect of the origin of the world or of man, but (1) because derived from Adam, the root and beginning of the human race; (2) because it is connected with the origin of the descendants of Adam; (3) because it is the origin and fountain of actual transgressions."

"In the language of Scripture, this connate depravity is called: (1) *indwelling sin*, Rom. 7: 17, because after the Fall it fixed its seat firmly in man, nor departs from him until the habitation of soul and body is dissolved; (2) *besetting sin*, because it surrounds us on all sides, like a long garment impeding a runner, Heb. 12: 1; (3) *a law in the members*, Rom. 7: 23, since, as a law rules and governs an agent, thus original sin directs the members of the body to the perpetration of wicked deeds; (4) *an evil lying near*, Rom. 7: 21, because like a chain it clings to a man who wishes to do good."

[9] More extended definitions. HOLL. (518): "Original Sin is a want of original righteousness, connected with a depraved inclination, corrupting in the most inward parts the whole human nature, derived from the fall of our first parents, and propagated to all men by natural generation, rendering them indisposed to spiritual good, but inclined to evil, and making them the objects of divine wrath, and eternal condemnation."

QUEN. (II, 52): "Original Sin is a want of original righteousness, derived from the sin of Adam and propagated to all men who are begotten in the ordinary mode of generation, including the dreadful corruption and depravity of human nature and all its powers, excluding all from the grace of God and eternal life, and subjecting them to temporal and eternal punishments, unless they be born again of water and the Spirit, or obtain the remission of their sins through Christ."

The proofs of the existence of Original Sin are drawn from Gen. 6: 5; 8: 21; Job 14: 4; Ps. 14: 2, 3; 58: 3; Isaiah 48: 8; John 3:

5, 6; Eph. 2: 3. Especially from Ps. 51: 5; Rom. 5: 12–14; Gen. 5: 3. Chmn. (Loc. Th., I, 230) thus comments on the important passage, Rom. 5: 12: "(1) The efficient cause of Original Sin is shown to be the first man. (2) The subject affected by Original Sin is pointed out, *i. e.*, that it not only adhered in Adam, but has passed into the world, *i. e.*, into all men who come into the world. (3) The punishment is described, which is not only the death of the body, but the reign of death and the sentence of condemnation. . . . (4) Lest the guilt should be understood only as for the sin of another, without any personal fault, Paul affirms that the whole world is guilty, both in consequence of the one sin of the first man, and because all have sinned, *i. e.*, have been constituted sinners. (5) He indicates what kind of sin it was, when he says that even they have original sin who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression. (6) He describes the manner in which original sin is propagated—he says, by one man."

[Grh., IV, 322: "The chief arguments of the Pelagians are: 1. Ez. 18: 20, '*The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father.*' Answer: The passage treats not of original, but of actual sins, whose penalty the son does not bear, if he desist from the sins of the guilty parent, and be converted. We invert the argument. Infants are punished by disease and death; therefore, they have sin of their own, because of which they are punished, viz., original sin propagated in them by their parents, which is no longer foreign to them, but transmitted to them, by the contagion of propagation. 2. Ps. 106: 38, *Infants are pronounced innocent.* John 4: 11; Rom. 9: 11. Answer. This is to be understood relatively with respect to actual sins, and not with respect to original sin. 3. Rom. 4: 15: '*Where there is no law, there is no transgression.*' Answer: Infants are both without the Law, *i. e.*, they are ignorant of the Law, Rom. 2: 12, and yet are not without Law, *i. e.*, they are not free from the accusation whereby the Law reproves and condemns all lawlessness. 4. '*If there be Original Sin, sin must be attributed to God forming infants in the womb; therefore, marriage is to be condemned.*' Answer: The fault in a nature must be discriminated from the kindness of God in forming the nature. Both nature and the fault or defect of the nature are propagated: of which, the former is good; the latter, evil. 5. *If the sins of godly parents are forgiven in baptism, how then do they propagate sin to their children?* Answer: Carnal generation is not according to grace, but according to nature. Augustine: 'In begetting, he does not give that whence one is regenerated, but whence one is generated.' 'That which is born of flesh is flesh.' Do you ask how an unrighteous man is

born of a righteous, when you see that one could not be righteous, unless he were regenerate? A grain of wheat, though freed from chaff, produces grains with chaff. Circumcised Israelites beget uncircumcised children."]

[10] QUEN. (II, 59): "In form, it is an habitual want of original righteousness, Ps. 14: 3; 53: 3; Rom. 3: 10, 11, 12, 23, united with a contrary form, *i. e.*, the most complete corruption of the whole nature, Rom. 7: 17, 20, 21; Heb. 12: 1." See Symbolical Books, and especially Ap. Conf., II, 26; Form. Conc., I, 11.

In reference to the former (viz., *the lack of original righteousness*), BR. (404) remarks: "Here belongs that death, or the want of spiritual life, and of all the active powers which are required for the exercise of vital acts in conformity with the divine Law. And this death is ascribed to men, because they are by nature children of wrath, Eph. 2: 1, 5; Col. 2: 13. For, as original righteousness had inhered in the faculties of the soul of the first men, and had, as it were, animated and prepared them to live a life of godliness, and to elicit and exercise among themselves actions and motions spiritually good; so, this primeval righteousness having been lost, a man is like a dead body which has been deprived, by the separation of the soul from the body, of all power to call forth in itself and to exercise vital acts and motions, because he is destitute of strength for the performance of spiritual actions and motions."

In reference to the latter (viz., concupiscence), BR. (404): "For the same carnal man who, in consequence of the want of spiritual life, is like one dead, in another respect is said to be living and very active, but it is a life alien from the life of God, Eph. 4: 18; 2: 3. The faculties of the soul are, indeed, essentially vital faculties; and, when they are deprived of original righteousness, although they lack the powers necessary to conduct the life in a manner agreeable to God, nevertheless those powers are not lost or destroyed, as far as there is in them vitality and strength to call forth vital acts and motions. Therefore, they pursue another course of life, manifestly different from the former." Concupiscence is, therefore, predicated along with the want of original righteousness; and the following position is taken as opposed to the Papists: QUEN. (II, 135): "Original Sin, formally considered, consists not in a mere want of rectitude which should exist, or a want of concreated righteousness, but also in a state of illegality, or an approach, contrary to the divine Law, to a forbidden object; which, in one word, is called a depraved concupiscence." "Original Sin is, therefore, a depravity *negative* and *positive: negative*, without the good which should exist; *positive*, desirous of the evil

which should not exist, *i. e.*, concupiscence itself." The *positive depravity* is thus more particularly defined. QUEN. (II, 136): "Original Sin is called a positive depravity, not accurately and according to philosophical abstraction, according to which every positive entity is a good created by God, but according to the latitude used by theologians, and that (1) *denominatively*, as far as it includes a subjective positive act; (2) *formally*, as far as, besides the act in which the privation is inherent, and besides the want of that original righteousness which ought to exist, it involves also an inclination, and a wickedness directly opposite to original righteousness."

The particular parts of Original Sin are then more specifically thus described by BR. (406–408): "In *respect of the intellect*, Original Sin implies a total want of spiritual light, so that it cannot know God aright, nor perfectly prescribe in what way He should be worshiped, nor embrace with a firm assent the things which have been divinely revealed; at the same time, also, there is a proneness of the intellect to form rash and false judgments concerning spiritual things; even also in those things which lie open to the light of nature, there is a certain impotency in the knowledge of God and the government of life. In *respect of the will*, Original Sin consists in a want of original holiness, or of the ability to love God above all things, to perform what the intellect has dictated aright, and to restrain the appetite in a proper manner; also, on the contrary, in that the will is inclined to sinful acts. In *respect of the sensuous appetite*, there is a want of the obedience that is due to the higher faculties, and a rushing, as if by some impulse, contrary to them, into those things which are agreeable to the senses, although prohibited by the divine Law; the decision of reason either not having been waited for, or having been rejected."

[11] CONF. AUG. II. "They teach that, since the fall of Adam, all men who are begotten in the natural way are born with sin (*i. e.*) without the fear of God, or faith in God, and with concupiscence; and that this disease, or original fault, *is truly sin*, condemning and causing now, also, eternal death to those who are not born again by Baptism and the Holy Spirit." See AP. CONF. II, 38, 41. FORM. CONC., *Sol. Decl.* I, 6. "This evil Dr. Luther was accustomed sometimes to call the sin of our nature or person; by which he meant that, although a man should not think, speak, or do any evil (which, indeed, since the fall of our first parents, is impossible for human nature, in this life), nevertheless, the nature and person of man are sinful (*i. e.*) that they are wholly and completely infected, poisoned, and corrupted before God, by original sin, in their

very inmost parts, and the most profound recesses of the heart; and in consequence of this corruption and fall of our first parents, the nature and person of man are accused and condemned by the Law of God, so that we are by nature the children of wrath, the slaves of death and damnation, unless we be liberated from these evils, and be preserved through the benefits which flow from the merits of Christ."

Quen. (II, 60): "This concupiscence, denoting the propensity to evil which is implanted in the depraved nature, even as it remains in the regenerate, is truly sin, because the definition of sin suits it. Therefore Paul, Rom. 7, calls it sin fourteen times, not by metonymy, that it is only the punishment of the first sin, and the cause of subsequent actual transgression, as the Papists teach, but *properly and formally*, because it is truly sin, whence also the Apostle names it the law of sin warring against the law of the mind, an evil, a sinning sin."

[12] Br. (420): "The consequences of Original Sin are various evils: *In respect of the soul*, a want of freedom of the will in spiritual things, and an infirmity of the will in things natural; actual transgressions, multiplied both in kind and number; a want of grace, and, on the contrary, the anger of God. *In respect of the body*, diseases and other troubles, with temporal death; finally, also, eternal death or damnation." It having been urged that Original Sin in itself is not an adequate cause of eternal death, Cal. (XII, 229, sqq.) answers: "That not all infected with Original Sin are condemned, is due not to the fact that original sin is not of itself an adequate or sufficient cause of condemnation, but that by faith some obtain forgiveness, as of actual, so also of Original Sin." The passage John 3: 18 being cited to show that unbelief is the only damning sin, he answers: "Unbelief condemns *formally;* but sins condemn *materially*. Unbelief is the cause of our not being freed from the condemnation, from which by faith we can be freed. * * Luther's marginal gloss on John 15: 22 does not teach the contrary. For he says that Original Sin has not been blotted out except by Christ's acquiring for it expiation through His merit; aye, he adds that original sin even now condemns those who do not believe." Cf. Gerhard VIII, 26 sqq. Quen. II, 62: "Original Sin is in itself, and of its own nature, deserving of divine wrath and eternal death, although in fact accidentally, viz., through and because of Christ's merit, apprehended by faith, it does not condemn the regenerate. That is: In itself, it is always a damnable sin, although in the regenerate, it has lost, because of Christ's merit, the power to damn, Rom. 8: 1. Here the Apostle does not say that there is

nothing *damnable* in the regenerate, or those who are in Christ Jesus, but that there is no κατάκριμα, *i. e.*, nothing which would actually bring damnation."

[13] When it is asserted, concerning Original Sin, that it is inherent naturally, two things are hereby intended:

(1) QUEN. (II, 62): "That it is not a mere *accident*, lightly and externally attached, but internally and intimately inhering, and therefore called, Heb. 12: 1, the easily besetting sin (ἐυπερίστατος); that it is an *accident* connate (συνέμφυτος) and natural; that although it does not arise from the nature as such, yet it is produced together with it, or is connate with it; that it is not any temporary and transient accident, but is fixed and permanent." In order to keep aloof from such a view (the Pelagian), the Dogmaticians express themselves in forcible language concerning human depravity. Thus CHMN. (Doc. Th., I, 259): "There are not a few who so extenuate Original Sin, that they pretend that it is a corruption of certain accidents only, and that the substance itself of man, and especially of the soul, exists after the Fall, and remains upright, uninjured, and pure: so that this *quasi* impediment having been removed, the substance itself of man, after the Fall, and before the renewing of the Spirit, by, in, or of itself, has certain spiritual powers or faculties which it employs of itself to begin to complete spiritual actions. . . . The true and constant sentiment of the Church must be opposed to, clearly explained and keenly defended against, these philosophical and Pelagian vagaries, . . . viz., that the nature or substance in man, since the Fall and before regeneration, is by no means upright, pure, or sound; but that the very nature or substance of man, and especially of the human soul, is truly corrupt, vitiated, and depraved, and that not lightly or only superficially, or even in some part only; but that the whole mass (if I may so speak) of the substance, or of human nature, and especially of the soul, is corrupted and vitiated with the deepest and extreme depravity. . . . This corruption or depravity is nothing abstract, nor an idea outside of the substance or nature of man, but is inherent in our very nature or substance, and like a spiritual poison has infected, pervaded, and diffused itself far and wide throughout all the members of our whole substance or human nature." The position of Flacius, viz., "That Original Sin is the very substance itself of man or the human soul," arose from a misapprehension or an overstraining of these views. Therefore the expression, "inherent in our nature," signifies—

(2) QUEN. (II, 62): "That Original Sin is not the very substance of man . . . but that which inheres in it after the manner of an

accident; for it is distinguished in the Scriptures, Rom. 7: 20, from the essence itself of man, and is called *indwelling sin;* now, as an inhabitant or guest is not the same as the house, so neither is sin the same as man."

Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec. 1: 33): "Although Original Sin has infected and corrupted the whole nature of man, like some spiritual poison and horrible leprosy, so that now, in our corrupt nature, these two, viz., Nature alone and Original Sin alone, cannot be distinctly pointed out to view; yet the corrupt nature or the substance of corrupt man, body and soul, or man himself created by God, *in whom original sin dwells* (by reason of which the nature, substance, and indeed the whole man is corrupted), and original sin itself, which dwells in the nature or essence of man and corrupts it, are not one and the same. . . . The distinction, therefore, between our nature, as it was created by God and is preserved to this day, in which Original Sin dwells, and Original Sin, which dwells in our nature, must be retained." And this is the reason why Original Sin is called accidental. Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec. I, 57): "Since, therefore, this is an unchangeable truth, that whatever is, is either a substance or an accident, namely, either something subsisting by itself, or something elsewhere derived and adhering in a substance, . . . we must assuredly admit . . . that sin is not a substance, but an accident." To this the Form. adds (I, 60): "When it is inquired what kind of an accident Original Sin is, that is another question. No philosopher, no papist, no sophist, yea, no human reason, can exhibit a true solution of this question; its explication is to be sought from the Holy Scriptures alone." The expressions which have been employed by Chmn. are sustained by the following distinction (Sol. Dec. I, 51): "In order to avoid logomachies, terms of an equivocal signification should be carefully and clearly explained. When, *e. g.*, it is said: 'God creates the nature of man,' by the term, nature, the very substance, body and soul is meant. But often a *property or condition* of anything (whether it be taken in good part or bad) is called the nature of that thing; as when it is said, it is the nature of the serpent to strike and to infect with poison (here not the substance, but the badness of the serpent is expressed); in this sense Dr. Luther uses the term nature, when he says that '*sin and to sin is the nature of corrupt man.*' "

[14] Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec. I, 7): "And at the present time, even in this corruption of nature, God does not create sin in us, but, together with the nature which God creates and effects in men, original sin is propagated by natural generation, by seed corrupted by sin, from father and mother."

Here the question naturally presents itself, in what manner this corrupt nature perpetuates itself, and "Whether the soul is propagated by traduction (*ex traduce*), *i. e.*, whether, as in natural generation, the flesh of the offspring is substantially transmitted from the seed of the parent, the soul of the child is, in like manner, also transmitted from the soul of the parent?" On this subject CHMN. (Loc. Th. I, 236) says: "Luther, in his discussions, concludes that he wishes to affirm nothing publicly concerning that question, but that he privately held the opinion of traduction. It is sufficient for us to know concerning the efficient cause, that our first parents by their Fall merited that, such as they were after the Fall, both in body and mind, such also all their posterity should be procreated. But how the soul contracts that sin we need not know, since the Holy Spirit has not been pleased to disclose this in certain and clear Scripture testimonies."

HUTT. also (328) says: "In consequence of this disagreement among the Dogmaticians, it has come to pass, even in our day, that there are not wanting theologians even of the highest rank who, in regard to this very question, would rather keep silent altogether (ἐπέχειν) than to assert anything positively either within or beyond the express authority of Scripture." But he adds, also: "If any of our brethren should ask which opinion we think most accordant with truth, we fearlessly answer that we precisely accord with the opinion of Luther, and hold it to be consonant with Scripture, namely, that the human soul is propagated by traduction; so that, just as everything else produces its like, a lion begetting a lion, a horse begetting a horse, so also man begets man, and not alone the flesh, or the body, but also the soul is propagated essentially from its parents." (319). . . . QUEN. (II, 62): "As the soul was the first to exhibit sin (πρῶτον δεικτικὸν), so original sin itself, through the medium of the soul, in which it most deeply inheres, is propagated *per traducem.*" (For a fuller discussion of this subject see § 20, Note 8.)

[HUTT. (329) further shows that as soon as the opinion of a new creation of souls is admitted, one of three things follows, viz., either that the soul, as immediately created by God, is free from sin, or that it is polluted by sin, or that it is defiled by union with the body. But if God creates it sinful, or unites it with a body where the inevitable consequence is that it contracts sin, He becomes the author of sin. On the other hand, the entrance of the soul into the world in a state of integrity is contradicted by the express testimony of Scripture concerning natural depravity.]

[15] It is more specifically described as follows. QUEN. (II,

62): "In Original Sin there are four things worthy of attention, to each of which a certain limit of duration has been prefixed. (1) An inflammable material (*fomes*, tinder) habitually inhering, or a root. (2) The sense of this tendency or root. (3) The dominion of it; and, finally, (4) Guilt. The *last* is removed in regeneration and justification; *dominion* in sanctification (not at once, but gradually and successively, because sanctification is not complete in this life); the *sense* of it is removed in death; the *material* itself, not in the incineration (since not the body, but the soul, is the first and immediate subject of sin), but in the dissolution of the soul and body."

Ap. Conf. (II, 35): "Luther always wrote that Baptism removes the *guilt* of Original Sin, although the *material of sin, as they call it*, viz., concupiscence, remains. He added, also, concerning its material character, that the Holy Spirit, being given in Baptism, begins to mortify the propensity to sin, and creates new motions in man. Augustine also speaks in the same manner, and says that sin is remitted in Baptism, not that it may not exist, but that it may not be imputed. He openly confesses that it exists, that is, that sin remains, although it is not imputed."

[On the other hand, the Council of Trent maintained that concupiscence, in the regenerate, is not properly sin. Chemnitz answers (Ex. Conc. Trid., Pr. Ed., 108): "It is not a good thing, as Paul shows in Rom. 7, in many words. Nor is it an adiaphoron, or indifferent matter, Rom. 7: 21. It is certain, therefore, that it is an evil. . . . This original concupiscence is forgiven, weakened and diminished in Baptism: yet not so as to be suddenly removed and altogether extinguished, as no longer to exist; for as long as the regenerate live here there must be a law of sin in their members. But the remaining concupiscence does not hinder them from pleasing God, and being heirs of everlasting life. Nevertheless this is not because this concupiscence in the regenerate has been rendered holy or indifferent by means of Baptism. But it is of God's grace, that such an evil dwelling in the flesh of the regenerate is, for Christ's sake, not imputed to them for condemnation."]

§ 27. *Of Actual Sins.*

Original Sin is the ground and source of all actual transgressions. By these we are to understand, however, not only sins which manifest themselves in outward acts, but also those which depend upon purely internal acts of man. Hutt. (Loc.

c. Th., 346): "Actual transgression is every act, whether external or internal, which conflicts with the Law of God." [1] They are numerous and diversified, and are divided, according to QUEN. (II, 65), in the following manner:

I. "*In respect of an internal defective cause in the agents*, into voluntary and involuntary. A *voluntary sin* is an act by which man transgresses the divine Law, by a deliberate volition, contrary to the dictates of conscience. *Involuntary sin* is an act inconsistent with the Law, committed without sure knowledge or a deliberate purpose of the will." Involuntary sin is accordingly divided into sins of *ignorance and of infirmity*. [2]

II. "*In respect of the person sinning*, 1, into our own sins and the sins of others. *Our own sins* are those which we ourselves contract, either by doing what has been prohibited, or by omitting to do what has been commanded. Those are called the *sins of others*, which are indeed perpetrated by others, but in which we share or participate; [3] 2, into venial and mortal. *Venial sins* are those which, as soon as they are committed, and at the very moment when they are perpetrated, have pardon connected with them by an indissoluble bond. *Mortal sins* are those which produce spiritual death at the very moment when they are committed." [4]

III. "*In respect of the material in which* (*in qua*) they are committed, they are divided into internal and external. *Internal* are those of the heart; *external* are those of word and deed." [5]

IV. "*In respect of the material about which* (*circa quam*) they are committed; into sins against the first table immediately and directly, and those against the second table, *i. e.*, against God, against a neighbor, and against the person of the transgressor himself."

V. "*In respect of the sinful act itself:* into sins of commission and of omission. *Sins of commission* are those which consist in positive acts which come into conflict with a negative precept. *Sins of omission* consist in the refusal or omission of acts which are prescribed by a positive precept." (BR. 440.) [6]

VI. "*In respect of the effect:* into sins which cry out for punishment, and those which do not. *Of the former kind* are

vicious acts which provoke God to vengeance, although men are silent or only connive at them. *The latter* are those which God endures through His long-suffering, and either postpones the punishment, or, if they have been committed by the regenerate, forgives." [7]

VII. "*In respect of their adjuncts,* sins are divided into, 1, *more or less grievous* (on account of the greater or less fault or wickedness connected with them); [8] 2, into *secret and manifest;* [9] 3, *into dead and living. Dead sins* are those which indeed remain in us, but are not known as sins, or certainly not considered as great as they really are. *Living sins* are those which are known to be such, and rage even after the knowledge of the Law, Rom. 7: 8, 9; 4, *into remaining and remitted sins. A remaining sin* is that which yet oppresses the sinner by its guilt and weight. *A remitted sin* is that whose guilt has been removed from the sinner, by the grace of God, for the sake of the merit of Christ; 5, *into sins connected with hardness of heart and blindness of mind, and those unconnected with these;* [10] 6, *into pardonable and unpardonable sins.* Of the latter class there is only the sin against the Holy Ghost. [11] This sin consists in a malicious denial of, a hostile attack upon, and a horrid blasphemy of divine truth, evidently known and approved by conscience, and an obstinate and finally persevering rejection of all the means of salvation. Holl. (556), Matt. 12: 31, 32; Mark 3: 28, 29; Luke 12: 10; Heb. 6: 4–6; 10: 26, 29."

[1] Cal. (V, 311): "Actual sin is a departure from the Law, by which human thoughts and actions proceeding from the flesh transgress the divine Law given by Moses, and thus it exposes the transgressor to temporal and eternal punishment."

Holl. (537): "Actual sin is a turning away, by a human act either of commission or omission, from the rule of the divine Law, incurring responsibility for guilt and liability to punishment."

Quen. (II, 63): "The words 'act' and 'actual' in this place are used not strictly for external acts only, and sins of commission, but with such latitude that they embrace also internal vicious emotions, both primary and secondary, and also sins of omission."

"In the Holy Scriptures, actual sins are called *works of the flesh*, Gal. 5: 19; *unfruitful works of darkness*, Eph. 5: 11; *deeds of the old man*, Col. 3: 9; *dead works*, Heb. 6: 1; 9: 14; *unlawful deeds*, 2 Peter 2: 8."

[2] Here these further remarks are to be added: (*a*) QUEN. (II, 67): "Sin is here called voluntary, not because it is with the will or in the will, for thus also involuntary violations of duty would be voluntary; but it is understood here as opposed to that which is done through ignorance and inconsiderately (*ἀπροαιρέτως*)." (*b*) HOLL. (542): "Voluntary sin is viewed both *in respect of conscience, and in respect of the purpose of the will.*" *Sin against conscience* is fourfold. For it is committed either against a *correct conscience*, when a man, either by action or omission, does not follow, but despises the dictate of conscience when it agrees with the divine Law; or against *an erroneous conscience*, when a man, either by action or omission, turns away from the dictate of conscience imbued in error; or against a *probable conscience*, when any one is delinquent contrary to the dictate of the intellect, which urges, for probable reasons, that something should be done or omitted now at this place; or against a *doubtful conscience*, when any one does or omits that, concerning which he is in doubt whether it should be done or omitted. *Voluntary sin*, viewed in respect of the purpose of the will, is twofold. *The one* kind is that which is committed from mere malice and a will altogether free. *The other* is that which is committed under the power of a will influenced by force or fear, and by surrounding dangers. Matt. 26: 70, 72, 74; Mark 14: 68, 70, 71; Luke 22: 57, 58, 60; John 18: 25, 27." (*c*) *Involuntary sins* are (QUEN., II, 70): "1. *Sins of ignorance*, which overtake the unwilling regenerate, in consequence of the darkness of the mind, which has not been yet entirely removed by the illumination of the *Holy Spirit*. 2. *Sins of infirmity*, which overtake the regenerate without any certain purpose of sinning. Such are sinful emotions of the mind, which have suddenly arisen without their will, and whatever unlawful words or deeds are the result of inadvertence or precipitancy, and contrary to the purpose of the will, Gen. 9: 21; 16: 5; 18: 12; Numbers 20: 11, 12; Acts 15: 39; Rom. 7: 15; Gal. 2: 12, 13, 14; 6: 1."

[3] HOLL. (552): "*Our own sin* is a vicious act, produced by a real influence of our own: *the sin of another* imputed to us, is an unlawful act, to the production of which we concur indeed by no real influence, yet by an efficacious intention, so that it can be justly imputed to us. (He concurs, by efficacious intention, in the sin of another, who commands, consults, consents, connives at, does not oppose, or give information, and thus is the moral cause of the sin of another), Eph. 5: 7 and 11; 1 Tim. 5: 22; 2 John 11; Rev. 18: 4."

[4] HOLL. (547): (*a*) "*Venial sin* is every involuntary sin in the

regenerate, which neither removes the indwelling grace of the Holy Spirit, nor extinguishes faith, but, in the moment in which it is committed, has pardon connected with it by an indissoluble bond. The distinction of sin into mortal and venial does not arise from the desert of sin, for every sin, of itself, and by its own nature, in a court of law is damnable; but (1) From the different conditions of the subject, or the person sinning. For a venial sin exists in the regenerate, a mortal sin in those who either never were regenerated, or, having been overcome by the predominating power of the flesh, fell from a state of grace. (2) From the estimate which God has made in the Gospel; because God, a reconciled and gracious Father, does not impute to the regenerate sins of infirmity and ignorance for guilt and punishment. (3) From the event. A *mortal sin* precipitates the sinner into a state of wrath, death, and condemnation, so that, if he should die in this state, and without repentance, he would be certainly condemned; but a *venial sin*, because it has pardon as an inseparable attendant, can consist with the grace of God and saving faith." (Id. 551): "The *causes* of forgiveness or non-imputation are: the compassion of God, the satisfaction and intercession of Christ (1 John 2: 1, 2; Rom. 8: 1), the efficacious operation of the Holy Spirit, and the daily penitence of the regenerate." (Id. 547): (*b*) "*A mortal sin* is that by which the regenerate, having been overcome by the flesh, and thus not remaining in a regenerate state, transgress the divine Law by a deliberate purpose of the will, contrary to the dictates of conscience, and thereby lose saving faith, reject the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit, and cast themselves into a state of wrath, death and condemnation."

[5] Holl. (552): "*Sins of the heart* are depraved thoughts and desires which are cherished within the human breast; *sins of the lips* are wicked words and gestures expressed by the lips; *sins of deed* are actions which are performed contrary to the divine Law, by an external effort of the members. Matt. 5: 21, 22."

[6] Holl. (552): "*Sins of commission* are positive acts, by which the negative precepts of God are violated. *Sins of omission* are the neglect of acts prescribed by the affirmative precepts of God, James 4: 16, 17. *Note.* Although there is oftentimes, in a sin of omission, a certain illicit *positive act*, either an internal act of the will, as, for example, to will to omit what had been commanded, or an external act, as an operation by which any one is hindered from that which he ought to do; yet such a positive act is not always or necessarily required, but the mere fact that one does not do what is commanded is sin."

[7] Holl. (553): "*Outcrying sins* are the following, the Scrip-

tures being witness: 1. The fratricide committed by Cain, Gen. 4: 10. 2. The sins of the Sodomites, Gen. 18: 20. 3. The oppression of the Israelites in Egypt, Exod. 3: 9; of widows and orphans, Exod. 22: 22. 4. The denial of wages due to hirelings, James 5: 4."

[8] Holl. (454): "*One sin is more grievous than another:* 1. In respect to the efficient cause or person sinning. A Christian sins more grievously than a heathen, though he commit the same crime. 2. In respect of the impelling cause. He who commits adultery with his neighbor's wife, for the sake of gratifying his lust, sins more grievously than he who steals when impelled by hunger. 3. In respect of the object. He is more guilty who slays his father than he who slays an enemy. 4. In respect of the Law. He sins more grievously who violates the first table of the Law, than he who violates the second. 5. In respect to the effect. That sin is regarded as the more grievous which is attended with the greater injury."

[9] Holl. (554): "*A secret sin* is that which is either unknown to the person himself who sins, or which is known only to him who sins, and a few others who wish it suppressed. *An open sin* is that which has become known to many, and, if it be connected with offence to others, is called a *scandal. A scandal* is an open sin which furnishes an occasion of sinning to those who know it. It is usually divided into *given or active scandal, and received or passive.* The former is an open sin which is the occasion of sinning to others; the latter is a word or deed of another, not in itself evil, by which others are offended, or take occasion to sin."

[10] Holl. (555): "Sin, connected with hardness of heart, is the most atrocious of all, by which the mind of man, having been polluted, remains averse to the Word of God and blind; the will, confirmed in wickedness, resists the Holy Spirit; the appetite indulges in beastly pleasures; and therefore the sinner, being with difficulty or not at all corrigible, brings upon himself temporal and eternal punishments. The cause of this hardness is not God, but partly the devil, who multiplies evils, blinds the mind, and fills the heart with wickedness, 2 Cor. 4: 4; Acts 5: 3; Eph. 2: 2; partly man, who rejects the ordinary means of salvation, and is continually selling himself to the desire and practice of sin, Matt. 13: 15." In reference to Exod. 7: 3, Holl. (492) remarks: "God does not harden men *causally or effectively*, by sending hardness into their hearts, but *judicially, permissively, and by forsaking them.* For the act of hardening is a judicial act, by which, on account of antecedent, voluntary, and inevitable wickedness, God justly permits a man habitually wicked to rush into greater crimes, and withdraws

His grace from him, and finally delivers him up to the power of Satan, by whom he is afterwards driven on into greater sins, until He finally cuts him off from the right of the heavenly inheritance."

[11] QUEN. (II, 74): "The word, Spirit, is not used here with respect to essence, as the term is common to the three persons of the God-head, but it is used personally, for the third person of the Godhead; yet respect being had, not so much to the person itself of the Holy Spirit, as if this sin were committed immediately against Him, as to His office and blessings, for example, as far as He strives to illuminate men through the doctrines of the Gospel. . . . Therefore, the Holy Spirit must here be viewed in relation to His office, and the sin is said to be against the Holy Spirit, partly in respect of His ministry, and partly in respect of His testimony. Rom. 8: 16."

GRH. (V, 85): "The Sin against the Holy Ghost, therefore, is an intentional denial of evangelical truth, which has been acknowledged and approved by conscience, connected with a bold attack upon it, and voluntary blasphemy of it. For we must observe that this kind of sin was proved against the Pharisees by Christ; for, although they were constrained by the force of the truth uttered by Him, and were convicted in their consciences by its illumination, yet they raged against Him by their wicked impiety, to such a degree that they blushed not to ascribe His doctrines and miracles to Satan. The epistle to the Hebrews thus describes those who sin against the Holy Ghost, that they, having been previously illuminated, have also tasted the heavenly gift and been made partakers of the Holy Ghost, have tasted also the good Word of God, and the powers of the world to come, yet afterwards fall away, and thus crucify to themselves afresh the Son of God, and put Him to an open shame; also that, by voluntary apostasy, they trample under foot the Son of God, and esteem His blood, by which they were sanctified, an unholy thing, and do despite unto the spirit of grace."

QUEN. (II, 82): "The form of the Sin against the Holy Ghost consists, (1) In a denial, by a full, free, and unimpeded exercise of the will, of evangelical truth, after the latter has been evidently and sufficiently acknowledged and approved. Heb. 6: 4; 10: 26, 29. (2) In a hostile attack upon the same. Matt. 12: 31, 32. (3) In voluntary and atrocious blasphemy. Heb. 10: 26, 29." To this the remark is added, however (Ib., p. 83): "That these essential requisites of this sin must always be taken conjointly, and never separately, and that then *that* must be called the sin against the Holy Ghost, concerning which all these can be conjointly veri-

fied." The following additional description flows from the nature of the subject: "Not infants, but adults, commit this sin, who are not destitute of the knowledge of the revealed Word of God, but who have been illuminated and convicted by conscience of the certainty of divine truth, and have fallen from the desire and love of it into bitter hatred against it." (Holl., 561.) To which Bk. adds (444): "Whether the doctrine had been once approved by the assent of divine faith and a public profession, or only so clearly perceived that the mind, having been convicted, had nothing which it could oppose to it. *In the former mode*, those apostates sin against the Holy Ghost who deny the truth once acknowledged and believed, and utter reproaches against it, as Paul describes them, Heb. 6: 4. The Pharisees and Scribes belong *to the latter class*, who never, by their confession, approved of the doctrines of Christ. In the meantime, they were so convinced of their truth, from the Scriptures and the miracles of Christ, that they could oppose nothing but reproaches." As adjuncts of this sin, Quen. (II, 83) adds: "(1) Final impenitence, Heb. 6: 4–6; (2) Absolute irremissibility, Matt. 12: 31; Mark 3: 28, 29; Luke 12: 10; (3) Exclusion from the prayers of believers, 1 John 5: 16."

Holl. (564): "It is irremissible, not through any want of divine grace, or inadequacy of the atonement of Christ, or any want of the efficacious influence of the Holy Ghost, but on account of a wicked rejection of all the means of grace, and by reason of final impenitence." On the other hand, the sin against the Son of man is remissible. Matt. 12: 32; Luke 12: 10. Quen. (II, 87): "The sin against the Son of man is either a denial of the truth of the Gospel already acknowledged concerning the Son of God, who became man, resulting from infirmity of the flesh and fear of danger, but *not united with a hostile attack and blasphemy*, or an attack or blasphemy through ignorance of the truth not acknowledged."

§ 28. *The Freedom of the Will.*

Since so great a change has taken place in man through the Fall, the question remains to be discussed, What powers to act does he still retain? [1] For, since all these powers are dependent upon knowledge and will, it is natural that, so far as knowledge and will are weakened or lost, these powers to act should also thereby suffer. But the question, as to the powers retained by man, is identical with that as to how far freedom of the will (*liberum arbitrium*) in regard to his actions pertains to him. [2] As, however, various opinions have

often been entertained in reference to this *liberum arbitrium*, it is necessary, first of all, that we definitely determine the proper significance of this term. If we understand by it the will itself, then it cannot be questioned that since the Fall this still belongs to man, for without this he would cease to be man. [3] In like manner it belongs also to the nature of man that neither in his will nor in his acts, neither externally nor internally (by instinct), can he be determined by irresistible necessity. [4] All this is therefore to be predicated of man after the Fall, no less than before it, for all this belongs strictly to the essential nature of man, which suffered no change through the Fall. But, if we understand by *liberum arbitrium* that power of willing, in virtue of which man can act in everything, in good as well as in evil, entirely without hindrance, just as he pleases ("the *liberum arbitrium* is that power of the will which, following the judgment of reason, enables man most freely to embrace the good and resist the evil" (Hutt., Loc. c. Th., 269)), [5] then it follows, from the change that has occurred in man through the Fall, that this cannot now be predicated of him. If this change consists in the loss of the divine image, it at once follows that man can no longer freely choose between good and evil, but has lost the power to will and to do that which is good. [6] If, then, we would describe more particularly the *liberum arbitrium*, as it exists in fallen man, we must say, that man, in consequence of the evil disposition that dwells within him since the Fall, is no longer able to will or to do anything really good and acceptable to God, viz., nothing of all that the Holy Scriptures designate and prescribe as such, because all of this can be accomplished only under the special influence of the Spirit of God. He is therefore so completely destitute of the *liberum arbitrium in rebus spiritualibus*, [7] that he cannot of his own accord even cherish a desire for salvation and a change of his present depraved condition. [8] And in this condition all that remains to him is *liberum arbitrium in malis* (liberty of choice in regard to what is evil), [9] and *liberum arbitrium in rebus externis*, [10] namely, in all those things which, being recognizable by the light of reason, are within the reach of the natural powers, without needing the aid of a truly good disposition. [11]

[1] Grh. (V, 87): "*Connection with the preceding.* We have seen above in what wonderful and miserable ways original sin, like poison, has pervaded all the powers of man, how intimately the corruption arising from it has adhered to human nature, what pestilential fruits that envenomed seed has produced. It remains for us to inquire, what there is yet of strength in man."

Chmn. (Loc. c. Th., 179): "This is the question, What human powers are there after the Fall to produce obedience to the Law, when darkness is in the mind, aversion to God in the will, and in the heart rebellion against the Law of God? And, because not only external civil acts are demanded by the Law of God, but a perfect and perpetual obedience of the whole human nature, what, and how much can the will of man accomplish? Therefore the caption of this section would have been more clearly stated, *concerning man's powers*, than *concerning the freedom of the will.*"

[2] Quen. (II, 170): "These powers remaining in man after the Fall are otherwise called the freedom of the will."

Grh. (V, 87), thus explains the term *liberum arbitrium*, or freedom of the will: "These powers of man are best judged of from the rational soul by which he is distinguished from the brutes, and is constituted a distinct species. Two faculties belong to the rational soul, viz., *mind* and *will:* the former performs its office by knowing, discriminating, reflecting, judging; the latter by choosing and rejecting. From the concurrence of both, that is produced which is commonly called the free determination, which is a faculty of the mind and will, so that the *determination* belongs to the mind and the *free* belongs to the will." Therefore Holl. (573): "The proper and adequate seat of free determination is the will. But the intellect concurs antecedently, and by way of preparation (παρασκευαστικῶς), in the execution of the free determination."

Quen. (II, 170): "The term 'free determination' is not given in so many words in the Scriptures; yet is found for substance, and in equivalent terms, in Deut. 30: 19; Josh. 24: 15; 1 Cor. 7: 37; Phil. 5: 14; Heb. 10: 26; 1 Pet. 5: 2."

[3] Chmn. (Loc. c. Th., 182): "There is great diversity among ecclesiastical writers, some affirming, others denying the freedom of the will. Even the same writer, in different places, seems oftentimes to express opposite sentiments on this subject, sometimes affirming and sometimes denying it. This diversity cannot be more readily settled than by a grammatical explanation of the word. For, if the term, free will, be used in the most common acceptation, it signifies nothing more than, (1) that the man who

possesses it is rational, or has mind and choice; (2) that besides natural emotions and actions, concerning which there is no deliberation of mind or choice of will, a man has voluntary emotions, to the exercise of which the judgment of the mind and the inclination of the will concur; (3) and that in virtues and vices, in order that actions may be called either good or bad, an intelligent mind is required and a will which either yields to or resists the judgment."

Hutt. (Loc. c. Th., 267): "Sometimes the term 'will,' or 'choice' is employed to designate the other faculty of the soul, indeed the very substance of the will itself, whose function is simply that of *willing*. Thus regarded, scarcely any one will deny free will to man, unless he dare assert that man is totally destitute of this faculty of the soul. The absurdity of this is, indeed, deservedly repudiated by all, inasmuch as no faculty or power of the soul can be ignored without ignoring the whole substance of the soul itself; for this is itself nothing else than what its faculties are, and when one faculty perishes it must itself expire." Grh. (V, 100): "The question is not whether the essence of the will itself has survived the Fall, for this we emphatically maintain, viz., that man has lost not his will, but the soundness of it."

[4] Grh. (V, 87): "Liberty is assigned to choice in the first place, in respect of its mode of action, because it is such that the will as far as it is such, acts freely, *i. e.*, it is not forced or violently hurried along by an *external motion*, nor does it act alone by natural instinct, but either embraces, or rejects something of its own accord, or from an inner principle of movement. In this sense, free and voluntary are synonymous; and to say that the will is not free, is the same as if any one would say, that that which is warm is without warmth. That is called *freedom from compulsion*, according to which it happens that the will cannot be forced to do anything contrary to its inclination. Also *freedom from necessity*, as far as necessity is employed in the sense of force and violence. Others call it *interior liberty*, by which the will of man is moved voluntarily, freely, without coercion, by a power implanted and with capacity to choose, and has within itself the principle of its own motion. By others it is called *liberty in the subject*. This liberty, since it is a natural and essential property, given to the will by God, has not been lost by the Fall. The substance of man has not perished; therefore, neither has the rational soul; therefore neither the will, nor the essential liberty of the will. The will is an essential power of the soul, and the soul is nothing else than the powers or essential faculties themselves. Therefore while the soul remains, its essential powers, intellect and will, also remain. On the other

hand, the power of free and uncoerced volition is essential to the will; therefore, as long as the will remains, this power also remains. In this sense and respect we firmly believe, and emphatically declare, that the will of man has remained free even after the Fall."

Quen. (II, 171) makes a distinction between *freedom from violence and constraint*, and *freedom from inward necessity*, and remarks: "Freedom from violence is common to man with the brutes; but man has freedom from necessity in common with God and angels." The following distinction also deserves a place here: "An intelligent nature, that is at the same time infinite and divine, possesses freedom of the will in the most excellent and perfect manner; finite, or angelic and human nature, in a more imperfect manner."

[5] Hutt. (Loc. c., 268): "Sometimes the term 'will,' or 'choice,' is understood to signify the capacity of determining freely to choose that which is good and freely to avoid that which is evil." In this respect, it is very properly denied that free will has remained in man since the Fall.

Grh. (V, 98): "Free will in man before the Fall was that faculty of the reason and will by virtue of which he was able either to sin or not to sin."

Quen. (II, 175): "The form of free choice consists in the indifference of the will, both that which has respect to specification as well as that which has respect to the exercise of the act; that is, it consists in such indifference and freedom that the will is not necessarily determined to one thing, but, all the requisites to action being placed before it in accordance with its own liberty, it can do either this or that, can choose one and reject the other, which is *freedom of specification* (or specific freedom); can either act or not act, which is *freedom of action* (or active freedom). This liberty is also called '*liberty of action from the necessity of immutability*,' which is exercised when one acts without being controlled by violence or coercion, at the prompting of an internal impulse that holds itself immovably to its purpose."

[6] Grh. (V, 98): "If the question be concerning the liberty of rectitude, or the power of deciding either way, of choosing or rejecting either good or evil, we maintain that this has perished. For, after through sin the image of God was lost, at the same time also the power to choose the good was lost (for it was part of the divine image): and, because through sin man was not only despoiled but also miserably corrupted, therefore, in the place of that liberty, there succeeded the unbridled impulse to evil, so that since the Fall, in men corrupt and not yet regenerate (either corrupt by their own will, as our first parents, or born from corrupt parents,

as all their posterity), the will is free only towards that which is evil, since such corrupt and not yet regenerate men are able to do nothing but sin."

(Id., V, 100): "Understanding the term 'liberty' as describing the free power and faculty of choosing the good and rejecting the evil, that was possessed by Adam, we maintain that Luther was perfectly correct in saying, 'Free will is a title without the thing itself, or a thing with nothing but a title.'"

[7] QUEN. (II, 177): "By spiritual things are understood such emotions and actions as are prescribed by the Law and the Gospel, and can be produced only by the motion and action of the Spirit of God, so that they are the true knowledge of God, according to the measure of written revelation, detestation of sin committed, or sorrow for sins, the fear of God, faith in Christ, the new obedience, the love of God and of our neighbor."

CHMN. (Loc. c. Th., 190): "The human will cannot, by its own powers, without the Holy Spirit, either begin interior and spiritual movements, or produce interior obedience of the heart, or persevere unto the end in the course commenced and perfect it. They are called spiritual acts because (Rom. 7: 14) 'the Law is spiritual,' that is, it is not satisfied by any external civil actions which the unregenerate can perform; but it demands such movements and actions (1) as cannot be performed except by the agency of the Holy Spirit; (2) as unrenewed nature not only cannot perform, but even hinders the Holy Spirit in performing."

The FORM. CONC. thus defines (Sol. Dec., II, 20): "Spiritual or divine things are those which have respect to the salvation of the soul." Concerning these says QUEN. (II, 178): "We assert that the powers of the unrenewed man, both in intellect and will, whether for the beginning, or continuing, or completing these entirely spiritual acts which have just now been mentioned, are not only bound, impeded, or even weakened or broken, but altogether destroyed, *lost*, *extinct* and a *nullity*. For, in knowing and seeking an object spiritually good, the old powers in man are not renewed, the drowsy are not awakened, the infirm strengthened, nor the bound loosed; but altogether other and new powers and faculties are bestowed and put on."

The proof of this position, as to the intellect, QUEN. (II, 178) derives from Eph. 5: 8; 1 Cor. 2: 14; 2 Cor. 3: 5; Rom. 1: 21, 22. as to the will, from Gen. 6: 5; Rom. 8: 7; Ezek. 11: 19; 36: 26; Rom. 2: 5; 6: 17, 20; John 8: 34; Eph. 2: 1, 2; Col. 2: 13; Ps. 14: 2, 3; Matt. 7: 18. This want of freedom extends so far that QUEN. (II, 178) proceeds: "To this category also we refer the

going to church for the sake of receiving information from the preached Word, the reading and hearing of the Word of God with the desire of profit, the being controlled by the desire of information from the Word, all which are the operations of antecedent and receptive grace. Here belongs also the external and historical knowledge of the biblical propositions which transmit the mysteries of faith, 1 Cor. 2: 14; Eph. 4: 18; 5: 8."

In the Symbolical Books the principal passages are in the Form. Conc. II.

[8] Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec. II, 7): "We believe that man is entirely corrupt and dead to that which is good, so that there has not remained, neither can remain, in the nature of man since the Fall, and before regeneration, even a scintillation of spiritual power, by which he can, of himself, prepare himself for the grace of God, or apprehend offered grace, or *be capable, in and of himself, of receiving that grace, or of applying or accommodating himself to grace, or by his own powers contributing anything, either in whole or in half, or in the smallest part, to his own conversion, or of acting, operating, or co-operating, as of himself, or of his own accord.*"

The Form. Conc. (II, 77) therefore rejects the dogma of the Synergists, "who pretend that in spiritual things man is not absolutely dead to that which is good, but only deeply wounded and half dead. And although the free will is too weak to begin and, by its own powers, convert itself to God and obey with the whole heart the Law of God, yet, if the Holy Spirit make a beginning, call us by the Gospel and offer to us His grace, the forgiveness of sins, and eternal life, then that free will could by its own peculiar powers, meet God, in some way contribute (something, at least, although little and languidly) to its own conversion, aid it, co-operate, prepare itself for grace, and apply it, apprehend it, embrace it, believe the Gospel, and co-operate together with the Holy Spirit in continuing and preserving its own operations." The following positions, taken by Melanchthon, in the *Examen Ordinandorum:* "Three causes concur in conversion, the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father and the Son send that He may enkindle our hearts, and our own will assenting to and not resisting the Word of God;" as also in Article XVIII of the altered Augsb. Conf.: "A state of spiritual justification is effected when we are assisted by the Holy Spirit," and "Human nature cannot produce the interior emotions, true fear, etc., unless the Holy Spirit govern and assist our hearts," are therefore regarded as synergistic. Chmn. (Loc. c. Th., I, 201) clearly comments upon the first of these propositions: "The human will does not

concur in such a manner as to aid spiritual acts by its own powers. . . . But the human will is numbered among the causes of a good act, because it can resist the Holy Spirit (Acts 7: 51) and destroy the work of God (Rom. 14: 20). The children of God are led by the Holy Spirit, not that they should believe or do good ignorantly and unwillingly, . . . but grace makes them willing from being unwilling, because it works to will, Rom. 7: 22."

[9] QUEN. (II, 176): "In the state of corruption, liberty in the will of man is not only that of contradiction or action, but that also of contrariety or specification; not, indeed, *that which is employed between spiritual good and evil*, for this was lost by the Fall, but *that which is employed between this and that spiritual evil in particular.*" "By *liberty of contradiction*, we are to understand that liberty which is employed about one and the same object, within opposing limits, as to will and not to will, to do and not to do; by *liberty of contrariety*, that liberty which is employed either about diverse objects or about diverse acts of the same object." HOLL. (570).

GRH. (V, 99): "There exists in man, therefore, freedom of will, along with the servitude of sin, for he both sins and is unable to refrain from sinning, while he nevertheless sins freely and delights to sin; although he is not moved except to evil, yet he chooses it freely, *i. e.*, willingly and spontaneously, not unwillingly or under coercion, and is moved to it with all his energy. Add to this, that in the very choice of evils he exercises a certain liberty."

HUTT. (Loc. c., 272): "Even in evil and vicious actions, freedom of the will is very readily conceded, inasmuch as the will, not yet regenerate, most freely, *i. e.*, not by coercion, but spontaneously, wills, chooses, approves, and does that which is evil. Whence it happens that that which is voluntary enters into the definition of sin, so that that cannot properly be called sin which is not voluntary. . . . But it is here asked why this propensity to evil is said to be free, aye, freedom itself, since it is rather a sad and horrid service. But it is very properly replied that both assertions are true in a different respect; for this propensity of our will is properly described as both enslaved and free. Enslaved it is with respect to the lost image of God; for, since by the Fall the faculty of choosing the good and avoiding the evil was taken away, there was afterwards left a will which is so held captive under the tyranny of sin that it is not moved, except to the choosing of evil and avoiding the good. Gen. 8: 21; Rom. 8: 7. But, though the will be such a slave, yet it nevertheless is very properly called free, if we only have regard to the proper seat of sin, which is in the

will of man. But if any one wish to assign to it also another cause, as when the Church sets the bounds of liberty concerning evil actions, that it may assign limits to human curiosity, so that the latter may not seek the cause of sin without itself, but rather examine and discover it in itself; to this assuredly we will not object."

[10] Chmn. (Loc. c. Th., I, 183): "Augustine calls the works of the present life 'external things.' Because in spiritual acts there is no liberty, the will not being free, therefore, in order that freedom may not be entirely taken away from the will even in external things, this doctrine is taught concerning the freedom of the will in external discipline. But discipline is diligence in governing external actions and restraining external members in accordance with the precepts of the Decalogue; although the interior movements either may not be present or may not consent. . . . But in external things, Paul (Rom. 1: 20) ascribes even to the unregenerate mind thoughts, knowledge, truth, etc. It is very evident that the mind was not despoiled of all intellect by the Fall, but that there is remaining, even in unregenerate men, some power of mind in perceiving and judging those things *which have been subjected to reason and the senses*, as in inventing and learning the various arts, in domestic life, politics, ethics, in counsel, prudence, etc. For this faculty makes the difference between rational man and irrational animals."

Mel. (Loci. Th., 68): "Since there remains, in the nature of man, a certain judgment and choice of things which are objects of reason or sense, there remains also a choice of external civil works; wherefore the human will is able, by its own powers, without renovation, to perform in some way the external duties of the Law. This is the freedom of the will which philosophers properly attribute to man. For even Paul, discriminating between carnal and spiritual righteousness, admits that the unregenerate have a certain power of choice, and perform certain external deeds of the Law, such as to abstain from murder, theft, robbery; and this he calls carnal righteousness." Hutt. (272): "Reason and will in man are so inseparably united that neither can exist without the other, but they mutually presuppose each other; so that any concession of the existence of reason since the Fall necessarily carries with it the concession of the faculty of the will, unless any one should wish to assert that the reason could choose or refuse anything without the will, which would be supremely absurd." Conf. Aug. XVIII: "Concerning free will, they teach that the human will has some liberty to attain civil righteousness and to

choose in regard to things subject to reason. But it has no power without the Holy Spirit, to attain righteousness before God or spiritual righteousness."

The expression '*Civil Rightcousness*' is more fully explained in the Ap. of the Conf., XVIII, 70: "We do not strip the human will of liberty. The human will has liberty of choice in works and things which reason by itself comprehends. It can in some measure attain to civil righteousness, or the righteousness of works, it can speak about God, it can offer to God a certain external worship, obey magistrates and parents; in choosing external acts it can withhold its hand from murder, adultery, and theft. Since there remains in the nature of man reason and judgment concerning things subject to sense, there remains also the choice concerning such things and the power of attaining civil righteousness. For it is this that the Scripture calls the righteousness of the flesh, which the carnal nature, *i. e.*, reason, by itself effects without the Holy Spirit. Although the power of concupiscence is so great that men more frequently obey their evil affections than their sound judgment. And the devil, who 'worketh in the children of disobedience,' as Paul says (Eph. 2: 2), does not cease to incite this imbecile nature to various sins. These are the reasons why civil righteousness also is so rare among men."

For proof, Chmn. (Loc. c. Th., I, 185): "(1) Because Paul affirms that there is a certain carnal righteousness, Rom. 2: 14; 10: 3; Phil. 3: 6. (2) Because Paul says that the Law is the object of free will, even among the unjust, 1 Tim. 1: 9, *i. e.*, the Law was given to the unregenerate to restrain the will, the affections of the heart and locomotion in externals."

The later divines point out, as "the objects about which the will of man in the state of corruption is occupied, two hemispheres, one of which is called the lower and the other the higher." To the latter belong the things purely spiritual or sacred (*sacræ internæ*) of which we have been speaking. To the former are referred Holl. (577): "All things and actions, physical, ethical, political, domestic, artificial, pedagogic, and divine, *as far as they can be known by the light of reason and can be produced by the powers of nature aided by the general concurrence of God.*" Grh. (V, 101): "For we confess that some liberty remained as far as acts are concerned which are just, in the sense of moral, political, and domestic justice, which, according to Luther, belong to the lower hemisphere. For example, an unregenerate man can control his external locomotion as he will, he can govern the members of his body by the dictate of right reason; he can, in some degree, attain civil justice,

and avoid the more heinous external sins that are in conflict with external discipline. Much more can he also hear with the outward ear, and meditate upon the words of God." Yet this cannot be admitted without some limitation. Holl. (583): "The will of regenerate and unregenerate men since the Fall has the power, in regard to different things which are subject to reason, of choosing or embracing one rather than another, *although that power is languid and infirm.*" This weakness arises from impediments both external and internal. Among *internal impediments* are reckoned the following, viz., "blindness of the intellect, which causes error in deliberations, disinclination of the will to pursue the good, and a proclivity to embrace the evil, vehemence of the affections, often so great that like a torrent it carries away with it the will and disturbs the judgment. The *external impediments* are the cunning of the devil, the blandishments and terrors of the world, the control of God, subverting plans and diminishing or cutting off the ability to act." Hutt. (269) divides all the actions of men into: "evil, viz., those forbidden by the Moral Law; mediate or indifferent; and good." Concerning the mediate he says: "These again are threefold, according as they pertain to the *condition of our nature*, such as to stand, sit, sleep, eat, drink, and such like, most of which are common to man and brutes, having mainly respect to the vegetative, positive, appetitive, and locomotive powers of the soul; or, as they pertain to our civil and domestic conduct, such as to buy, sell, go to law, go to war, to follow a trade, and whatever pertains to civil or domestic life; or, finally, such as pertain to the external government and discipline of the Church, such as to teach and hear the Word of God, to observe certain ceremonies, to give and receive the sacraments, and similar external works, affecting the external senses. We call the actions of this second class mediate or indifferent, because by their nature, or in themselves, they are neither good nor bad; but whatever of good or evil belongs to them, this they derive from other accidental causes." Concerning good actions he says: "They are twofold, either morally good, such as to live honestly, to give every one his due, not to injure another; or spiritually good, such as to have proper regard for the worship of God, for true religion, and the eternal salvation of souls." It is only the latter that he denies to the unregenerate. Of the others he says (273): "It is clear that some liberty of the will must be conceded to the unregenerate, not only as to the despotic (δεσποτικὸν) kind of actions, when, namely, the movement of the members is controlled by the command of the will, whether the affections inwardly consent or not, but also as to the freely chosen (προαιρετικὸν),

when the will, in accordance with a good affection, prefers honest actions."

[11] This description of free will applies to man in the state of corruption. The Dogmaticians distinguish, however, a threefold condition, "the state before the Fall, the state of corruption, the state of reparation," and in each of these conditions free will is a different thing. QUEN. (II, 176): "*In the state before the Fall* man was free (1) from physical necessity; (2) from compulsory necessity; (3) from the servitude of sin; (4) from misery; (5) from the necessity of immutability; not, however, (6) from the necessity of obligation" ("which is the determinative direction of the will for the attainment of good and the avoidance of evil, according to the rule of a higher law," HOLL. (571).)." QUEN. (II, 183): "*In the state of reparation.* The restoration of the integrity lost by the Fall is either that commenced in conversion or that completed in glorification; the former occurs in this life, the latter in the life to come. *In the state of incipient restoration* there exists in man, when converted, or after his conversion, a freedom in relation to an object supernatural or purely spiritual, not only from physical necessity, but also from the necessity of immutability, because his will is no longer determined to evil, as before his conversion, but it can freely choose good, by the grace of the Holy Spirit assisting and co-operating; it can also choose spiritual evil in consequence of the remains of a carnal disposition still adhering to him. *In the state of consummated restoration*, or in eternal life, there will succeed a full and perfect freedom of the human will, not only from compulsion and from the servitude of sin, but also from misery, and from the root and sense of sin; and also a liberty from internal necessity or immutability, as well that of contrariety (or, as to what relates to the kind of sin) as that of contradiction (or, as to whether the power to sin shall be exercised or not)."

FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec. II, 67): "There is a great difference between the baptized and the unbaptized. For since, according to the teaching of Paul (Gal. 3: 27), all who are baptized put on Christ, and are truly born again, these now have free will, *i. e.*, have again been made free, as Christ testifies (John 8: 36). Whence, also, they not only hear the Word of God, but also, though not without much infirmity, can assent to it and believingly embrace it."

PART III.

OF THE SOURCES OF SALVATION.

§ 29. *Sources of Salvation.*

IF man is to be redeemed from the lost condition in which he lies since the Fall, this can be accomplished only through divine grace. This exhibits itself in three acts, one of which proceeds from the Father, another from the Son, and the third from the Holy Ghost. The Father is moved with compassion towards fallen man, and this impels Him to the gracious determination to effect redemption by the sending of the Son. The Son accomplishes this redemption, and the Holy Spirit offers to man the means whereby he can appropriate it to himself.

The third part of our work therefore treats:

I. *Of the benevolence of God the Father towards fallen man, who is to be delivered and blessed;*

II. *Of the fraternal redemption by Christ;*

III. *Of the grace of the Holy Spirit in the application of redemption.**

* Holl. (585): "The sources of salvation are the acts of divine grace, upon which the eternal salvation of men depends. The Saviour Himself, John 3: 16, points to these three sources of salvation. God, by loving the world, and giving His Son as Mediator, manifests His benevolence. The Son was given to rescue from destruction the world, *i. e.*, the entire human race inhabiting this earth, and thus to become its Redeemer. The means of enjoying the redemption of Christ is true faith, fixed in Christ's merit, which the Holy Spirit (inasmuch as He is called the spirit of faith, 2 Cor. 4: 13) enkindles by His efficacious working through the Word and Sacraments."

Quen. (III, 1): All three persons of the Godhead have been occupied in the procuring of human salvation. The Father loves those who have fallen, the Son redeems those who have been loved, and the Holy Ghost calls and teaches those who have been redeemed."

CHAPTER I.

Of the Benevolence of God towards Fallen Man. [1]

§ 30. *Benevolence of God.*

THE gracious will of God, to deliver fallen men from their ruined condition, is the first thing we have to consider, for it is this that originates the sending of the Son, who accomplishes the redemption, and the sending of the Holy Spirit, who applies it to individual persons.

This, His gracious will, God at once announced in His promise (recorded in Gen. 3 : 15). But God did not then, for the first time, form this purpose of redeeming man ; for, as He foresaw from eternity that he would fall, He determined at the same time both to create and to redeem him. [2] This purpose of God, however, will, in time, be accomplished only in the case of those who fulfil the condition upon which redemption is to be applied. Therefore we distinguish this gracious will of God into *general and special benevolence.*

I. The gracious will of God is called the *universal* or *general will* (*benevolence*) when it is considered in itself, as it refers to all men alike miserable, and it is exhibited in preparing the means of redemption for all, and effectually offering the same to them, without for the present considering the manner in which men treat the grace thus offered to them. [3] Holl. (586): "The universal benevolence of God is that act of divine grace by which God, having witnessed the common misery of fallen men, is moved not only earnestly to desire the salvation of them all, but also to give Christ as Mediator for its accomplishment, and to appoint appropriate and efficacious means with the intention that all men should use them, attain through them true faith in Christ, and possess and enjoy eternal salvation, procured through Him, to the praise of the divine goodness." This will is also called *antecedent*, inasmuch as, in the nature of the case, it antedates all question as to the manner in which man may treat the offered grace. [4] It refers to all men alike (universally to all, without a single exception. John

3 : 16 ; 1 Tim. 2 : 4 ; Rom. 11 : 32 ; Acts 17 : 30, 31 ; Tit. 2 : 11 ; 2 Pet. 3 : 9 ; Ezek. 33 : 11), [5] depends alone upon God's compassion for the wretched condition of man, and has in no sense been called forth by any merit or worthiness of man. [6] This will of God, moreover, earnestly and sincerely proposes that all men obtain salvation through Christ, [7] and God offers unto all the necessary means, and is ready to render these available for them. [8] Meanwhile this will of God is still not as absolute and unconditional as is the compassion of God towards man, from which the plan of salvation has proceeded ; that is, this will of God aims at saving men through the merits of Christ and the appropriation of the means of redemption as furnished to them. [9] The statements concerning the *universal will of God* may accordingly be summed up under the following characteristics :

It is (1) *gratuitous and free* (Gal. 3 : 22 ; Rom. 11 . 32 8 : 32); (2) *impartial* (Rom. 3 : 22); (3) *sincere and earnest* (Ezek. 18 : 23, 32 ; 33 : 11); (4) *efficacious* (Rom. 2 : 4); (5) *not absolute, but ordinate and conditioned* (John 3 : 16 ; 1 Tim. 2 : 6 ; Rom. 5 : 8 ; 1 John 1 : 4, 9, 10. [10] The *universal will of God* is distinguished from—

II. *The Special Will of God.*—Thus this same [11] will of God in reference to the salvation of men is designated, when we view it in connection with the divinely foreseen conduct of men towards the offered grace, as the condition upon which they are to be saved. Holl. (586) : "This special benevolence of God is that which induces Him to bestow eternal salvation upon sinners who embrace the means of salvation offered to them." Although the will of God is *general*, inasmuch as God's disposition is equally gracious toward all men, and inasmuch as for their salvation He has prepared a plan of redemption in the sending of His Son, available equally for all; yet it already follows from the above distinction, according to which the *general will of God* is not *absolute*, but *ordinate* and *conditioned*, that the accomplishment of this gracious will is conditioned by the conduct of man towards the offered grace. If the aim of the will of God, considered in itself, without regard to this conduct of men, be that *all* are to be saved by the plan of redemption through Christ, yet its aim, more specific-

ally described, is *that only those shall be saved who accept of the salvation offered and persevere therein*, and it refers only to these. This will of God, thus more specifically described (*the special will of God*), is also called *consequent*, because the divine foreknowledge of the proper conduct on the part of man precedes it; and it is also designated as *particular*, because it refers not to all men, but only to those of whom God foreknows that they will properly treat the offered grace. [12] (Eph. 1 : 1 ; James 2 : 5 ; Rev. 2 : 10 ; 1 Tim. 1 : 16 ; John 17 : 20.)

From this *special benevolence of God*, which is based upon the *universal benevolence of God*, and proceeds from it, there comes forth the purpose of God, [13] which is called *predestination* [14] *or election ;* [15] the purpose, namely, to save through the merits of Christ the definite number of those whose right treatment of the offered grace God had foreseen. Holl. (604): "Predestination is the eternal decree of God to bestow eternal salvation upon all of whom God foresaw that they would finally believe in Christ." [16]

In virtue of the *universal benevolence*, salvation is provided for and offered to all, but the purpose of redemption is accomplished not with all, but only in the case of a definite number of men ; the reason of this, however, lies in the *special benevolence*, in virtue of which only those really are to be saved who truly accept by faith the offered salvation, and persevere in this faith. [17] But God, by His *foreknowledge*, eternally foresees who these will be, and this foreknowledge is the ground upon which the purpose of God, embracing only a definite number of men, is eternal. [18]

The decree of God is still further defined as (1), *not absolute, but ordinate* (determined by a certain order of means) *and relative* (1 Cor. 1 : 21), [19] *i. e.*, there is no arbitrariness on the part of God, if He include a number of persons among the *elect*, and exclude others, for His purpose depends upon the observance of the order to which salvation is bound ("The apostle does not say that God absolutely wills to save all, in whatsoever manner they may conduct themselves, but that God wills that all may be saved, that is, by certain means." Quen.), and He has respect, therefore, in forming His purpose, to man's conduct towards this appointed order of salvation. But this

decree is also (2), *not conditional*, but *categorical and simple, i. e.*, God does not allow it to be still doubtful, *in time*, whether He will bestow salvation upon this or that man, as though His purpose were only to save this or that man, *if* or *after* he may have laid hold upon the merit of Christ; but, by virtue of His foreknowledge, He recognizes in advance those who will lay hold upon the merit of Christ, and only to these does His purpose refer, and thus it is simple and categorical. [20] Hence it follows, therefore, also (3), that the *election* (taken in its strictest sense), because it rests upon an eternal decree of God, is *immutable and irrevocable* (so that an elect person cannot become a reprobate, Matt. 25 : 34; James 2 : 5; Matt. 24 : 24; 1 Pet. 1 : 2, 4; John 10 : 28; Dan. 12 : 1; Rom. 8 : 29, 30); for God would not have correctly foreseen if His purpose would have to suffer change (election is immutable, because based upon an ordinate decree and because of the infallibility of the divine foreknowledge). Though the *elect* may for a while fall into sin and from grace, this cannot continue forever, and they cannot fail of eternal salvation. [21]

The *attributes* or *adjuncts of election and of the elect* may be thus compendiously stated (Quen., III, 20):

"I. The *attributes of election:* (*a*) Eternity (Eph. 1 : 4; 2 Tim. 1 : 9; 2 Thess. 2 : 13; Matt. 25 : 34); (*b*) Particularity (Matt. 20 : 16); (*c*) Immutability (2 Tim. 2 : 19; Matt. 24 : 24; 1 Pet. 1 : 4; Rom. 8 : 29, 30).

"II. The *attributes of the elect:* (*a*) Paucity (Matt. 20: 16; 22: 14); (*b*) Possibility of totally losing, for a while, indwelling grace (Ps. 51: 12; 1 Cor. 10: 12); (*c*) The certainty of election [22] (Luke 10: 20; Rom. 8: 38; 2 Tim. 4: 8; Phil. 2: 12); (*d*) Final perseverance in the faith (Matt. 10: 22; Rev. 2: 10)."

In contrast with *predestination* stands *reprobation*. [23] As God foreknows those who will preseveringly believe in Christ; and as, in view of this, He forms His purpose to save these, so also, in the same way, His purpose of condemnation embraces the definite number of those who are lost; and therefore *reprobation* is "that act of the consequent divine will by which God (before the foundation of the world) through His vindicative justice, and for its perpetual glory, adjudged to eternal condemnation all contumacious sinners, of whom He foresaw

that they would finally reject the proffered grace of the call and of justification, and would depart this life without faith in Christ." (Holl. 643.)

All the specifications referring to this topic correspond to those given concerning Predestination. The "*internal exciting cause* is the vindicative or punitive justice of God (Rom. 2: 8); the *external exciting cause* is the rejection of the merit of Christ, *i. e.*, the foreseen ἀπιστία or final incredulity (Mark 16: 16; John 3: 36)." [24] The form of reprobation, however, consists in "exclusion from the inheritance of eternal salvation, and in adjudication to eternal punishment according to the purpose and foreknowledge of God (Matt. 25: 41)."

Thus the attributes of reprobation and of the reprobate correspond to those of election and the elect. The *attributes of reprobation* are: (*a*) Eternity (Matt. 25: 41; Jude 5: 4); (*b*) Immutability (Numb. 23: 19; 1 Sam. 15: 29; Mal. 3: 6)." The *attributes of the reprobate* are: "(*a*) Plurality (Matt. 7: 13); (*b*) Possibility of being for awhile in the state of the truly regenerate; (*c*) Perseverance in final unbelief."

Observation I.—The foregoing representation, as here developed, belongs to a later period. Grh. is the first who, with special reference to earlier scholastic distinctions, presented the doctrine in this form; while the earlier theologians, in their statement of this doctrine, adhered to the definition which in Note 14 we designate as the second. That is as follows: "God determined from eternity to save those who would believe upon Christ." Thus the Form. Conc. When, however, the later theologians undertook systematically to present what can be said concerning *predestination*, the statement of the Form. Conc. did not seem to them sufficient, because the purpose of God to save all who would believe on Christ could not be so indefinite in His own mind as was expressed by the words, "all those who would believe." This purpose of God, they supposed, must rather be so positive that the definite number of those who should be saved must be known to Him, as otherwise it might be maintained that God would allow it to remain undecided until in the course of time which persons are to be saved; which would be inconsistent with the assumed eternity of the purpose. From this effort to

express themselves accurately originated the definition of *predestination in the strictest sense*, as also the distinction between πρόνεσις and προορισμός. But to avoid the error of assuming that, if the number of the *elect* was fixed from eternity, their reception among that number in time was for that reason no longer conditioned by the conduct of men with reference to the offered grace, but depended upon an absolute and hidden decree of God, the further specification was added, that God, by virtue of His foreknowledge, antedating the purpose itself, from eternity foresaw who those would be who would accept the offered grace. (A specification which, indeed, is not unknown to the Form. Conc., cf. Sol. Dec. XI, 54, but which was not then introduced into the definition of predestination.) And then there was added by the later theologians the distinction between the *general and special will of God*, which was meant to show that the will of God to save was, indeed, in itself considered, and without reference to the conduct of men, general and applicable to all; but that, as the actual conferring of salvation was dependent upon the conduct of men with reference to it, as soon as reference was had to this, it then became special, and referred then only to those who conducted themselves properly with reference to the offered salvation. By all these further specifications, however, the doctrine of *predestination* was only more accurately stated, and not in any wise altered.

Observation II.—The question, whether the foreknowledge of God does not necessarily determine the fate of men, so that human freedom is thereby abolished, is not discussed by any of the theologians in this connection. Chmn. (Loc. c., I, 162) endeavors, in the discussion of the cause of sin, to meet the above objection by remarking that the *foreknowledge* is no act of the will, and that therefore the future is not determined by it. "The fact, whether past or future, does not depend upon knowledge, but knowledge upon the fact, . . . and it was rightly said by Origen, 'yet we judge by common consent concerning foreknowledge, not that anything will happen because God knows that it will, but that, because it will happen, God already knows it.'" And so also the later Dogmaticians. Quen. (I, 539): "That same divine foreknowledge or foresight does not depend upon any divine decree, nor does it of itself

impose any necessity upon things foreseen, nor remove their contingency, although in itself it is certain and infallible." (Compare the specific statements in § 21, Note 4.) The Form. Conc. appears to regard this question as belonging to the domain of the inexplicable and mysterious, the prying into which constitutes no part of human duty. Sol. Dec. XI, 54, 55.

[1] Hutt. (l. c., 768, sq.) introduces the doctrine with the following words: "The apostle in his golden epistle to the Romans, having treated the subject of Divine Predestination very extensively and accurately, at length, as though having passed into a stupor, as he surveys somewhat more deeply the exhaustless abyss of the divine mysteries about this article, breaks forth in the almost unaccustomed exclamation: 'O the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are His judgments, and His ways past finding out.' Rom. 11: 33. This exclamation has caused most of the orthodox Fathers to treat the article of Predestination too cautiously and briefly; and even to-day there are some who regard its consideration imprudent and useless, nay, rather troublesome and painful; who affirm that it cannot be presented, in an assembly of hearers, without great danger; and who apply to this the trite proverb, *Noli me tangere.* While we, indeed, think that the modesty and care of the ancient Fathers deserve praise, we, at the same time, neither can nor ought, in any way, to approve the excessively severe judgment of some later teachers. For if the consideration of this article ought to be regarded imprudent, certainly Christ and the apostles can scarcely be defended from the suspicion of temerity, since they often, and indeed accurately and publicly, presented and explained to their hearers the subject of Predestination. If you except the one article of Justification, there is scarcely any other theological topic which the Holy Spirit has so fully unfolded in the Scriptures of the New Testament, Matt. 28: 22, 31; Mark 13: 20, 22, 27; Luke 18: 7; Job 13: 18; 15: 16; Rom. 8: 30; and almost the entire ninth, tenth and eleventh chapters; 1 Cor. 1: 27, 28; Eph. 1: 4, 5; Col. 3: 42; 2 Thess. 2: 13; 2 Tim. 1: 9; 2: 10; Tit. 1: 1; 1 Pet. 1: 2; Rev. 17: 14. As, therefore, those things which God has wished to be secret are not to be investigated, so those things which He has revealed are not to be denied or concealed; in order that we may not be found unlawfully curious in regard to the former, or culpably ungrateful in regard to the latter. . . . These matters being considered in such a manner that we can be occupied, profitably and with a good conscience, in the

explanation of the mystery of eternal predestination, we are thoroughly convinced, nevertheless, that, just as we confine ourselves within the bounds and limits of the Divine Word, we will err neither in excess nor defect. But here we must especially observe the caution, to attend well to the source whence judgment concerning this article can and should be sought and framed. Moreover, the Book of Christian Concord teaches correctly, that outside of and beyond the Word of God no place for weighing this mystery should be left for human reason. . . . Furthermore, neither is Predestination to be sought immediately in God Himself, whom no one has ever seen. But it is the Word of God alone from which the entire treatment of this mystery is to be solely sought; as, in it, nothing has been omitted that at all pertains to the mystery of our salvation and election: nay, rather, according to the testimony of the apostle, the whole counsel of God has been revealed in it to us. Acts 20: 27. . . . This Word is nothing else than the Gospel of Christ. As, therefore, we have the will of God revealed in the Word of the Gospel, we declare that this itself must be considered the eternal and immutable decree; and the counsel and purpose of God is the ground both of our eternal election and salvation, because in God there are not contradictory wills." .

Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec. XI, 9, sq.): "Still this eternal election or ordination of God to life eternal must be considered not merely in that secret, heavenly, and inscrutable counsel of God, as though the election comprehended or required nothing more, and in thinking upon it nothing more required to be taken into account than the fact that God has foreseen what men and how many will attain salvation, and who and how many will perish eternally, or as though the Lord would make a military review, and would say or determine, 'This one is to be saved, but that one is to be damned; this one shall persevere steadfast in faith to the end, but that one shall not persevere.' For, from this opinion, many derive absurd, dangerous, and pernicious thoughts, which produce and strengthen, in the minds of men, either security and impenitence or distress and despair. . . . (13) Wherefore, as we wish to think or speak correctly and with profit concerning the eternal election or predestination and ordination of the sons of God to eternal life, let us accustom ourselves not to endeavor, by our reason, to investigate the mere, secret foreknowledge of God, which no man has explored and learned to know. But let us meditate upon the divine election according to the manner in which the counsel, purpose, and ordination of God are revealed to us, through the Word, in Christ Jesus (who is the true Book of Life). Therefore, let us

comprehend at the same time, in thought, the whole doctrine concerning the purpose, counsel, will, and ordination of God (namely, all things which pertain to our redemption, call, justification, and salvation)."

[2] Grh. (IV, 146): "After Adam with all his descendants had been ensnared, by the Fall, in the toils of eternal death, and no other remedy could be found for this evil, by the wisdom either of men or angels; God, coming forth from the secret seat of His majesty, revealed the adorable mystery concerning the restoration of the human race, through His Son, Gen. 3: 15. From the fact, therefore, that God, in fulfillment of this first promise, sent in the fulness of time His own Son, born of a woman, Gal. 4: 4, we infer that God from eternity had made a decree concerning sending His Son into the flesh, that, by His obedience and satisfaction, the wounds might be healed, which the infernal serpent had inflicted upon man, and the blessings lost by the Fall might be restored."

[3] Quen. (III, 1): "The most kind and merciful, universal will of God the Father towards fallen men embraces within its bounds all men in general who have been placed in misery, and has, according to our method of conception, two acts; of which the *first* is the pity of God, by which He inwardly and sincerely lamented that the human race, and indeed the whole of it, had been deceived so basely by the fraud of the devil, and, through the Fall, had been cast into instant, and that, too, eternal ruin; and by which He willed to deliver it from evil, and, provided it could be done without any injury to His justice, to recover for the same its lost salvation. *The second act* is that by which God, moved by this pity and love to man, made a decree concerning the liberation of the human race, through the sending of His Son, and the revelation of the same through the Gospel, to the end that all might believe in Him and thus be saved. For upon the interposition of His Son, offering and promising a most perfect satisfaction, God mercifully ordained from eternity in His Son to restore all, and give them eternal life."

[4] Grh. (IV, 169): "The antecedent will is so named, because it precedes the consideration of the obedience and disobedience of men, and consists simply in that aspect of the divine will in which we regard the beneficent will of God as disposing itself equally towards all."

Holl. (586): "The antecedent will is that by which God wills the salvation of all fallen and wretched men, and for attaining this has given Christ as a mediator, and has ordained those means by which the salvation acquired through Christ, and strength for be-

lieving, are offered to all men with the sincere intention of conferring such salvation and faith."

[5] Hutt. (Loc. c., 792): "In this antecedent will of love and mercy in God, not even a single individual of the entire human race has been neglected or passed by, even the son of perdition not being excepted, John 17: 12. The full force of this assertion is, that God desired the salvation of all mortals; that he destined His Son as the Redeemer for the whole world equally; that He willed to offer these blessings to all in common, even to those who indeed do not actually hear this Word, who do not actually believe, who are not actually saved; yea, even to those who God foreknew would not hear His Word, would never believe, and also never be saved."

The passages which ordinarily are quoted against the universality of grace, are Rom. 9: 18, 19; 9: 11–13, 22. In reference to Rom. 9: 19, Quen. (III, 12): "From this passage the Calvinists frame an argument like this: 'The will of which Paul speaks is absolute. But it is the will to save and to destroy, of which Paul speaks. Therefore, the will to save and to destroy is absolute.' Reply: The minor premise is false. For, indeed, it is the same will in both cases; yet there is a difference between willing the same absolutely, and with a condition." In reference to Rom. 9: 18, Holl. (594): "(*a*) The apostle speaks not of the general, or universal, but of the special mercy of God, by which He justifies those believing in Christ (v. 30), and therefore he does not treat of the antecedent but of the consequent will of God. (*b*) The mercy of God is indeed free, but it is not absolute. . . . (*c*) God hardens whom He wills by sending upon them hardness, not causatively but judicially." . . . In reference to Rom. 9: 11–13 (Quen. III, 12): "(*a*) The text does not speak of Esau and Jacob, in their persons, but of their descendants. . . . (*b*) It does not give this testimony with reference to eternal predestination to salvation, or reprobation to destruction. Therefore, the Calvinists are inconsiderate in assuming that the love for Jacob, and the hatred towards Esau, relate to love of the former for life, eternal and absolute, and the reprobation of the latter to death eternal and absolute; but the apostle treats, Rom. 9: 10, 11, of the rejection of the Jews from the outward superiority which they enjoyed in the course of so many ages, and the reception by the Gentiles of those prerogatives which the Jews claimed for themselves alone. If the discussion had been concerning election, from the opinion of the Calvinists this absurdity would follow, viz., that all the descendants of Jacob have been saved, and, on the other hand, all the descendants of Esau have been condemned. Therefore *the sense of the passage is:*

I have not brought or granted as much blessing to the descendants of Esau as I have to the descendants of Jacob, and thus I have preferred the latter to the former; I have loved them less (the word hatred is thus employed, Luke 14: 26; Matt. 10: 37)." In reference to Rom. 9: 22, "From these words it is clear that God has indeed prepared vessels of mercy for glory, but vessels of wrath are not said to have been prepared by God, but to have been tolerated by God with much long suffering. Wherefore, men hardened not by God, but by themselves, and by their own wickedness and voluntary perversity, have become vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, because they despise the counsel of God against themselves, Luke 7: 30."

[6] Holl. (599): "The mercy of God has been called forth by no merits, Gal. 3: 22; Rom. 11: 32. Pity for the sinner does not move God causally, but only affords an occasion, and presents an object for pity, towards which, while He is able, yet He is under no obligation, to exercise φιλανθρωπία. For in man there is no impelling cause whatever."

[7] Holl. (599): "The benevolence of God towards the fallen human race has not been feigned or counterfeited, but is earnest and sincere; because, in the caring for human salvation, the will of the sign conspires most harmoniously with the will of the divine purpose, the precept and promise with the divine intention. He acts the hypocrite who promises one thing with his mouth and another with his heart; to think this of God is a crime." Hutt. (Loc. c., 792): "The truth of this statement is evident from clear testimonies of Scripture, 1 Tim. 2: 4; 2 Pet. 3: 9; Matt. 23: 37; Ez. 18: 32. Finally, the same is manifest from the use of the oath in most solemn attestation, Ez. 33: 11."

[8] Holl. (599): "The benevolence of God is not an empty vow, a fruitless wish, an indifferent complacency, by which one does not long to effect or obtain the thing which pleases him and which in itself he loves, and, therefore, is not willing to employ the means leading to that end; but it is an efficacious desire, by which God seriously intends, through sufficient and efficacious means, to effect and obtain the salvation of men, in which He is most ardently delighted, Rom. 2: 4. The *antithesis of the Calvinists* states that God indeed, by His will, manifested in Scripture, or that of the sign (*signi*), wishes all to be saved; but by His secret will, which they call that of His purpose (*beneplaciti*), that He wishes to save the elect alone." (Quen., III, 7.) Cf. § 18, Note 13.

[9] Holl. (600): "Although the first compassion of God, by

which He pitied the human race that had fallen into sin, and in fact the appointment of a Mediator, and the administration of the means of salvation, are absolute, yet the merciful will of God to confer remission of sins and eternal salvation is not absolute, but relative and limited by justice, because it has respect to the satisfaction of Christ, by which divine justice was satisfied."

QUEN. (III, 5): "It is founded in Christ, and is limited to the ends and means by which He is moved." In regard to the will of God, in general (HUTT., Loc. c., 782): "The will of God, in this mystery, is not considered according to its own most simple essence; it is distinguished only according to our understanding, and access to it does not lie open to our mind; but by reason of His act, with respect to things created, God goes forth beyond His own essence. According to the former method of consideration the will in God is just as indivisible as it is impossible for the essence of God itself to be divided into parts. But, according to the latter method of consideration, namely, as the will of God goes forth beyond its essence to creatures, it is twofold. For, whatever God wills to take place in created things, He wills either simply or with a determined mode or condition. The former will is commonly called, in the schools, absolute, and is joined with the immutable necessity of the event; according to this He calls those things which are not, as though they were, Rom. 4: 17. . . . The latter will is fulfilled in no other way than by the fulfilment of the predetermined mode or precise condition; when this is not fulfilled, it likewise comes to pass that that does not occur which God has notwithstanding especially willed should occur. The former is to be altogether separated from this mystery, and to be relegated to the schools of the Stoics and Calvinists . . . but the latter, namely, the modified or limited will of God, enters into the act of the present mystery."

[10] HOLL. (600): "The benevolence of God is ordinate, because God from His most profound counsel established a fixed τάξις or series of means, to which, in the conferring of blessedness upon sinners, He has regard. These means are the Word of God and the Sacraments, by which God seriously intends to call sinners to the kingdom of grace, and convert, regenerate, justify, and save them. By this ordinate will God wishes not only that all men be saved, but also that all men come to the knowledge of the truth. The will is called *conditionate*, not as though God wills only the end, and does not will the means, or wills the end under a condition which He Himself from His mere purpose is unwilling *should be* fulfilled in many; but as God, willing that men should

be saved, does not will that they should be saved without regard to the fulfilment of any satisfaction or condition, but should be led to salvation under the condition of determined means." Hence the proposition concerning the universality of grace is more specifically expressed thus: "God wills, through ordinary means, to confer saving faith upon all men." (Ib.)

[11] Grh. (IV, 169): "Moreover this division (into antecedent and consequent will) distinguishes not the will by itself, which in God is one and undivided, just as the essence also is one; but its twofold relation. In the antecedent will, regard is had to the means for salvation, in so far as, on the part of God, they have been appointed and are offered to all. In the consequent will, regard is had to the same means, but in so far as they are accepted or neglected by men." Hutt. (l. c., 783): "This distinction was introduced into the Church because of those passages of Scripture which bear witness that the will of God is not always done or fulfilled, *e. g.*, Matt. 23: 37; 1 Tim. 2: 4."

[12] Holl. (586): "The consequent will is that by which God, from the fallen human race, elects those to eternal life who He foresees will use the ordinary means, and will persevere to the end of life in faith in Christ." More specific definitions. Holl. (587): "The will of God is said to be *antecedent* and *consequent*. (1) *Not with regard to time*, as though the antecedent will preceded the consequent in time; for, as God is free from any limitations of time, He does not have any will which anticipates another in time. (2) *Neither with regard to the divine will itself*, as though two actually distinct wills in God were affirmed; for the divine will is the essence itself of God, with a connoted object, conceived under the mode of an act of volition. (3) But the will of God is said to be antecedent and consequent, *from the order of our reason*, distinguishing the diverse acts of volition in God, *according to a diverse consideration of the objects*, and regarding one act before the other, so that it is only indicated that the antecedent will precedes the consequent in that which is the *image of the divine reason:* because, according to our mode of conception, God's willing eternal salvation to men, and His providing the means of grace, are anterior to the will of the same to confer in act eternal salvation upon those who would to the end believe in Christ, or to assign eternal condemnation to the impenitent."

Quen. (III, 2): "The *antecedent* will relates to man, in so far as he is wretched, no regard being had to circumstances in the object; but the *consequent* will is occupied with certain circumstances in reference to man, namely, as he is believing or unbe-

lieving." [Holl. (588): "Wherefore the antecedent and consequent wills of God are not opposed to each other in a contrary or contradictory manner, but are subordinated to one another. The latter is materially contained in the former, and passes into it when the condition is assumed. This I prove thus: By His antecedent will, God wills that all men be saved if they believe to the end. But those using aright the ordinary means of salvation, are those who finally believe. Therefore the antecedent will of God is not overthrown, abolished, or removed by the consequent, but rather passes into the same when the condition is fulfilled."] "The *antecedent* respects the *giving*, and the *consequent*, the *receiving* of salvation on the part of man. The *former* is universal; the *latter*, particular. The *former* precedes, the *latter* follows, a purified condition. In the *former*, salvation is regarded with reference to the means, as on the part of God, these have been established and offered equally to all men. In the *latter*, the same salvation is regarded with respect to the means, but in so far as these are either accepted or neglected by men. The will of God, pertaining to that which is antecedent (*antecedanea*), defines what men ought to do, viz., to hear the word of God, through its hearing to receive faith, to apply to themselves the merit of Christ, and by means of this faith to be saved. The *consequent* will considers what men in fact do or do not, whether they obey the antecedent will or not, *i. e.*, it considers who in fact use the means of salvation established by God and who do not, who hear the Word of God and believe in Christ and who do not." Hutt. (l. c., 794): "In the antecedent will (προηγουμένη) faith is considered as a part of the order which God, so far as it pertains to Himself, desires should be observed. In the consequent will (ἑπομένη) the same is considered not only in the manner in which God desires His own order to be observed by men, but, in so far as that order either is in fact observed by believing, or is not observed by not believing. Although, indeed, this occurs in time with regard to men; yet, by reason of His prescience, it was especially present to God, inasmuch as, by the nature of eternity, nothing is future to Him, but all things are from eternity especially present to Him in the most simple *now* (τῷ νῦν). By reason of this ultimate difference, the consequent will always attains its end, either for salvation or condemnation; but the antecedent will, not in like manner." Concerning the necessity of this distinction, Holl. (587): "This distinction (between the general and special will) is necessary, on account of the wonderful combination of divine justice and mercy, which are to be reconciled with each other. For there are expressions in

the Holy Scriptures that show that the mercy of God is inclined towards all sinners, 1 Tim. 2: 6; 2 Pet. 3: 9. There are other expressions which indicate the justice of God, and exclude from the inheritance of salvation those who resist the divine order, John 3: 18; Mark 16: 16. Finally, there are biblical passages in which both the mercy and justice of God are declared, Matt. 23: 37. Christ, by His antecedent will, as far as it pertained to Himself, willed that the children of Israel be gathered together; but, by His consequent will, because they were unwilling to be gathered, He willed that their house be left to them desolate, cf. Acts 13: 46. This distinction is implied in the parables of Christ, Matt. 22: 1; Luke 14: 16."

[13] Quen. (III, 14): "From the admitted universal benevolence of God, in the establishment and presenting of means, whereby He has determined to convert, regenerate, justify, and save men, through His own efficacy, there arises a special benevolence conspicuous in the predestination to eternal life." . . .

[14] The Dogmaticians observe that the word 'predestination' has been employed in the Church in various senses: *sometimes in a wider sense*, according to which it denotes the purpose of God, referring equally to the saving of believers and the condemnation of unbelievers; *sometimes in a narrower sense*, according to which it refers alone to the former. In the latter sense they understand it to be employed in Biblical usage. Rom. 8: 30; Eph. 1: 5. Holl. (607): "Some Fathers and teachers have employed the word predestination improperly (ἀκύρως), inappropriately, and in a wider sense than is lawful, to denote the divine purpose both for saving believing men and condemning unbelievers. But in Biblical usage the term predestination is always taken in a good sense, to denote the divine decree concerning the salvation of fallen men." But, even then, there is still a threefold distinction to be observed in the definition of predestination; and the more the Dogmaticians appropriate at one time the one, and again the other, so much the more is this distinction to be considered, in order that the thought may not hence arise, that the Dogmaticians stood in opposition to each other in regard to the subject itself. Sometimes they understood by predestination, in the most general manner, the purpose of God to establish a scheme of redemption whereby all might be saved. Br. (711): "The decree refers to the entire work of leading man to salvation." Thus the notion is defined by the *Formula Concordiæ* (Sol. Dec. XI, 14): "Therefore we embrace in mind, at the same time, the entire doctrine of the design, counsel, will, and ordination of God (viz., all things which pertain to our

redemption, call, justification, and salvation, cf. sq.)," and, after it, Hutt. and others. Holl. (609) gives the following definition: "Predestination, taken in a wider sense, can be defined as the eternal, divine decree, by which God, from His immense mercy, determined to give His Son as Mediator, and, through universal preaching, to offer Him for reception to all men who from eternity He foresaw would fall into sin; also through the Word and Sacraments to confer faith upon all who would not resist; to justify all believers, and besides to renew those using the means of grace; to preserve faith in them until the end of life, and, in a word, to save those believing to the end." Sometimes those are more particularly described in whose case the decree of redemption is really to be accomplished; they are those concerning whom God knows that they will believe. Holl. (608): "In the special or stricter sense, it signifies the ordination of believers to salvation, combined with *πρόθεσις* and *πρόγνωσις*. The *πρόθεσις* (the divine, general and undefined decree concerning the communicating of eternal salvation to all sinful men who, to the end, will believe in Christ) is therefore more specifically defined through the *πρόγνωσις* (the foreknowledge of certain human persons or individuals, who will retain true faith in Christ to the last breath of life)." In the latter case, however, by predestination (taken in the strictest sense) only that decree is understood which was really based upon the general *πρόθεσις* in accordance with the antecedent *πρόγνωσις*, in so far as it embraces the specific number of men who are to be saved, which decree is called *προορισμός*. Holl. (608): "In the most special and strict sense, by which *προορισμὸς* is distinguished from *πρόθεσις* and *πρόγνωσις*, and denotes the eternal purpose of God, determinate or applied to certain men as individuals, whom God from the common mass of corruption elects to eternal life, because He distinctly foresees that they will believe to the end in Christ." The meaning of the last two distinctions is this: that, when we come to speak very accurately, the conceptions of the *πρόθεσις* and *πρόγνωσις*, contained in the latter statement, are merely the antecedent factors of the true and actual purpose (the *προορισμὸς*), which factors, therefore, are not to be connected with the conception of predestination itself, when that is defined as an act or decree. Whence these two factors, viz., the *πρόθεσις* and *πρόγνωσις* are also defined as the normative or directive sources from which election proceeds; the *πρόθεσις* being regarded as the primary or mediate normative source, and the *πρόγνωσις* as the immediate or proximate source. Quen. (III, 18): "The *πρόθεσις* is the primary directing principle of election; yet not immediate, but mediate, for it concurs with the interven-

ing πρόγνωσις, or the foreseeing for election of individuals who would to the end believe in Christ."

[15] Concerning the relation between predestination and election. Quen. (III, 16): "Election is a synonym of predestination, yet predestination and election are not logical synonyms, so as to have the relation of genus and species, as the Calvinists state (contending that the divine predestination as a genus contains, within its bounds, two species, viz., election and reprobation; or, as others say, it contains two decrees, the one of election, the other of reprobation)." Hutt. (773): "But, according to the tenor of Scripture, they are grammatical synonyms, and of the same breadth. And, although they differ somewhat with respect to formal signification, yet materially, and in relation to the subject, they are not distinguished; whence in Eph. 1: 4 and 5, both terms, election and predestination, are received in the same sense, nor is there an unlike example given in Scripture." Holl. (605): "Predestination and election *agree* with respect to the subject, because no man has been predestined to eternal salvation who has not been elected to the same, nor has any one been elected who has not been predestinated." But "they *differ* with respect to formal signification. Election, according to its formal notion, relates to the objects which are to be elected; and predestination, to the end and order of means, which lead to the end of election, or eternal life. For the particle *pre*, in the word *predestination*, connotes the priority and eternity of the divine ordination; but the particle *e*, in the word election, connotes the common aggregate of men, from which there is a separation of some men, and therefore the divine election is the separation of some men from the common mass of corruption, and their adoption into the inheritance of eternal salvation. *Predestination* (1) presupposes πρόγνωσις, the foreknowledge of certain persons believing to the end, Rom. 8: 29; (2) it formally denotes the ordination to eternal life of those men who, according to the divine foreknowledge, receive and continue to employ the means of grace. Acts 13: 48. But election (1) presupposes the love of God, Eph. 1: 6; (2) it formally denotes the separation, from the common mass of perdition, of those men who He foresees will perseveringly believe in Christ, John 15: 19." "Another expression for predestination is, according to Phil. 4: 3; Rev. 3: 5, the writing in the Book of Life."

[16] (*a*) *Full Definition.* Holl. (604): "Predestination is an act of the consequent divine will, by which God (moved by gratuitous mercy, because of the merit of Christ, to be apprehended by persevering faith) separated from the fallen human race, and

ordained to the obtaining eternal salvation for the praise of His glorious grace, those men alone and individually who He foresaw would believe in Christ to the end."

QUEN. (III, 19): "Predestination is an act of the divine will, by which, before the foundations of the earth were laid, not according to our works, but out of pure mercy, according to His purpose and design, which He purposed in Himself in consideration of the merit of Christ to be apprehended by faith, God ordained to eternal life for the praise of His glorious grace such men as, by the power of the Holy Ghost, through the preaching of the Gospel, would perseveringly and to the end believe in Christ."

QUEN. (III, 14): "The peculiar and chief foundation of this fundamental article is Eph. 1: 4–7."

(*b*) The *form of election* is then thus described by QUEN. (III, 18): "It consists in the entire τάξις, or order, which God, in ordaining the eternal decree of election, had as His design, and according to which, for the sake of His own mercy, because of the merit of Christ apprehended by faith, He elects those believing and persevering in faith to the end of life, or, according to which He fulfils in time the election decreed from eternity." From the fact that election has its ground in the preceding πρόθεσις and πρόγνωσις, which are related as major and minor premises to the conclusion, viz., the προορισμός, the syllogism of Predestination arises:

"Every one who will perseveringly believe in Christ to the end of life, will certainly be saved, and, therefore, shall be elected and be written in the Book of Life.

"But Abraham, Peter, Paul, etc., will perseveringly believe in Christ to the end of life.

"Therefore, Abraham, Peter, Paul, etc., will certainly be saved, and, therefore, shall be elected and be written in the Book of Life." (HOLL., 630.)

(*c*) The *causes of election* are then stated thus: "The *efficient cause* of election is the will of the Triune God, freely decreeing (Rom. 8: 28; Eph. 1: 4; John 13: 18; 15: 16, 19; Acts 13: 2; 2 Thess. 2: 13); the *impulsive or moving internal cause* is the purely gratuitous grace of God (Rom. 9: 15, 16; Eph. 1: 5; 2: 8, 9; Rom. 11: 5, 6); the *moving external cause* is the merit of Christ, regarded with respect to foreseen final application (Eph. 1: 4–7)." As the *external less principal cause*, some state, "Faith in Christ, and this final."

[17] HUTT. (795): "Concerning the question (whether the eternal election of those who are to be saved is to be assigned to the

antecedent or the consequent will), a twofold way presents itself, some turning too much to the right, others too far to the left, and both from the path of truth, although in a diverse mode, relation, and end. For those who follow the side of Calvin affirm that the decree of election should be sought in the antecedent will of God alone, but in such a way, as thence to derive both the absolute and the particular will, and indeed also the absolute election of few men. *Huber*, on the other hand, likewise placed election in the antecedent will alone; and, although contending aright, against the Calvinists, that this will is universal, yet erroneously and falsely constructed thence, against the orthodox, the opinion that election is universal and entirely unlimited. Therefore, just as Calvin removes and eliminates from the decree of election all reference to faith, so Huber does the very act of faith. Each of these errors, deviating from the analogy of faith, violates it in this, that it altogether substitutes election for every consideration of righteousness, imputed through faith on account of Christ In this way, indeed, it is lawful to infer no election at all, rather than either the absolute election of a few, or the universal election of all. For in all Scripture the name of the elect is never ascribed except to those alone who actually believe and absolutely persevere in faith. In the second place, even the very sound of the terms, *election* and *elect*, and their peculiar relation, intimate and prove a distinction or dissimilarity with respect to men. For the elect are so called in distinction from the non-elect; and yet, in fact, Christian piety and faith forbid us making any distinction among men in the antecedent will. Therefore, the orthodox Church, making a separation from each of these errors, *places election not in the sole and merely simple antecedent will of God, but rather in the consequent will.*"

[18] Holl. (633): "Those elected by God in Christ are wretched sinful men; yet not all promiscuously, but those whom God from eternity distinctly foresaw as those who would believe in Christ to the end." Therefore (619), "The election to eternal life of men corrupted by sin was made by the most merciful God, in consideration of faith in Christ remaining steadfast to the end of life." To guard the expression, *in consideration of faith* (*intuitu fidei*), from misunderstanding, it was still farther observed by Quen. (III, 36): "(*a*) Faith, and that, too, as persevering or final faith, enters into the sphere of eternal election, *not as already afforded, but as foreknown.* For we are elected to eternal life from faith divinely foreseen, apprehending, to the end, the merit of Christ; (*b*) Faith enters into election not by reason of any meritorious worth, but with respect to its correlate, or so far as it is the only means of

apprehending the merit of Christ; or, in other words, faith is not a meritorious cause of election, but only a prerequisite condition, or a part of the entire order divinely appointed in election;" others express themselves so as to mark faith as the less principal external cause. Concerning the different expressions through which the relation of faith to predestination is stated, Br. (725): "Some of our theologians, indeed, have said that faith in Christ is the instrumental cause of the decree of election; others, that it is its condition; some that it is the condition on the part of the object of election; others that it is a part of the order of predestination. These all practically agree with each other, and with those who call it the impulsive less principal cause. For all acknowledge that faith is not a mere condition which exercises no causality; but, as it is constituted for the act of saving, so is it for the act of decreeing salvation (virtually causing salvation), as that in consideration of which we have been elected, and yet not as a principal cause, of itself able to influence God to elect us. Whence, when faith is otherwise regarded under the figure of a hand or organ, by which, as a cause of salvation, the grace of God electing and the merit of Christ are apprehended, and, in this manner, is usually called an *instrument;* yet here the relation of faith to the decree of election itself must be shown: where our theologians do not say that it is of the manner of an instrument, which the efficient principal cause, God, in electing, employs to produce the act of election by a real influx. But those who have spoken of *an instrumental moral cause* cannot understand anything else than an impulsive less principal cause. . . . Therefore, then, this formula of speaking remains, by which faith is called the impulsive cause or reason, yet not the chief or principal; but with the addition, for the sake of avoiding ambiguity, of *less principal.*" Baier commends the following from Meissner: "It seems more fitting that faith be considered not separately as a peculiar cause of election, distinct from the merit of Christ, but joined with that merit as apprehended, so as to render both united the one impelling cause of election. For neither does faith merit without the application, nor does it itself move God to elect, but both combined in the divine foreknowledge, i. e., *the merit apprehended by faith, or faith apprehending the merit.*"

Concerning the relation of prescience and predestination, Hutt. (Loc. c., 803): "I. The word Prescience is received in this place, not in a general, indefinite, and loose sense, concerning the knowledge of all future things; in which sense the prescience of bad things, as well as of good, belongs to God, and presupposes, at the same time, predestination: but restrictedly and determinatively to

a certain matter and subject, namely, to prescience of faith in Christ, which is peculiar to the elect. This determinative distinguishing of prescience always presupposes predestination, according to Rom. 8: 29, *whom He foreknew*, viz., according to the interpretation of Augustine, those who would believe in His Son, *He also did predestinate;* and He indeed predestinated them to be conformed to the image of His Son. For in this passage the Apostle does not treat of the antecedent will of God, by reason of which He wishes all men to be conformed to the image of His Son, but he treats of those who already, in the very decree of God, are conformed to this image. II. This prescience is not the predestination itself of God, or the decree of election, as Calvin affirms. . . . For the Apostle, in the words just cited, expressly considers prescience and predestination as two distinct things; saying, *whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate;* otherwise, a most senseless notion, such as this, would appear: 'Whom He predestinated, He predestinated.' . . . Therefore, it is decided aright that the word prescience in this passage denotes, according to the Hebrew idiom, not the simple knowledge of God, but that which is joined with approbation and delight, because determined to an object pleasing to God, viz., to Christ apprehended by faith, or, what amounts to the same thing, to faith apprehending the merit of Christ. III. This prescience, which we have said enters into the decree of election, is not regarded as a cause, on account of, or because of, which election takes place, or salvation itself is conferred upon the elect; because it is not an essential part, constituting election itself, but is added to predestination only as an adjunct, and that, too, inseparable. For although prescience, since it is placed in a lower grade, can be sometimes unaccompanied by predestination, as happens in regard to the sins and wicked actions of men, yet, with predestination determined because of a higher grade, it is necessary that the lower should always be included. Hence the Apostle says: 'The foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal, "The Lord knoweth them that are His,"' 2 Tim. 2: 19. Moreover, He knew this not only in time, but foreknew it from all eternity. This knowledge or foreknowledge is therefore an eye, as it were, of the eternal election; for he who would destroy this would render our election blind and destroy it."

[19] Holl. (631): "The decree is relative, because when God predestined certain fallen men to eternal life, and, indeed, some rather than others, He regarded something outside of Himself as an impulsive external cause, viz., the merit of Christ, to be apprehended by persevering faith."

QUEN. (III, 31): "Predestination to eternal life is not *absolute*, but is founded upon Christ as Mediator. The antithesis of the Calvinists, who exclude the merit of Christ from the causes of election, and refer to means of accomplishing it furnished in time, and, therefore, deny that Christ is the meritorious cause of our election." The doctrine of Calvin is accordingly distinguished from that of the Lutheran Church, in that, according to the former, predestination rests upon an absolute decree of God ("by which God absolutely of Himself, without a prerequisite condition or without outward respect to any other cause or intervening reason, wills and does something, according to the manner in which He absolutely willed to create and preserve it." QUEN.); and hence, likewise, it is not the earnestly intended will of God that all men should be saved unto whom the Gospel is preached, and, accordingly, a distinction is made between the manifest will, or that of the sign, and the secret will, or that of the purpose.

[20] HOLL. (631): "God indeed decreed absolutely and unconditionally to save this or that one, because He certainly foresaw his persevering faith in Christ." If it be asserted of the decree that it is not conditioned, it appears to contradict the former assertion that it is not absolute. HOLL. (632) explains the apparent contradiction by the following: "When the decree of predestination is said to be not absolute, it must not be regarded on that account conditional. For the idea is not, that God from eternity would elect this or that one to salvation, *if* he would believe in Christ, and depart hence in the true faith, but *because* he would believe and would persevere. Faith regarded in the will of God, before the act of predestination, is therefore indeed a condition, under which He desires the salvation of all; yet in the decree itself it is not a condition under which the election was made, but a reason by which God was moved to elect. Therefore, the decree should not be denied to be absolute, when considered with respect to that which is conditional; yet not in such a manner as to exclude the consideration of the *a priori* reason outside of God, as a part in the order of predestination, which is, without doubt, faith in Christ foreseen from eternity, or, what amounts to the same thing, the merit of Christ, apprehended by faith. For the decree must not be confounded with the antecedent will of God, which, we affirm, from the Word of God, does not exclude a condition, but appoints it, Rom. 11: 23."

[21] QUEN. (III, 21): "Through mortal sins the elect may altogether lose and banish the Holy Ghost, faith and the grace of God, and thus for a time become subjects of condemnation, yet

they cannot be wanting to the end, and perish eternally. Total loss of grace is one thing, final loss of grace is another. That is *total*, by which any one is entirely deprived of the grace of God; that is *final*, by which any one, shortly before death, departs from the faith, and dies in unbelief."

[22] Holl. (642): "A regenerate man in the midst of the course of his life is certain of his election conditionally (Phil. 2: 12); but, at the end of life, he rejoices in the absolute certainty of his predestination."

[23] Holl. (644): "The word 'reprobation' (ἀποδοκιμασία) is not found in just so many syllables in Holy Scripture. The word ἀδόκιμος is used, 1 Cor. 9: 27; 2 Cor. 13: 5; Heb. 6: 8." Quen. (III, 21): "It is otherwise called προγραφὴ εἰς τὸ κρίμα, Jude 4."

[24] Brchm.: "When the case of reprobation is considered, there is need of pious caution. We must avoid considering God the cause of reprobation in the same manner as He is the cause of election. For He is the cause of election, both with regard to His effecting it and with regard to the end; both with regard to the decrees and to all the means leading to the end. But the matter is different in reprobation. For, since reprobation is eternal perdition, to which there is no direct way except through sin, and especially unbelief, every one must see that reprobation cannot be ascribed to God as effecting it, inasmuch as it is either damnation itself or sin, the means leading thither. The true cause of reprobation is in man himself, and is undoubtedly the obstinate contempt of the grace offered in the Gospel. . . . God, meanwhile, is not the indifferent witness of reprobation, but, as the just avenger of crimes and of despised grace, is occupied with certain special acts concerning the wicked and unbelieving, who, although they have been for a long time admonished, invited, and punished, yet out of pure malice have continued to despise and resist the Gospel."

CHAPTER II.

Of the Fraternal Redemption by Christ, as the Second Source of Salvation.

§ 31. *Statement of the Subject.*

THE redemption designed by God from eternity was accomplished in time by His only begotten Son, Jesus Christ, [1] and of this we are now to treat. The subject will be discussed under three heads: I. The Person of the Redeemer. II. The Work by which He accomplished Redemption. III. The several States in which He appeared from the time of His incarnation.

[1] Holl. (650): "The Redeemer of the human race is Jesus Christ. The Redeemer is called Jesus, *i. e.*, Saviour, because He was to save His people from their sins, Matt. 1: 21." (655): "He is called Christ, *i. e.*, anointed, because He was anointed by the Holy Ghost as our king, priest, and prophet, John 1: 41." The Dogmaticians prove that Jesus Christ is the true Messiah, in whom all the prophecies of the Old Testament concerning the Messiah are exactly fulfilled. Holl. (675): "Proof. (1) Whoever is God and man is the true Messiah. But Jesus, etc. The major premise is evident from 2 Sam. 7: 12, 13; Ps. 110: 1; Micah 5: 1; Jer. 23: 5 . . . (2) Whoever was born of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Judah, of the royal branch of David, and of a pure virgin, is the true Messiah. The major premise, from Gen. 22: 18; 49: 10; 2 Sam. 7: 12; Is. 7: 14. The minor, from Luke 3: 23; 1: 34. (3) Whatever ruler of Israel, as God, was begotten from eternity, and as man was born in the fulness of time at Bethlehem, is the true Messiah. The major premise, from Micah 5: 2. The minor, from Matt. 2: 6. . . . (4) He is the true Messiah, for whose approach a divinely-appointed herald prepared the way. The major, from Is. 40: 3; Mal. 3: 1. The minor, from Mark 1: 2, 3. . . . (5) Whatever king of Zion entered Jerusalem poor and humble, riding upon an ass, is the true Messiah, Zach. 9: 9. . . . (6) Whoever is the *Goel*, or Redeemer, according to the law of consanguinity, Job 19: 25; the prophet like Moses, Deut. 13: 15; a universal king, Zach. 9: 9; Ps. 72: 8; a priest according to the order of Melchize-

dek, Ps. 110: 4; a priest interceding for sinners, Is. 53: 12; who is to pass through the extremity of suffering, Ps. 22; Is. 53; who is to die, Dan. 9: 26; who is to be buried, Is. 53: 9; who is to be free from corruption; to descend to the dead and to rise again, Ps. 16: 10; to ascend to heaven, Ps. 68: 18; to sit at the right hand of God the Father, Ps. 110: 1, is the promised Messiah. All these things the New Testament declares of Jesus of Nazareth."

A.—OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

§ 32. *Of the Personal Union.*

In Christ the Redeemer we recognize a duality of natures and a unity of person, as expressed in the statement: "*In Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, are two natures, a divine, that of the Word* (ὁ λόγος), *and a human nature, so united that Christ is one person.*" (CHMN., Loc. Th., I, 75.) We are to treat, therefore, in succession, first, of the two natures in Christ, and secondly, of the person of Christ.

I. *Of the Two Natures in Christ.*—Christ is God and man. This is otherwise thus expressed: He exists in two natures, the divine and the human. [1] The divine nature He has of God the Father, and from eternity; the human nature He assumed in time from the Virgin Mary. [2] Each of these natures is to be regarded as truly genuine and entire, [3] for Christ is true God and true man. [4] As true man He participates in all the natural weaknesses to which human nature is subject since the Fall—He participates therein, however, not in consequence of a natural necessity, but in consequence of His own free will, for the accomplishment of His mediatorial work; for, as He was born of a human being, the Virgin Mary, but not begotten of a human father, His human nature did not inherit any of the consequences of Adam's sin. [5] This does not prevent us from ascribing to Christ a true, complete human nature, like our own, as this is, indeed, predicated of Adam when not yet fallen, inasmuch as original sin, that we have inherited in consequence of the sin of Adam, has not given man another nature. It does, however, follow from the peculiar circumstances connected with the birth of Christ, and from the peculiar relation which the divine λόγος sustains to this human nature, that certain peculiarities must be predi-

cated of the human nature of Christ which distinguish it from that of other men. These are (1) the ἀνυποστασία [*i. e.*, want of personality]; (2) the ἀναμαρτησία [*i. e.*, sinlessness]; (3) the *singularis animæ et corporis excellentia* [*i. e.*, the peculiar excellence of soul and body.] [6] The first results from the peculiar relation which the divine λόγος entered into with the human nature; for this latter is not to be regarded as at any time subsisting by itself and constituting a person by itself, since the λόγος did not assume a human person, but only a human nature. Therefore there is negatively predicated of the human nature the ἀνυποστασία, inasmuch as the human nature has no personality of its own; and there is positively predicated of it the ἐνυποστασία, inasmuch as this human nature has become possessed of another hypostasis, that of the divine nature. The ἀναμαρτησία (sinlessness) is expressly taught in many passages of the Scriptures (2 Cor. 5: 21; Heb. 7: 26; Is. 53: 9; Dan. 9: 24; Luke 1: 35; 1 Peter 1: 19; 2: 22), and follows also from the supernatural birth of Christ. The singular excellence of soul and body is a consequence of His sinlessness.

II. *Of the Person of Christ.*—The person of the Redeemer is constituted, when the λόγος, the Second Person of the Godhead, the Son of God, unites Himself with human nature, and this so firmly and intimately that the two natures now united constitute One Person, which is that of the Redeemer, the God-man. [7] The act itself by which this is accomplished is called *unitio personalis.* Hollaz (665): "The divine action by which the Son of God assumed human nature, in the womb of the Virgin Mary, into the unity of His own person." [8] This act is chosen and determined upon by the entire holy Trinity, by whom the substance that constitutes the human nature is prepared, and by whom this is united with the divine nature; but this act is accomplished in the second person of the Godhead, who alone has become man. [9] This Second Person of the Godhead, the λόγος, in the act of uniting holds such a relation to the human nature that He, the λόγος, imparts the personality, [10] and is in general the efficient agent through which the union is accomplished; for it is He that sustains an active relation to the human nature, which He assumes, whilst the human nature stands in a passive relation

to Him. [11] This firm union of the divine and human natures, regarded as a *condition*, is then called *unio personalis seu hypostatica* [*i. e.*, personal or hypostatic union]. Holl. (679): "The personal union is a conjunction of the two natures, divine and human, subsisting in one hypostasis of the Son of God, producing a mutual and an indissoluble communion of both natures." [12] And the result of this activity of the λόγος is, that the hypostasis of the divine nature now has become also the hypostasis of the human nature, *i. e.*, both natures have now one hypostasis, that of the λόγος, and together form one person, that of the Redeemer, the God-man. [13] In consequence thereof the union of the two natures is so close and inseparable [14] that the one can no longer be conceived of as without or away from the other, but both are to be regarded as in all respects united, [15] yet in such a way that each of the two natures in this union retains its own essential character and peculiarities as before, and remains unmingled with the other. [16] So the Scriptures teach. But it is impossible to form a correct conception of the way and manner in which these two natures are united in the One Person, because the Scriptures teach us only the union itself, and not the mode in which it is effected. We shall have to content ourselves, therefore, with guarding against false conceptions that might be entertained in regard to this union. [17] Accordingly, we say that the union is "(1) not an *essential* one, by which two natures coalesce in one essence (against the Eutychians); (2) not a *natural* one, such as that of the soul and body in man; (3) not an *accidental* one, such as (*a*) between two or more different qualities united in one subject (as whiteness and sweetness are united in milk); (*b*) between a quality and a substance (as we find in a learned man); (*c*) between two substances that are accidentally united (as between beams that happen to be fastened together); (4) not a merely *verbal* one, arising either from a sinecure title (as when a man is called a counselor of his sovereign, which title was never bestowed upon him because of counsels he had given), or from the use of figurative language (as when Herod is called a fox); finally, (5) not an *habitual* or *relative* one, which may exist, although the parties to this union may be separated and far apart. (There are

many varieties of this relative union, such as moral, between friends; domestic, between husband and wife; political, between citizens; ecclesiastical, between members of the Church.)" [18] Holl. (679). On the other hand, we may predicate of this union, positively, that

"(1) It is *true* and *real*, because it exists between extremes that really adhere, there being no separation or distance between them;

"(2) It is a *personal* one (but not a union of persons), and interpenetrative (*perichoristica*); *

"(3) It is a perpetually enduring one." (See Notes 6, 7, 8.)

[1] Heffr. (260): "By the *natures*, the two sources or parts, so to speak, are understood, of which the person of Christ has been constituted, namely, a Divine nature and a human nature." Of *Person* it is remarked: "The Person of our Redeemer is here considered, not as ἀσαρκος, or such as it was from eternity before the incarnation, but as ἐνσαρκος, or such as it began to be in the fulness of time, through the taking of our human nature into His own divine person." (Holl., 656.)

General Definition of Nature and Person. Chmn. (de duab. nat., 1): "Essence, or *substance*, or *nature*, is that which of itself is common to many individuals of the same species, and which embraces the entire essential perfection of each of them."

"*Person or individual* is something peculiar, possessing indeed the entire and perfect substance of the same species, but determined and limited by a characteristic and personal peculiarity, and thus subsists of itself, separated or distinguished from the other individuals of the same species, not in essence, but in number. For a person is an indivisible, intelligent, incommunicable substance, which neither is a part of another, nor is sustained in another, nor has dependence upon another object such as the separated soul has upon the body that is to be raised up. Therefore, the names of the essence or natures are θεότης, ἀνθρωπότης, divinity, humanity, divine nature, human nature, divine essence, human substance. The designations of the person are *God*, *man*."

Concerning the difference of signification, in which the term *nature or essence* is employed with reference to God and to man, cf. chapter, "Of the Holy Trinity," note 14, p. 141.

Quen. (*Of the Divine Nature of Christ* (III, 75)): "The divine nature otherwise signifies the divine essence, one in number, com-

*Perichoristica. See § 33, Note 2.

mon to all three Persons, and entire in each; but, in the article 'Of the Person of Christ,' this is not considered absolutely, in so far as it is common to the three persons of the Godhead, but relatively, so far as it subsists in the person of the Son of God, and, as by the manner of its existence, it is limited to the Second Person of the Trinity. Whence it is true that the entire divine essence is united to human nature, but only in one of its persons, viz., the second."

[2] QUEN. (III, 75): "The incarnate Person consists of two natures, divine and human. The divine nature He possesses from eternity, from God the Father, through eternal, true, and properly named generation of substance; whence Christ is also the true, natural, and eternal God, and Son of God. A true and pure human nature He received in time, of the Virgin Mary."

A twofold generation is, therefore, distinguished in Christ: one "an eternal generation, through which He is the Son of God;" and another, "a generation in time, through which He is man, or the Son of man. Gal. 4: 4." (BR., 457.)

[3] HOLL. (659): "The Council of Chalcedon: 'We confess that He is true God and true man, the latter consisting of a rational soul and a body, co-essential with the Father according to the Godhead, and co-essential with us according to the manhood, in all things like unto us, sin only excepted.'"

SCHRZR. (177): "The antithesis of the Eutychians, who indeed admit two natures prior to the act of union, but affirm that from that time the human nature has been altogether absorbed by the Godhead."

QUEN. (III, 75): "With regard to the human nature we must consider: 1, its truth; 2, its completeness; 3, its ὁμοουσία (identity of essence). The first excludes a mere appearance; the second, incompleteness; the third, contrariety of essence (ἑτεροουσία)."

GRH. (III, 373): "In Christ there is a *true and perfect divine nature*, and hence Christ is also true, natural, and eternal God. We say that in Christ there are not only divine gifts, but also a true and perfect divine nature; nor do we simply say that He is and is called God, but that He is true, natural, and eternal God, in order, by this means, to separate our confession the more distinctly from the blasphemies of the Photinians, and all opponents of the divine nature."

(Id. III, 400): "In Christ there is a *true, complete, and perfect human nature*, and for this reason Christ is also true, perfect, and natural man. By *truth* of human nature is meant that the Word took upon Himself not an appearance, or mere outward form of human nature, but in reality became a man. By *completeness* of

human nature is meant that He took, into the unity of His person, all the essential parts of human nature, not only a body, but also a rational soul; since His flesh was flesh pervaded by soul. Nor is it said only that He was, but that He still is, a man: because He never has laid aside, nor ever will lay aside, what He has once assumed." These expressions are directed against the Monotheletes, "who acknowledged a human mind in Christ, but denied to Christ a human will." (BRCHM.)

[4] HOLL. (656): "1. *The true and eternal divine nature* is proved by the most complete arguments, derived (*a*) from the divine names (arg. ὀνομαστικοῖς); (*b*) from the attributes peculiar to the true God alone (arg. ἰδιωματικοῖς); (*c*) from the personal and essential acts of God (arg. ἐνεργητικοῖς); (*d*) from the religious worship due God alone (arg. λατρευτικοῖς);" cf. chapter on the Trinity, note 34.

"II. That Christ is *true man*, is shown (*a*) from human names (John 8: 40; 1 Tim. 2: 5); (*b*) from the essential parts of a man (John 2: 21; Heb. 2: 14; Luke 24: 39; John 10: 15; Matt. 26: 38; Luke 2: 52; John 5: 21; Matt. 26: 39); (*c*) from the attributes peculiar to a true man (Matt. 4: 2; John 19: 28; Matt. 25: 37; Luke 19: 41; John 11: 33); (*d*) from human works (Luke 2: 46, 48; Matt. 4: 1; 26: 55); (*e*) from the genealogy of Christ as a man (in the ascending line, Luke 3: 23; in the descending line, Matt. 1: 1)."

[5] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 11): . . . "Christ, conceived of the Holy Ghost, took upon Himself a human nature without sin, pure. Therefore the infirmities, which as punishments accompany sin, would not have been in the flesh of Christ by necessity of the condition, but His body could have been kept clear and exempt from these infirmities. Sinful flesh was not necessary to His being true man, as Adam, before the Fall, without the infirmities which are punishments, was true man. But for our sakes, and for our salvation, the incarnate Christ, to commend His love to us, willingly took upon Himself these infirmities, that thus He might bear the punishment transferred from us to Himself, and might free us from it." HUTT. (l. c., 125): "That He took upon Himself these, not so far as they have reference to any guilt, but only as they have the condition of punishment; neither, indeed, these individually and collectively, but only such as the work of Redemption rendered it necessary for Him to take upon Himself, and which detract nothing from the dignity of His nature." But a distinction is made between natural and personal infirmities.

HOLL. (657): "*The natural infirmities common to men* are those

which, since the Fall, exist in all men, *e. g.*, to hunger, to thirst, to be wearied, to suffer cold and heat, to be grieved, to be angry, to be troubled, to weep. Since they are without guilt, Christ, according to the testimony of Holy Scripture, took them upon Himself, not by constraint, but freely; not for His own sake, but for our sake" (QUEN. (III, 76): "that He might perform the work of a mediator, and become a victim for our sins"), "not forever, but for a time, namely, in the state of humiliation, and not retaining the same in the state of exaltation. . . . *Personal infirmities* are those which proceed from particular causes, and derive their origin either from an imperfection of formative power in the one begetting, as consumption, gout; or from a particular crime, as intemperance in eating and drinking, such as fever, dropsy, etc.; or from a special divine judgment, as the diseases of the family of Job (2 Sam. 3: 29). *These are altogether remote from the most holy humanity of Christ, because to have assumed these would not have been of advantage to the human race, and would have detracted from human dignity.*"

[6] HOLL. (657): "To the human nature of Christ there belong certain individual designations, by which, as by certain distinctive characteristics or prerogatives, He excels other men; such are (*a*) *ἀνυποστασία*, the being without a peculiar subsistence, since this is replaced by the divine person (*ὑπόστασις*) of the Son of God, as one far more exalted. If the human nature of Christ had retained its peculiar subsistence, there would have been in Christ two persons, and therefore two mediators, contrary to 1 Tim. 2: 5. The reason is, because a person is formally constituted in its being by a subsistence altogether complete, and therefore unity of person is to be determined from unity of subsistence. Therefore, one or the other nature, of those which unite in one person, must be without its own peculiar subsistence; and, since the divine nature, which is really the same as its subsistence, cannot really be without the same, it is evident that the absence of a peculiar subsistence must be ascribed to the human nature." Still, a distinction must be made between *ἀνυποστασία* and *ἐνυποστασία*. QUEN. (III, 77): "That is *ἀνυπόστατον* which does not subsist of itself and according to its peculiar personality; but that is *ἐνυπόστατον* which subsists in another, and becomes the partaker of the hypostasis of another. When, therefore, the human nature of Christ is said to be *ἀνυπόστατος*, nothing else is meant than that it does not subsist of itself, and according to itself, in a peculiar personality; moreover, it is called *ἐνυπόστατος*, because it has become a partaker of the hypostasis of another, and subsists in the *λόγος*."

HOLL. (658) considers the following objections: "You say, 'If the human nature is without a peculiar subsistence, the same will be more imperfect than our nature, which is αὐθυπόστατος, or subsisting of itself.' Reply: 'The perfection of an object is to be determined from its essence, and not from its subsistence.'" The observation of GRH. (III, 421) is also of importance: "'Ανυπόστατον has a twofold meaning. Absolutely, that is said to be ἀνυπόστατον, which subsists neither in its own ὑποστάσις, nor in that of another, which has neither essence nor subsistence, is neither in itself, nor in another, but is purely negative. In this sense, the human nature of Christ cannot be said to be ἀνυπόστατον. Relatively, that is said to be ἀνυποστατον, which does not subsist in its own, but in the ὑποστάσις of another; which indeed has essence, but not personality and subsistence peculiar to itself. In this sense, the flesh of Christ is said to be ἀνυποστατος, because it is ἐνύποστατος, subsisting in the λόγος." "The statement of some, that the starting-point of the incarnation is the ἀνυποστασία of the flesh intervening between that subsistence, on the one hand, by which the mass whereof the body of Christ was formed subsisted as a part of the Virgin, not by its own subsistence and that of the Virgin; and the subsistence, on the other hand, whereby the human nature, formed from the sanctified mass by the operation of the Holy Ghost in the first moment of incarnation, began to subsist with the very subsistence of the λόγος, communicated to it, is not to be received in such a sense *as though the flesh of Christ was at any time entirely* ἀνυπόστατος; but, because in our thought, such an ἀνυποστασία is regarded prior to its reception into the subsistence of the λόγος, not with regard to the order of time, but to that of nature. *The flesh and soul were not first united into one person; but the formation of the flesh, by the Holy Ghost, from the separated and sanctified mass, the giving of a soul to this flesh as formed, the taking up of the formed and animated flesh into the subsistence of the* λόγος, *and the conception of the formed, animated, and subsisting flesh in the womb of the virgin, were simultaneous.*"

(*b*) ἀναμαρτησία. CHEMN. (de duab. nat., 13, 14): "For this reason Gabriel says to Mary, 'The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee, so that what shall be born of thee will be holy.' Therefore, the working of the Holy Ghost caused the Virgin Mary without male seed to conceive and be with child. And the Holy Ghost so sanctified, and cleansed from every spot of sin, the mass which the Son of God, in the conception, assumed from the flesh and blood of Mary, that that which is born of Mary was holy, Is. 53: 9; Dan. 9: 24; Luke 1: 35; 2 Cor. 5: 21; Heb. 7: 26; 1 Pet. 1: 19; 2: 22."

(Quen. (III, 77): "I say inherent, not imputative, sinlessness; for our sins were really imputed to Him, and He was made sin for us, 2 Cor. 5: 21.")

Schrzr. (189): "Christ never sinned, nor was He even able to sin. We prove the statement that He was not even able to sin, or that He was impeccable, as follows: (α) He who is like men, sin only excepted, cannot be peccable. For, since all men are peccable, Christ would be like them also with regard to sin and peccability, which contradicts the apostle, Heb. 7: 26. (β) He who is both holy by His origin, and is exempt from original sin, who can never have a depraved will, and constitutes one person with God Himself, is clearly impeccable. (γ) He who is higher than the angels is altogether impeccable. (δ) He to whom the Holy Ghost has been given without measure, is also holy and just without measure, and therefore cannot sin."

(c) *An eminent excellence of soul and body.* Quen. (III, 78): "A threefold perfection of soul, viz., of intellect, will, and desire." (Holl. (658): "The soul of Christ contains excellences of wisdom, Luke 2: 47; John 7: 46, and of holiness.") "The perfection of body: (α) The highest εὐκρασια, a healthful and uniform temperament of body. (β) ἀθανασία, or immortality" (Holl. (ib.) "which belongs to Him, both because of the soundness of an impeccable nature, Rom. 6: 23, and through the indissoluble bond of the personal union. Christ, therefore, is immortal, by reason of an intrinsic principle, and the fact that He died arose from an extrinsic principle, and according to a voluntary arrangement, John 10: 17, 18. Yet, in the death which was voluntarily submitted to, the body of Christ remained ἄφθαρτον, or exempt from corruption, Ps. 16: 10; Acts 2: 31.") (γ) "The greatest elegance and beauty of form, Ps. 45: 2." (Holl. (ib.): "The beauty of Christ's body is inferred from the excellence of the soul inhabiting it, . . . and from the immediate operation of the Holy Ghost, by whose efficacious presence the most glorious temple of Christ's body was formed." Quen. (III, 78): "The passage, 'He was despised and rejected of men,' Is. 53: 3, refers to the deformity arising from the wounds of the passion.")

[7] Chmn. (de duab. nat., 18): "It is not sufficient to know and to believe that in Christ there are, in some way or other, two natures, divine and human, but we must add to this that, in the hypostatic union, they are so closely joined, that there is one and the same subsistence consisting of these two natures, and subsisting in two natures."

Holl. (668): "The divine and human natures existing in the

one united person of the Son of God have one and the same hypostasis, yet have it in a diverse mode. For the divine nature has this primarily, of itself and independently; but the human nature has this secondarily, because of the personal union, and therefore by partaking of it from another (Lat. *participative*)."

[8] Br. (461): "The union of the human nature with the divine consists in this, that the natures are so joined that they become one person." Expressions of like import are: σάρκωσις, ἐνσάρκωσις, σαρκογεννησια, incarnation, becoming man, becoming body (*incorporatio*, ἐνανθρώπησις and ἐνσωμάτωσις), assumption (πρόσληψις).

Quen. (III, 80): "The basis of this mystery is found in John 1: 14; Gal. 4: 4; 1 Tim. 3: 16; Heb. 2: 14, 16; Rom. 9: 5."

Definition.—Holl. (665): "The incarnation is a divine act, by which the Son of God, in the womb of His mother, the Virgin Mary, took into the unity of His person a human nature, consubstantial with us, but without sin, and destitute of a subsistence of its own, and communicated to the same both His divine person and nature, so that Christ now subsists forever, as the God-man, in two natures, divine and human, most intimately united."

[9] Grh. (III, 413): "The question is asked, 'How is the work of incarnation ascribed to the Father and Holy Ghost, so that, nevertheless, the Son alone is said to be incarnate?' We distinguish between (1) the sanctification of the mass whereof the body of Christ was formed, which cleansed it from every stain of sin, and (2) the formation of the body of Christ from that sanctified mass by divine power, which twofold action is common to the entire Trinity, and (3) the assumption of that body into the person of the λόγος, which is peculiar to the Son of God. Whence the work of incarnation, so far as the act is concerned, *is said to be common to the entire Trinity;* but, so far as the end of the assumed flesh, which is the person of the λόγος, is concerned, it is peculiar to the Son. So far as the effecting or production of the act is concerned, it is said to be a *work ad extra and essential*, or common to the entire Trinity. So far as its termination or relation is concerned, it is *a work ad extra and personal*, or peculiar to the Son.* The *act* of assumption proceeds from the divine virtue common to the three persons; the *end* of the assumption is the person peculiar to the Son. The Father sent the Son into the world. The Holy Ghost, coming upon the drops of blood from which the body of Christ was formed, *sanctified* and cleansed them from all sin, in order that that which would be born of Mary should be holy, and by divine power

*** Compare chapter on the Trinity, note 22.**

so wrought in the blessed Virgin that, contrary to the order of nature, she conceived offspring without male seed. The Son descended from heaven, *overshadowed the Virgin*, came into flesh, and became flesh by partaking of the same, by manifesting Himself in the same, and by taking it into the unity of His person." (In Luke 1: 35, "The power of the Highest shall overshadow thee," is generally understood as referring to the Son.) HOLL. (661): "Overshadowing denotes the mysterious and wonderful filling of the temple of the body, formed by the Holy Ghost. For the Son of God overshadowed the Virgin Mary, while He descended in an inscrutable manner into the womb of the Virgin, and by a peculiar assimilation filled and united to Himself a particle of the Virgin's blood excited by the Holy Spirit, so that He dwelt in it bodily, as in His own temple." (Id. 661 and 662): "*The conception of the God-man* is referred to the Holy Ghost, Luke 1: 35: (*a*) because the entire work of fructifying is ascribed to Him, Gen 1: 2; (*b*) in order that the purity of the particle of blood, from which the flesh of Christ grew, might be the more evident; (*c*) that thus the cause of the generation of Christ as a man, and of our regeneration, might be the same, viz., the Holy Ghost. *The material source, and that the entire source*, of the conception and production of Christ, the man, is Mary, the pure Virgin (Is. 7: 14), born of the royal pedigree of David, and therefore of the tribe of Judah (Luke 3; Acts 2: 30). *The material, partial and proximate source* is the quickened seed of the Virgin (Heb. 2: 14, 16)."

Against the above, Vorstius, following the Socinians, asserts: "That the Holy Ghost in forming Christ, the man, supplied the place of male seed, yea, even of man himself, and that nothing was absent from this generation of Christ except the agency and seed of a male." GERHARD, in reply, asks (III, 417): "Whether, because of the peculiar work of the Holy Ghost in the conception of Christ, it is right to call Him the father of Christ?" and answers: "By no means; for none of those acts which are ascribed to the Holy Ghost, in this work, confers upon Him the right and title of father. The devout old authors confine this action to three points. The first is the immediate energy which gave the Virgin the power of conceiving offspring, contrary to the order of nature, without male seed. The second is the miraculous sanctification, which sanctified, *i. e.*, cleansed from sin, the mass of which the body of the Son of God was formed. The third is the mysterious union, which joined the human and divine natures into one person. *The Holy Ghost was not the spermatic, but* (a) *the formative* (δημιουργική), (b) *the sanctifying* (ἁγιαστική), (c) *the completing* (τελειωτική) *cause of conception.* . .

But, because of none of these operations can the Holy Ghost be called the father of Christ, because the flesh of Christ was not begotten of the essence of the Holy Ghost, but of the substance of the Virgin Mary. 'Of the Holy Ghost,' does not denote the material, but the efficient cause and operation. . . . When we say, 'Of the Holy Ghost,' the 'of' is potential."

[10] CHEM. (de duab. nat., 23): "The human nature did not assume the divine, nor did man assume God, nor did the divine person assume a human person; but the divine nature of the λόγος, or God the λόγος, or the person of the Son of God, subsisting from eternity in the divine nature, assumed in the fulness of time a certain mass of human nature, so that in Christ there is an assuming nature, viz., the divine, and an assumed nature, viz., the human. In other cases, human nature is always the nature of a certain individual, whose peculiarity it is to subsist in a certain hypostasis, which is distinguished by a characteristic property from the other hypostases of the same nature. Thus each man has a soul of his own. But in the incarnate Christ, the divine nature subsisted of itself before this union, and indeed from eternity. *Yet the mass of the assumed nature did not thus subsist of itself before this union, so that before this union there was a body and soul belonging to a certain and distinct individual*, i. e., *a peculiar person subsisting in itself, which afterwards the Son of God assumed. But in the very act of conception, the Son of God assumed this mass of human nature into the unity of His person, to subsist and be sustained therein, and, by assuming it, made it His own, so that this body is not that of another individual or another person, but the body is peculiar to the Son of God Himself, and the soul is the peculiar soul of the Son of God Himself.*" (Id. Loc. c. Th., I, 76): "Since in the incarnate Christ there are two intelligent, individual natures, and yet only one person, because there is one Christ, we say that these two natures are united, not in such a manner that the human nature of Christ was conceived and formed in the womb of Mary, before the divine nature was united to it. For if, before the union, the humanity of Christ had ever by itself had a subsistence, there would then be in Christ two persons also, just as there are two intelligent individual natures." The communication of person or subsistence, therefore, proceeds from the λόγος. HOLL. (668): "The communication of person is that by which the Son of God truly and actually conferred upon His assumed human nature, destitute of proper personality, His own divine person, for communion and participation, so that the same might reach a terminus, be perfected in subsisting, and be established in a final hypostatic existence."

[11] Quen. (III, 83): "Of these two extremes (the divine and the human nature), one has the relation of an agent or of one perfecting, and the other the relation of one passive and able to be perfected. The former is the Son of God, or the simple person of the λόγος, or, what is the same thing, the divine nature determined by the person of the λόγος; the latter is the human nature. . . . The former extreme is the active principle of περιχωρησις, which acts and perfects; the latter the passive principle of the same περιχώρησις, which is perfected or receives the perfections." Kg. (126): "Περιχώρησις (immission, active intermingling) is that by which the divine nature of the λόγος, in perfecting, pervades inwardly and all around, so to speak, the human nature, and imparts to all of it its entire self, *i. e.*, in the totality and perfection of its essence, Col. 2: 9." Moreover its effect is, that the fulness of the Godhead dwells in the human nature, and both natures are, in the highest degree, present to each other.

[12] Grh. (III, 412): "The state of the union is properly and specifically called union, hypostatic union, and is the most intimate περιχώρησις, or unmixed and unconfused pervasion in one person of two distinct natures, mutually present in the highest degree to each other, because of which one nature is not outside of the other, neither can it be without impairing the unity of the person. Such *a distinction is made between the state and the act of the union*, that the act is transient and the state is permanent; that the act is that of a simple person, *i. e.*, of the λόγος, who before His incarnation was a simple person, upon a human nature, but the state exists between two natures, divine and human, in a complex person; that the act consists in the assumption of humanity, made in the first moment of incarnation, but the state, in the most intimate and enduring cohesion of natures."

Quen. (III, 86): "The form of this personal union implies: (*a*) The participation or communion of one and the same person, 1 Tim. 2: 5; (*b*) the intimate personal and constant mutual presence of the natures, John 1: 14; Col. 2: 9."

[13] Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec. VIII, 6): "Although the Son of God is Himself an entire and distinct person of the eternal Godhead, and therefore from eternity has been, with the Father and the Holy Ghost, true, essential, and perfect God; yet that He assumed human nature into the unity of His person, not as though there resulted in Christ two persons, or two Christs, but that now Jesus Christ, in one person, is at the same time true eternal God, begotten of the Father from eternity, and true man." . . .

Chmn. (de duab. nat., 25): "To the specific difference of the

hypostatic union belongs the fact that these two natures are joined and united, in order to constitute one personality in the incarnate Christ, *i. e.*, the nature inseparably assumed in the union became so peculiar to the person of the Word assuming it, that although there are and remain in Christ two natures, without change and mixture, with the distinction between the natures and essential attributes unimpaired, yet there are not two Christs, but only one Christ."

Hence, since the act of union, Christ is called a complex person. GRH. (III, 427): "The hypostasis is called complex, not because it became composite, by suffering in and of itself an alteration and loss of its simplicity, but because, since the incarnation, it is an hypostasis of two natures, while before it was an hypostasis of the divine nature alone. Before the incarnation the person of the λόγος was self-determined and simple, subsisting only in the divine nature; by the incarnation the hypostasis became complex, consisting, at the same time, of the divine and human nature, and thus *not only His divine, but also His assumed human nature, belongs to the entireness of the person of Christ now incarnate.* Because the hypostasis of the λόγος became an hypostasis of the flesh, therefore the hypostasis of the λόγος was imparted to the flesh," and hence there follows the impartation of personality to the human nature.

[14] HFRFFR. (263): "These two natures in Christ are united (1) *inconvertibly.* For He became the Son of God, not by the change of His divine nature into flesh; (2) *unconfusedly.* For the two natures are one, not by a mingling, through which a third object (*tertium quiddam*) comes into being, preserving in no respect the entireness of the simple natures; (3) *inseparably and uninterruptedly.* For the two natures in Christ are so united that they are never separated by any intervals, either of time or place. Therefore this union has not been dissolved in death, and the λόγος cannot be shown at any place without the assumed human nature. For the Son of God took upon Himself human nature, not as a garment which He again would lay aside. Neither did the Son of God appear, as angels sometimes have appeared, in human form to men, but He made the assumed flesh His own, and since He has assumed it, never leaves it. For, according to the Council of Chalcedon: 'We confess one and the same Jesus Christ, the Son and Lord only-begotten, in two natures, without mixture, change, division, or separation (ἐν δύο φύσεσιν, ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως).'"

[15] GRH. (III, 428): "For neither has a part been united to a part, but the entire λόγος to the entire flesh, and the entire flesh

to the entire λόγος; therefore, because of the identity of person and the pervasion of the natures by each other, the λόγος is so present to the flesh, and the flesh is so present to the λόγος, that neither the λόγος is without the flesh, nor the flesh without the λόγος, but wherever the λόγος is, there He has the flesh present in the highest degree with Himself, because He has taken this into the unity of His person; and wherever the flesh is, there it has the λόγος in the highest degree present to itself, because the flesh has been taken into His person. As the λόγος is not without the divine nature, to which the person belongs, so also is He not without His flesh, finite indeed in essence, yet personally subsisting in the λόγος. For as, by eternal generation from the Father, His own divine nature is peculiar to the λόγος, so through the personal union, flesh became peculiar to the same λόγος." Form. Conc., Sol. Dec., VIII, 11.

[16] Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 7): "We believe that now, in this undivided person of Christ, there are two distinct natures, namely, the divine, which is from eternity, and the human, which in time was taken into the unity of the person of the Son of God. And these two natures in the person of Christ are never either separated, or commingled, or changed the one into the other, but each remains in its nature and substance, or essence, in the person of Christ to all eternity. We believe . . . that as each nature in its nature and essence remains unmingled, and never ceases to exist, so each nature retains its natural essential properties, and to all eternity does not lay them aside."

[17] Grh. (III, 422): "The mode of this union is wonderfully unique and uniquely wonderful, transcending the comprehension not only of all men, but even of angels, whence it is called 'without controversy, a great mystery.' There are various and diverse modes of union which are to be excluded from the mode of the personal union. For, as devout old writers say that it is better to know and be able to express what God is not, than what He is, so also of the divine and supernatural union of the two natures in Christ, we can truly affirm that it is easier to tell what is not, than what is its mode."

From the Holy Scriptures, Grh. (ib.) justifies the above-mentioned presentation of this doctrine as follows: "The more prominent passages of Scripture which speak of the union of the two natures in Christ are: John 1: 14; Col. 2: 9; 1 Tim. 3: 16; Heb. 2: 14–16. As these are all parallel, they must be constantly connected in the explanation of the union. John says: 'The Word was made flesh;' but, lest any one might think that the Word was made flesh in the same sense that the water was made wine, Paul

says that God, *i. e.*, the Son of God, 'was manifest in the flesh,' and that 'He took part of flesh and blood' (κεκοινώνηκε). But now communion is between at least two distinct things, otherwise it would be interchange and coalescence. God is said by the apostle to have been 'manifest in the flesh;' but, lest any one might think that it was such a manifestation as there was in the Old Testament, when either God Himself or angels appeared in outward forms, John says that the 'λόγος became flesh,' *i. e.*, that He so took flesh into His person as never afterwards to lay it aside. The Son of God is said to have taken on Him the seed of Abraham; but, lest any one might think that it was an assumption such as that was when angels for a time took upon them corporeal forms, it is said that, 'as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself likewise took part of the same.' But now it is evident that children partake of flesh and blood in such a manner that, by birth, flesh and blood, or human nature, is imparted to them by their parents. The apostle describes the union by the dwelling of the λόγος in assumed flesh; but, lest any one might think that the Son of God dwelt in assumed flesh in the manner in which God dwells, through grace, in the hearts of believers, he adds significantly that all the fulness of the Godhead dwells in the assumed flesh, and that, too, bodily, to denote the dwelling-place, or personally, to express the mode of union."

[18] The negative properties are enumerated very differently by the Dogmaticians. Besides those specified in the text, the most prominent are these: "The union occurred (*a*) ἀσυγχύτως, unconfusedly; (*b*) ἀτρέπτως, inconvertibly; (*c*) ἀδιαιρέτως, indivisibly; (*d*) ἀχωρίστως, inseparably; (*e*) ἀναλλοιώτως, uninterchangeably; (*f*) ἀδιαλύτως, indissolubly; (*g*) ἀδιαστάτως, uninterruptedly." Or, "Not by reason of place (τοπικῶς), as formerly in the temple at Jerusalem; not by reason of power (ἐνεργητικῶς), as in creatures; not by reason of grace (χαριέντως), as in saints; not by reason of glory (δυξαστικῶς), as in the blessed and the angels."

§ 33. *Continuation.*

The hypostasis of the divine nature having thus, through the *personal union*, become at the same time that of the human nature, and thus no longer only a divine but a divine and human nature being now predicated of the person of the Redeemer, a real communion of both natures is thereby asserted, in consequence of which the two natures sustain no merely outward relation to each other; for, as the hypostasis of the

divine nature is not essentially different from this nature itself, and this hypostasis has imparted itself to the human nature, it therefore follows that there exists between the divine and human nature a true and real impartation and communion. [1] The first effect of the personal union is, therefore, the "*communion* (also *communication*) *of natures.*" QUEN. (III, 87): "The communion of natures is that most intimate participation (κοινωνία) and combination (συνδύασις) of the divine nature of the λόγος and of the assumed human nature, by which the λόγος, through a most intimate and profound *perichoresis*, so permeates, perfects, inhabits, and appropriates to Himself the human nature that is personally united to Him, that from both, mutually inter-communicating, there arises the one incommunicable subject, viz., one person." As, however, in the act of union, the divine nature is regarded as the active one, and the divine λόγος as that which assumed the human nature, so the intercommunion of the two natures must be so understood as that, between the two natures, the active movement proceeds from the divine nature, and it is this that permeates the human. [2] It is, indeed, just as difficult for us to form an adequate conception of this as in the case of the personal union, and we must be satisfied with analogies, which furnish us with at least an approximate conception of it. Such we may find, *e. g.*, in the union of soul and body; in the relation in which the three persons of the Godhead stand towards each other; or in the relation between iron and fire in red-hot iron. Just as the soul and body do not stand outwardly related to each other, as a man to the clothing that he has put on, or as an angel to the body in which he appears, but as the union between soul and body is a real, intimate and perfect one, so is also the union and communion of the two natures. As body and soul are inseparably united, and constitute the one man, so are also the human and divine natures most inseparably united. As the soul acts upon the body and is united with it, without there being any mingling of the two, the soul remaining soul and the body remaining body, so are we also to regard the communion of the two natures in such a light, that each abides in its integrity. As, finally, the soul is never without the body, so also the λόγος is to be regarded as always in the flesh and never without it. [3]

If, now, there really exist such a communion of natures, it follows—

I. That the personal designations derived from the two natures must be mutually predicable of each other; that we must therefore just as well be able to say, "The man (Christ Jesus) is God," as "God is man," which expressions, of course, do not signify that God, having become man, has ceased to be God, but rather, that the same Christ, who is God, is at the same time man (Holl. (686): "The Son of God, personally, is the same as the Son of man: and the Son of man, personally, is the same as the Son of God"); whence the predicate "man" belongs just as much to the subject God as the predicate "God" belongs to the subject man. [4] For, if we refuse to say this, we would betray the fact that we conceive, not of two natures in Christ, but rather of two persons, each remaining as it originally was, which would be Nestorianism.

From the communion of natures are, therefore, deduced the *personal designations*, *i. e.*, statements in which the concrete of one nature (as united) is predicated of the concrete of the other nature; *i. e.*, the two essences really (ἀληθῶς) different, the divine and the human, are in the concrete reciprocally predicated of one another, really and truly, yet in a manner very singular and unusual, in order to express the personal union. [5] To guard against a misunderstanding of these personal designations, it may be more particularly stated that they are (1) *not merely verbal*, *i. e.*, they are not to be understood as if only the name, but not the nature thereby designated, were predicated of the subject, as Nestorius does, when he says of the son of Mary, He was the Son of God, ascribing to the subject a title, as it were, but altogether refusing to acknowledge that He who was the son of Mary was also really the Son of God; (2) *not identical* (when the same thing is predicated of itself); *i. e.*, the predicates that are ascribed to the subject dare not be so explained as if they applied to it only in so far as the predicate precisely corresponds to the nature from which the designation of the subject is derived. The proposition, "The Son of God is the son of Mary," dare not, therefore, be interpreted, "The man who is united with the Son of God is the son of Mary;" (3) *not metaphorical, figurative, or tropical;* as

when, in the predicate that is applied to a subject, not the essential nature itself of the subject is ascribed to it, but only particular qualities of this predicate are appropriated to the subject, so that it might be said, in a figurative sense, God is man, as we understand the expression when it is applied to a picture: "This is a man," "a woman;" or, when it is said of Herod, "He is a fox;" (4) *not essential and univocal;* as if the subject, in its essential nature, were that which the predicate ascribes to it (the expression, "God is man," would then mean, The nature of God is this, that it is the nature of man). The *personal designations* are rather—

(1) *Real;* i. e., that which is ascribed to the subject really and truly belongs to it.

(2) *Unusual and singular;* for, as there is no other example of the personal union, so there are no other examples of the personal designations.

But from the communion of natures it follows also—

II. That there is a participation of the natures in the person as well as of the natures with each other. [6] This is set forth in the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum.* Br. (467): "The communicatio idiomatum is that by which it comes to pass that those things which, when the two natures are compared together, belong to one of them *per se* and formally, are to be truly predicated, also, of the other nature (either as regards concretes, or for that which is peculiar to it.)" [7] According to this doctrine, therefore, it is neither possible to ascribe a quality to one of the two natures, which is not a quality of the whole person, nor is it possible to predicate an act or operation of one of the two natures, in which the other nature does not participate (not, however, in such a way as if along with the qualities or the acts proceeding from them, their underlying essence were transferred to the other nature). [8] There exists, therefore, a *communicatio idiomatum* between the natures and the person, and between the natures reciprocally. [9] The *communicatio idiomatum* is, therefore, of several genera, of which we enumerate three (for so many are distinctly mentioned in the Scriptures), [10] the *idiomatic, majestatic,* and *apotelesmatic.*

I. The Idiomatic Genus.

If the two natures are really united in one person, then every *idioma* (peculiarity) that originally belongs to one of the two natures must be predicated of *the entire person;* the *idiomata* (peculiarities) of the divine nature, as well as those of the human nature, must belong to the person of the Redeemer. If, therefore, to be born or to suffer is an idioma of the human nature, then we must just as well be able to say, "Christ, the God-man, was born, suffered," as it is said of Him, "by Him were all things created," although creation is an idioma of the divine nature. [11] For, if we will not say this, but maintain that an idioma of the human nature can be predicated only of the concrete of the human nature, and an idioma of the divine nature only of the concrete of the divine nature, so that we would say: "The man, Jesus Christ, was born," "by Christ, who is God, all things were created;" then the personal union would be set aside, and it would appear that two persons and not two natures are recognized. [12] But it is just in this that the personal union shows itself to be real, that all the idiomata which belong to the one or the other nature are equally idiomata of the person. As, further, in virtue of the communion of natures, and of the personal designations resulting therefrom, it is all the same whether we designate Christ by both of His natures or only by one of them, an idioma of one of the two natures can be just as readily predicated of the concrete of the one as of the other; we can, therefore, just as well say, "God is dead," as, "the man, Jesus Christ, is Almighty." [13]

While, however, the idiomata of the two natures are attributed to the concrete of both natures (to Christ, the God-man) or to the concrete of one of the two natures (God—the man, Christ Jesus), it by no means follows from this that therefore the idiomata of the one nature become those of the other; for the two natures are not in substance changed by the personal union, but each of them retains the idiomata essential and natural to itself. Therefore it is *only to the person* that, without further distinctions, the idiomata of the one or of the other nature can be ascribed; but this can in no wise happen between the natures themselves, in such a sense as though each

of them did not retain the idiomata essential to itself. [14] To avoid such a misunderstanding in statements of this kind, it is usual to designate particularly from which nature the idiomata predicated of the person are derived. [15]

General Definition.—Holl. (693): "The first genus of communicatio idiomatum is this, when such things as are peculiar to the divine or to the human nature are truly and really ascribed to the *entire person* of Christ, designated by either nature or by both natures." [16] This genus the later Dogmaticians divide into three species, according as the different idiomata are predicated of the concrete of the divine nature, or of the concrete of both natures. These species are "(*a*) ἰδιοποίησις (appropriation), or οἰκείωσις (indwelling), when human idiomata are ascribed to the concrete of the divine nature. Acts 3: 15; 20: 28; 1 Cor. 2: 8; Gal. 2: 20. (*b*) κοινωνία τῶν θείων (participation of the divine), when the divine idiomata are predicated of the person of the incarnate Word, designated from His human nature. John 6: 62; 8: 58; 1 Cor. 15: 47, (*c*) ἀντίδοσις or συναμφοτερισμός, alternation, or reciprocation, in which as well the divine as the human idiomata are predicated concerning the concrete of the person, or concerning Christ, designated from both natures. Heb. 13: 8; Rom. 9: 5; 2 Cor. 13: 4; 1 Pet. 3: 18." (Holl. 694).

II. The Majestatic Genus.

As the divine λόγος has assumed human nature, so that by the personal union the hypostasis of the divine nature has become also that of the human nature, a further and natural consequence of this is, that thereby the human nature has become partaker of the attributes of the divine nature, and therefore of its entire glory and majesty: [17] for, by the personal union, not only the person, but, since person and nature cannot be separated, the divine nature also has entered into communion with the human nature; and the participation in the divine attributes by the human nature occurs at the very moment in which the λόγος unites itself with the human nature. [18] But there is no reciprocal effect produced; for, while the human nature can become partaker of the idiomata of the divine, and thus acquire an addition to the idiomata essential

to itself, the contrary cannot be maintained, because the divine nature in its essence is unchangeable and can suffer no increase. [19] The attributes, finally, which, by virtue of the personal union and of the communion of natures, are communicated to the human nature, are truly divine, and are therefore to be distinguished from the special human excellences possessed by the human nature which the λόγος assumed, over and above those of other human natures. [20].

Definition.—(Holl. 699): "The second genus of communicatio idiomatum is that by which the Son of God truly and really communicates the idiomata of His own divine nature to the assumed human nature, in consequence of the personal union, for common possession, use, and designation." [21]

III. The Apotelesmatic Genus.

The whole design of the incarnation of Christ is none other than that the λόγος, united with the human nature, may accomplish the work of redemption. From the communion of the two natures, resulting from the personal union, it follows that none of the influences proceeding from Christ can be attributed to one only of the two natures. [22] The influence may, indeed, proceed from one of the two natures, and each of the two natures exerts the influence peculiar to itself, but in such a way that, while such an influence is being exerted on the part of one of the natures, the other is not idle, but at the same time active; that, therefore, while the human nature suffers, the divine, which indeed cannot also suffer, yet in so far participates in the suffering of the human nature that it wills this suffering, permits it, stands by the human nature in its suffering, and strengthens and supports it for enduring the imposed burden; [23] further, that the human nature is to be regarded as active, not alone by means of the attributes essentially its own, but that to these are added, by virtue of the second genus of the communicatio idiomatum, the divine attributes imparted to it, with which it operates. [24] For the divine nature could not of itself, alone, have offered a ransom for the redemption of the world; to do this it had to be united with the human nature, which, consisting of soul and body, could be offered up for the salvation of men. Again, the human nature

could not have accomplished many of the deeds performed (miracles, etc.), had not its attributes been increased by the addition of the divine. [25]

Definition.—Grh. III, 555): "The third genus of the communicatio idiomatum is that by which, in official acts, each nature performs what is peculiar to itself, with the participation of the other. 1 Cor. 15: 3; Gal. 1: 4; Eph. 5: 2." [26]

If we now contemplate the entire doctrine of the Person of Christ, its supreme importance at once becomes manifest. Only because in Christ the divine and human natures were joined together in one person, could He accomplish the work of redemption. [27]

In order clearly to exhibit this truth, it has been necessary for us to develop the present doctrine at such length. [28]

[1] Quen. (III, 87): "If the hypostasis of the λόγος has been truly and really imparted to the assumed flesh, undoubtedly there is a true and real participation between the divine and the human nature, since the hypostasis of the λόγος and the divine nature of the λόγος do not really differ. But as the former is true, so also must be the latter." Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 14): "But we must not regard this hypostatic union as though the two natures, divine and human, are united in the manner in which two pieces of wood are glued together, so as really, or actually and truly, to have no participation whatever with each other. For this is the error and heresy of Nestorius and Paul of Samosata, who thought and taught heretically that the two natures are altogether separate or apart from one another, and are incapable of any participation whatever. By this false dogma, the natures are separated, and two Christs are invented, one of whom is Christ, but the other God, the λόγος, dwelling in Christ."

Quen. (III, 143): "The antithesis of the Calvinists, some of whom teach that it is only the person of the λόγος, and not, at the same time, His divine nature that has been united to human nature, unless by way of consequence and accompaniment, because of its identity with personality, which alone was at first united. Thus they invent a double union, mediate and immediate; that the natures are united, not immediately, but through the medium of the person of the λόγος."

[2] Holl. (680): "The communion of natures in the person of Christ is the mutual participation of the divine and human natures of Christ, through which the divine nature of the λόγος, having be-

come participant of the human nature, pervades, perfects, inhabits, and appropriates this to itself; but the human, having become participant of the divine nature, is pervaded, perfected, and inhabited by it."

Br. (463): "From the personal union proceeds the participation of natures, through which it comes to pass that the human nature belongs to the Son of God, and the divine nature to the Son of man. For marking this, the word περιχώρησις, which, according to its original meaning, denotes penetration, or the existence of one thing in another, began to be employed, *so that the divine nature might indeed be said actively to penetrate*, and the human nature passively to be penetrated. Yet this must be understood in such a manner as to remove all imperfection. For the divine nature does not penetrate the human *so as to occupy successively one part of it after another, and to diffuse itself extensively through it;* but, because it is spiritual and indivisible *as a whole, it energizes and perfects at the same time every part of the human nature and the entire nature, and is and remains entire in the entire human nature, and entire in every part of it.* Here belongs the passage, Col. 2: 9.

Holl. (681): "Περιχώρησις is not indeed a biblical term; nevertheless it is an ecclesiastical term, and began especially to be employed when Nestorius denied the communion of natures. But they did not understand περιχώρησις as local and quantitative, as an urn is said to contain (χωρεῖν) water, but as illocal and metaphorically used."

[3] Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 18, 19): "Learned antiquity has indeed declared this personal union and communion of natures by the similitude of the soul and body, and likewise, in another manner, by that of glowing iron. For the soul and body (and so also fire and iron) have a participation with each other, not merely nominally or verbally, but truly and really; yet in such a manner that no mingling or equalizing of the natures is introduced, as when honey-water is made of honey and water, for such drink is no longer either pure water or pure honey, but a drink composed of both. Far otherwise is it in the union of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ, for the union and participation of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ is far more exalted, and is altogether inexpressible."

Holl. (681): "The fathers have seen fit to describe the personal περιχώσησις (*a*) from the essential περιχώρησις of the persons of the Holy Trinity; (*b*) from the natural περιχώρησις of body and soul; (*c*) from the accidental περιχώρησις of fire and iron. For, as one person of the Trinity is in another, as the soul pervades the body, as fire pene-

trates all the pores of iron, so the divinity of Christ is in the humanity, which it completely fills and pervades. From this it is easy to infer that περιχώρησις denotes (1) that the personal union is an inner one and most complete. A union is outward and incomplete when an angel assumes a body, a pilot stands by a ship, a garment hangs on a man. The teachers of the Church, to separate from it the idea of such an outward union, were in the habit of calling the union a personal union, and the communion proceeding from it περιχώρησις. For, as the soul does not outwardly stand by the body, nor merely direct its movement, but enters, moves into, and fashions it, by imparting to the body its own essence, life, and faculties; so the λόγος enters the flesh, and inwardly communicates to it its own divine nature. (2) That the communion of natures is mutual, yet in such a manner that the divine nature, as actual being (ἐντελέχεια), *i. e.*, as a most absolute act, permeates and perfects the assumed human nature, and the assumed flesh is permeated and perfected. (3) That the personal union and communion of natures in Christ is inseparable (ἀχώριστον). The rational soul so enters the body that it could in no way have been separated from it, if, by the divine judgment, the violence of death had not followed from the Fall accidentally intervening. It is true that the natural union of soul and body was dissolved during the three days of Christ's death; but the divine nature of the λόγος was not separated from the assumed humanity, but was, in the highest degree, present to it. (4) That the natural union and communion is without mingling, mixture, or change (ἀσύγχυτον, ἀμικτον, καὶ ἀτρεπτον). As the persons of the Trinity permeate each other without mixture; as the soul fashions the body without any disturbance, mingling, or change of either; so the λόγος pervades His own flesh in such manner that in essentials there is in no respect a giving way by either, and neither is mingled or mixed with the other. (5) That the natures of Christ have been united continuously (ἀδιαστάτους), or are mutually present to each other. The persons of the Trinity enter each other so mutually that neither is outside of nor beyond the other. In like manner the rational soul is in the body so as never to be outside of or beyond it; the λόγος also is in the flesh, so as never to be beyond, and never to be outside of it."

[4] Grh. (III, 453): "The source and foundation of the personal designations consist solely and alone in the personal union and participation of natures, from which they alone and immediately proceed, from which alone, also, they are to be judged and explained. For God is man, and man is God, because the human and divine natures in Christ are personally united, and because an

inner περιχώρησις exists between these two natures personally united, so that the divine nature of the λόγος does not subsist outside of the assumed human nature, and the assumed human nature does not subsist outside of the divine. God is and is called man, because the hypostasis of the λόγος is the hypostasis not only of His divine, but also of His human nature."

Scriptural examples: Jer. 23: 5, 6; 33: 16; Matt. 22: 42–45; Luke 20: 44; Ps. 110: 1; 2 Sam. 7: 19; Is. 9: 6; Matt. 1: 21–23; 16: 13, 16; Luke 1: 35; 2: 11; 1 Cor. 15: 47.

[5] *a.* The expression "*concrete*" was employed when a personal designation was sought for Christ, as one who is of two natures. If the personal designation was derived from one of His two natures, the same was called the *concrete of that nature;* and, therefore, since Christ is of two natures, *the concrete of the divine nature*, when the designation was derived from the divine nature; *the concrete of the human nature*, when the designation was derived from the human nature. To the former class belong the designations, "God," "Son of God," etc.; to the latter, "man," "Son of man," "Son of Mary." Holl. (685): "The concrete of a nature is a term whereby the nature is expressed with a connotation of the hypostasis." Br. (465): "By the concrete, a term is understood which, in the direct sense, denotes a suppositum, but in an indirect sense a nature. Thus God denotes a suppositum, having a divine nature; man denotes a suppositum, having a human nature. Still, a distinction must be made between the *concrete of the nature*, and *the concrete of the person;* the latter expression is employed where the personal designation has not been derived so much from one of the two natures, as where it rather serves to designate, through an expression elsewhere derived, the particular person in whom the two natures are united as one person." Br. (466): "The concrete of a person is such a term or name, as formally signifies the person consisting of both natures, *e. g.*, Christ, Messiah, Immanuel; which names, in the nominative case, denote the suppositium,and, in an oblique case, neither nature alone, but rather both." In the present case, only the *concrete of the nature* comes into use; for the question is only in reference to the cases in which the communion of natures shall also express itself in their personal designations. To personal designations, in the proper sense, such designations do not belong, in which *a concrete of the nature* is predicated of *a concrete of the person*, as occurs in the sentences: Christ is God, is man, is God-man. Grh. (III, 453): "For these designations accurately and formally express, not so much the unity of person, as the duality of natures in Christ; for

Christ is and is called man, because in Him there is a human nature; and He is and is called God, because in Him there is a divine nature; and He is and is called the God-man, because in Him there is not only a human, but also a divine nature."

It is furthermore self-evident that these designations can be employed only upon the presupposition of the personal union, and that they are not universally applicable. Hence, Holl. (685): "If the divine and human natures, or man and God, be regarded outside of the personal union, they are disparate, neither can the one be affirmed of the other. For as I cannot say: a lion is a horse, so also I cannot say: God is man. But if a union exists between God and man, and that too a real union, such as exists in Christ, between the divine and human natures, they can be correctly predicated of each other in the concrete. The reason is, because, through the union, the two natures constitute one person, and every concrete of the nature denotes the person itself. Since, therefore, Christ the man is the same person who is God, or this person who is God is that very person who is man, it is also said correctly: man is God, and God is man."

b. To the abstracts of nature ("an abstract is that by which a nature is considered, yet not with respect to its union, but in itself, and withdrawn from its union or the concrete, nevertheless not actually, but only in the mind." Hefrfr. (283)) the like does not apply, as to the concretes of nature; therefore it cannot be said that deity is humanity, and humanity is deity. Quen. (III, 88): "The reason is, because the union was not made to one nature, but to one complex person, with the difference of natures unimpaired, and therefore, one nature in the abstract is not predicated of the other, but the concrete of one nature is predicated of the concrete of the other nature."

[6] Grh. (III, 466): "Whatever in the assumption of human nature comes under the *union*, that also comes under the participation. But now the properties come under the *union*, because no nature is destitute of its own properties, since a nature without properties is also without existence, and the two natures are united in Christ, not as alone, or stripped of their properties, but entire, without incompleteness, having suffered no loss of peculiarities. Therefore, the properties also come under the participation."

Holl. (691): "No union can be perfect and permeant (perichoristic) without a participation of properties, as the examples of animated body show. We readily grant that a parastatic (adjacent) union of two pieces of wood may occur without a participation of properties, because that grade of union is low and imperfect.

But, according to the definition of Scripture, the personal union of the two natures in Christ is most absolute, perfect and permeant (perichoristic); therefore it cannot be without a participation of properties." In like manner, proof can be produced from the communion of natures, which, just as the union, has the participation of properties (commun. idiom.) as a necessary consequence.

[7] Holl. (690): "The *communicatio idiomatum* is a true and real participation of the properties of the divine and human natures, resulting from the personal union in Christ, the God-man, who is denominated from either or both natures."

Explanation of the individual notions of the Communicatio and Idioma. —(*a*) Grh. (III, 465): "*Communicatio* (communication) is the distribution of one thing which is common to many, to the many which have it in common." Quen. (III, 91): "Not that the properties become common, *ἰδιώματα κοινά*, but that through and because of the personal union they become communicable (*κοινωνητά*)."

(*b*) *ἰδίωμα*, *proprium*, property. Quen. (III, 92): "By *ἰδιώματα* are understood the properties and differences of natures, by which, as by certain marks and characteristics, the two natures (in unity of person) are mutually distinguished and known apart. The term *ἰδιώματα* is received either in a narrow sense, *for the natural properties themselves*, or in a wide sense, so that it comprehends the *operations* also, through which these properties properly so called exert themselves; *in this place*, properties or idiomata are received in a wider sense, so that, in addition to the properties strictly so called, they embrace within their compass actions and results, *ἐνεργήματα καὶ ἀποτελέσματα*, because properties exert themselves through operations and results." Grh. (III, 466): "Observe, that the notion of the divine properties is one thing and that of the human properties another. The properties of the divine nature belong to the very essence of the *λόγος*, and are not really distinguished from it. The properties of the human nature do not constitute but proceed from the essence." In regard to the authority for this doctrine, Holl. (690): "The expression, *communicatio idiomatum*, is not found in the Holy Scriptures word for word, yet the matter itself has the firmest scriptural foundation. For as often as Scripture attributes to the flesh of Christ actions and works of divine omnipotence, so often, by consequence, is omnipotence ascribed, as an immediate act, to Him, from whom the divine operation (*ἐνέργεια*) proceeds, as a mediate act. But, although the *communicatio idiomatum* was first so named by the Scholastics, yet orthodox antiquity employed equivalent forms of speech in the controversies with Nestorius and Eutyches." The first complete elaboration of this

doctrine among the Dogmaticians is given by Chemnitz, in his book, *De Duabus Naturis in Christo*, 1580.

[8] Therefore the more specific caution with regard to the *communicatio*, according to which it is said that it is not a "*communicatio κατὰ μέθεξιν*, or according to the essence, by which one passes into the essence and within the definition of the other; but a *communicatio κατὰ συνδύασιν* (not essential or accidental, but) personal, *i. e.*, a participation of the two natures, whereby one of those united is so connected with the other that, the essence remaining distinct, the one, without any mingling, truly receives and partakes of the peculiar nature, power, and efficacy of the other, through and because of the communion that has occurred." (Quen., III, 102.) So, also, still more extended definitions have been given, just as of the personal union. Grh. (III, 466): "As the union is not essential, nor merely verbal, neither through mingling, or change, or mixture, or adjacence, neither is it personal or sacramental; so also the *communicatio* is not such."

[9] Grh. (III, 465): "The *communicatio idiomatum* is of a nature to a person, or of a nature to a nature."

Hfrfr. (286): "The *communicatio idiomatum* is a true and real participation of divine and human properties, by which, because of the hypostatic union of the two natures in Christ, *not only the idiomata of both natures of the person* (who is at the same time God and man), *but also the properties of each one of the natures, are ascribed to the other*, i. e., the human nature to the *λόγος*, and the divine nature to the assumed man. And because of the same communion, each nature works with a communication of the other, yet with their natures and properties preserved unimpaired."

Quen. (III, 155): "The antithesis of the Calvinists, who (1) state that the *communicatio idiomatum* is indeed real with respect to the person, designated by Deity or humanity, but that with respect to natures it is only verbal, *i. e.*, that it is a *communicatio* of words and terms and not of properties. (2) They say that those are only verbal designations when human things are declared of God, or divine things of man."

[10] Quen. (III, 92): "Definite and distinct degrees of the *communicatio idiomatum* are given; but, inasmuch as the question of the number of degrees or genera of the *communicatio idiomatum* does not pertain to faith and its nature, but to the method of teaching, some define two, others three, and others four genera of properties. Yet the number three pleases most of our theologians, inasmuch as in the holy volume this is discussed according to a threefold method of expression. I say that Holy Scripture dis-

tinctly presents three genera, although it does not enumerate them." A few Dogmaticians assume four genera of *communicatio idiomatum*, since they distinguish the declarations in which the properties of the human nature are ascribed to the Son of God, from the declarations in which the properties of one of the two natures are affirmed in reference to the entire person of Christ; and, therefore, the proposition, "Christ suffered," they assign to a different genus from the proposition, "God suffered." Still, the most of the Dogmaticians express themselves against this classification. But the order also in which the three genera are given, is not the same in all the Dogmaticians.

Quen. (ib.): "Some follow the *order of doctrine;* others the *order of nature.* The former (Form. Conc., Chmn., Aegid. Hunn.) place the communication of the official actions, since this is more easily explained and less controverted, before the communication of majesty, which is especially controverted and must be explained more fully. The latter follow the order of nature, and place the communication of majesty before the communication of the official actions, because the former by nature precedes the latter."

[11] Grh. (III, 472): "The foundation of this *communicatio idiomatum* is unity of person. For, inasmuch as, since the incarnation, the one person of Christ subsists in two and of two natures, each of which has been clothed, as it were, with its own properties, the properties of both natures, the divine as well as the human, are affirmed of the one complex (συνθέτῳ) person of Christ." Form Conc. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 36): "Since there are in Christ two distinct natures, which in their essences and properties are neither changed nor mixed, and yet the two natures are but one person, those properties which belong only to one nature are not ascribed to it, apart from the other nature, as if separated, but to the entire person (which at the same time is God and man), whether He be called God or man."

[12] Chmn. (de duab. nat., 67): "Nestorius taught such a participation as to ascribe divine properties to Christ only as God, and human properties to Christ only as man; such as that man, not God, was born of Mary, was crucified, etc. Likewise, that God, not man, healed the sick and brought to life the dead. But thus, Christ as God would be one person, and Christ as man would be another, and there would be two persons and two Christs."

[13] Chmn. (de duab. nat., 69): "In order to show this most complete unity of the person, those things which are properties, whether of the divine, or human, or both natures, are ascribed to the one hypostasis, or are designated by the concrete derived from

the divine, or from the human, or from both natures." (Id., 68): "Because the union of natures occurred in the hypostasis of the Word, so that there is now one and the same person of both natures subsisting at the same time in both natures, when the concrete terms, derived from the divine nature, as God the λόγος, the Son of God, are predicated of the incarnate Christ, although the designation is derived from the divine nature, yet they signify not only the divine nature, but a person now subsisting in two natures, divine and human. And when the concrete terms derived from the human nature, as man and Son of man, are predicated of the incarnate Christ, they designate not a merely human nature, or a human nature alone, but an hypostasis, subsisting both in the divine and human natures, or which consists, at the same time, of both a divine and a human nature, and to which both natures belong. Hence it occurs that all the properties are correctly ascribed to concrete terms, denoting the person of Christ, whether named from both or only from one of the two natures."

[14] Chmn. (de duab. nat., 67): "But it" (*i. e.*, true faith) "does not, with Eutyches and the Monotheletes, confound that communication between the natures with a change and mixture both of natures and properties, so that humanity is said to be divinity, or *the essential property of one nature* becomes the substantial property of the other nature, considered in the abstract, whether, on the one hand, beyond the union or in itself, or, on the other, by itself in the union. But a property belonging to one nature is imparted or ascribed to the person in the concrete." Hence Holl. (696): "(1) The *subject* is not the abstract, but the concrete, of the nature or person." (It cannot, therefore, be said that Deity was crucified.) "(2) The *predicate*" (namely, that which is affirmed of the subject, *i. e.*, of the incarnate (complex) person) "does not mark a divine or human substance itself, but a property of one of the two natures." Grh. (III, 485): "In this genus, are the abstract expressions to be employed, 'Deity suffered, Divinity died?'" He adds, "that they have indeed been employed by some with the limitation, 'Divinity suffered in the flesh;'" but is of the opinion "that it would be better to abstain from this mode of expression;" and he proves this "(1) From the silence of Scripture. (2) From the nature of Deity. Deity is incapable of suffering, or of change, and interchange; therefore, suffering cannot be ascribed to it. Deity pertains to the entire Trinity; . . . but if, therefore, Deity in itself were said to have suffered, the entire Trinity would have suffered, and the error of the Sabellians and Patripassians would be reproduced in the

Church. . . . (3) From the condition of the union. Through the union, the distinction of natures has not been removed, but the hypostasis of the λόγος became the hypostasis of the flesh, so as to constitute one complex person; therefore, something can be predicated of the entire person, according to the human nature, and yet it by no means follows that the same should be ascribed to the divine nature. As works and sufferings belong to the person, and not to the nature, I am correct in saying, 'God suffered in the flesh;' but I cannot say, 'the divinity of the λόγος suffered in the flesh.'"

[15] Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 37): "But in this class of expressions it does not follow that those things which are ascribed to the whole person are, at the same time, properties of both natures, but *it is to be distinctly declared* according to which nature anything is ascribed to the entire person."

Chmn. (de duab. nat., 69): "Yet, lest the natures may be thought to be mingled, from the example of Scripture there is generally added a declaration to which nature a property belongs that is ascribed to the person, or, according to which nature of the person it is ascribed. For the properties of one nature do not hinder the presence also of the other nature with its properties. Nor do they hinder the properties of one nature from being ascribed to the person subsisting in both natures. Nor is it necessary that what, in this genus, is predicated of the person should be applicable to both natures. But it is sufficient that it pertain to the person according to one or the other nature, whether the divine or the human. Quen. (III, 94): "Particles used for this purpose are ἐν, ἐξ, διὰ, κατὰ, 1 Pet. 2: 24; 3: 18; 4: 1; Rom. 1: 3; 9: 5; Acts 20: 28." By this additional more specific statement, it is furthermore shown how the predicate, applied to the subject, properly belongs only to one of the two natures, although, by virtue of the union of persons, it belongs also to both natures. (Holl. (696): "The mode of expression is true and peculiar by which divine or human properties are declared to belong to the entire theanthropic person (for the properties of humanity, because of the personal union, are truly and properly predicated of the Son of God, and *vice versa*), yet in such a way that, by means of discretive particles, they are claimed for the nature to which they formally belong, while they are appropriated by the other nature to which they belong, not formally, but because of the personal union.") The mode of expression is illustrated by the following examples. (Holl. (697): "The Son of God was born of the seed of David, according to the flesh. Rom. 1: 3. The *subject* of this idiomatic proposition is the Son of God, by which the entire person of Christ, designated from

the divine nature, is denoted. The *predicate* is, that He was born of the seed of David, which is a human property. This is predicated of the concrete of the divine nature, to which it does not by itself belong, but through something else, because of the unity of the theanthropic person; whence, by the restrictive particle, κατὰ, 'according to the flesh,' the human property of the human nature is asserted, to which a birth in time formally applies; yet the divine nature is not excluded or separated from participation in the nativity, inasmuch as the being born of the seed of David belongs to it by way of appropriation.'') The proposition, "God suffered," is thus explained: "The Son of God suffered according to His human nature subsisting in the divine personality. As, therefore, when a wound is inflicted upon the flesh of Peter, not alone the flesh of Peter is said to have been wounded, but Peter, or the person of Peter, has been truly wounded, although his soul cannot be wounded; so, when the Son of God suffers, according to the flesh, the flesh or His human nature does not suffer alone, but the Son of God, or the person of the Son of God, truly suffers, although the divine nature is impassible." (Id., 698): "The sentence, 'God has suffered,' is not then to be explained away with Zwingli into 'The man, Jesus Christ, who at the same time is God, has suffered,' in which case the mode of expression would be no real and peculiar one." Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 39): "Zwingli names it an *allæosis* when anything is ascribed to the divine nature of Christ, which, nevertheless, is a property of the human nature, and the reverse. For example, where it is said in Scripture, Luke 24: 28, 'Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into His glory?' there Zwingli triflingly declares that the term Christ, in this passage, refers to His human nature. Beware! beware! I say of that *allæosis;* . . . for if I permit myself to be persuaded to believe that the human nature alone suffered for me, Christ will not be to me a Saviour of great worth, but He Himself stands in need of a Saviour." . . . Quen. (III, 155): "They" (the Calvinists) "explain the designations of the first genus of *communicatio idiomatum* either with Zwingli by *allæosis*, by which they state that the name of the person, or of one of the two natures, is put in the place of the subject only for the other nature which is expressed in the predicate; or with Piscator by *synecdoche*, of a part for the whole, *i. e.*, that while the entire is put in the place of the subject, yet that it is in such a manner that the passion is restricted and limited to only a part of it, *i. e.*, to the flesh alone. For example, they explain the proposition, 'God suffered,' in this way: 'Man alone, although united to God, suffered.'"

[16] As appellations of this first genus the following were quoted, and their origin traced back to the old Church Fathers: *ἀντιδοσις*, alternation, *τροπος ἀντιδόσεως* (Damascenus), *ἐναλλαγὴ καὶ κοινωνια ὀνομάτων*, exchange and participation of names (Theodoret), *ἰδιοποιία καὶ ἰδιοποίησις* appropriation (Cyril), *ἀλλοίωσις* (but used in a different sense from that of Zwingli), *οἰκειωσις*, *συναμφοτερισμός*. Examples from Holy Scripture: Heb. 13: 8; 1 Cor. 2: 8; Acts 7: 55; Ps. 24: 7, 8; Acts 3: 15; John 8: 58.

[17] Grh. (III, 499): "That which is communicated, the holy matter of communication, is the divine majesty, glory, and power, and on this account gifts truly infinite and divine."

Quen. (III, 102): "The foundation of this communication is the communication of the hypostasis, and of the divine nature of the *λόγος*. For, inasmuch as the human nature was taken into the union, and through the union became a partaker of the person and divine nature of the *λογος*, it became truly and really a partaker of the divine properties; for these really do not differ from the divine essence."

Chmn. (de duab. nat., 97): "If the dwelling of God in the saints by grace confers, in addition to and beyond natural endowments, many free divine gifts, and works many wonders in them, what impiety is it to be willing to acknowledge in that mass of human nature, in which the whole fulness of the Godhead dwells bodily, only physical endowments, and to be willing to believe of that nothing which surpasses and exceeds the natural conditions of human nature considered by or in itself, outside of the hypostatic union?"

Quen. (III, 158) concerning the nature of the mode: "We deny that this communication is merely verbal and nominal, as the Reformed contend" (p. 160, "who altogether deny this second genus of *communicatio idiomatum*. The propositions: 'The flesh of Christ quickens, the Son of man is omnipotent,' the Zwinglians explain by *allæosis* thus: 'The Son of God who assumed flesh, quickens,' etc."); "but we maintain that it is true, peculiar, and real. Yet we do not say that there is any transfusion of divine properties into the human nature of Christ (whereby the reproach of Eutychianism is repelled), or that there is any change of the human nature into the divine, or that there is an equalization or abolition of natures, but that there is a personal communication."

[18] Quen. (III, 101): "For the communication of majesty occurred in that very moment in which the personal union occurred. For, from the very beginning of incarnation, the divine nature, with its entire fulness, united and communicated itself to

the assumed flesh." With reference to the subsequent doctrine of the states of Christ, QUEN. however still adds: "We must here distinguish between the communication, with reference to possession, and the communication, with reference to use. So far as possession and the first act are concerned, the divine properties were communicated to the human nature at one and the same time with the very moment or the very act of the union, and new ones have not been superadded. And although the second act, and the full use of the imparted majesty, were withheld during the state of humiliation, yet rays of omnipotence, omniscience, etc., frequently appeared, as often as seemed good to divine wisdom. But the full exercise of this majesty began not until His exaltation to the right hand of God."

[19] QUEN. (III, 159): "Reciprocation, which has a place in the first genus, does not occur in this genus; for there cannot be a humiliation, emptying or lessening of the divine nature (ταπείνωσις, κένωσις, ἐλάττωσις), as there is an advancement or exaltation (βελτίωσις or ὑπερύψωσις) of human nature. The divine nature is unchangeable, and, therefore, cannot be perfected or diminished, exalted or depressed. The object of the reciprocation is a nature in want of and liable to a change, and such the divine nature is not. The promotion belongs to the nature that is assumed, not to the one that assumes it." The ground on which only the properties of the divine nature are communicated to the human, and not the reverse, arises from the mode of the act of union. BR. (472): "It amounts to this, that, as on the part of the nature, although the divine is personally united to the human, and the human to the divine, yet this distinction intervenes, that the divine nature inwardly penetrates and perfects the human, but the human does not in turn penetrate and perfect the divine, but is penetrated and perfected by it; so in the *communicatio idiomatum*, this distinction intervenes, that the divine nature, penetrating the human, also makes the same, abstractly considered, in its own way, partaker of its divine perfections; but not so in turn the human nature, which neither permeates nor perfects the divine nature, and does not and cannot in a like manner render this, abstractly considered, the partaker of its own properties."

[20] GRH. (III, 499): "We do not deny that, in addition to the essential properties of human nature, certain gifts pertaining to this condition inhere subjectively in Christ as a man, which, although they surpass, by a great distance, the most excellent gifts of all men and angels, yet are and remain finite; but we add, that, in addition to these gifts which pertain to the condition and are finite, *gifts truly infinite and immeasurable* have been imparted to Christ the

man, through the personal union, and His exaltation to the right hand of the Father." Holl. (702): "Through and because of the personal union, there have been given to Christ, according to His human nature, gifts that are truly divine, uncreated, infinite, and immeasurable." And, although it may be said in general "*all* the divine attributes have been imparted to the flesh of Christ, still a distinction should be made between attributes *ἀνενέργητα* and *ἐνεργητικά*."

As is well known, the doctrine of the *communicatio idiomatum* forms a main point of difference between the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches. But of most significance is the difference concerning this second genus of properties, since the doctrine set forth under this head is decisive in regard to the doctrine of the Lord's Supper; for here the discussion has special reference to the attribute of omnipresence. We give, therefore, in this place, first, a summary of the difference between the two churches, and then a more specific statement of the doctrine of omnipresence. Cotta (in Grh., Loci, IV, Diss., I, 50), in the first place, groups together the points in reference to the doctrine of the person of Christ, on which both sides generally agree. "They agree (1) that in Christ there is only one person, but two natures, namely, a divine and a human; (2) that these two natures have been joined in the closest and most intimate union, which is generally called personal; (3) that by this union, a more intimate one than which cannot be conceived, the natures are neither mingled, as has been condemned in the Eutychians, nor the person divided, as has been condemned in the Nestorians; but (4) that this union must be regarded as without change, mixture, division, and interruption (*ἀτρέπτως, ἀσυγχύτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως*); and therefore (5) that by this union neither the difference of natures nor the peculiar conditions of either have been removed: for the human nature of Christ is always human, nor has it ever, by its own natural act, ceased to be finite, extended, circumscribed, passible; but the divine nature is and always remains infinite, immeasurable, impassible; (6) that nevertheless by the power of the personal union the properties of both natures have become common to the person of Christ, so that the person of Christ, the God-man, possesses divine properties, uses them, and is named by them; that in addition to this (7) by means of the hypostatic union there have been imparted to the human nature of Christ the very highest gifts of acquired condition (*habitualia*), for example, the greatest power, the highest wisdom, although finite; but that (8) to the mediatorial acts of Christ each nature contributed its own part, and that the divine

nature conferred upon the acts of the human nature infinite power to redeem and save the human race. In a word (9) that the intimate union of God and man in Christ is so wonderful and sublime that it surpasses, in the highest degree, the comprehension of our mind." But "they" (the Reformed) "differ from us when the question is stated concerning the impartation abstractly considered, or of a nature to a nature; because they deny that, by the hypostatic union, the properties of the divine nature have been truly and really imparted to the human nature of Christ, and that, too, for common possession, use, and designation, so that the human nature of our Saviour is truly Omnipresent, Omnipotent, and Omniscient." The controversy between the Lutherans and Reformed had mainly reference, therefore, to the possession and use of the divine attributes which were ascribed to the human nature of Christ; among these the following were made especially prominent, viz., omnipotence, omniscience (which He used, however, in the state of humiliation, not always and everywhere, but freely, when and where it pleased Him), omnipresence, vivific power, and the worship of religious adoration, which also were ascribed to the humanity of Christ (so that the flesh of Christ should be worshiped and adored with the same adoration as that due to the divine nature of the λόγος). Among these attributes, however, none was more zealously controverted than that of omnipresence, because this was the chief point in dispute between the Lutherans and Reformed with regard to a presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper. The chief objection against the real presence of Christ in the Holy Supper, Carlstadt, and after him Zwingli, had derived from the statement that Christ is sitting at the Right Hand of the Father, and therefore cannot be at the same time upon earth, in the elements of bread and wine. In opposition to this, Luther appealed to the personal union; from this, and the consequent communion of natures, he inferred the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ, and proved thereby the possibility of a real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Holy Supper. Thus the doctrine of the omnipresence, or, as the Reformed expressed it, the ubiquity of the flesh in Christ, became very important, and the Lutheran theologians are very accurate in its presentation.

Quen. thus states the question here at issue (III, 185): "Whether Christ, according to the humanity united with His divine and infinite person, and exalted at the Right Hand of the divine majesty, in this glorious state of exaltation is present to all creatures in the universe with a true, real, substantial, and efficacious omnipresence?" From this question the others, viz., whether omnipresence

is to be ascribed to Christ, according to His divine nature, and whether it is to be at all ascribed to the person of Christ, are carefully distinguished. The first follows, as a matter of course; and also in regard to the other question, both parties were agreed in this, namely, that "omnipresence is properly ascribed to the entire person, in the concrete, or in the divine person of Christ, in which human nature subsists, wherever it is; or, what is the same thing, that Christ is everywhere, by reason of His person." And, from the question stated above, they further distinguished the one with reference to the *personal* or *intimate* presence, which is mutual between the λόγος and the flesh (by which the λόγος has the assumed nature most intimately present with itself, without regard to place, so that the λόγος never and nowhere is without or beyond His flesh, or this without or beyond Him, but, where you place the λόγος, there you also place the flesh, lest there be introduced a Nestorian disruption of the person subsisting of both natures). The controversy had rather to do with the outward presence, viz., that relating to creatures, and the most of the Dogmaticians understood by this omnipresence, "*the most near and powerful dominion of Christ in His human nature.*" Accordingly, the thesis of the Dogmaticians concerning the question is the following: "The majesty of the omnipresence of the λόγος was communicated to the human nature of Christ in the first moment of the personal union, in consequence of which, along with the divine nature, it is now omnipresent, in the state of exaltation, in a true, real, substantial, and efficacious presence. And so there is given to Christ, according to His human nature, a most near and powerful dominion, by which Christ as man, exalted at the Right Hand of God, preserves and governs all things in heaven and earth by the full use of His divine majesty." Quen. (III, 185). "And, finally, it was protested that this omnipresence was not physical, diffusive, expansive, gross, local, corporeal, and divisible (as the Calvinists pretend that we hold), and it was described as majestatic, divine, spiritual, indivisible, which did not imply any locality, or inclusion, or expansion, or diffusion." (Id. III, 186.) And it was not thereby asserted that the body of Christ had lost its natural properties in such a manner that He had now ceased to be at any particular place. (Holl. (712): "We must distinguish between a natural and personal act of the flesh of Christ. The flesh of Christ, by an act of nature, when Christ dwelt upon earth, was in a certain place, in the womb of His mother, upon the cross, etc., circumscribedly, or by way of occupying it; and now also in the state of glory, in accordance with the manner of glorified bodies, it is in a certain celestial somewhere,

not circumscribedly, however, but definitively. But to this natural act that personal act is not opposed, by which it is illocally in the λόγος, from which presence all local ideas or conceptions are to be abstracted.") To the proofs for the second genus of idiomata, the Dogmaticians add also, for the omnipresence especially, that derived from the sitting at the right hand of God. (Holl. (714): "Christ rules with omnipresence according to the same nature according to which He sits at the right hand of God. But, according to His human nature, etc. Therefore, to sit at the Right Hand of God is explained by ruling. Just as, therefore, the Right Hand of God is everywhere and rules, for by this is designated in Holy Scripture the immense and infinite power and might of God, nowhere excluded, nowhere inoperative; thus, to sit at the Right Hand of God is, in virtue of the exaltation, to rule everywhere with divine power, truly immeasurable, and this cannot be conceived of without omnipresence, for surely the divine dominion is not over the absent, but over the present.") The opposite statement of the Reformed was this: "Just as the body of Christ, while He moved upon earth, was not present in heaven, so now that same body, after the ascension, is not present on earth; and, exalted above the heavens, we believe it is held there." Their main arguments against the omnipresence were these: "Because thereby the reality of the body of Christ, of His death and ascension to heaven would be disproved, inasmuch as a true human nature cannot be extended infinitely; because He who is omnipresent cannot die; because He who is, by virtue of His omnipresence, already in heaven, cannot still ascend thither." To these objections Holl. (718) answers: "1. The doctrine concerning the reality of the flesh of Christ is not overthrown by the ascription of omnipresence to it, for it is not omnipresent by a physical and extensive, but by a hyperphysical, divine, and illocal presence, which belongs to it not formally and *per se*, but by way of participation, and by virtue of the personal union. 2. The doctrine concerning the death of Christ is not overturned by it, for the natural union of body and soul was indeed dissolved by death, but without disturbing the permanent hypostatic union of the divine and human natures. 3. The doctrine of the ascension of Christ is not disproved by it, for before the ascension the flesh of Christ was present in heaven by an uninterrupted presence as a personal act, but He ascended visibly to heaven in a glorified body according to the divine economy (κατ' οἰκονομίαν), so that He might fill all things with the omnipresence of His dominion. For Christ, by virtue of His divine omnipotence, can make Himself present in various ways."

Notwithstanding these precise statements concerning the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ, there still was no uniform and, in all its features, settled doctrinal statement concerning it prevalent among the Lutheran Dogmaticians. The reason of this lies in the fact, that until the time of the Form. Conc. the only aim had in view, in the development of this doctrine, was the practical one of showing through it the possibility of the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Holy Supper. So far as this was necessary, all the Lutheran Dogmaticians are agreed. But this is no longer the case to such an extent, when, without reference to the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, they had to do merely with the dogmatic development of the doctrine of omnipresence. As, however, the Dogmaticians were led by the right tact, to attribute no great importance to a difference which led to no practical result, they had no controversy about it, and the different views stood unassailed alongside of each other. There was still room enough for different views. The questions, *e. g.*, could arise: 1. Whether the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ was to be conceived of as only one by virtue of which Christ, according to His human nature, *could* be omnipresent *when and where He wished;* or, as one by virtue of which, in consequence of the communicatio idiomatum, He was always, without exception, actually omnipresent from the state of exaltation onward, and only refrained from exercising this omnipresence during the state of humiliation, in consequence of the mediatorial work He had undertaken? 2. How the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ should be defined; whether only as one by virtue of which the human nature participates in the dominion which is exercised by the divine nature; or as one by virtue of which it is present to all creatures in such a manner as Christ is present to them by virtue of His divine nature? In regard to these questions, the views of the Dogmaticians, already before the Form. Conc., were not alike, and the Form. itself is so variable in its utterances on this subject that a satisfactory answer to the questions above stated cannot be elicited from it. Hence it happens that later Dogmaticians of different views believed themselves authorized to appeal to the Form. Conc. in vindication of their several opinions. After the completion of the Form. Conc., therefore, the Dogmaticians were divided in opinion, about as follows, viz.: the majority mentioning the omnipresence only as "a most powerful and present dominion over creatures," either not entering at all upon the questions of the absolute presence, or rejecting that doctrine entirely. This omnipresence was then called also modified omnipresence. Thus Quen., Br., the latter of whom appeals

to the Form. Conc. (475): "(They (the authors of the Form. Conc.) manifestly describe that omnipresence *not as absolute*, as a mere close proximity to all creatures and without any efficacious influence, but as modified, or joined with an efficacious influence, and according to the needs of that universal dominion which Christ exercises according to both His natures.") At the same time they assert that, from the time of the exaltation onward, Christ is to be regarded as constantly omnipresent according to His human nature, *i. e.*, as always exercising the "most powerful dominion." Others, on the other hand, as the majority of the Swabian theologians, but beside these also, Holl., asserted, that not only the "most powerful dominion" belonged to the human nature of Christ from the time of the exaltation onward, but also the true presence, and the latter, indeed, from the time of the conception. A short-lived controversy arose at the time when the theologians of Helmstadt and Brunswick refused to accept the Form. Conc., mainly because, as they asserted, a doctrine of the omnipresence was taught in it with which they could not coincide. They admitted, indeed, that Christ, according to His human nature, can be present where He will; but they maintained that He actually willed to be present only there where it has been expressly promised concerning Him, namely, in the Holy Supper and in the Church. Besides, they characterized this presence not as an effect of omnipresence, but of omnipotence. The omnipresence maintained by them they designated the *relative* omnipresence. This view (which Calixtus, also, at a later date, adopted) was opposed by both classes of Dogmaticians, mainly because they wished to have the possibility of the presence of Christ in the Holy Supper deduced from His omnipresence, and this from the communicatio idiomatum, without agreeing among themselves as to the mode of stating it. This point, therefore, has remained unsettled. Another question that arose was, concerning the time in which Christ, according to His human nature, assumed the exercise of the divine majesty. Cf., on that subject, the topic of the "States of Christ."

[21] *Scriptural Proofs.—Majesty* is imparted to the human nature: Matt. 11: 27; Luke 1: 33; John 3: 13; 6: 62; Phil. 2: 6; Heb. 2: 7. *The sitting of Christ, the man, at the right hand of Majesty*, Matt. 26: 64; Mark 14: 62; Luke 22: 69; Rom. 8: 34; Eph. 1: 20; Heb. 7: 26; 8: 1. *Omnipotence*, Matt. 28: 18; Phil. 3: 21. *Omniscience*, Col. 1: 19; 2: 3, 9. *Omnipresence*, Matt. 18: 20; 28: 20; Eph. 1: 23; 4: 10. *Power to quicken*, John 6: 51; 1 Cor. 15: 21, 45. *Power to judge*, Matt. 16: 27; John 5: 27; Acts 17: 31.

[22] Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 46): "With respect to the

functions of Christ's office, the person does not act and operate in, or with one, or through one nature alone, but rather in, with, according to and through both natures; or, as the Council of Chalcedon declares, one nature effects and works, with impartation of the other, that which is peculiar to each. Therefore Christ is our Mediator, Redeemer, King, etc., not merely according to one nature, whether the divine or the human, but according to both natures." Grh. (III, 555): "The Son of God took upon Himself human nature, for the purpose of performing in, with, and through it, the work of redemption, and the functions of the mediatorial office, 1 John 3: 8, etc. Hence in the works of His office, He acts not only as God, nor only as man, but as God-man; and, what is the same, the two natures in Christ, in the works of the office, do not act separately, but conjointly. From unity of person follows unity in official act." Holl. (726): "The remote basis of this impartation is unity of person, and the intimate communion of the divine nature in Christ. The proximate basis is the *communicatio idiomatum* of the first and second genus."

[23] Chmn. (de duab. nat., 85): "When one nature in Christ does that which is peculiar to it, or, when Christ does anything, according to the property of one nature, in that action or suffering the other nature is not unemployed, so as to do either nothing or something else; but, what is a peculiarity of the one nature is effected and performed in Christ with impartation of the other nature, that difference being observed which is peculiar to each. Therefore, when Christ, according to His human nature, suffers and dies, this also occurs with impartation to the other nature, not so that the divine nature in Him also suffers and dies, for this is peculiar to the human nature, but because the divine nature of Christ is personally present with the nature suffering, and wills the suffering of its human nature, does not avert it, but permits its humanity to suffer and die, strengthens and sustains it so that it can bear the immense weight of the sin of the world and of the entire wrath of God, and renders these sufferings precious to God and saving to the world."

[24] Chmn. (de duab. nat., 85): "Because the offices and blessings of Christ as Saviour are such that, in many or most of them, the human nature in Christ cannot co-operate with its natural or essential properties or operations alone, numberless attributes *ὑπερφυσικὰ καί παραφυσικὰ* [supernatural and extraordinary] were delivered and imparted to the human nature from its hypostatic union with divinity."

Holl. (726): "The mode of impartation and mutual confluence

consists in this, that the divine nature of the λόγος not only performs divine works, but also truly and really appropriates to itself the actions of the assumed flesh; but the human nature, in the office of the Mediator, acts, not only according to its natural strength, but also according to that divine power which it has communicated to it from the personal union." QUEN. (III, 106): "I say that *by means* of His person, He appropriates to Himself actions and sufferings of humanity, for it must not be said *the divine nature* sheds blood, suffers, dies, just as it is said that the human nature quickens, works miracles, governs all things, but *God* sheds His blood, suffers, dies."

[25] CHMN. (de duab. nat., 86): "The testimonies of Scripture clearly show that the union of the two natures in Christ occurred in order that the work of redemption, atonement, and salvation might be accomplished in, with, and through both natures of Christ. For if redemption, atonement, etc., could have been accomplished by the divine nature alone, or by the human nature alone, the λόγος would have in vain descended from Heaven for us men, and for our salvation, and become incarnate man." GRH. (III, 556): "The human nature indeed could have suffered, died, shed its blood. But the sufferings and bloody death of Christ would have been without a saving result, if the divine nature had not added a price of infinite value to those sufferings and that death, which the Saviour endured for us." Accordingly, the work of redemption, as well as every individual action of Christ, is considered as one in which both natures in Christ participate. The technical term for this is ἀποτέλεσμα ("a common work, resulting from a communicative and intimate confluence of natures, where the operations of both natures concur to produce this, or the work is divinely-human, because both natures here act unitedly." QUEN. (III, 105)). Yet as each individual action proceeds, first of all, from one of the two natures, namely, from that one to whose original properties it belongs, the technical term for this is ἐνέργημα ('a result peculiar to one nature'). Thus, the shedding of Christ's blood is an operation of the human nature, for only the human nature has shed blood; the infinite merit which belongs to this blood is an operation of the divine nature. But the atonement for our sins, which has been wrought by means of the shed blood only in view of the fact that both natures have contributed their part thereto, the human nature by shedding it, and the divine nature by giving to the blood its infinite merit, is the work (ἀποτέλεσμα) of both natures. HOLL. (728) further describes the apotelesmata of Christ, as of a twofold order. "The divine nature of the λόγος cannot effect some things except by

a union with flesh (for example, suffering as a satisfaction, a life-giving death); other things, from His free good pleasure or purpose, He does not will to effect without flesh (for example, miracles)."

[26] Br. (478): "The third genus of *communicatio idiomatum* consists in this, that actions pertaining to the office of Christ do not belong to a nature singly and alone; but they are common to both, inasmuch as each contributes to them that which is its own, and thus each acts with the communication of the other."

Quen. (III, 209): "The antithesis of the Calvinists, who (1) deny that the communication of the apotelesmata or of official actions can be referred to the *communicatio idiomatum*. . . . (2) who teach that both natures act their parts by themselves alone, each without participation of the other, and thus that the human nature of Christ in the works of the office only performs human works from its own natural properties, but must altogether be excluded from divine actions. . . . (3) who affirm that the flesh of Christ contributed to the miracles only as a mere and passive (ἀέργον) instrument."

[27] Chmn. (de duab. nat.): "This union of the kingship and priesthood of Messiah was made for the work of redemption, for the sake of us and our salvation. But as redemption had to be made by means of suffering and death, there was need of a human nature. And it pleased God that, for our comfort, in the offices of the kingship, priesthood, and lordship of Christ, our assumed nature should also be employed, and thus the acts (ἀποτελέσματα) of Christ's offices should be accomplished in, with, and through both."

[28] Chmn. (de duab. nat., 81): "For let not exactness be regarded as idle, just as also accurate care in speaking. But let the question, What is the true use of this doctrine? be always in sight. For thus we will be the more inclined to cultivate care in speaking properly, and will be the more easily able to avoid falling into logomachies and quibbles." . . .

B.—OF THE OFFICE OF CHRIST.

§ 34. *The Threefold Office of Christ.**

The doctrine of the *Person* of Christ is followed by that of the *Work* that He performed; for to accomplish this was the

*Grh. was the first to treat of this entire doctrine under a separate head; before his day it was discussed in connection with other doctrines, usually under the head of *Justification;* and the form, too, in which the doctrine is now set forth,

very design of His incarnation. This Work is the redemption of the human race. CONF. AUG., III: "*They teach, that the Word, i. e., the Son of God, assumed human nature . . . that He might reconcile the Father to us and become a sacrifice, not only for original sin, but also for all the actual sins of men.*" To accomplish this work of redemption was the work assigned to Christ upon earth, and the undertaking that He assumed. We designate it as His mediatorial work, and understand by it all that Christ did to effect a redemption, and all that He is still doing to make it available to men. "*The mediatorial office is the function, belonging to the whole person of the God-man, originating theanthropic actions, by which function Christ, in, with, and through both natures,* [1] *perfectly executed, and is even now accomplishing, by way of acquisition and application, all things that are necessary for our salvation.*" QUEN. (III, 212)[2]. This work Christ undertook in its whole extent, *i. e.* (1) While upon earth, He Himself announces to men the divine purpose of redemption, and provides that after His departure it shall be further announced to men. (2) He Himself accomplishes the redemption, by paying the ransom through which our reconciliation with God is effected. (3) After His departure He preserves, increases, guides, and protects the Church of the Redeemed thus established. As these three functions correspond to those of the Old Testament prophets, priests, and kings, the mediatorial office of Christ is accordingly divided into the Prophetic, Sacerdotal, and Regal offices. [3]

[1] The Dogmaticians say here, expressly, that Christ is Mediator according to both natures, as would indeed naturally and properly follow from the topic just discussed. Erroneous opinions upon this subject, that arose even in the bosom of the Evangelical Church itself, furnished the occasion of giving prominence to it, and so we see the FORM. CONC. already denouncing existing errors upon this subject (Epit., Art. III, 2 sq.: Concerning the righteousness of faith before God): "For one side (Osiander) thought that

appears for the first time complete (though in brief outlines) in GRH. MEL. is the first to use the expression, Kingdom of Christ; he does this, however, in the doctrine of the resurrection. STRIGEL then annexed the Priesthood of Christ, which afterwards was developed into the sacerdotal and prophetic offices. We cannot ignore the fact, that this topic has failed to receive anything like as thorough a discussion and development as many others.

Christ is our righteousness only according to the divine nature. . . . In opposition to this opinion, some others (Stancar, the Papists) asserted that Christ is our righteousness before God only according to the human nature. To refute both errors, we believe . . . that Christ is truly our righteousness, but yet neither according to His divine nature alone, nor according to His human nature alone, but the whole Christ, according to both natures." . . . QUEN. (III, 212): "For both natures concur for the mediatorial office, not by being mingled, but distinctly and with the properties of both remaining unimpaired, and yet not separately, but each with impartation of the other."

[2] GRH. (III, 576): "The office of Christ consists in the work of mediation between God and man, which is the end of incarnation, 1 Tim. 2: 5." HOLL. (729): "If the mediatorial office of Christ be taken in a narrower sense, it seems to coincide with His sacerdotal office, 1 Tim. 2: 5, 6. Yet this does not prevent us from receiving it in a wider sense, so as to embrace His office as prophet and king. For Moses, the prophet, is likewise called mediator, and it escapes the observation of no one that kings not unfrequently bear the part of mediators."

[3] GRH. (III, 576): "The office of Christ is ordinarily stated as threefold, that of a prophet, a priest, and a king; yet this can be reduced to two members" (thus Hutter), "so that the office of Christ is stated as twofold, that of a priest and of a king. For the priest's office is not only to sacrifice, pray, intercede, and bless, but also to teach, which is a work that they refer to His office as a prophet." QUEN. (III, 212): "Yet, by most, the tripartite distinction is retained." "The appropriateness of this distribution is proved according to GRH. (ib.): (1) From the co-ordination of Scripture passages. It is correct to ascribe just as many parts to the office of Christ, as there are classes to which those designations can be referred which are ascribed to Christ with respect to His office, and passages of Scripture which speak of the office of Christ. But now there are three classes to which the designations which are ascribed to Christ, with respect to office, can be referred. Therefore, etc. (2) From the enumeration of the benefits coming from Christ. Christ atones before God for the guilt of our sins . . . which is a work peculiar to a priest. Christ publishes to us God's counsel concerning our redemption and salvation, which is the work of a prophet. Christ efficaciously applies to us the benefit of redemption and salvation, and rules us by the sceptre of His Word and Holy Ghost, which is the work of a king." . . .

§ 35. *The Prophetic Office.*

By the *Prophetic Office* we understand the work of Christ, in so far as He proclaims to men the divine purpose of redemption, and urges them to accept the offered salvation. [1] This work Christ performed as long as He was upon the earth; He thereby acted as a prophet, for it was the business of prophets to teach and to declare the will of God; [2] and, in consequence of the greater dignity and power that belonged to Him as the God-man, He performed this work in a much more perfect and effective manner than all the prophets that preceded Him. [3] But this did not cease with His departure from the earth; on the other hand, by the establishment of the sacred office of the ministry, Christ made provision that this work should still be performed, and that, too, with the same efficiency as before, inasmuch as He imparted to the Word and the Sacraments, the dispensation of which constitutes the work of the ministry, the same indwelling power and efficiency that belong to Himself by virtue of His divine nature; and thus, in them and through them, He is still effectively working since His departure. [4] His prophetic office is, therefore, to be regarded as one still perpetuated, and we are to distinguish only between its *immediate* and *mediate* exercise. [5]

"The prophetic office is the function of Christ the God-man, by which, according to the purpose of the most holy Trinity, He fully revealed to us the divine will concerning the redemption and salvation of men, with the earnest intention that all the world should come to the knowledge of the heavenly truth." (Quen., III, 212) [6] From this prophetic office Christ is called a *Prophet*, Deut. 18: 18; Matt. 21: 11; John 6: 14; Luke 7: 16; 24: 19; an Evangelist, Is. 41: 27; a Master, Is. 50: 4; 55: 4; 63: 1; Rabbi or Teacher, Matt. 23: 8, 10; Bishop of Souls, 1 Pet. 2: 25; Shepherd, Ezek. 34: 23; 37: 24; John 10: 11; Heb. 13: 20.

[1] Grh. (III, 578): "The function of teaching is that by which Christ instructs His Church in those things necessary to be known and to be believed for salvation." Quen. (III, 217): "The will of God, to reveal which Christ from eternity was chosen, and in time was sent forth as the great Prophet, embraces

primarily and principally the doctrine of the Gospel, but secondarily the Law, just as also the revealed Word of God itself is divided into Law and Gospel. Specifically considered, this office consists: (*a*) in the full explanation of the doctrine of the Gospel, before enveloped by the shadows and types of the Law, or in the proclamation of the gratuitous promise of the remission of sins, of righteousness and life eternal, by and on account of Christ; . . . (*b*) in the declaration and true interpretation of the Law." Concerning the relation of Christ to the Law, HOLL. (760): "The old Moral Law Christ neither annulled, nor abated, nor perfected, since it is most perfect (Ps. 19: 7), yet He delivered the same from the corruptions of the Pharisees, and fully interpreted it (Matt. 5: 21, seq.). Therefore, Christ is not a new legislator, but the interpreter and maintainer of the old Law."

[2] HOLL. (756): "The office of the prophets of the Old Testament was to teach the Word of God, to hand down the true worship of God, to make known secret and predict future things. As Christ also did these things, He discharged the functions of the office of prophet." Yet no stress is placed upon the latter, viz., prophecy concerning the future. Therefore, QUEN. (III, 218): "The office of prophet does not consist simply and exclusively in the revelation of future things, but generally in the announcement of the divine will."

[3] HOLL. (756): "Christ is the greatest prophet (Luke 7: 16; Deut. 18: 18; Acts 3: 22; John 1: 45; 6: 14; Heb. 3: 5, 6); a universal prophet (John 1: 9; Matt. 28: 19); the most enlightened prophet (Ps. 45: 7; John 3: 34; Col. 2: 3; John 1: 18); the prophet having the most seals of authority (John 6: 27; Matt. 3: 17; 17: 5; John 12: 28); the most powerful and exemplary (Luke 24: 19)." GRH. (III, 578): "The efficacy of the doctrine is that divine power by which Christ, through the Holy Ghost, effectually moves the hearts of men to embrace the doctrine of faith (Ps. 68: 35; John 6: 45)."

[4] HOLL. (759): "According to His divine nature, He has united the highest power, efficacy, and influence with the Word and Sacraments. Whence the Lord co-worked everywhere with the preaching of the apostles."

[5] QUEN. (III, 218): "He revealed this divine will *immediately*, when He Himself, in His own person, for three years and a half during the time of His ministry, taught and instructed and trained His disciples to be the teachers of the Church Universal. *Mediately*, when He employed the vicarious labor of the apostles and their successors, through whom He perpetuated, still perpetu-

ates, and will perpetuate to the end of the world, the office of teaching. John 20: 21; Matt. 28: 19; Mark 16: 15; Eph. 4: 11." GRH. (III, 578): "To this office of Christ, therefore, belong the publication, in the Gospel, of the divine counsel concerning the redemption of the human race, the appointment and preservation of the office of the ministry, the appointment of the Sacraments, the giving of the Holy Ghost, and, through Him, the effectual change, illumination, regeneration, renewal, sanctification, etc., of human hearts."

[6] QUEN. (III, 219): "The end designed by Christ, the greatest prophet, is, in itself, the bringing of *all* men to the knowledge of heavenly truth. 1 Tim. 2: 4; 2 Pet. 3: 9. For all things are so arranged that the blind may be led into the way, and those who walk in darkness may be enlightened. Acts 26: 18. For, although it happens with regard to some that they are thereby blinded and hardened, yet this happens not by the fault of this prophet, and His work, but through their own wickedness they bring this evil upon themselves. John 3: 19; 12: 39, 40."

§ 36. *The Sacerdotal Office.*

The second office of Christ is to accomplish the redemption itself and reconciliation with God. [1] Christ thereby performed the work of a priest, for it was the office of priests to propitiate God by the sacrifices they offered, and therewith to remove the guilt which men had brought upon themselves. Christ, however, did not, like the priests of the Old Testament, bring something not His own as a sacrifice, but Himself, whence He is both priest and sacrifice in one person. [2] This part of His work is called the *Sacerdotal Office*. "The sacerdotal office consists in this, that Christ holds a middle ground between God and men, who are at variance with each other, so that He offers sacrifice and prayers that He may reconcile man with God." [3] (BR., 491.) Accordingly it is subdivided into two parts, corresponding to the two functions that belong to priests, *i. e.*, the offering of sacrifice and intercessory prayer. [4] The work is, therefore, in part already accomplished, and in part is still being executed by Christ. The first part of it is called *satisfaction*, by which expression, at the same time, the reason is implied why reconciliation with God was possible only through a sacrifice; because thereby satisfaction

was to be rendered to God, who had been offended by our sins, and therefore demanded punishment. [5] The other part is called *intercession.*

I. SATISFACTION.—If the wrath of God, which rests upon men on account of their sins, together with all its consequences, is just and holy, then it is not compatible with God's justice and holiness that He should forgive men their sins absolutely and without punishment, and lay aside all wrath together with its consequences; not compatible with His justice, for this demands that He hold a relation to sinners different from that He holds towards the godly, and that He decree punishment for the former; not with His holiness, for in virtue of this He hates the evil; finally, it is not compatible with His truth, for He has already declared that He will punish those who transgress His holy Law. [6] If God, therefore, under the impulse of His love to men, is still to assume once more a gracious relation to them, something must first occur that can enable Him to do this without derogating from His justice and holiness; [7] the guilt that men have brought upon themselves by their sins must be removed, a ransom must be paid, an equivalent must be rendered for the offence that has been committed against God, or, what amounts to the same thing, satisfaction must be rendered. [8] Now, as it is impossible for us men to render this, we must extol it as a special act of divine mercy [9] that God has made it possible through Christ, and that He for this end determined upon the incarnation of Christ, so that He might render this satisfaction in our stead. [10] In Him, namely, who is God and man, by virtue of this union of the two natures in one person, everything that He accomplishes in His human nature has infinite value; while every effort put forth by a mere man has only restricted and temporary value. Although, therefore, a mere man cannot accomplish anything of sufficient extent and value to remove the infinite guilt that rests upon the human race, and atone for past transgressions, yet Christ can do this, because everything that He does and suffers as man is not simply the doing and suffering of a mere man, but to what He does there is added the value and significance of a divine and therefore infinite work, [11] in virtue of the union of the di-

vine and the human nature, and their consequent communion; so that, therefore, there can proceed from Him an act of infinite value which He can set over against the infinite guilt of man, and therewith remove this guilt. In Christ, the God-man, there is therefore entire ability to perform such a work, and in Him there is also the will to do it. But a twofold work, however, is to be accomplished. The first thing to be effected is, that God cease to regard men as those who have not complied with the demands of the holy Law. This is done, when He who is to render the satisfaction so fulfils the entire Law in the place of men that He has done that which man had failed to do. Then it must be brought about that guilt no longer rests upon men for which they deserve punishment, and this is accomplished when He who is rendering satisfaction for men takes the punishment upon Himself. Both of these things Christ has done; [12] the first by His *active obedience* (which consisted in the most perfect fulfilment of the Law), for thereby He, who in His own person was not subject to the Law, fulfilled the Law in the place of man; [13] the second by His *passive obedience* (which consisted in the all-sufficient payment of the penalties that were awaiting us), for thereby He suffered what men should have suffered, and so He took upon Himself their punishment, and atoned for their sins in their stead. [14] Through this manifestation of obedience to the divine decree in both these respects, Christ rendered, in the place of man, [15] a satisfaction fully sufficient [16] and available for all the sins of all men, which is designated as the former part of the sacerdotal office by which Christ, by divine decree, through a most complete obedience, active and passive, rendered satisfaction to divine justice, [17] infringed by the sins of men, to the praise of divine justice and mercy, and for the procurement of our justification and salvation." Holl. (735). [18] But since Christ rendered satisfaction, as above stated, He thereby secured for us forgiveness of sins and eternal salvation, which we designate as His merit that is imputed to us. Quen. (III, 225): "Merit flows from satisfaction rendered. Christ rendered satisfaction for our sins, and for the penalties due to them, and thus He merited for us the grace of God, forgiveness of sins, and eternal life." [19]

II. Intercession.—For, after Christ had thus offered Himself as a sacrifice for men, the second part of His priestly office consists in His actively interceding with the Father, when He had been exalted to His right hand, upon the ground of His merit, so that men thus redeemed may have the benefit of all that He has secured for them by His sufferings and death, of everything, in fact, that can promote their bodily, and especially their spiritual welfare. "Intercession is the latter part of the sacerdotal office, by which Christ, the God-man, in virtue of His boundless merit, intercedes truly and properly, and without any detriment to His majesty; intercedes for all men, but especially for His elect, that He may obtain for them whatsoever things He knows to be salutary for them, for the body, and especially for the soul (but chiefly those things which are useful and necessary for securing eternal life), 1 John 2: 1; Rom. 8: 34; Heb. 7: 25; 9: 24." (Holl., 749.) [20] "This intercession has reference, therefore, it is true, to all men, as all men while upon earth may become partakers of salvation; but, inasmuch as Christ can give very differently and more freely to those who have by faith already become partakers of His merit than to those who still reject it, this is distinguished as to its *comprehension* into *general intercession*, in which Christ prays to the Father for all men, that the saving merit of His death may be applied to them (Rom. 8: 34; Is. 53: 12; Luke 23: 34); and *special intercession*, in which He prays for the regenerate, that they may be preserved and grow in faith and holiness, John 17: 9." (Holl., 749.)[21] As to its *nature*, it is described as true, real, and peculiar, *i. e.*, as such, that Christ is not content merely in silence to await the effect of His satisfaction, but that He actively, effectively, really avails Himself of His merit with the Father in such manner as becomes Him in His divine dignity. [22] Finally, as to its *duration*, it never ceases. [23]

The effect accomplished by the priestly office, in its whole compass, is *the redemption of men*. [24] If they appropriate it in faith, their sins are no longer reckoned, nor is temporal or eternal punishment imposed, nor does the wrath of God any longer rest upon them; for, in the true and proper sense of the term, they are redeemed from all this by the ransom that

Christ has paid for them. "The redemption of the human race is the spiritual, judicial, and most costly deliverance of all men, bound in the chains of sin, from guilt, from the wrath of God, and temporal and eternal punishment, accomplished by Christ, the God-man, through His active and passive obedience, which God, the most righteous judge, kindly accepted as a most perfect ransom (λύτρον), so that the human race, introduced into spiritual liberty, may live forever with God." Holl. (752). [25]

[1] Kg. (I, 150): "The *end* of the office of priest is to reconcile men with God, Heb. 4: 16; 9: 26, 28; 1 John 2: 2." More specifically, Quen. (III, 222): "(1) The perfect reconciliation of man, the sinner, with God, or the restoration of the former friendship between the separated parties, God and men the sinners, Rom. 5: 10; Col. 1: 20, 21; 2 Cor. 5: 18, 19; Heb. 7: 27. (2) Deliverance from the captivity of the devil, Luke 1: 74; Heb. 2: 14, 15; 1 John 3: 8. (3) From sin, as well in relation to its guilt, Col. 1: 14; Eph. 1: 7, as its slavery, 1 Pet. 1: 18; Gal. 1: 4, and its inherency, Rom. 8: 23."

[2] Holl.: "The material of the sacrifice is Christ Himself, Eph. 5: 2." Br. (493): "While, in other sacrifices, victims are offered different from the priests, Christ sacrificed Himself, when He voluntarily subjected Himself to suffering and death, and thus offered Himself to God as a victim, for expiating not His own sins, but those of the entire human race."

[3] Holl. (731): "Christ's office as a priest is that according to which Christ, the only mediator and priest of the New Testament, by His most exact fulfillment of the Law and the sacrifice of His body, satisfied, on our behalf, the injured divine justice, and offers to God the most effectual prayers for our salvation." Quen. (III, 220): "From this priestly office Christ is called a priest, Ps. 110: 4 (Heb. 5: 10; 6: 20; 7: 26; 9: 11; 10: 21); a great high priest, Heb. 4: 14; a high priest, Heb. 4: 15; 9: 11; 3: 1." The priesthood of Christ is adumbrated in the priesthood of Aaron and Melchisedek. The latter is related to the former, as the shadow to the very substance. Apol. Conf. (XII, 37): "As in the Old Testament, the shadow is seen, so, in the New Testament, the thing signified must be sought for, and not another type, as though sufficient for sacrifice." Holl. (732): "As the shadow yields in eminence to the body, so does Aaron to Christ." Quen. (III, 221): "Hebrews 7 diligently unfolds the type set forth in Mel-

chisedek, and applies it to Christ. . . . This very comparison of Christ with Melchisedek is presented in the germ by Moses, Gen. 14: 17, is formally declared by David, Ps. 110: 4, and is specifically explained by Paul."

[4] Quen. (III, 225): "The priestly office of Christ is composed of two parts, satisfaction and intercession; because, in the first place, He made the most perfect satisfaction for all the sins of the whole world, and earned salvation. In the second place, He anxiously interceded and still intercedes and mediates, on behalf of all, for the application of the acquired salvation. That the Messiah would perform these functions of a priest, Is. 53: 12 clearly predicted."

[5] Holl. (735): "Satisfaction is not a Scriptural but an ecclesiastical term, yet its synonyms exist in the holy volume, namely, ἱλασμος, propitiation for the sins of the whole world (1 John 2: 2; 4. 10), (ἱλαστήριον, Rom. 3: 24, 25), καταλλαγή, Rom. 5: 10; 2 Cor. 5: 18, ἀπολυτρωσις, Eph. 1: 7; Col. 1: 14, paying the ransom (τον λύτρον), Matt. 20: 28. For this redemption denotes the payment of a sufficient price for the captive; and the reconciliation of God with men is described in Scripture in such a manner, that it is evident that it was made not without a ransom, which divine justice demanded of the Mediator."

[6] Hutt. (Loc. Com., 418): "This threatening (Gen. 2: 17) ought necessarily to have been fulfilled after the Fall of our first parents, because the truth and justice of God are immutable, and God cannot lie. But if God had remitted anything from this, His truth, as the Photinians say, *i. e.*, from this Law, and, without any satisfaction, had embraced the human race in His mercy, then God would have lied, when He said: 'Thou shalt surely die.' This truth and justice of God, therefore, remaining unmoved, the human race must either perish eternally, or could be redeemed from this penalty only by the intervention of the most complete satisfaction. But this could be provided by no mortal. Therefore it was necessary to be provided by Christ, the Son of God, as Saviour."

[7] Therefore the proposition (Hutt., Loc. Com., 406): "The mercy of God is not absolute, but in Christ, and founded only in Christ and in His merit and satisfaction. . . . God is not only supremely merciful but also supremely just. But this justice of God required, of the whole human race, such penalties as those with which God Himself in Paradise threatened our first parents, if they should transgress the Law that had been given them. . . . Therefore, there could not be a place for God's mercy until satisfaction should be rendered the divine justice. . . . Hence, the

position remains, established, firm and immovable, that this mercy of God could have had no place, except with respect to, or in consideration of, the satisfaction of Christ."

The love of God to men is therefore denoted accurately as ordinate, and not as absolute. HUTT. (Loc. Com., 415): "God indeed loved already from all eternity the whole human race, yet not absolutely and unconditionally, but ordinately; namely, in His beloved Son. This ordinate love includes and relates to the Son likewise not absolutely, or only in such a respect as that God willed that He should be the teacher of the human race; but also ordinately, so far as He took upon Himself the guilt of our sins, and made satisfaction on behalf of the whole human race to the divine wrath or justice. Therefore, this ordinate affection or love of God necessarily presupposes His wrath, so that this love in God could not have a place, unless, likewise from all eternity, satisfaction had been made to this divine wrath or justice through the Son, who from eternity, offered Himself as a mediator between God and men."

[8] QUEN. (III, 227): "The object to which satisfaction has been afforded is the Triune God alone." (HOLL. (736): "Observe, that, in a certain respect, Christ made satisfaction *to Himself*. For, as far as Christ made satisfaction as a mediator, He is regarded as the God-man; but, in so far as He likewise demanded satisfaction, He must be regarded as the author and maintainer of the Law, who by His essence is just.") QUEN. (III, 227 sq.): "For the entire Holy Trinity, offended at sins, was angry with men, and, on account of the immutability of its justice (Rom. 1: 18), the holiness of its nature, and the truth of its threatenings, could not with impunity forgive sins, and, without satisfaction, receive men into favor. But this Triune God has not the relation of a mere creditor, as the Socinians state, but of a most just judge, requiring, according to the rigor of His infinite justice, an infinite price of satisfaction. For redemption itself, made for the declaration of righteousness (Rom. 3: 25), proves the necessity of requiring a penalty, either from the guilty one himself, *i. e.*, man, or from his surety, namely, Christ. If God, without a satisfaction, could have forgiven man's offence, without impairing His infinite justice, there would not have been need of such an expense as that of His only Son." . . .

The chief passages in the Symbolical Books are the following: AP. CONF. (III, 58): "The Law condemns all men; but Christ, because without sin He submitted to the punishment of sin, and became a victim for us, removed from the Law the right of accus-

ing and condemning those who believe in Him, since He is the propitiation for them, for the sake of which we are now accounted righteous." Ibid. (XXI (IX), 19): "The second requirement, in a propitiator, is that his merits be presented in order to give satisfaction for others, to bestow upon others a divine imputation, that, through these, they may be regarded precisely as righteous as though by their own merits. As, if a friend should pay the debt of a friend, the debtor would be freed by another's merit just as though by his own. The merits of Christ are so presented to us that, when we believe in Him, we are accounted just as righteous, by our confidence in the merits of Christ, as though we had merits of our own." FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., III, 57): "Since this obedience of Christ is that not of one nature only, but of the entire person, most perfect is the satisfaction and expiation, on behalf of the human race, according to which satisfaction was made to the eternal and immutable divine justice revealed in the Law. This obedience is that righteousness of ours that avails before God." . . .

Moreover, it was especially the Socinians against whom the Dogmaticians had to defend the doctrine above stated; and it was under the influence of the controversy with them that the doctrine assumed the form just presented. HUTT., who already in his LOC. TH. opposes the Socinian doctrine at great length, states it as follows: "That man is justified before God, not because of the merit or satisfaction of Christ, because neither the justice of God required this, nor did Christ by His death afford it, but because alone of the forgiveness of sins, which God, not on account of any merit of His Son, but from His most free will, grants those who believe in the Word of Christ, and pursue a life of innocence." In refutation of this doctrine, HUTT. makes a distinction between three controversies. (402): "The *first* is, concerning the mercy of God, which, the Photinians contend, (1) is not natural or essential, but accidental to God; (2) that in respect to men, as sinners, it is altogether absolute, and is not based upon any satisfaction whatever, whether of Christ or of ourselves. The *second* is, concerning the justice of God, as avenging or punishing the sins of men, of which the Photinians imagine that there neither is, nor ever has been, any such in God; just as though in the Scriptures God were nowhere read of as ever being or having been angry with sinners. The *third* is, concerning the satisfaction and merit of Christ our Saviour; for they absolutely deny both, contending very blasphemously, (1) that there was no necessity whatever for a satisfaction; . . . (2) that the suffering of Christ neither was nor could have been a satisfaction or merit for our sins; . . . (3) that the final

cause of Christ's suffering was nothing else than that He might be able to show us the way of life, and that, by means of His doctrine, we might embrace salvation; . . . (4) that the remission of sins comes to us without the shedding of Christ's blood, solely by free, unconditional, and absolute will of God's mercy, according to which He is willing to forgive us our sins, and truly forgives them if we truly repent."

[9] Holl. (736): "The wisdom and mercy of God especially shine forth from the wonderful satisfaction of the Mediator, a most precious ransom having been most wisely found, and most mercifully determined and accepted."

[10] Hutt. (Loc. Com., 408): "Wherefore, in order that the mercy of God might harmonize with His justice, it was necessary that a combination of divine justice and mercy should intervene; by reason of which, both His justice would press its right, and mercy, at the same time, would have a place. We are permitted to hold such a combination, and that, too, by far the most perfect, in one and the same work of our salvation, with respect to one and the same subject, namely, Christ our Saviour. For, when about to reconcile the world, and that, too, not without an unparalleled feeling of mercy, He saw that satisfaction must first be made to justice. Therefore, He turned upon Himself the penalties due our sins, He was made sin for us, He truly bore our griefs, and thus became obedient to God the Father, even to the death of the cross, satisfied divine justice to the exactest point, and thus reconciled the world, not only to God the Father, but also to Himself."

But the price of redemption must be paid God, and to Him the satisfaction must be rendered. Hutt. (Loc. Com., 430): "Neither the devil, nor sin, nor death, nor hell, but God Himself, was the ruler holding the human race in captivity, as He delivered it to the infernal prison by this sentence, 'Thou shalt surely die.' The devil bore only the part of a lictor; sin was like chains; death and hell, like a prison. Therefore, the price of redemption was to be paid not to the devil,* not to sin, not to death or hell, but to God, who had it in His power once again to declare the human race free,

* [Referring to the doctrine found in many of the early writers of the Church, (especially Origen, Gregory of Nyssa), and in Lombardus and other Scholastics, which represented the price of redemption as paid the devil. Men, they taught, because of sin, had been handed over to Satan's power. Christ offered Himself as man's substitute, and was gladly accepted by Satan, who overlooked Christ's omnipotence, and was thus not only defrauded of his prey, but even himself was destroyed, when the Son of God, brought within his realm, completely overthrew and ruined it. It was the work of Anselm to antagonize this perversion of Heb. 2: 14, 15, and to define the doctrine that has since prevailed.]

and to redeem it for grace; provided only a satisfaction to the exactest point be rendered His justice."

[11] Quen. (III, 228): "It was the infinite God that was offended by sin; and because sin is an offense, wrong, and crime against the infinite God, and, so to speak, is Deicide, it has an infinite evil, not indeed formally, . . . but objectively, and deserves infinite punishments, and, therefore, required an infinite price of satisfaction, which Christ alone could have afforded." Grh. (III, 579): "The guilt attending the sins of the entire human race was infinite, inasmuch as it was directed against the infinite justice of God. An infinite good had been injured, and, therefore, an infinite price was demanded. But the works and sufferings of Christ's human nature are finite, and belong to a determined time, *i. e.*, are terminated by the period of His humiliation. In order, therefore, that the price of redemption might be proportionate to our debt and infinite guilt, it was necessary that the action or mediation not only of a finite, viz., a human, but also of an infinite, *i. e.*, a divine nature, should concur, and that the suffering and death of Christ should acquire power of infinite price elsewhere, viz., from the most effectual working of the divine nature, and thus that an infinite good might be able to be presented against an infinite evil." Cf. the doctrine of the third genus of *communicatio idiomatum*. Christ, as the God-man, could afford such a satisfaction. Quen. (III, 227): "The source from which" (Christ made satisfaction) "comprises both natures, the divine, as the original and formal source, and the human, as the organic source, acting from divine power communicated through the hypostatic union." Cf. Form. Conc., Sol. Dec., III, 56.

Note.—The passages cited prove that the Dogmaticians attached so much importance to the union of the divine and human natures for the special reason that, if the divine nature had not participated with the human in suffering, in the manner indicated in § 33, Note 23, this suffering would not have had an infinite value, and in this they follow the theory of Anselm. But this theory still further magnifies the importance of the union of the two natures in Christ by another consideration, stating that "if this service of infinite value had not been rendered by one who was at the same time man, it would have been of no avail for us men;" and without this addition the theory is confessedly incomplete. Although our Dogmaticians do not expressly mention this point, we may still assume that they silently included it. This assumption is justified by the self-consistency of the Anselmic theory, which they on this subject adopted.

[12] QUEN. (III, 244): "The means by the intervention of which satisfaction was afforded is the price of Christ's entire obedience, which embraces (1) the most exact fulfilment of the Law; (2) the enduring, or most bitter suffering, of the penalties merited by us transgressors. For by *His acts* Christ expiated the crime which man had committed against justice, and by *His sufferings* He bore the penalty which, in accordance with justice, man was to endure. Hence the obedience of Christ, afforded in our place, is commonly said to be twofold, the *active*, which consists in the most perfect fulfilment of the Law, and the *passive*, which consists in the perfectly sufficient payment of penalties that awaited us. The distinction into active and passive obedience is not very accurate, as Dr. Mentzer well remarks, because the passive obedience does not exclude the active, but includes it, inasmuch as the latter was wonderfully active, even in the very midst of Christ's death. Hence Bernard correctly calls Christ's action passive, and His passion active. 'From the Scriptures and with them we acknowledge only one obedience of Christ, and that the most perfect,' says the already quoted Mentzer, 'which, according to the will of His Father, He fulfilled with the greatest holiness and the highest perfection in His entire life, and by the action and suffering of death.' The active obedience is His conformity with the very Law. And therefore, properly and accurately, and by itself, it is called obedience. But what is ordinarily called *passive* obedience is the enduring of a penalty inflicted upon the violator of the Law. If this is to be named obedience, it will be so called in a broad sense, or from its result, for it is certain that alone and without the accompaniment of active obedience, it is not conformity with the very Law. . . . The obedience of Christ is with less accuracy called passive, because He voluntarily did and suffered all things for us and our salvation."

[13] HOLL. (737): "By His active obedience, Christ most exactly fulfilled the divine Law in our stead, in order that penitent sinners, applying to themselves, by true faith, this vicarious fulfilment of the Law, might be accounted righteous before God, the judge, Gal. 4: 4, 5; Rom. 10: 4; Matt. 5: 17."

In the doctrine of the active obedience, the following points come into consideration: (1) That God could not forgive us if we could not be considered as having satisfied the demands of the divine Law. QUEN. (III, 244): "For, inasmuch as man was not only to be freed from the wrath of God as a just judge, but also, in order that he might stand before God, there was a necessity for righteousness which he could not attain except by the fulfilment

of the Law, Christ took upon Himself both, and not only suffered for us, but also made satisfaction to the Law in all things, in order that this His fulfilment and obedience might be imputed to us. (2) That Christ was subject to the Law not for His own person." QUEN. (III, 246): "The cause on account of which the Son of God was subject to the Law was not His own obligation; for Christ not only as God, but also according to His human nature, was in no way subject to the Law. . . . For Christ, with respect to Himself, was the Lord of the entire Law, and not its servant, Mark 2: 28. And, although He was and is the seed of Abraham, yet, because in the unity of His person He was and is the Son of God, He was not subject to the Law with respect to Himself." (3) That consequently as Christ has nevertheless fulfilled the Law, He has done it in our stead. GRH.: "Rom. 8: 3. Here there is ascribed to the Son of God the fulfilment of the Law, which it was impossible for us to render, in order that the righteousness of the Law might be fulfilled in us through faith, viz., through Christ, cf. Rom. 5: 8; Phil. 3: 9. The Son of God, therefore, was sent to render that which, because of weakness, was impossible for us, and it was, therefore, necessary that the Son of God Himself should fulfil the Law for us, in order that the righteousness demanded by the Law and rendered by Him might become ours through the imputation of faith, and thus, in God's judgment, according to His reckoning, might be fulfilled or be able to be regarded as fulfilled by us." Christ engaged Himself to fulfil the Law on our account, as CALOV. (VII, 424) asserts, already through "circumcision, which to Him was not a means of regeneration or renewal, because He needed neither; wherefore, for no other reason, except for our sake, He submitted to circumcision, and through the same put Himself under obligation to render a fulfilment of the Law, that should be vicarious or in our place."

Concerning the nature of the Law that Christ fulfilled, HOLL. (737): "The Law to which He was subject is understood both as the universal or moral, and the particular, *i. e.*, the ceremonial and forensic." QUEN. (III, 245): "And the Law was thus fulfilled by the Lord: (1) the *ceremonial*, by showing its true end and scope, and fulfilling all the shadows and types which adumbrated either His person or office; (2) the *judicial*, both by fulfilling those things which in it belonged to common, natural, and perpetual law; (3) the *moral*, in so far as by His perfect obedience, and the conformity of all the actions of His life, He observed the Law without any sin and defect, reaffirmed its doctrine which had been corrupted by the Pharisees, and restored it to its native integrity and perfection."

Andr. Osiander gave occasion to the supplementing of the passive by the active obedience. The doctrine was first developed by Flacius (in his work, "Concerning Righteousness *vs.* Osiander," 1552) in the following manner: "The justice of God, as revealed in the Law, demands of us, poor, unrighteous, disobedient men, two items of righteousness. The first is, that we render to God complete satisfaction for the transgression and sin already committed; the second, that we thenceforth be heartily and perfectly obedient to His Law if we wish to enter into life. If we do not thus accomplish this, it threatens us with eternal damnation. And therefore this essential justice of God includes us under sin and the wrath of God. . . . Now there are often two parts of this righteousness due to the Law: the former, the complete satisfaction of punishment for sin committed, for, since it is right and proper to punish a sinner, one part of righteousness is willingly to suffer the merited punishment; the other part is perfect obedience, which should then follow and be rendered. Therefore the righteousness of the obedience of Christ, which He rendered to the Law for us, consists in these two features, viz., in His suffering and in the perfection of His obedience to the commands of God."

The Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., III, 14) states the doctrine thus: "Therefore the righteousness which, out of pure grace, is imputed before God to faith or believers, is the obedience, the suffering, and the resurrection of Christ, by which, for our sake, He made satisfaction to the Law and expiated our sins. For since Christ is not only man, but God and man in one undivided person by reason of His own person, He was no more subject to the Law than He was to suffering and death, as He was the Lord of the Law. For this reason, His obedience (not only that by which in His entire passion and death He obeyed the Father, but also that by which, for our sake, He voluntarily subjected Himself to the Law and fulfilled it by His obedience) is imputed to us for righteousness, so that because of the entire obedience which, for our sake, Christ rendered His Heavenly Father, both by doing and suffering, God forgives us our sins." Cf. III, 57. Intimations of this doctrine occur, indeed, already in the writings of earlier theologians, even in those of Luther, but before the time of the Form. Conc., the obedience of Christ was considered mainly with reference to His sufferings. Thus Mel. (Loc. c. Th., II, 212): "Since, therefore, men did not afford obedience, it was necessary either that they should perish as a punishment, or that another one pay the penalty or ransom; therefore by His wonderful and unerring counsel, the Son of God, by interceding for us, paid the ransom, and drew

upon Himself the wrath which we ought to have borne; wherefore, God did not abate His Law without a compensation, but preserved His justice in demanding punishment. Christ therefore says, 'I am not come to destroy but to fulfil the Law,' namely, *by undergoing punishment for the human race and by teaching and restoring the Law in believers.*" And at the time, and even after the time, of Osiander, many divines contented themselves with thus stating it, and to the passive added a further obedience only in this sense, viz., that the obedience of Christ manifested itself not only in suffering, but also throughout His entire holy life. Thus GRH. states it (VII, 60), who, however, in other passages, expresses himself as favoring the active obedience in the sense of the FORM. CONC.): "It remains for us to inquire by what means Christ merited the righteousness that avails before God. We reply, from the Scriptures, that the entire obedience of Christ, the active as well as the passive, that of His life as well as that of His death, concur in procuring this merit. For, although in many passages of Scripture the work of redemption is ascribed to Christ's death and the shedding of His blood, yet this must be received by no means exclusively, as though by it the holy life of Christ were excluded from the work of redemption, but it must be regarded as occurring for the reason that nowhere does the fact that the Lord has loved and redeemed us, shine forth more clearly than in His passion, death, and wounds, as the devout old teachers say; and because the death of Christ is, as it were, the last line and completion, the τέλος, the end and perfection of the entire obedience, as the apostle says, Phil. 2: 8. That it is altogether impossible in this merit to separate the active from the passive obedience, is evident, because even in the death of Christ the voluntary obedience and the most ardent love concur, of which the former respects the Heavenly Father, and the latter us men, John 10: 18; Gal. 2: 20." Direct opposition to the distinction drawn by Osiander was first made among the Lutheran theologians by Parsimonius (1563), who soon, however, withdrew it. He said: "The Law binds to either obedience or punishment, not both at once. Therefore, because Christ endured the punishment for us, He thereby rendered obedience for Himself." Also: "What He rendered, that we dare not render, and are under no obligation to do it. But we must render obedience to the Law. Christ, therefore, did not render obedience to the Law for us, but for Himself, that He might be an offering unspotted and acceptable to God." (Arnold, "*Kirchen und Ketzer Geschichte,*" vol. ii, pt. xvi, ch. xxx, § 12.) On the part of the Reformed, the chief opposition to this doctrine came from John Piscator, in Herborn.

His arguments are answered at length by Grh., vii, 70, sqq.: "The suffering of penalties alone is not the righteousness of the Law, for then it would follow that the condemned most perfectly fulfill the Law; since they endure the most exquisite punishments for their sins. . . . The passion of Christ would not have profited had it not been combined with most full and perfect obedience to the Law. . . . The *active* obedience alone would not have been sufficient, because punishment was to be inflicted for the sins of the human race; the *passive* obedience alone would not have been sufficient, because if the sins were to be expiated, perfect obedience to each and every precept of the Law was required, *i. e.*, the passive obedience had to be that of one who had most fully met every demand of active obedience. . . . Rational creatures not yet fallen into sin, the Law places under either punishment or obedience. The holy angels it obliges only to obedience, but in no way to punishment. Adam, in the state of innocency, it obliges only to obedience, but not at the same time, except conditionally, to punishment. For, where there is no transgression, there is no punishment. But rational creatures that have fallen into sin, it obliges to both punishment and obedience: to obedience, so far as they are rational creatures; to punishment, because they have fallen into sin. Thus, since the Fall, Adam and all his posterity are under obligation at the same time both of punishment and of obedience, because the obligation to obedience is in no way abated by a fall, but on the other hand, a new obligation has entered, viz., that of the endurance of punishment for sin."

For the history of the doctrine of the active obedience, see *Fr. H. R. Frank:* "The Theology of the *Form. Conc.*," II, 1861. *J. G. Thomasius:* "The Person and Work of Christ," Part III, Division 1, second edition. 1863.

[14] Holl. (737): "By the passive obedience, Christ transferred to Himself the sins of the whole world (2 Cor. 5: 31; Gal. 3: 13), and besides this suffered the punishments due them, by shedding His most precious blood, and meeting for all sinners the most ignominous death (Is. 53: 4; 1 Pet. 2: 24; John 1: 29; Rom. 4: 25; Gal. 1: 4; 1 Cor. 15: 3: 1 Pet. 3: 18; Heb. 10: 12; Rom. 6: 23; Heb. 9: 28), in order that, to believers in Christ the Redeemer, sins might not be imputed for eternal punishment." To the satisfactory sufferings of Christ, there are referred (Quen. III, 253): "All the acts of Christ, from the first moment of conception to the three days of His atoning death; as, His lying hid for nine months in the womb of the Virgin, His being born in poverty, His living in constant misery, His bearing hunger, thirst and cold. For He bore

all these things for us and our sake." Nevertheless, the passive obedience is said to consist "especially of death, and the yielding up of the spirit."

[15] The satisfaction which Christ has made is, therefore, *a vicarious satisfaction*. Holl. (737): "To a vicarious penal satisfaction, (*a*) if it be *formally* regarded, there is required: 1. A *surrogation*, by which some one else is substituted in the place of a debtor, and there is a transfer of the crime, or an imputation of the charge made against another. 2. A *payment of penalties*, which the substituted bondsman or surety makes in the place of the debtor; (*b*) considered with regard to the *end*, the payment of the penalty, for obtaining the discharge of the debtor, occurs in such a way that he is declared free from the crime and penalty." The attacks of the Socinians against the vicarious satisfaction are refuted by Grh. (VII, l. xvii, c. ii, § 37, sq.), and Quen. (*De officio Christi, pars polemica*, qu. 6). The chief objection: "The action of one cannot be the action of another; the fulfilment of the Law is an action of Christ; therefore the fulfilment of the Law cannot be our action," Holl. (734) refutes thus: "An action is considered either *physically*, as it is the motion of one acting, or *morally*, as it is good or evil. The action of one can be that of another by imputation, not physically, but morally."

[The argument of Grh. is: 1. Christ is our *mediator*, 1 Tim. 2: 5; Heb. 8: 6; 9: 15; 12: 24. 2. Our *redeemer*, Ps. 111: 9; Luke 1: 68; 2: 38; Rom. 3: 24; 1 Cor. 1: 30; Eph. 1: 7; Col. 1: 14; 1 Tim. 2: 6; Heb. 9: 12, 15; 1 Pet. 1: 18; Rev. 5: 9. 3. The ἱλασμὸς, *propitiation* for our sins, 1 John 2: 2; 4: 10; Rom. 3: 24, 25. 4. By Him we are reconciled to God, Is. 63: 3; cf. Rev. 19: 13; John 1: 17; Rom. 5: 10, 11; 2 Cor. 5: 18, 19; Eph. 2: 16; 5: 2; Col. 1: 20. 5. He gave His life a λύτρον καὶ ἀντίλυτρον for us, Matth. 20: 28; Mark 10: 45; 1 Tim. 2: 5, 6, the latter meaning properly an equivalent compensation; and hence the benefit acquired is said to be λύτρωσις and ἀπολύτρωσις, Luke 1: 68; Tit. 2: 14; 1 Pet. 1: 18; Heb. 9: 15. 6. He was made *sin* for us, 2 Cor. 5: 21; Rom. 8: 3. 7. He became a *curse* for us, Gal. 3: 13. 8. He took upon Himself our sins and their *punishment*, Ps. 69: 4; Is. 43: 24, 25; 53: 4, 6, 8; John 1: 29; 1 Pet. 2: 24. Here belongs the scape-goat, Lev. 16: 20, as a type of Christ, John 1: 29. 9. He shed His *blood* for our sins, Matth. 26: 28; 1 John 1: 7; Heb. 9: 13, 14. 10. He blotted out the *indictment*, Col. 2: 14. 11. He freed us from the *curse of the Law*, Gal. 3: 13; 4: 5. 12. From the *wrath* of God, 1 Thess. 1: 10. 13. From eternal *condemnation*, 1 Thess. 5: 9, 11. 14. In Christ we are *righteous and beloved*, 2 Cor. 5: 21.

The counter-arguments of the Socinians are then examined: *e. g.*, Against (1) they urge, that Moses was also a mediator. This is conceded. But there is more in the antitype than in the type. The manner in which Christ is said to be mediator is especially taught in Scripture, 1 Tim. 2: 4, 5, 6; Heb. 9: 15. Against (2) that redemption means only simple liberation without an intervening price of satisfaction. It is conceded that the word *redeem* is so used in some passages, but not in those which refer to Christ as our Redeemer, 1 Cor. 6: 20; 1 Pet. 1: 18, 19; Gal. 3: 13; Eph. 1: 7; Tit. 2: 14; Heb. 9: 12, 15; Rev. 5: 9. Against (4) that the reconciliation is not of men with God, but of men with themselves, *i. e.*, of Gentiles with Jews, and of men with angels. It is conceded that in Eph. 2, the apostle is speaking of the antagonism between Jews and Greeks, and in Col. 1, of that between angels and men; but from this it does not follow, that there is no reference to the removal of the dissent between men and God by Christ's satisfaction, for this is distinctly said, Eph. 2: 16; therefore He reconciled the Gentiles not only to the Jews, but also to God Himself, vs. 13, 18, 19. So, according to Col. 1, angels are reconciled to men, because, through Christ, the human race is reconciled to God. That we are reconciled to God through Christ, Scripture clearly asserts; but from this, it neither can, nor should be inferred that God is not reconciled to us through Christ, but rather that the one follows from the other. As we could not be reconciled to God, unless God were reconciled to us, the Apostle says (Rom. 5: 10): "When we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son," etc.

Among the general objections of the Socinians, the chief is that any satisfaction conflicts with the *gratuitous* remission of sins; as a creditor cannot be said to remit a debt gratuitously, for which a satisfaction is rendered. GRH. answers that there is no opposition, but only a subordination, Rom. 3: 24: 'Being justified freely by His grace' (gratuitous remission) 'through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus' (satisfaction), Eph. 1: 7: 'In whom we have redemption through His blood' (satisfaction), 'the forgiveness of sins according to the riches of His grace' (gratuitous remission). As the grace of God does not destroy the justice of God, so gratuitous remission does not annul the merit and satisfaction of Christ which the Law demands. Nor was God a mere creditor, but also a most just judge and avenger of sins; nor were sins mere debts, but they conflict with the immutable justice of God revealed in the Law. In short, the particle *freely* excludes our worth, our merits, our satisfaction; but in no way the satisfaction of Christ.

The mercy of God remitting sins is gratuitous; but not so absolute as to exclude the merit of Christ."]

[16] QUEN. (III, 246): "The form or formal mode of the satisfaction consists in the most exact and sufficient payment of all those things which we owed. . . . Indeed this very payment of the entire debt of another, freely undertaken by Christ, and imputed to Him in the divine judgment, was sufficient, not merely because accepted of God. For in this satisfaction God did not, out of liberality, accept anything that was not such in itself, neither, in demanding a punishment due us and rendered by a surety, did He abate anything: but in this satisfaction Christ bore everything that the rigor of His justice demanded, so that He endured even the very punishments of hell, although not in hell, nor eternally. . . . Therefore the satisfaction of Christ is most sufficient and complete by itself, or from its own infinite, intrinsic value, which value arises from the facts, (1) that the person making the satisfaction is infinite God; (2) that the human nature, from the personal union, has become participant of divine and infinite majesty, and therefore its passion and death are regarded and esteemed as of such infinite value and price as though they belonged to the divine nature. Acts 20: 28." If men have merited eternal punishment, and Christ suffered only for a short time, yet this was nevertheless still a sufficient atonement, inasmuch as the sufferings of Christ are of infinite value. HUTT. meets the objection of the Photinians (Loc. Com., 427): "That the curse of the Law was eternal death; but now, since Christ did not undergo eternal death, therefore He has not undergone or borne for us the curse of the Law," by saying: "The reasoning deceives through the sophism of '*non causa pro causa.*' For it is not true, that the merit of Christ is not of infinite value, for the reason that Christ met a death that is not eternal; for, as the sins of our disobedience are actually finite, yet in guilt are infinite, since they are committed against the infinite justice of God; so the obedience and death of Christ were indeed finite in act, so far as they were circumscribed by a period of fixed time, namely, the days of humiliation, but they are infinite with respect to merit, inasmuch as they proceed from an infinite person, namely, from the only begotten Son of God Himself. Secondly, it is not unconditionally true, that the curse of the Law is to be defined only by eternal death. For if this were true, the Apostle's definition of the curse of the Law, by the declaration of Moses: 'Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree,' Deut. 21: 23, would have been extremely inaccurate. Then, eternal death is defined not only by its perpetual continuance, or the enduring of the tor-

tures of hell, but also by the feeling of the sorrows of hell, united with rejection or desertion by God; so that he who even but for a moment endures such sorrows, can be said to have experienced eternal death. Thus Christ, indeed, not for a moment, or a short space of time, but through the entire period of His humiliation, truly endured the feeling of those sorrows of hell, so that at length He was constrained to exclaim, 'My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?' But the reason that He did not suffer death in the latter manner is, that He Himself, as an innocent man, by dying satisfied the Law." Holl. (742) remarks: "Christ endured a punishment equivalent to eternal punishment, inasmuch as He suffered the punishments of hell *intensively* as respects their power, weight, and substance, although not *extensively*, so far as their duration and the accidents pertaining to the subject's suffering are concerned; He bore the extremity, but not eternity of tortures."

[The students of the history of the doctrine of the "Active Obedience," have occupied themselves too exclusively with polemical treatises. In practical works, its formulation is much earlier than 1553. It is distinctly taught in the Third Homily of the Church of England (Cranmer) of 1547, in the Articles for the Reformation of Cologne (Melanchthon and Bucer) of 1543, and the Brandenburg-Nürnberg Articles of 1533. What is especially interesting is, that this earliest document was prepared by Andrew Osiander himself, with the assistance of Brentz. Its presentation is as follows:

"This Mediator treated thus with God: First, He directed His entire life to the will of the Father; did for us what we were under obligation to do, and yet could not do; and fulfilled the Law and all righteousness for our good, Matt. 5: 17; Gal. 4: 4; 1 Cor. 1: 30; Phil. 3: 9" (*Active*). "Secondly, He took upon Himself all our sins, and bore and suffered all that was due us, John 1: 29; Is. 53: 4–6; Rom. 8: 32;" Gal. 3: 13 (*Passive*).

Nowhere, in the whole range of Lutheran theology, are these two forms of the obedience more sharply discriminated than in the above.]

[17] Quen. (III, 228): "The *real** object for which satisfaction was rendered is one thing; the *personal* object is another. I. The *real object* comprises (1) *all sins whatever*, original as well as actual, past as well as future, venial as well as mortal, yea, even the very sin against the Holy Ghost, Is. 53: 4 sq.; Tit. 2: 14; 1 John 1: 7; Heb. 1: 3; 1 John 2: 2. (2) All the penalties of our sins, temporal as well as eternal, Is. 53: 5; Gal. 3: 13; Rom. 5: 8, 9; Heb. 2: 14, 15; 1 Cor. 15: 14."

* In the sense of pertaining to things.

On the *real* object, GRH. VI, 306: "1. Scripture everywhere speaks *indefinitely* when it treats of the satisfaction rendered for sins by Christ. John 1: 29: 'The *sin* of the world,' *i. e.*, sin understood universally, everything having the nature of sin. 2. Not only indefinitely but also *universally*, Is. 53: 6; Rom. 3: 12; Tit. 2: 14; 1 John 1: 7. 3. Species of actual sins are specified, Is. 53: 6; Rom. 3: 12; Heb. 9: 14. 4. Christ made satisfaction for every sin which the Law accuses and execrates. But the Law accuses and execrates all sins, not only original, but also actual, Gal. 3: 13; Deut. 27: 5. 5. Had Christ made satisfaction only for original sin, so that it would be left us to make satisfaction for actual sins, only one part of the work of redemption would be left to Christ, while the other, and that, too, the greater part, would be transferred to men. For Christ's satisfaction would be for but one sin, while men would have to render satisfaction for many sins. But Scripture ascribes the entire work of redemption to Christ, 1 Tim. 2: 5; Is. 63: 3; Heb. 10: 14. Christ however made full satisfaction not only for actual sins, but also for the temporal and eternal punishments due our sins: 1. According to the nature of a perpetual relation, when the guilt is removed, the debt of punishment belonging to the guilt is also removed. But Christ took upon Himself our sins, Is. 53: 6; John 1: 29; 1 Pet. 2: 24. Therefore, He also transferred to Himself the penalty due our sins, and consequently freed us from the debt of the penalty that was to be paid. 2. Scripture emphatically says that the punishment due our sins was imposed on Christ, Is. 53: 5. 3. All punishments, temporal and eternal, corporeal and spiritual, are included under the name '*curse*,' Gal. 3: 13. One punishment of sin is the curse of the Law; but 'Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the Law.' Another punishment of sin is the dominion of Satan; but Christ has delivered us from the dominion of Satan, Heb. 2: 14. Another punishment of sin is the wrath of God; but Christ has delivered us from the wrath to come, 1 Thess. 1: 10. Another punishment is death; but Christ has delivered us from death, Hos. 13: 14. Another is hell and eternal damnation; but Christ has delivered us from hell and eternal damnation, Rom. 8: 1. 4. God's justice does not allow the same sin to be punished twice; and He has 'bruised' His most beloved Son for our offenses, Is. 53: 4. Therefore He will not punish them in those who have become partakers of the satisfaction rendered by Christ. 5. If we had still to render satisfaction as to the penalties of sin, the satisfaction of Christ would not yet be perfect, the work of redemption would not yet be complete, all things would not yet be finished by Him. And yet He cried on the cross,

'It is finished,' from which Heb. 10: 14 infers, etc. Had He made satisfaction for original sin alone, or for guilt alone, it would be better called ἡμιλύτρωσις than ἀπολύτρωσις.

That, by faith, men become partakers of the most perfect satisfaction rendered by Christ, we prove by the following arguments:

1. Scripture describes our reconciliation with God to be such that God no longer remembers our sins, Jer. 31: 34, but casts them behind our backs, Is. 38: 17, blots them out like a cloud, Is. 44: 22, casts them into the depths of the sea, Mic. 7: 19, does not impute, but covers them, Ps. 32: 1. Therefore He does not hold the reconciled to the reckoning, or exact of them punishments. For were God still to punish, He would still impute; were He to avenge, He would still remember; were He to account, He could not keep covered; were He to examine, He could not cast away; were He to inspect, He could not blot out.

2. The complete forgiveness of sins is inconsistent with a debt of satisfaction yet to be rendered for the punishment. That for which a satisfaction is still exacted is not yet completely forgiven. No one would say that a creditor who still demands a satisfaction, had forgiven a debtor. When all the debt is forgiven, the obligation to pay even the least part is removed, etc.

The contrary doctrines are the various opinions of the Scholastics and Papists: (*a*) That "we can make satisfaction for our guilt;" (*b*) that while "we cannot make satisfaction for our guilt, we can for the penalty;" (*c*) that "eternal punishment is, by the power of the keys, commuted to temporal punishment, so as to bring it within our ability;" (*d*) that "while *eternal* guilt and punishment are remitted, the obligation to some *temporal* punishment remains." Thus Bonaventura: "In sinning, the sinner binds himself to eternal punishment. Divine mercy, in justifying, remits all the guilt and subjection to eternal punishment. But since mercy cannot prejudice justice, whose office it is to punish what is wicked, it releases in such a way that he remains under subjection to only a relatively small amount of temporal punishment."

In the controversy, the very practical question arose as to how then we are to regard the temporal afflictions of the justified. These, the Papists argued, were a fulfilment of the obligation of punishment, and thus satisfactions. The Lutherans, especially Chemnitz in his *Examen*, "*De Satisfactione*," maintained that, properly speaking, they were not punishments, but chastisements. "What before forgiveness were punishments of sinners, after forgiveness became the contests and exercises of the justified" (Chrysostom in Gerhard). Gerh. (VI, 319): "The former are indica-

tions, testifying that the person afflicted is under the wrath of God; the latter proceed not from an enraged, but from a propitious God, Lam. 3: 33. The former are testimonies, aye, beginnings of eternal punishment; the latter look towards the reformation and salvation of the godly. Where there is remission of sins, there punishment properly so called cannot occur; for what else is remission of sins, but forgiveness from punishment?"

II. (QUEN., III, 238): "The *personal* object comprises (not angels, but) each and every sinful man, without any exception whatever. For He suffered and died for all, according to the serious and sincere good pleasure and kind intention of Himself and God the Father, according to which He truly wills the salvation of each and every soul, even of those who fail of salvation; not κατὰ δοξαν (in appearance), but κατ' ἀλήθειαν (in truth, *i. e.*, not in imagination or conjecture, but in very deed, and most truly, Is. 53: 6; Matt. 20: 28; 2 Cor. 5: 14, 15; Heb. 2: 9; 1 Tim. 2: 6; John 1: 29; 1 John 2: 1, 2; Rom. 14: 15; 1 Cor. 8: 11; Heb. 6: 4–6; 2 Pet. 2: 1."

On the *personal* object:

GRH., IV, 178: "If the reprobate are condemned because they do not believe in the Son of God, it follows that to them also the passion and death of Christ pertain. For, otherwise, they could not be condemned for their contempt of that which, according to the divine decree, does not pertain to them. The former is distinctly affirmed, John 3: 18, 36; 16: 9. If Christ had not made satisfaction for the sins of unbelievers, it follows that they are condemned for the very reason that they are unwilling to believe that that pertains to them, which in truth, and according to God's immutable decree, does not pertain to them. I add also this argument: To whomsoever God offers benefits acquired by the passion and death of Christ, for them also Christ has died. For far be it from us to ascribe to God such dissembling as though by His Word, He would call the unbelieving to repentance and the kingdom of Christ, whom nevertheless He would exclude therefrom by an absolute decree. But both Scripture and experience testify that God has offered and still is offering His Word and Sacraments to some reprobate and condemned, and, in these means, also the blessings acquired by the passion and death of Christ."

He next shows how the Calvinists have attached another sense to the Scholastic axiom, which they have adopted: "*Christ died sufficiently, but not efficiently for all.*" The Scholastics meant by this, that Christ potentially saved all, and that the reason that all do not partake of His grace must be found in their own guilt, in

not accepting Him by faith. The Calvinists, on the other hand, understand by it that Christ's death would not be without the power to expiate the sins of all, if it had been destined by God for this end, but that such was not His purpose.

"The former refer the cause of the inefficiency to the men themselves; by the latter, it is referred to the decree of God."

The chief arguments in opposition to the universality of the satisfaction are recounted:

1. "Christ says, that He lays down His life for His sheep, John 10: 15; sanctifies Himself for those given Him of His Father, John 17: 19; His blood is given for many, Matt. 26: 28. Christ, therefore, has died only for the elect." But (*a*) the force of such argument is: Christ died for His sheep. Therefore, for His sheep *alone*. He died for the *elect;* therefore, *only* for the elect. (*b*) The particular is included in its universal, viz., that Christ died for all; hence the univesral ought not to be limited by the particular, but the particular extended by its universal. (*c*) The word "*many*" is frequently used in Scripture for all, Ps. 97: 1; Dan. 12: 2; Rom. 5: 19. Hence the argument: "Christ died for many; and, therefore, not for all," is invalid. (*d*) In these passages "many" must necessarily be understood of the whole multitude of men. This is shown by the opposition in the argument of Rom. 5: 19. For all who were rendered sinners by Adam's fall, the benefit of righteousness has been acquired. Cf. Is. 53: 12 with v. 6; also Matt. 20: 28, with 1 Tim. 2: 6. (*e*) Scripture speaks in accordance with the double relation of Christ's merit, it is universal, if considered apart from its application; but its application and actual enjoyment is, by man's fault, rendered particular.

2. "If Christ truly died for all, the effect and fruit of His death must pertain to all" But (*a*) that alms be received, there must be not only a hand to give, but also a hand to take. It is not enough that the benefits of Christ, acquired by His death, are offered; they must also be received by faith. (*b*) This faith God ordinarily enkindles in the heart through the Holy Spirit, working in Word and Sacraments; but they who repel the Word, and resist the Spirit, are, by their own fault, deprived of the benefits of Christ's death. (*c*) This is clearly shown from 2 Cor. 5: 18, 19: "God hath reconciled us to Himself," etc., *i. e.*, reconciliation *has been* made, viz., with respect to the acquiring of the benefit by Christ's death, and yet, v. 18: "God hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation;" v. 20: "We pray you, be ye reconciled," *i. e.*, reconciliation *is still to be* made, viz., with respect to its application. (*d*) The argument rests on the hypothesis that the death of Christ

does not belong to those who do not partake of its fruit. Were then Paul, the thief on the cross, and others, as long as they were unbelieving and impenitent, excluded from the number of those for whom Christ died? If this be denied, the universality of the proposition falls; if it be affirmed, it follows that in conversion, the justified are either without the death of Christ, or that only then does Christ die for them. (*e*) This may be illustrated by an example: A hundred Christian captives are in bondage to the Turkish Emperor. A Christian prince pays a certain sum for the ransom of all. If any afterwards prefer to remain longer in captivity rather than enjoy the liberty acquired and offered them, they should ascribe this to themselves. For the universality of the ransom is not thereby invalidated.

3. "Christ made no satisfaction for those for whom He does not pray. But for the reprobate He does not pray, John 17: 9." But, while it is true, that the satisfaction of Christ is not for those, for whom He absolutely does not pray, this cannot be said of the reprobate, Is. 53: 12; Luke 23: 34. A distinction must be drawn between the general and the special intercession; also between the office of Christ, as a priest and as a prophet: as a priest, praying for all, when on the altar of the cross He offered His body as a sacrifice for the sins of the whole world; but as a prophet, proclaiming that sins are retained against sinners impenitent and resisting.

4. "That for which there could have been no use, we must not believe to have been done by God. But there would be no use of a universal merit, since some of the reprobate for whom Christ would have then suffered were already in hell." With equal reason we could conclude that Christ did not suffer for Abraham, Isaac, and the other saints of the Old Testament, since they had already attained that which is said to come through Christ's passion. We should rather say, according to Rev. 13: 8, that the Lamb of God was slain from the foundation of the world, viz., with respect to the divine decree, the promise, the types in the sacrifices, and the efficacy; and that the fruit of Christ's passion is not to be restricted to the moment of time in which it occurred, but extended to both past and future, whence the ancients said that "Christ's passion was before it was." We, therefore, are right in saying that Christ suffered and died also for those who, while He was suffering, were in hell; not as though Christ, by His suffering, would liberate them from hell, but because while they were still living, the promises concerning the Messiah ought to have been embraced, and the merits of His passion thus received, as patri-

archs, prophets, and the rest of the godly under the Old Testament, were saved by faith in Christ.

[18] QUEN. (III, 253): "Satisfaction is an act of the sacerdotal office of Christ, the God-man, according to which, from the eternal decree of the triune God, out of His immense mercy, He cheerfully and voluntarily substituted Himself as the bondsman and surety for the entire human race, which, through sin, had been cast into incredible misery; and, having taken upon Himself each and every sin of the entire world, by His most perfect obedience and the suffering, in their place, of the penalties that men had merited, made satisfaction, on this earth, during the whole time of His humiliation, and especially in His last agony, to the Holy Trinity that had been most grievously offended; and, by thus making a satisfaction, acquired and earned for each and every man the remission of all sins, exemption from all penalties, grace and peace with God, eternal righteousness and salvation."

[19] Concerning the relation of satisfaction and merit, HOLL. (736): "(1) Satisfaction precedes, merit follows; for Christ has merited righteousness and life eternal by rendering a satisfaction. (2) Satisfaction is made to God and His justice; but Christ has merited salvation, not for God, but for us. (3) Merit precedes the payment of a price; satisfaction, the compensating of an injury. Therefore, by His satisfaction, Christ made a compensation for the injury offered to God, expiated iniquity, paid the debt, and freed us from eternal penalties; but, by His merit, He acquired for us eternal righteousness and salvation. (4) The satisfaction rendered by Christ is the payment of our debts, by which we were under obligations to God; but merit arises from the fulfilment of the Law and the suffering that is not due." The entire obedience which Christ rendered avails for us, and Christ did not need to merit anything for His own person. This the Dogmaticians express in the following manner: "Christ, as a man, merited nothing for Himself by His obedience; because, through the personal union, Christ was given all the fulness of the Godhead (Col. 2: 9), and was anointed with the oil of joy (the gifts of the Holy Ghost) above His fellows (Ps. 45: 7). Therefore, it was not necessary that He should merit anything for Himself." (HOLL. (749)).

[20] CONF. AUG. (XXI, 2): "The Scripture propoundeth unto us one Christ, the mediator, propitiator, high priest, and intercessor." AP. CONF. (III, 44): "Christ who sitteth at the Right Hand of the Father, and perpetually maketh intercession for us."

QUEN. (III, 264): "Of this priestly act in the type, we may read in Lev. 16: 17, 18; Ex. 28: 29, 35. Christ, the God-man, is

our only intercessor, 1 Tim. 2: 5." (257): "The ground of this intercession is the satisfaction and universal merit of the intercedor Himself; for by and through His bloody satisfaction, or, by the virtue of His merit, Christ, as a priest, intercedes for us with God the Father." A more specific explanation of intercession is given in the following (ib.): "By the virtue of His merit, Christ truly and formally intercedes for all men, not indeed by *acquiring* anew for them grace and divine favor, but only according to the mode of His present state, which is that of exaltation, by *seeking* that the acquired blessing may be applied to them for righteousness and salvation." GRH.: "Intercession is nothing else than the application and continual force, as it were, of redemption, perpetually winning favor with God."

[21] QUEN. (III, 256): "He does not indeed intercede for those who, having died in impenitence, are in hell, suffering eternal punishments (for He is not their intercessor, but the judge condemning and punishing them), but in general for all those who still live in the world, and still have the gate of divine grace standing open before them, whether they be elect or reprobate. For He interceded for the transgressors, or His crucifiers, Is. 53: 12; Luke 23: 34." HOLL. (750): "How He prays for the elect, we read, John 17: 11. From which is inferred that Christ intercedes for the regenerate and elect, that they may be preserved from evil, be kept in the unity of faith, and be sanctified more and more by the Word of truth." QUEN. (III, 257): "It is evident that Christ justly does not ask the peculiar blessings that have been recounted, the actual, saving enjoyment of which belongs to the faithful and godly alone, for the ungrateful, wicked, and refractory world, in so far as it is and remains such, since it is incapable of these. These special blessings, Christ has not sought for such a world, by no means out of any absolute hatred against it, . . . but because of its wickedness, ingratitude, and contumacy. . . . The Saviour, therefore, in His prayers, does not commend to the Father the inflexible despisers and violent persecutors of the Gospel, but His own beloved disciples who received His Word; yet that this does not absolutely exclude the world either from His satisfaction or from His intercession, is evident from John 17: 21."

[22] HOLL. (749): "The intercession of Christ is not *merely interpretative* through the exhibition of His merits" ("as though Christ interceded for us not by prayers, but by His merit alone, and its eternal efficacy" (QUEN. III, 257)); "for the word, ἐντυγχάνειν, Rom. 8: 34; Heb. 7: 25, employed concerning the intercession of Christ, means more than the real yet silent presentation of merits.

. . . Therefore, the intercession of Christ is not only *real*, but also *vocal* and *oral;* not *abject* by submission" ("as though Christ, as a suppliant, with bent knees and outstretched hands, and a vocal lamentation, should entreat the Father as in the days of His flesh, for such an entreaty conflicts with Christ's glorious state; therefore we must regard it in a manner becoming God (John 17: 24), and not after the manner of the flesh or of a servant" (QUEN. III, 257), "but is *expiatory* and *effectual* for obtaining saving blessings for men (because whatever He asks of His Father is pleasing and agreeable to the Father, John 11: 22). The intercession of Christ is effectual to obtain for us salvation, although those who do not believe in Christ *do not enjoy the effect.* Hence, it is said to be effectual, by reason of the saving intention of Christ, and not by reason of the result in the unbelieving and wicked." But BR. observes, in regard to the verbal intercession (498): "Whether this intercession be verbal, consisting in words and prayers presented either mentally or vocally, or whether it be only real, consisting in this, that, by the virtue of His merit and satisfaction formerly rendered, and of His prayers formerly made, Christ moves God to remit our sins, it is not necessary to determine." [QUEN. (III, 271): "Elegantly has St. Augustine, on Ps. 85, said: 'He prays *for* us, as our *Priest;* He prays *in* us, as our *Head;* He is prayed to *by* us, as our *God.*' Let us, then, recognize our voices in Him, and His voices in us."]

[23] QUEN. (III, 258): "This intercession will not be terminated by the end of the world, but will continue to all eternity, Heb. 7: 25; Ps. 110: 4; Heb. 5: 6; 7: 17. For it must not be thought that after the end of the world, when the elect have passed into life eternal, intercession is superfluous; for He prays and intercedes, not that they may not by sin fall from eternal salvation, but that they may be kept in glory, which, as it must be regarded as having been received for merit, must also be regarded as having been received for Christ's meritorious intercession."

As, in Rom. 8: 26, mention is made of an intercession by the Holy Spirit also, some of the Dogmaticians inquire what is to be understood by this, and how it differs from the intercession that is offered by Christ. QUEN. (III, 259): "Some receive *ὑπερεντυγχάνειν* by metalepsis and with respect to the result, so that He is said to pray and groan, because He causes us to pray and groan, shows and teaches us for what to pray and how to pray aright, and forms our prayers within us. But others also understand it literally as referring to the very person of the Holy Ghost, viz., that the Holy Ghost Himself, in His own person, prays and intercedes for us." QUEN. decides for the former interpretation. And he thus states

the difference between the two kinds of intercession: "The one intercession (that of Christ) is θεανθρωπική [that of the God-man]; the other is purely θεική [divine]. The one is mediatorial; the other is not. The intercession of Christ is founded upon His suffering and death, which cannot be said of the intercession of the Holy Ghost" (Ib. 260).

[24] Holl. (751): "Redemption is not *simple*, *absolute*, and *metaphorical*, but *precious*, *satisfactory*, and *literal*, 1 Cor. 6: 19, 20; 1 Pet. 1: 18; Matt. 20: 28; 1 Tim. 2: 6." Id. (752): "The former is liberation without any intervening price, from a penalty that has been decided; the latter is that by which a guilty person is redeemed from his crime and the punishment, by the payment of a price. . . . For, properly speaking, to *redeem* signifies to *buy again*, just as the Greek words λυτροῦν, ἀγοράζειν, ἐξαγοράζειν, and the Hebrew words, פָּדָה, גָּאַל, denote purchase or repurchase, which occurs through an intervening price. Therefore, when, in the present argument, where we treat of the redemption of the fallen human race accomplished by Christ, these Hebrew and Greek words from the holy volume are employed, we receive them in a literal sense, because no necessity appears to be imposed upon us of departing from the literal sense."

The expressions used in Holy Scripture to denote redemption are (*a*) in the Old Testament גָּאַל, Lev. 25: 24, 26, 29, 31, 32, 48, 51, 52; פְּדוּת, Ex. 21: 30; Ps. 49: 8; (*b*) in the New Testament, λύτρωσις, Luke 1: 68; 2: 38; Heb. 9: 12; ἀπολύτρωσις, Luke 21: 28; Rom. 3: 24; 8: 23; 1 Cor. 1: 30; Eph. 1: 7, 14; 4: 30; Col. 1: 14; Heb. 9: 15; 11: 35; ἀγόρασις, 2 Pet. 2: 1; Rev. 5: 9; 14: 3; ἐξαγόρασις, Gal. 3: 13; 4: 5.

[25] The Dogmaticians Kg., Quen., and Holl., treat still more fully of redemption, distinguishing (1) the captive (the whole human race). (2) The one holding the captive (God, Rom. 11: 32; Gal. 3: 22, to whom the ransom must be paid; and the devil who holds the wicked in the snares of sins, 2 Tim. 2: 26, to whom not a price, but punishment is due). (3) The one redeeming the captive (Christ, the only and the universal Redeemer of the whole human race, availing by the right, strength, and will to redeem, Rom. 3: 24). (4) The chains from which Christ redeemed the human race (sins, offences against God, and temporal and eternal punishments). (5) The means of redemption. (6) The end of redemption (the final end, the glory of God; the intermediate, freedom from the guilt and dominion of sin). As, however, all the matters discussed under these heads have been included in the previous discussion, their further citations could be dispensed

with, and their presentation by the Dogmaticians above named is to be regarded as a mere recapitulation of what had been given before.

§ 37. *The Regal Office.*

To Him, who announces to the world God's gracious purpose of redemption, and who Himself accomplishes the redemption, the dominion over the world is committed; and, in exercising this dominion, He performs a regal function. This regal dignity belongs to Christ, as God, from eternity; but from the moment of His incarnation His humanity also participated in it. [1] Yet, as long as He tarried here upon earth, He did not exercise this regal dominion in its full extent; but rather, as long as He was in the state of humiliation, refrained, for the most part, from its use and exercise, and not until the time of His exaltation did He enter upon the complete exercise of this, His regal dominion. [2] Inasmuch as Christ is thus King and Lord of the world, His dominion extends over everything that is in the world and belongs to it; and there appertains to Him not only the preservation and government of the world in general, but also the preservation and government of the Church in particular. At the same time, this His dominion extends not only over the present, but equally also over the future world. This kingdom of Christ is, in itself, only one, and embraces the whole world, the present and the future, with all that it contains. Yet this one kingdom can also be distinguished as a threefold one, in the same sense in which we distinguish at present the world and the Church, and in which we distinguish the citizens of this and of the future life, of heaven and of earth. Accordingly, the world and the Church, in this life, are regarded as each a special kingdom, over which Christ rules; and those who are in the life to come constitute the third kingdom. This threefold kingdom is designated as the kingdom of power, of grace, and of glory. The first is called the *Kingdom of Power*, because it is the kingdom in which Christ exercises His divine power by governing and upholding the world; the second is called the *Kingdom of Grace*, because in this Christ operates through His saving grace; the third is called the *Kingdom of Glory*, because He therein unfolds, in all its perfection, His divine glory before the eyes of all who are there assembled. [3]

The regal office is accordingly defined as, "The theanthropic function of Christ, whereby He divinely controls and governs, according to both natures, the divine and the human (and the latter, as exalted to the Right Hand of Majesty), all creatures whatever, in the kingdom of power, grace, and glory, by infinite majesty and power: as to the divinity, by virtue of eternal generation; as to the assumed humanity, by virtue of the personal union belonging to Him." (Quen., III. 264.)[4]

To the *Kingdom of Power* ("in which Christ powerfully rules over this universe, and upholds it and providentially governs it") belong all creatures in the world, visible and invisible; [5] Christ's dominion extends over them all, and all must be subject unto Him. By Him everything is upheld and governed. [6]

To the *Kingdom of Grace* ("in which Christ collects the Church Militant upon earth, governs it, furnishes it with spiritual gifts, preserves and defends it, to the praise of the divine name, to the destruction of Satan's kingdom, and the salvation of believers," Jer. 23: 5; 33: 15; Zech. 9: 9; Holl., 763) belong those who believe in Christ, the members of His Church. To enlarge this Church, and to bestow upon its members all the blessings of the Gospel, is the regal function which Christ exercises in this kingdom, [7] and the Word and Sacraments are the means which He uses for that purpose. [8] This kingdom will, it is true, come to an end in this world, but only by passing over into the kingdom of glory. [9]

To the *Kingdom of Glory*, finally ("in which Christ most gloriously rules the Church Triumphant in heaven, and fills it with eternal felicity, to the praise of the divine name and the eternal refreshment of the saved," Matt. 25: 34; John 17: 24; Holl., 763), belong all the inhabitants of heaven, the good angels and redeemed men. They behold the Lord in His glory, as He shows Himself to the dead, when He awakens them to life. [10] This glory of the Lord begins with the time of His ascension to heaven, but will not be perfectly unfolded until, after the final judgment, believers also will enter into the kingdom of His glory, to share with Him its possession. Matt. 25: 34. [11]

[1] Quen. (III, 260): "Just as Christ, in His prophetic and

sacerdotal offices, acts and works according to both natures, so also, according to both natures, in this regal office He acts and peforms His part; for He rules over all creatures, not only as God, according to His divinity, but also as man, according to His exalted humanity." The Holy Scriptures speak of a regal dignity in Ps. 2: 6; 20: 9; 45: 1, 3, 5; 47: 7; Heb. 2: 7, 8; Ps. 8: 6; 97: 5; 2 Sam. 23: 3; 1 Tim. 6: 15; Rev. 17: 14; 19: 16.

Quen. further remarks (III, 261): "One in number is that regal power which Christ, according to His divine nature, has, and according to His human nature, possesses. Only the mode of having it varies; for what, according to His divinity, He has by eternal generation from eternity, that, according to His humanity, through and because of the personal union, He has received in time, and fully exercises now in the state of exaltation." His power to rule, even according to His human nature, is evident from Ps. 8: 6; Jer. 23: 5; John 17: 5.

[2] Holl. (764): "Christ immediately, in His very conception, was anointed to a regal dignity, and, during His visible intercourse upon the earth, possessed the power to rule, and sometimes exercised it according to His pleasure. But, in the state of humiliation, He voluntarily refrained from the most full and uninterrupted employment of His rule." Christ, therefore, "during that time in which He visibly dwelt on this earth, was a true King. Luke 2: 11; 19: 35; Mark 14: 61. There is an antithesis of the Socinians, who say that Christ, before His resurrection, was not actually a King; although they do not deny that, before His death, He was described as a King." (Holl., 764.) Quen. (III, 264): "A distinction must, therefore, be made here between the appointment to this regal office and the refraining from the full administration and use of the same. Christ, as man, was King and Lord even in the womb (Luke 1: 43), in the manger (Luke 2: 11), in bonds (John 18: 37), on the cross (Luke 23: 42); and yet did not actually exercise that dominion." That Christ also possessed regal power in the state of humiliation, the Dogmaticians regard as proved by His performing miracles.

[3] Hutt. and Hfrfr. still account, as belonging to the regal office, only His dominion over believers; and Grh., who was contemporaneous with them, was the first to include under the regal office all the relations in which Christ is Lord and King, and in this they were imitated by all the later Dogmaticians. Of course, no doctrinal difference was hereby intended. The faith of the Church always was, that Christ was Lord and King of the world. Thus we have it stated, *e. g.*, by Chmn. (De duab. naturis, 205):

"Scripture clearly affirms that to Christ, even according to His humanity, as Lord, all things have been made subject, not only in the Church, but all things in general; . . . and distinct and express mention is made of the beasts of the field, the fowls of the air, the fish of the sea, and all the works of God's hands, whether they be in heaven, or on earth, or under the earth, even of the enemies of Christ, and, therefore, the devil and death itself, as being in this subjection." The difference is only this, that GRH. was the first to introduce the method of arranging under one head all that is to be said concerning the dominion of Christ.

As to the division itself. GRH. (III, 578): "The kingdom of Christ is considered either in this or in the future life. In this life, it is called the kingdom of power or grace; . . . in the life to come, it is called the kingdom of glory." BR. (498): "The regal office of Christ is threefold, according to the diverse nature of those whom He regards as His subjects, and governs diversely. For although, if you regard the words themselves, the kingdom of grace, as well as that of glory, may seem to be comprised under the kingdom of power, as both truly depend upon divine power imparted to the human nature of Christ, yet the *usus loquendi* requires it to be named the kingdom of grace, with respect to the spiritual blessings which are conferred in this world, and the kingdom of glory, with respect to the glory of the future world; while the kingdom of power signifies a universal government." QUEN. (III, 264): "Some say that Christ reigns in the world by power, in the Church by grace, in heaven by glory, and in hell by justice." In regard to the last, HOLL. observes (763): "You say, that 'also a fourth kingdom of Christ is mentioned, viz., the kingdom of justice over the wicked angels and condemned men.' Reply: We refer the kingdom of justice to the kingdom of power." On the other hand, BR. (501): "Some, referring both (the kingdom of glory and the kingdom of justice) to the same kingdom of glory, say that the glorifying of the elect belongs by itself to the former; but the condemnation of the wicked . . . they refer to the latter in the manner in which under other circumstances opposites are wont to be referred to the same faculty."

The threefold division is, accordingly, not to be understood as if there were three separate kingdoms over which Christ rules, but the reason of the division lies (1) partly in the different divine influences which Christ exerts. The same persons who are in the kingdom of grace are also in the kingdom of power; but in the one kingdom the divine saving grace, and in the other the divine power, is exercised; (2) partly in the difference of the places in which they

are found, over which Christ rules, viz., in the one case upon earth, and in the other in heaven.

Quen. (III, 264): "The kingdom of grace includes, or rather presupposes, the kingdom of power; for the kingdom of power is required for the kingdom of grace, or the Church, which in this world is to be established, ruled, etc., through the ministry of the Spirit by means of the Word and Sacraments."

[4] Grh. (III, 578): "The regal office is that according to which Christ as the God-man governs all things in heaven and earth, and especially protects His Church against enemies." On the other hand, Hfrffr. (353) (see note 3): "The regal office is that according to which, to the end of the world, through the ministry of the Word, He collects His citizens, and, having furnished them with eminent gifts, vigorously defends them against enemies (in whose midst He rules), and at length crowns them with eternal glory and honor."

[5] Quen. (III, 265): "The object or matter with which this government is occupied comprises all the works of God in general, or all creatures, visible, invisible, corporeal, incorporeal, animate, inanimate, rational, irrational. Ps. 8: 6, 7, 8; 1 Cor. 15: 27, 28; Heb. 2: 7, 8; Eph. 1: 21, 22; 1 Pet. 3: 22."

[6] Grh. (III, 578): "The kingdom of power is the general dominion over all things, or the governing of heaven and earth, Ps. 8: 6; Dan. 7: 14; Matt. 28: 18; Eph. 1: 21; the subjugation of all creatures, 1 Cor. 15: 27; Eph. 1: 20; Heb. 2: 8; dominion in the midst of His enemies, whom He suppresses, restrains, and punishes, Ps. 2: 9; 110: 2; 1 Cor. 15: 25."

[7] Holl. (763): "The subjects, in this kingdom of grace, are all believing men, who constitute the Church Militant. *The regal acts* are the collecting, governing, adorning, and preservation of the Church, His defense of it against the enemies of grace, and His ruling in their midst. John 3: 5; 17: 17; Eph. 5: 26; Tit. 3: 5; Matt. 28: 20." When Quen. (III, 268), on the other hand, says: "The object of the kingdom of grace, according to the antecedent will, comprises *all men universally*, but the godly and believing especially," he means to say only that participation in the blessings of the Church is intended for, and sincerely offered to all men, and, therefore, does not contradict the statement of Holl.

[8] Quen. (III, 267): "The Word and Sacraments are the *instrumental cause*, for it pleased the King in Zion, Ps. 2: 6, to act here ordinarily in no other way than by the Word and Sacraments, and by these means to collect, increase, and preserve on this earth a Church for Himself. Matt. 4: 23; 9: 35; 24: 14."

[9] QUEN. (III, 270): "The end of the world will indeed terminate the mode of the kingdom of grace, but not the essence of the kingdom. That which is said in 1 Cor. 15: 24, concerning the giving up of this kingdom, is to be understood, not as applying to the government itself, but only to the mode of governing, and the form and quality of the government; because Christ will govern no longer through means, namely, through the Word and Sacraments, through the cross and among enemies, but, all enemies being put down, the last enemy, viz., death, being destroyed, and the wicked being cast into hell, He will deliver the kingdom to God the Father, *i. e.*, He will hand over the captive enemies and establish the elect, among whom He holds His spiritual kingdom. Therefore there will be a triumphal handing over of subjugated enemies, and a presentation of liberated believers. By this act of handing over, Christ will not lay aside the administration of His spiritual and heavenly kingdom, but will then only enter upon another mode of ruling." QUEN. then quotes approvingly Dorschaeus: "This handing over will be not *actus depositionis, sed propositionis.* Christ will not, at the consummation, lay down the kingdom, which, up to the consummation, He has governed in grace and in glory; but He will present it to God the Father for His inspection and glory. Just as a general, after having destroyed all his enemies, presents to the king, who through him has waged the war, the victorious and triumphant army, the saved citizens, and the free people, and tenders them to him, that he may judge and approve his deeds, and nevertheless does not lay down the power which he had over the army; so, much more, when the world is ended, and all enemies have been suppressed, shall Christ, as the Son, place His immaculate (Eph. 5: 27) ecclesiastical army in the presence of God the Father, before His tribunal, Rom. 14: 10, and shall say: 'These are they who are not defiled, who have followed me, the Lamb, whithersoever I have gone, who are the first fruits to Thee, O God, the Father, and to me the Lamb, Rev. 14: 4.'"

[10] HOLL. (763): "The subjects in this kingdom of glory are both good angels and glorified men (who in faith continue in the kingdom of grace to the end. Matt. 24: 13; Rev. 2: 10). *The regal acts* are: the raising to life of the believing dead, their solemn introduction into life eternal, Matt. 25: 34; Luke 22: 29, 30, and the most happy and glorious rule over them."

[11] QUEN. (III, 273): "Christ, the king of glory, indeed, even as a man, immediately from His first conception, was the possessor of all glory, but did not actually rule gloriously until after His exaltation, when His sufferings were finished. This very kingdom

of glory will truly receive its final completion in the general resurrection of the dead, the assembling of all of the elect, and their translation to the possession of the heavenly inheritance, and thence will endure to eternity."

C.—OF THE STATES OF CHRIST.

§ 38.

As the work of redemption, for whose accomplishment the λόγος became man, could be brought about only through suffering and death, it is altogether natural that we should see Christ, through all His earthly life, even until the completion of His work of redemption, going about in the form of a servant, subject to all the weaknesses and infirmities of human nature. Not until after His resurrection did He lay aside the form of a servant and appear in divine glory. Accordingly, from the time of the incarnation of Christ, we have to predicate of Him a two-fold condition, that of the form of a servant and that of glory. Inasmuch, however, as in consequence of the *communicatio idiomatum*, resulting from the *unio personalis*, the human nature participated in all the attributes and glory of the divine nature; and, inasmuch as, in accordance with this, a condition of divine glory would naturally have been looked for from the moment of the incarnation; we cannot comprehend the antecedent condition in the form of a servant without assuming that Christ voluntarily refrained from a glory that belonged to Him. And this indeed is the teaching of the Scriptures in Phil. 2: 5–9. Accordingly we designate the former condition the *State of Humiliation*, a condition of self-renunciation; the other, the *State of Exaltation*. This self-renunciation, however, that is followed by His being in the condition of a servant, does not lie in the act of incarnation; for, although it is a gracious condescension of the λόγος, that He assumed human nature, yet that cannot be the fact here referred to, as the condition of self-renunciation is designated as temporary, while the incarnation is permanent. [1] Neither the self-renunciation nor the exaltation, indeed, can be predicated of the λόγος, or of the divine nature; for this, remaining ever the same, is not susceptible of self-renunciation or of exaltation. It is only, therefore, of the human nature that the

one or the other can be predicated, [2] and it is only to this that the self-renunciation and the exaltation here described refer. But, when self-renunciation is predicated of it, this is not to be so understood, as if in this condition of self-renunciation the human nature were entirely stripped of the divine glory and confined entirely to itself, and as if the divine glory, as such, were not associated with the human nature until in the condition of exaltation; for this is disproved already by the fact that Christ, even in the State of Humiliation, performed deeds that imply the possession of divine glory. [3] Finally, the self-renunciation is not to be so understood as if the human nature, in consequence of its inalienable possession of divine glory, really exercised the dominion thence accruing to it, but concealed this exercise from the eyes of men, which would have been no real self-renunciation at all: [4] but it must be assumed that the human nature, although, in itself considered, having full right to the divine glory, and being in possession of all the dominion resulting therefrom, here upon earth voluntarily renounced *the use and exercise of the same* out of regard for the work of redemption that was to be accomplished, [5] and instead thereof led a life of lowliness; that, therefore, the human nature of Christ, which in virtue of the *Communicatio Idiomatum* was entitled to all the majesty belonging to God, renounced the same, and instead thereof assumed poverty, lowliness, and all the natural (though sinless) weaknesses, infirmities, limitations, and wants of human nature. [6] The self-renunciation consists, therefore, in the real, though at times interrupted abnegation, by the human nature of Christ, of the glory due unto it, and the exaltation, in the assumption by this human nature, of the full use of this divine glory after the completion of the work of redemption. [7] The first state commences with the incarnation and continues until the last moment of His remaining in the tomb. The other begins with the re-animation and continues in eternity, but develops itself in several stages. [8]

(Br. (482): "The *State of Humiliation* consists in this, that Christ for a time renounced (truly and really, yet freely) the plenary exercise of the divine majesty, which His human nature had acquired in the personal union, and, as a lowly

man, endured what was far beneath the divine majesty (that He might suffer and die for the life of the world)").

"The *State of Exaltation* is the state of Christ, the God-man, in which He, according to His human nature, having laid aside the infirmities of the flesh, received and assumed the plenary exercise of the divine majesty." [9]

I. THE STATE OF HUMILIATION.—The following are the principal aspects in which the humiliation of Christ reveals itself: HOLL. (759, sq.) [10]

"1. *Conception*, Luke 1: 31. A supernatural act, by which the flesh of Christ, produced from the mass of the blood of the Virgin Mary, received in her womb its original being, consubstantial with our own, through the supervention of the Holy Spirit." [11]

2. *Nativity;* which besides was accompanied with many humiliating circumstances. "Luke 2: 7. The nativity of Christ is the going forth of God, as an infant, from the maternal womb into the light of day." [12]

3. *Circumcision;* by which Christ, at the same time, made Himself subject to the Law. "Luke 2: 21. The circumcision is the bloody cutting off of the foreskin of the infant Jesus on the eighth day." [13]

4. *Education;* according to which Christ also subjected Himself to the laws of domestic life. "The education was His becoming accustomed, in boyhood, to the mode of life customary in Israel, and to a manual occupation." [14]

5. The *visible intercourse* of Christ in the world; by which He exposed Himself to all kinds of ill treatment from those who surrounded Him, and to all the discomforts of a lowly life. "The intercourse of Christ was His most holy association, in the days of His flesh, with all kinds of men, even the most contemptible, an association full of troubles, inconveniences, and dangers." [15]

6. The *great suffering;* the bodily and mental anguish which Christ endured in the last days of His earthly life. "The great suffering of Christ is the extreme anguish which our Redeemer suffered toward the end of His life, two days before His death, partly in His soul, partly in His body, by enduring to the end the most extreme and bitter sorrows." [16]

7. The *Death of Christ.* "The death of Christ is His loss of life through the dissolution of the natural union of body and soul." [17]

8. The *Burial.* "The burial of Christ was the placing of the body of our Redeemer, who had died upon the cross, in a new tomb, in demonstration of the truth of His death."

II. The State of Exaltation.—This begins with the return of Christ to life, [18] and exhibits itself to the lower world by the *descent*, to this world by the *resurrection* and *ascension*, attaining its completion in the *session* at the Right Hand of God the Father. [19]

1. *The Descent to the Lower World.* After Christ had been again restored to life, and before He had given to men in His resurrection from the dead the proof that He was alive, [20] He descended to hell (1 Pet. 3: 18–20; Col. 2: 15), and exhibited Himself there to Satan and the condemned spirits as the victor over death and Satan, and as Lord over death and life. [21] This descent of Christ into hell is, accordingly, not to be understood in a figurative sense, as if thereby only the greatness of the pains which Christ endured for the sake of men were indicated; or, as if thereby merely the benefits which were secured for men by the sufferings and death of Christ were set forth, namely, that men were freed from hell by them; but it is to be understood literally as a real descent into hell. [22] We are therefore to regard the whole Christ as being for awhile in hell; the act of descending is, however, to be predicated only of the human nature, since the divine nature, as filling all things, is, aside from this, to be understood as entirely present everywhere. [23] (1 Pet. 3: 18–20; Eph. 4: 9.)

Holl. (777): "The Descent of Christ to the lower world is the true, real, and supernatural movement by which Christ, having been freed from the chains of death and restored to life, in His entire person betook Himself to the lower regions, that He might exhibit Himself to the evil spirits and to condemned men as the conqueror of death." [24]

2. *The Resurrection.* After His descent to hell, three days after His death, Christ appears again upon earth to a small circle of intimate friends. Along with death, however, He

had laid aside also the weaknesses and infirmities of human nature, and this is now in a glorified condition. Through the resurrection He has proven Himself conqueror of death and the devil, and, without it, our faith would be vain. (1 Cor. 15 : 14.)

Holl. (779): "The resurrection is the act of glorious victory by which Christ, the God-man, through the same power as that of God the Father and the Holy Spirit, brought forth His body, reunited with the soul and glorified, from the tomb, and showed it alive to His disciples, by various proofs, for the confirmation of our peace, fellowship, joy, and hope in our own future resurrection." [25]

3. The *Ascension.* After Christ had shown Himself to His disciples as one raised from the dead, He ascended to heaven, *i. e.*, His human nature also betook itself into heaven, where it had not yet been. (Acts 1: 9; Luke 24: 51.)

Holl. (784): "The ascension is the glorious act of Christ by which, after having been resuscitated, He betook Himself, according to His human nature, by a true, real, and local motion, according to His voluntary determination (*per liberam œconomiam*),* and in a visible manner unto the clouds, and thence in an invisible manner into the common heaven of the blessed, and to the very throne of God; so that, having triumphed over His enemies, He might occupy the kingdom of God (Acts 3 : 21), reopen the closed Paradise (Rev. 3 : 7), and prepare a permanent inheritance for us in heaven (John 14: 2)." [26]

4. The *Sitting at the Right Hand of God.* This expression signifies the assumption, on the part of the human nature of Christ, of the full divine glory and dominion; for not until His ascension did the human nature of Christ assume, in all its extent, the real exercise of all the divine glory from which it had refrained in the state of humiliation. (Heb. 1 : 13; Eph. 1 : 20–22; Mark 16 : 19; Rom. 8 : 34; Rev. 3 : 21.)

Holl. (786): "The sitting at the right hand of God is the

*[Quen. (III, 382): "Just as His eating, touching, etc., during the forty days occurred κατ' ὀικονομίαν, so also this local and visible motion occurred by the same. For we ought not to doubt that, from the gift of agility belonging to glorified bodies, Christ could, in a moment, have withdrawn Himself from the eyes of the disciples."—Tr.]

highest degree of glory, in which Christ, the God-man, having been exalted, as to His human nature, to the throne of divine majesty, most powerfully and by His immediate presence governs all things which are in the kingdom of power, grace, and glory, for the glory of His own name, and for the solace and safety of the afflicted Church." [27]

[1] Holl. (765): "Although in an ecclesiastical and figurative sense the incarnation is sometimes said to be a self-renunciation ('where it is employed in reference to the kind inclination by which the λογος inclined Himself to pity and assist us, and, descending from heaven, deigned to assume human nature. This self-renunciation, figuratively and in an ecclesiastical sense so termed, is called the humiliation of incarnation, Grh., III, 562'), yet properly speaking, and *in accordance with scriptural usage*, the incarnation must not be called self-renunciation (*exinanitio*). For (1) self-renunciation is predicated of the incarnate (ἐνσαρκος) Son of God, or Christ, the God-man; incarnation, of the not yet incarnate (ἀσαρκος) Son of God; (2) when the self-renunciation is removed by exaltation, the state of incarnation remains."

[2] Holl. (767): "Christ was humbled (*exinanitus est*) according to His human nature considered in the personal union." Id.: "The subject (of the humiliation) is the human nature alone, but considered in the union; for (1) since the divine nature is immutable and most perfect, it cannot be exalted and humbled; (2) the self-renunciation extended even to the death of the cross, Phil. 2: 8, and the divine nature neither died nor was crucified."

[3] Chmn. (de duab. nat., 216): "Neither was it only after His resurrection that the entire fulness of the divine nature began to dwell bodily in Christ; as though, after the occurrence of the hypostatic union in conception and before the ascension, and sitting at the right hand, either any empty vacancy or partialness of divine nature dwelt bodily in Christ; or as though the hypostatic union or personal indwelling of the entire fulness of the Godhead, in the assumed nature of Christ, became in the process of years constantly greater, more intimate, fuller, and more complete: for, from the first moment of the hypostatic union, the entire fulness of the Godhead dwelt bodily, or, in other words, in the flesh, or assumed nature, of Christ."

Holl. (765): "The self-renunciation of Christ consists formally . . . *not* in the entire abdication or abandonment of divine majesty, . . . for (1) this could not have occurred without a dissolution of the personal union; for, since it is a perfect and inner

union, it cannot exist without an impartation of natures and properties; (2) during the state of self-renunciation Christ sometimes produced remarkable proofs of the divine majesty dwelling in His flesh (John 2: 1 sq.), although He exercised this majesty very rarely, and, as it were, extraordinarily."

[4] Holl. (765): "Self-renunciation does not consist in the mere concealment or hiding of divine majesty;" for, (1) self-renunciation does not pertain to Christ in His exaltation, although there pertains to Him in that state a hiding of majesty, 1 Cor. 1: 7; (2) the hiding of gifts is not true self-renunciation, just as when the sun, when covered by clouds, has not been truly darkened; although we do not deny that Christ concealed the possession of communicated majesty and did not everywhere exert it."

[Grh. III, 575; "1. If by κρύψις, or hiding, there be understood a simulation, we deny that the self-renunciation should be thus described: because there was a true and real self-renunciation, embracing both ἄρσις, *i. e.*, abstaining from the use, not of just any, but of the plenary communicated, divine majesty and virtue, which the apostle calls κένωσις; and θέσις, *i. e.*, the assumption of a servile form, and extreme humiliation, which the apostle joins to the κένωσις. Just as, on the other hand, exaltation embraces both ἄρσις, viz., the laying aside of the form of a servant and human infirmities, which Christ had spontaneously assumed, and θέσις, viz., the full use and administration of dominion in the entire universe, all of which are ascribed to Christ not feignedly or κατὰ φάντασμα, but truly. 2. κρύψις can be referred both to the communication of majesty, and to the employment of communicated majesty. In the former respect it is rightly so-called, because the divine majesty was hid in the assumed flesh, but not separated from it; and all treasures of wisdom and knowledge are said to be hid in Him, Col. 2: 3. In the latter respect, it was not ony κρύψις, but true and real κένωσις, as the assumption of the servile form, which Christ afterwards laid aside in exaltation, shows."]

[5] Chmn. (de duæb. nat., 216): "Self-renunciation, therefore, does not signify a deprivation, removal, despoiling, putting off, casting aside, laying down, removal, want, absence, defect, destitution, or vacancy of the fulness of the Godhead, which, from the very moment of conception, dwelt in Christ bodily. But it respects its use or employment, because, being covered by weakness during the time of self-renunciation, it did not always shine in and through the human nature of Christ, and through it fully and clearly exercise itself; for, for a short time withdrawing and withholding from activity the divine virtue present and dwelling bodily

in the human nature, and through the human nature of Christ, as Ambrose says, He permitted His natural properties and other assumed infirmities to prevail, predominate, and exercise themselves, as if alone in His human nature. Yet, lest any one, because of the self-renunciation of this employment, should imagine the absence and defect of the very fulness of the divine nature in the humanity of Christ, He, in the very time of self-renunciation, whenever He wished, showed that this fulness dwelt in His flesh; and, in the very time of His self-renunciation, whenever and as far as He wished, He exercised, manifested, and employed its use by means of His assumed nature. Thus in miracles He manifested His glory." . . .

Holl. (765): Self-renunciation "consists in the abdication of the full and uninterrupted use of divine majesty, the assumption of the form of a servant, likeness to other men, and the most humble obedience."

The detailed description of the state of humiliation is given by Holl. (766): "Four requisites must be combined in order to describe fully the self-renunciation of Christ: (1) *κένωις*" ("intermission, withholding, restraining of the full activity, of the constant and universal divine majesty and excellence really imparted to Christ as a man," Quen. (III, 334)); "(2) *λῆψις μορφῆς δούλου*, the taking upon Himself the condition of a servant, for Christ was treated and sold in the manner of a servant, and endured a servant's punishment; (3) *ὁμοίωσις ἀνθρώπων*, likeness to the lower and meaner class of men, especially to the Israelites, in His birth, circumcision, ablactation, His trade as a carpenter, His intercourse, and mode of life; (4) *ταπείνωσις ὑποτακτική*, most humble, active, and passive obedience."

The Dogmaticians find the state of humiliation described in Phil. 2: 5–8. The particular phrases occurring in this passage are thus explained by them: "*Μορφὴ θεοῦ* formally and accurately denotes not the divine essence itself, but properly the glorious divine condition, or the glory and universal use of divine majesty, which cannot exist except with a true Godhead, but presuppose the same in the same person." (Quen., III, 333.) Chmn. (de duab. nat., 133): "A *μορφὴ* is when a nature or essence is considered as endowed, and clothed, and furnished as it were, with properties, attributes, and conditions, either divine or human." Quen. (III, 333): "*Ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ ὑπάρχων*. The participle *ὑπάρχων* is here very emphatic, showing (1) that Christ did not take upon Himself the *μορφὴ θεοῦ* (as it is said that He took upon Himself the *μορφὴ δούλου*), but that He existed in it; (2) that with the *μορφὴ θεοῦ*, Christ is said

to have truly possessed at the same time a divine essence and nature; . . . (3) that Christ Jesus, when He had taken upon Himself the *μορφὴ δούλου*, neither laid aside the divine nature itself, nor in any way resigned the *μορφὴ θεοῦ*, but that He did not entirely and fully exercise it, and did not make an ostentatious display of it, but rather that in the form of a servant He ministered to other men, yet in such a way as always to remain *ὑπάρχων ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ*." HOLL. (766): "'*Οὐχ ὡρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο το εἰναι ἴσα θεῷ.*' He did not judge that a public display of the majesty of the almighty and omnipresent God would have the form of robbery, but He held the same secretly, and only when it seemed good to Him sent forth some rays of His form as God. '*Ἴσα θεῷ*,' to act as though equal in glory and majesty to God. '*Εαυτὸν ἐκένωσε*,' by not shedding forth His imparted majesty, but restraining and withholding its full and universal use. '*Μορφὴ δούλου*' is not human nature, which Christ, the God-man, not only assumed but possessed, and which by His exaltation He did not lay aside; but it is the state of a servant and a humble condition." QUEN. (II, 335) explains the whole passage thus: "That Christ, from the very first moment of incarnation, could have exercised to its fullest extent the divine glory and majesty imparted to Him according to His human nature, and have acted as God, but that He withheld Himself from its full use, and showed Himself humble, and became obedient to His Heavenly Father, even to the death of the cross."

[6] HOLL. (767): "*Generally* speaking, Christ in the state of self-renunciation abstained from the full, universal, and incessant use of eternal glory, imparted through the personal union to His assumed flesh. John 17: 5." (Concerning this passage it is observed: "Glorification does not denote (*a*) the granting of the possession of glory, for Christ as man already possessed infinite glory before, John 1: 14; nor (*b*) its special employment, which He manifested in certain miracles; (*c*) but it denotes the enthronization and introduction of Christ as man into His kingdom, which He is to administer with Almighty power.") "*Specifically*, He suspended and withheld the use of omnipotence (the exercise of which would have hindered Christ's suffering and death of satisfaction for our sins), of omniscience (for He was truly ignorant of the day of final judgment, Matt. 24: 36, the barrenness of the fig-tree, Matt. 21: 19, the burial place of Lazarus, John 11: 34), of the most abundant wealth (inasmuch as He became poor for us, 2 Cor. 8: 9; Matt. 8: 20), of omnipresent dominion (John 11: 21), and religious worship (inasmuch as He became less than the angels, Heb. 2: 7)."

GRH. (III, 575) develops the practical side of this doctrine, on the basis of 2 Cor. 8: 9: "Christ was rich, because of the true and real communication of divine attributes to the flesh, Col. 2: 9; He was rich, because given a name above every name, Heb. 1: 4; He was rich, because of the power communicated to govern heaven and earth, Matt. 28: 18; He was rich, because of His participation in infinite and divine knowledge, Col. 2: 3, and because of the subjection of all things, Matt. 11: 26; John 3: 35. With these riches, Christ was endowed from the first moment of incarnation, as is shown by the personal union, the working of miracles, and every special demonstration of this majesty and power. But He became poor by His self-renunciation, humiliation, assumption of the form of a servant; hence, as a child of poverty, He is born in a stable, rests in the lap of a poor mother, lies in a poor hut, receives presents of gold from the magi, is presented to the Lord with the offering of doves—gifts of the poor, is brought up in poverty in the home of His parents, is regarded the son of a poor carpenter, experiences poverty in fasting, is without a home of His own, is stripped of His vesture on the cross, and at length is laid in the sepulchre of another—all of which pertain to the poverty and self-renunciation of Christ. But by this poverty, He has made us rich. Just as, by His death, He bought for us life, so by His poverty, He has restored to us heavenly riches; and hence, His poverty is described to us as a ground for our joy, Zech. 9: 9. The poverty of Christ has earned for us our patrimony, our property in life, our passage money (*viaticum*) in death, heavenly riches." Then, on Phil. 2: 5: "1. The example: 'Thou shouldst deign to be humble for God's sake, since God deigned to be humble for thy sake.' (*Augustine.*) Christ, without whom nothing was made, humbled Himself, so as to seem almost nothing, while thou boastest immensely, and thinkest thyself something when thou art nothing. How absurd and preposterous it is for the highest sublimity to be humbled, and the lowest worthlessness to want to extol itself! 2. As Christ humbled Himself, God exalted Him; so thou wilt not attain to a lofty station, unless by the path of humility. ἀρίστη ὁδὸς ὑψώσεως ἡ ταπείνωσις. (*Bernard.*) As Christ, by His divine nature, was incapable of growth, but by His descent, He found that whereby He could gorw; so it is only by humility that an entrance to what is high shall open to thee."

[7] HOLL. (775): "Exaltation (ὑπερύψωσις, Phil. 2: 9; δόξασις, John 17: 5; στεφάνωσις, Heb. 2: 9; ἐνθρονισμός, Heb. 8: 1), actively taken, is defined as the solemn enthronization and inauguration of the revived Christ to the full and perfect employment of the heavenly

government and the rule of heaven and earth, especially of the Church."

QUEN. (III, 368): "The form of exaltation consists in the laying aside of the servile condition or the form of a servant, and in the full, universal, and uninterrupted employment of the divine majesty, received in the personal union and possessed during the period of self-renunciation. (For in exaltation there was not given to Christ new power, virtue, or majesty, which He did not have before, but there was only conferred upon Him the full power of administering His kingdom, which He had received through the union itself.)"

The principal passage in which the State of Exaltation is described is (besides Ps. 8: 6, 7; 110: 4; Heb. 2: 7; Acts 5: 31) the same before referred to, viz., Phil. 2: 9–11. HOLL. (775): "(*a*) The particle διό does not denote a meritorious conferring, but a consequence in order. The διό being often cited to prove that by His humiliation, Christ procured merit for Himself, GRH., III, 584, argues that such doctrine would conflict with: 1. The dignity of Christ's person, since, at the very first moment of the incarnation, the human nature was brought into the very person of the Logos, than which nothing higher in glory and dignity can be imagined, Heb. 1: 5. 2. The truth of the communication of truly divine gifts. 3. The quality of His merit. For whatever Christ merited in His office, He merited *for us*, Is. 45: 24; Zech. 9: 9; John 17: 19; 1 Tim. 1: 15; 1 Cor. 1: 30. 4. The worship due Him in the days of the flesh. For if it were only after the exaltation that worship was due Him, then in the days of His flesh such was not due; and yet often He did not refuse such worship when offered Him. As to the meaning of διό: 1. The humiliation is not described as the meritorious cause of the exaltation, but the exaltation is described as the consequent profit attending the humiliation. For the particles διό and διά τοῦτο do not always and everywhere denote the meritorious cause of a thing, but sometimes also the final cause, and more frequently the consequence, whereby one thing is concluded from another. Cf. Gen. 2: 24; Matt. 19: 5; Mark 7: 29; Rom. 2: 1; 2 Cor. 4: 13; 6: 17; Eph. 4: 8, 25; Heb. 1: 9. 2. Compare the parallel passage, Luke 24: 29. The order, therefore, was divinely appointed, that Christ by His passion, and after His passion, should enter into glory. Heb. 2: 9, 10, where διὰ τὸ πάθημα, δαα παθημάτων, cannot refer to a meritorious cause. The διό, compounded of the pronoun ὁ and the proposition διὰ must be rendered *wherefore*, so that the order and consequence, but not the effect of the merit, are indicated. 4. Χαρίζεσαι, "to give gratuit-

ously," excludes the idea of merit. 5. The scope of the argument is not to inculcate confidence in merit, but to commend the pursuit of humility, so that we may expect from God the gratuitously bestowed advantages consequent upon humility. (*b*) The *bestower of glory* is God the Father. John 17: 7; Rom. 6: 4." (Yet only by way of pre-eminence, as the original source; otherwise, it is an act of the entire Trinity, and we can also say, "The Son raised Himself from the dead." John 2: 19.) "(*c*) ὑπερύψωσις, following self-renunciation and humiliation, . . . implies, in place of the emptying of the form of God, the full employment of the form of God; in place of the hiding of those things which are equal with God, their public manifestation; in place of the assumption of the form of a servant, the laying aside of the same, and the administration of universal dominion. (*d*) *The giving of a name above every name*, marks the conferring of the highest glory, than which none that is more lofty can be named, and which, with respect to its fullest use, has been presented to Christ by means of exaltation. (*e*) *The consequence of the glory bestowed* is the subjection of all creatures, represented by the bowing of the knee. Ps. 97: 7; Rev. 5: 13; John 14: 13; James 2: 19; 10: 17. What was said of the humiliation is equally true of the exaltation, viz.: "(1) That this term is not employed in an ecclesiastical sense, for the bringing up of humanity into the person of the λόγος, and therefore, as a consequence, the impartation of divine grounds of glorying (αὐχηματα);" but "in a biblical sense, as it denotes the universal glorification of Christ, who has been freed from death;" (2) That the exaltation has reference only to the human nature of Christ.

Chmn. (de duab. nat., 218) thus contrasts the terms, incarnation, humiliation, and exaltation: "Accordingly it is from this also manifest, that a confusion of articles of faith cannot occur, but that they are and remain distinct, and that each contains something peculiar to itself. For in *incarnation* there occurred a hypostatic union of the Godhead of the λόγος with assumed humanity, in which the whole fulness of the Godhead dwelt personally from the first moment of conception. But by reason of *self-renunciation*, its employment and manifestation were for a time postponed, and, as it were, suspended, so that it did not exercise itself through the assumed humanity immediately and always. Moreover, by the *ascension*, infirmities being laid aside and self-renunciation removed, He left the mode of life according to the conditions of this world, and departed from the world. Moreover, by *sitting* at the Right Hand of God, He entered upon the full and public employment and display of the power, virtue, and glory of

the Godhead, which, from the beginning of the union, dwelt personally in all its fulness in the assumed nature; so that He no longer, as in self-renunciation, withholds, withdraws, and, as it were, hides Himself, but clearly, manifestly, and gloriously exercises it in, with, and through the assumed human nature."

[8] Holl. (768): "The *state of self-renunciation* lasted from the first moment of conception to the last moment of rest in the sepulchre." Quen. (III, 367): "The beginning of the *exaltation* (*terminus a quo*), and that through which it was attained, is the preceding passion and self-renunciation. The limit to which (*terminus ad quem*) is infinite glory and majesty (John 17: 5; Eph. 1: 20; Phil. 2: 9, 10), here considered with reference to their employment and distinct degrees."

[9] The doctrine, as here stated is not so clearly set forth in the Form. Conc. This asserts, indeed, very decidedly, that Christ, already here upon earth, was in possession of the divine glory, even according to His human nature; but, along with passages in which it is said that Christ, during His life upon earth, renounced the exercise of this glory, there are also others in which a renunciation is not mentioned. To passages of the former kind belong the following: Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec. VIII, 26): "From this union and communion of natures, the human nature possesses, since the resurrection from the dead, that exaltation over all creatures in heaven and on earth, which is really nothing else than that Christ entirely laid aside the form of a servant, and yet did not lay aside the human nature, but retains it to all eternity, and that, according to His assumed human nature, He was raised to the *full possession and use of divine majesty.* Moreover, He had this majesty immediately at His conception, even in the womb of His mother; but, as the Apostle (Phil. 2: 8) says, 'He humbled (*exinanivit*) Himself,' and, as Luther teaches, in the state of His humiliation He possessed it secretly, and did not always make use of it, but only so often as seemed good to Him. But now, since He has ascended to heaven, not in a common manner, as any other saint, but as the Apostle (Eph. 4: 10) testifies, 'He ascended up far above all heavens,' and really 'fills all things,' and, everywhere present, not only as God, but also as man, He rules and reigns from sea to sea and to the ends of the earth." Form. Conc. (Ep. 16): "And this majesty, by reason of the personal union, Christ always possessed, but in the state of His humiliation He humbled (*exinanivit*) Himself, and, for this reason, truly grew in age, wisdom, and favor with God and men. Wherefore, He exercised this majesty not always, but as often as seemed good to Him, until, after His resur-

rection, He fully and entirely laid aside the form of a servant, but not human nature, and was invested with the full employment, manifestation, and declaration of divine majesty, and in this manner entered into His glory. (Phil. 2: 6, sq.) Therefore, now, not only as God, but as man also, He knows all things, can do all things, is present to all creatures, and has under His feet and in His hand all things that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth. (Matt. 28: 18; John 13: 3; Eph. 4: 10.)" FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VIII, 65): "But, in the state of humiliation, this majesty of human nature was for the greater part concealed, and, as it were, kept secret."

To the second class (Sol. Dec., VIII, 73): "But this certainly does not occur in such a manner, that as man He knows and can accomplish only some things; just as other saints, by the power of the Holy Ghost, know and can accomplish certain things. For, since Christ, by reason of His Divinity, is the Second Person in the Holy Trinity, and from Him, no less than from the Father, the Holy Ghost proceeds, . . . undoubtedly, through the hypostatic union, the entire fulness of the Spirit has been imparted to Christ, according to the flesh, which has been personally united to the Son of God. Moreover, this exerts its entire power most freely in and with the human nature of Christ, and through it; not in such a manner as that Christ, according to His human nature, knows only some things and is ignorant of others, and can accomplish certain things yet cannot accomplish others; but even now, according to His assumed human nature, He knows and can accomplish all things . . . 75. Moreover, it is manifest from history that there was a sect called *Agnoetæ*, because they imagined that the Son, as the Word of the Father, indeed knew all things, but that His assumed nature was ignorant of many things. This heresy also Gregory the Great refuted."

The FORM. CONC. was still undecided in regard to this topic, because the Dogmaticians of that day were not agreed upon it. Some, following BRENZ (De divina majestate Domini nostri Jesu Christi ad dextram Dei patris et de vera praesentia corporis et sanguinis ejus in coena, 1562) asserted that Christ, even in the state of humiliation, was not only in possession of the divine glory, but also exercised it here, only not openly. ("He lay dead in the sepulchre, in humiliation; living, He governed heaven and earth, in majesty; and this, indeed, during the time of His humiliation, before His resurrection.") The others followed CHMN. (De duabus naturis in Christo, 1570), who, it is true, also ascribed the possession of divine glory to Christ, but taught a partial renunciation of

the use of it during His life upon earth. ("The human nature, in the first moment of the union, received and possessed the majesty, the fulness of the Deity, but during the time of the humiliation did not always exercise and use it.") The FORM. CONC. did not deem it necessary to express a decided judgment upon the question. Later (1619), the question was again started, and a controversy arose between the Theologians of Giessen and those of Tübingen. The starting point was the omnipresence of the flesh of Christ (comp. § 33, note 20, near the end). The Tübingen theologians (L. OSIANDER, NIKOLAI, and THUMMIUS) were of the opinion that the omnipresence of Christ was so strictly an immediate consequence of the personal union, that the flesh of Christ was to be regarded as omnipresent from the moment of His conception; and they defined the omnipresence as an absolute presence (*nuda adessentia*) or propinquity to creatures, by which He was closely present to all creatures. They assumed, therefore, an absolute omnipresence (in the sense in which BR. (comp. § 33, note 20) had denied it). This opinion, then, had its influence upon the doctrine of the state of humiliation and exaltation. Omnipresence, considered as a mere nearness, was necessarily predicated also of the human nature of Christ, as it was an immediate consequence of the personal union, and there could be no question as to the use or renunciation of it; and then, too, dominion could not readily be denied to the same nature to which uninterrupted nearness was ascribed. Hence, they maintained that there was a difference only in the manner in which Christ exercised this dominion, in one way in the state of humiliation, and in another in the state of exaltation. The only difference between the state of humiliation and the state of exaltation they held to be, that in the former Christ exercised this dominion in the form of a servant, hidden from the eyes of the world, and in the latter, openly and in a form corresponding to His majesty. ("They taught, that Christ in His humiliation governed heaven and earth, in the same way that He exercises this government in the state of exaltation, sitting at the right hand of the Father; with only this difference, that in the state of humiliation He covered and concealed that government under the form of a servant, but now, having laid aside that servile condition, He declares and manifests the same gloriously and majestically."

According to this theory of the Tübingen Theologians, there was, therefore, no κένωσις (renunciation) in the proper sense of the word, but merely a κρύψις (concealment); for the divine dominion, according to this view, was exercised also during the state of humilia-

tion by the human nature, only in a secret manner, not perceptible to men (hence also from the statement: "That Christ, according to His human nature, already from the first moment of His conception sat at the Right Hand of the Father, not indeed in a gloriously majestic manner, but without that and in the form of a servant"); and the assumption of the form of a servant and of human infirmities on the part of Christ, could not be explained, though the Tübingen theologians wished to do so, as such a real κένωσις, or self-renunciation. According to this theory, also, the same exaltation, which, according to the other, did not take place until after the resurrection of Christ, was assumed as existing at once from the moment of the incarnation ("That, most strictly speaking, there is one exaltation, and only one, most perfectly accomplished in the moment of the assumption, which (by reason of His essence) could not be greater and more exalted; but that the later meaning of the exaltation (*i. e.*, the exaltation of Christ following His resurrection) was not the new addition of dignity and excellence, but the majesty previously given and communicated in the moment of the assumption and union, covered over in the state of humiliation, and veiled under the form of a servant, but in the state of exaltation abundantly revealed, uncovered, manifested, and demonstrated before the inhabitants of heaven and all other creatures"). And the only difference between the state of humiliation and the state of exaltation was this, that in the two the manner of the exercise of the divine majesty was different. ("That the exaltation, following upon the resurrection of Christ from the dead and His ascension into heaven, did not confer *anything* upon Christ, in His humanity, but only *the mode of something*, *i. e.*, that Christ, restored to life as man, and exalted at the Right Hand of God, did not indeed attain the full use of the divine majesty in the government of the world, but merely received a new mode of government, viz., one majestically glorious and manifest; for, in the state of humiliation, He had been as to His person ignominious and obscure.")

This view was opposed by the theologians of Giessen (Menzer and Feuerborn), who adopted that of Chemnitz. The question at issue was this: "Whether the man Christ, having been taken into union with God, during the state of His humiliation governed, as a present king, all things, though in secret?" This question the Giessen theologians denied, and those of Tübingen affirmed. In the case of the former, the doctrine naturally assumed a different aspect in consequence of a different conception of omnipresence. They rejected absolute omnipresence; therefore

they did not assume that Christ, according to His human nature, in the state of humiliation, was present to all creatures; but defined omnipresence as a divine work. ("They held that the idea of a work belongs to the definition of omnipresence and to its constitutive character, as they call it, and that the essential part is, that Christ, in His humiliation, did not exhibit Himself as present in the same sense as that held by the Tübingen theologians." COTTA, Diss. II, in GRH., Loc. IV, 62.) According to their view, there followed from the personal union only this, that the real possession of the divine attributes belonged to the human nature of Christ; but the use which the human nature made of them they inferred, not so much from the personal union as rather from the divine will. The personal union did not, therefore, seem to them as if dissolved, when the human nature made no use of these divine attributes; just as they also believed that, without detriment to the personal union, they could assume that the divine nature of Christ was intimately present to creatures at all times, but not so the human nature. QUEN. (III, 187): "Although, during the whole period of the humiliation, the divine nature of the Word was present to all creatures, so that meanwhile the human nature, taken into union with God, was not present, but was very far removed, even in its substantial nearness, from those creatures to whom the λόγος was present; nevertheless, the union is not broken, the person is not divided, the natures are not separated."

They also believed themselves, therefore, not to be hindered by the previously prevalent assumption, that Christ, according to His human nature, had for a season renounced the use and exercise of the divine dominion; and they maintained that Christ, according to His divine nature, exercised dominion over the world until the completion of His work of redemption, without His human nature taking any part therein. According to their theory, moreover, the exaltation was real (as indeed the positive statements of the Holy Scriptures seemed to them to demand) in such a sense that, not until it occurred, therefore not until the resurrection, did the human nature obtain the full use and the full exercise of the divine dominion; whereby, however, it was not meant to deny that the human nature partially, and by way of exception, as in the performance of miracles, made use of this dominion (which feature was made especially prominent by the Saxon theologians). The difference between the state of humiliation and that of exaltation they held to be this, that the human nature did not assume the full use of the divine dominion until the introduction of the latter.

By this means, they thought to avoid the absurdities that followed from the views of the Tübingen theologians, according to whose theory it must be held that, at the time when Christ was lying in the cradle and in the grave, or hanging upon the cross, He was also, according to His human nature, filling all things and present everywhere and to all creatures.

After the decision (1624) pronounced by the Saxon theologians, which in the main was favorable to the Giessen theologians, those of Tübingen modified their views in this direction, in this one point, that they also admitted a humiliation in a literal sense, with reference to the functions of the sacerdotal office, in accordance with which, therefore, Christ, in relation to these, renounced the use of the divine glory during His passion and death, and in connection with everything that He did in behalf of the work of redemption. But *this* difference still continued between the two parties, that the Tübingen theologians, adhering to their former opinion, so far as the prophetic and the regal offices are concerned, regarded the humiliation as a mere occultation, and characterized it as only exceptional, when Christ, during His life upon earth, in certain cases renounced the exercise of the dominion belonging to His human nature; while the Giessen divines, in direct opposition to this view, considered it exceptional, when Christ, during His life upon earth, made use, on the part of His human nature, of the right of divine majesty that belonged to Him. The controversy was interrupted by the Thirty Years' War, but the succeeding theologians adopted the views of the Giessen and Saxon theologians, as above stated, with the exception of some of those of Tübingen, who afterwards, indeed, attached no great importance to the controversy, but still favored the doctrinal tendency of their University (comp. Cotta, Diss. II, Grh., in Loc. Th., IV). A full discussion of this doctrine and description of the controversies connected with it may be found in Quen. III, 389, sq. and Thomasius: "*The Person and Work of Christ*," Part II, second edition, 1857, p. 429.

[10] Quen. (III, 338): "The self-renunciation of Christ in general consists of two acts, viz., the abdication of the full and universal use of imparted majesty, and the assumption of the form of a servant. This form or condition of a servant, in turn, includes under it certain acts in which it was most clearly manifest."

Other distributions than those given in the text are as follows: Grh. (I, 361): "Conception, the being borne about in the womb, birth, growth in age and wisdom, obedience in the form of a servant even to the death of the cross, which was followed by burial."

Kg. (161): "Conception, birth, suffering, abandonment, death, burial." Quen., as Kg., only he adds thereto: "Subjection to the Law in circumcision." Br., as Holl., only he omits circumcision.

[11] Holl. (769): "We now are considering this not absolutely, with respect to itself, but in so far as it pertains to the state of self-renunciation, or, in so far as the flesh of Christ, although not of male seed, was nevertheless formed in the womb of woman; in connection with which it is certain that some infirmities occur."

Grh. (I, 361): "From the fact which I have mentioned, that conception, and the being borne about in the womb, and birth from the womb of His mother, belong to the state of self-renunciation, if we reflect, it can be understood that Adam was a true man, who, nevertheless, was neither conceived in the womb nor born from the womb of a mother; therefore, in the same manner, the Son of God, without such a conception and birth, could have assumed human nature, but He wished in all things to be made like to His brethren, Heb. 2: 17."

[12] Br. (483): "In this" (birth) "the fact is especially considered that the fruit of Mary's womb, having passed through the accustomed months of gestation, was thus at length brought to light, in accordance with the common lot of men. But the opinion of some, that Mary brought forth her son while her womb was closed, is uncertain; more certain and manifest are the lowliness of His birth and the humble condition and poverty of His parents."

[13] Holl. (769): "Circumcision is an act of most humble obedience on the part of Christ, by which He not only lay in a very low state of self-renunciation beneath the knife of the circumciser, but also was made subject to the divine Law, although He was the Lord of the Law, Matt. 12: 8; Mark 2: 28."

[14] Holl. (770): "According to which, Christ voluntarily subjected Himself to the care of His father, Joseph, and the commands of His mother, Mary, Luke 2: 51."

[15] Br. (484): "He was made subject to the magistracy and regarded equal or inferior to others; for the purpose of satisfying hunger and thirst, He ate and drank; being wearied, He slept, and endured the troubles of labors and journeys, dangers, temptations, sadness, poverty, reproaches, etc."

[16] Br. (484): "Especially the aggregation of afflictions which Christ suffered during the period of two days before His death; in connection with which the forsaking, mentioned in Matt. 27: 46, is especially to be regarded. Manifestly Christ was forsaken, not indeed as though either the bond of the personal union were broken, or He had been altogether rejected from the face of God,

never to be taken back again into grace, nor that He, actually and properly speaking, despaired; but that, in that greatest accumulation of evils, because of the sins of men imputed to Him, He, while bearing the part of all sinners, so felt the wrath of God, or that God was estranged from Him, that He felt no comfort within Himself from the fulness of the indwelling Godhead. In this manner, also, that must be understood which is elsewhere said, viz., that Christ bore the pains of hell."

[17] QUEN. (III, 360): "Its formal nature consists in the true, voluntary, and local separation of the soul from the body (Luke 23: 43, 46), the bond of the personal union meanwhile remaining unimpaired. From the dissolution of the soul from the body the dissolution of the union of the two natures in Christ is not to be inferred. For, although the natural union between the soul and body was broken, yet the personal union existing between the λόγος and the assumed nature was not separated, but the divine nature in Christ remained truly united to the soul, which then was in heaven, and truly united to the body in the sepulchre. Even in death, the λόγος, I say, remained a *suppositum* * of parts physically separated, namely of body and soul. The entire divine nature was in the separated soul, and the entire divine nature was in the body left upon earth, without any division or distention, as either of these would conflict with a divine nature." HOLL. (772): "The passion and death of Christ were true, not imaginary; voluntary, not forced; undertaken not by accident, but according to a certain plan and purpose of God; bloody and ignominious; vicarious; meritorious, and satisfactory."

[18] HOLL. (776): "ζωοποίησις, or quickening, is Christ's liberation from death and the reunion of soul and body, by which Christ, according to His flesh, began to come again to life. This is not a peculiar grade of exaltation, but a prerequisite condition for preparing the subject, namely, Christ, to receive the full and universal use of divine majesty."

[19] HOLL. (776): "The revived Christ exercised His divine majesty through certain clearly marked grades: (1) by descending *ad inferos*, He exhibited Himself alive to the wicked spirits and condemned men as the conqueror of death; (2) by rising again, He declared to the apostles, and, through them, to the entire world, that through His death He had made satisfaction to divine justice; (3) by ascending to heaven, He showed angels and blessed men that He was the conqueror not only of death, but also of wicked spirits, and the Saviour of men; (4) by sitting at the Right

* [See Appendix.]

Hand of God, He exercises most full and universal dominion over all creatures that are in the kingdom of power, of grace, and of glory." As the exaltation was completed with the sitting at the Right Hand of the Father, HFRFFR. (339), instead of assuming degrees of exaltation, as others do, distinguishes (1) "the *State of Glorification* into which Christ entered after His resurrection, when, laying aside the infirmities of human nature, He was transferred to the condition of glorified bodies," and (2) "the *State of Majesty* of Christ as a man, into which, after His glorious ascension into heaven, He was transferred, being placed at the Right Hand of God the Father."

[20] QUEN. (III, 373): "The moment of time of the descent is, according to 1 Peter 3: 19, the time that intervened between the quickening and the resurrection of Christ, properly so called." To the assertion, that the descent preceded the resurrection, and therefore did not succeed the vivifying, HOLL. (668) replies: "A distinction must be made between an outward and an inner resurrection. The former is the going forth from the sepulchre, and the outward appearance to men, and is described in the Apostles' Creed; the latter is the quickening itself."

[21] HOLL. (778): "Christ descended into hell, not for the purpose of suffering any evil from the demons (John 19: 30; Luke 24: 26), but to triumph over the demons (Rev. 1: 18; Col. 2: 15), and to convince condemned men that they were justly shut up in the infernal prison, 1 Peter 3: 19. The preaching of Christ in hell was *not evangelical*, which is proclaimed to men only in the kingdom of grace; but legal, accusatory, terrible, and that too, both *verbal*, by which He convinced them that they had merited eternal punishments, and *real*, by which He struck frightful terror into them." To the question, "Why did Christ preach in hell to those alone who were unbelieving in the time of Noah?" HOLL. replies (ib.): "(1) Others are not excluded, but these are presented as monstrous examples of impenitence and unparalleled examples of divine judgment; (2) The Apostle especially named these to teach that even the antediluvians ought to have believed in Christ; . . . (3) That the Apostle might pass conveniently from the flood, as a type, to its antitype, baptism."

[22] QUEN. (III, 371): "The descent of Christ *ad inferos*, *figuratively* taken, is understood either *metaphorically*, as denoting that most exquisite and truly infernal pain and anguish which, in the time of His passion, Christ felt and bore in His most holy soul, Ps. 16: 10; or, by *metonymy*, as denoting the virtue and efficacy of Christ's passion and death, Zech. 9: 11 (as though the sense were,

'Christ, by His passion and death, effected and purchased by His merit our deliverance and redemption from hell'). But neither signification pertains to this article." Holl. (777): "But, taken *literally*, the *descensus ad inferos* denotes a true and real departure into the place of the damned, inasmuch as Peter (1 Pet. 3: 19) calls it a πορεία, or going, cf. Matt. 5: 25; Rev. 18: 2; 20: 7; 2 Pet. 2: 4." The observation is added: "Although the descent of Christ *ad inferos* was true and real, yet the motion was not physical or local, but *supernatural*. For physical and local motion is peculiar to natural bodies; but the revived body of Christ was a glorified body. Nor was the movement successive; it was made, ἐν πνεύματι, *i. e.*, by divine power, which knows nothing of tedious efforts."

[23] Quen. (III, 372): "Christ, the God-man, and therefore His entire person (and hence not only according to His soul, or only according to His body), after the reunion of soul and body, descended to the very place of the damned, and to the devils and the damned manifested Himself as conqueror. For the descent, since it is a personal action, cannot be ascribed otherwise than to the entire person of the God-man. And, as in the Apostles' Creed it is said of the entire God-man that He suffered, was crucified, dead, and buried, so also it is said of the same that He descended into hell." The descent is, very naturally, predicated of Christ, the God-man, *i. e.*, it is taught that Christ, the God-man, was for a time in hell; but the descent itself is predicated only of the human nature of Christ. "Christ descended into hell, not according to His divine nature; for, according to this, He was in hell before, filling all things through His dominion. . . . Therefore, Christ descended, *according to His human nature*. For the predications θανατωθεὶς σαρκὶ and ζωοποιηθεὶς, belong to the human nature alone." (Quen., III, 373.)

[24] The doctrine as here set forth belongs to the period of the later Dogmaticians. Until the time of the Form. Conc., no explanation whatever was attempted of the phrase, "Descendit ad inferos," which was found already in the Apostles' Creed. The Form. Conc., however, was led to make a statement concerning it, mainly in consequence of controversies originating with the Hamburg Superintendent, John Aepin (1549). According to him, the descent of Christ was "a part of that entire obedience which He rendered for our redemption." ("The simple and plain confession of Aepin: I believe that the descent of the soul of Christ to hell was a part of Christ's passion, *i. e.*, of the contests, dangers, difficulties, pains, and punishments, which, for our sake, He took

upon Himself and bore; for the reason that, in the Scriptures, to descend into hell means to be involved in extreme and the deepest griefs, pains, and difficulties. I believe that the descent of Christ to hell was a part of His obedience, predicted in the prophets, and imposed upon Him because of our sin.") The descent of Christ is, therefore, "one act of His humiliation, and, indeed, its final stage." ("I believe that the descent of Christ belongs to His humiliation, not to His glorification and triumph. . . . The final grade of this humility and self-renunciation, and the extreme part of the obedience and satisfaction imposed upon Christ by the judgment of God, was His descent to hell.") While the body of Christ lay in the grave, His soul descended into hell; He did not descend with body and soul after their reunion, before the resurrection, but with the soul alone ("Peter clearly teaches, Acts 2, that the soul of Christ, while His body rested in the sepulchre, experienced the pains of death and hell"), and "the descent was not a public act of victory and triumph, but an act of suffering, to which Christ submitted in the same sense in which He subjected Himself to the condemnation of death." ("The testimonies of Scripture nowhere show, by even the least indication, that to descend to hell is to triumph, and that the descent itself is a joyful, glad, splendid, and manifest triumph. There is, therefore, nothing certain and well-established in the caviling of those who contend that the descent of Christ was nothing else than the fierceness, manifest force, and triumph of Christ, by which He utterly crushed, and, with violence, oppressed those in hell.") "Christ has, indeed, destroyed hell for us, and robbed the devil of his power, not, however, by violent destruction or suppression, but by righteousness and obedience; as He conquered and destroyed death by His dying, so also did He the same to hell by His descent into it." ("As Christ did not vanquish death by force and manifest violence, but in death by truly dying, so He overthrows those in hell, not by warlike or glorious violence, and with manifest oppression of the devil, but by righteousness, by truly dying, by descending for us to those in hell, and rising again from death.") Aepin constantly protests against the use of the Petrine passages in the discussion of the doctrine of the descent of Christ to the lower world. . . . As proof passages for this article of faith, in addition to the Apostles' Creed, the following are applicable: Ps. 16: 10; 68: 19; 30: 4; Hos. 13: 14; Acts 2: 27; Matt. 12: 40; Eph. 4: 8, 9; Rom. 10: 6, 7.

A question of entirely different character was agitated, in 1565, by the court chaplain, John Parsimonius, in Stuttgard. "He

called in question the locality of the lower regions. Hell was, in his opinion, no locality, no corporeal fire, no corporeal darkness." ("Scripture, indeed, calls hell a place, and says that it is situated beneath and below us; but these expressions are to be understood not according to Aristotle and mathematically, but theologically and according to the usage of Scripture. . . . The terms, 'place,' 'upward,' 'downward,' 'above,' 'beneath,' 'within,' 'high,' 'deep,' and the like, are not terms of the spiritual but of the bodily world; and when Scripture speaks of spiritual things and those of the other world, it borrows terms from bodily and earthly things, and uses them not literally but metaphorically.") "Hell is where God's wrath is, and the perception of this wrath. Accordingly, the descent to hell cannot be a corporeal, local movement, but only a change of condition, according to the measure of the conception above given of the lower regions. . . . Christ did not, therefore, after being made alive in the grave, before the resurrection, descend in a corporeal and local manner to hell. How Christ descended, and when, this the Scriptures have not specially revealed to us." (Holy Scripture wishes us to believe that Christ descended to those in hell, and freed us from the kingdom of Satan, and the perpetual torments of hell; it does not wish us to know when and at what point of time He descended to those in hell, otherwise it would have revealed it to us.") "Christ, after His death, suffered nothing at all; but, during His lifetime, He endured the pains of hell and in this sense He descended, illocally, into hell. In either case, however, Christ exhibited Himself as victorious and triumphant."

These two theologians were the occasion of having an article concerning the *descensus ad inferos* inserted in the Form. Conc. This contains, however, no decisions concerning the questions agitated by them, but rather keeps aloof from useless inquiries, and limits itself to the firm adherence to the confession that Christ, by His descent, "has destroyed hell for all believers, and delivered them from the power of death, of the devil, of eternal damnation, and of the jaws of hell." Form. Conc. (Epit., IX): "There was a controversy concerning this article among some theologians who profess the Augsburg Confession, as to when and how our Lord Jesus Christ, as our Catholic faith testifies, descended to those in hell, whether this were done before or after His death. In addition it was asked whether He descended only by His soul alone, or His divinity alone, or indeed by soul and body, and whether this were done after a spiritual or after a bodily manner. It was also disputed *whether this article were to be referred to the Passion, or indeed to*

the glorious victory and triumph of Christ. But since this article of our faith . . . can be comprehended neither by our senses nor reason, but is to be received by faith alone, we unanimously advise that there be no controversy concerning this matter, but that we believe and teach this article with the greatest simplicity. . . . For we ought to be satisfied to know that Christ has descended to those in hell, that He has destroyed hell for all believers, that, by Himself, He has delivered us from the power of death and of Satan, from eternal damnation, and, therefore, from the jaws of hell. But let us not curiously search into the manner in which these things have been effected, but reserve the full knowledge of this matter for another world." . . .

For the history of this article, see FRANK: "The Theology of the FORM. CONC. (III, 1863) *de descensu ad inferos*," in whose words we have cited the doctrines of AEPIN (which he obtained, in part, from a manuscript in the library at Wolfenbüttel) and Parsimonius.

Concerning the different explanations of the *descensus ad inferos*, GRH. (I, 362): "Concerning the *descensus ad inferos*, the opinions of the old and the more recent theologians greatly vary: (1) Some have altogether omitted this article. Thus, the several Councils of Nice, Constantinople, and Toledo have not mentioned it. (2) Clement, of Alexandria, says that Christ and the apostles descended to those in hell to preach the Gospel to the minds of the damned, and to carry to believers the hope of salvation. (3) Chrysostom refers the *descensus ad inferos* to the power of working miracles, by which Christ raised many from the dead. (4) Some in a general manner receive the *descensus ad inferos* as referring to the entire state of humiliation (*Sohnius*). (5) Some hold that descending *ad inferos* is the same as being buried (*Bucer*, *Beza*). (6) Some understand this descent with reference to the pains which Christ suffered in His soul (*Calvin*). (7) Some understand it with reference to the power and virtue of Christ's death extending even to the dead. We say with Luther that this article is not to be treated with acuteness and anxious care, as to how it occurred, and what the *descensus ad inferos* means, but the most simple opinion must be retained, just as the words read. We believe, therefore, that Christ undoubtedly descended *ad inferos*, . . . and that by Himself He has delivered us from the power of death and of Satan, from eternal damnation, and, therefore, from the jaws of hell."

[25] QUEN. (III, 377): "The term 'resurrection' is received either comprehensively, according as it is an official meritorious act, and belongs to both natures, or restrictedly, according as it is

a change of state of the human nature, resulting from exaltation; not the former but the latter signification has a place here. Just as Christ was nailed to the cross and delivered over to death, not according to His divine nature, which considered in itself is entirely free from suffering, but according to His human nature; so He was raised up by God not according to His divine, but only according to His human nature. Yet the divine nature is not, therefore, altogether excluded from this act; for it has imparted to the human nature the power to rise again, and has made its resurrection of advantage to us, *i. e.*, that the resurrection might be victor over death, sin, and hell, and our justifier."

(Id., 378): "The material is the same body in substance and number that endured the death of the cross, reunited with the soul, the same in number which before had departed from it, but clothed with new qualities, Phil. 3: 21. . . . When the question is asked, 'What is the nature of the body with which Christ rose again,' we reply: (1) Not with a psychical (ψυχικῷ) body, or one subject to natural infirmities, but with a spiritual (πνευματικῷ) body, or one adorned with spiritual endowments, namely, invisibility, impalpability, illocality, etc. By virtue of this endowment, Christ penetrated the closed stone of the sepulchre, the closed door, and did not stand in need of raiment and food. The fact mentioned in Luke 24: 43, that He truly ate, occurred not from necessity but from free will; not for the nourishment of His own body, as the body neither stood in need of this nor admitted the same, but for the strengthening of the faith of the disciples. (2) Not with a weak body, but one strong and powerful. (3) Not with a corruptible body (such Christ's body never was), but with an incorruptible and immortal body, both as to act and as to power. (4) Not with a body having ignominy, but with a glorious body, and hence the body of Christ is called σῶμα τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ, Phil. 3: 21."

The design of the resurrection, according to Holl. (783): "Christ rose again in order to manifest the victory which He had obtained over death and the devil, Acts 2: 24; and to offer and apply to all men the fruits of His passion and death." These fruits are: "The confirmation of our faith concerning Christ's full satisfaction, 1 Cor. 15: 17; the application of the benefits obtained by the death of Christ; our justification, Rom. 4: 25; the sealing of our hope concerning our preservation for salvation, 1 Pet. 1: 3; our being raised again to life eternal, John 11: 25; 14: 19; 2 Cor. 4: 14; 1 Thess. 4: 14; and our renewal, Rom. 6: 4; 2 Cor. 5: 15."

[26] Quen. (III, 380): "The ascension is regarded either in a

wide sense, in so far as it includes the sitting at the right hand of God, as in Acts 2: 33, 34; Eph. 4: 10; or in a narrow sense, in so far as it denotes the visible elevation of Christ on high, as Mark 16: 19; Acts 1: 9, 11. The latter is the signification in this article."

QUEN. (III, 382): "Of the general goal of the ascension, the passages Mark 16: 19 and Acts 1: 11 speak. But the heaven into which Christ ascended is not the aerial or sidereal heaven of nature, for to think of this here is irreverent; nor the heaven of grace (HOLL. (785), which is the Church Militant upon this earth, from which Christ has withdrawn His visible presence until the day of judgment); not a glorious state, whether of infinite glory, which pertains to the succeeding article, the sitting at the Right Hand of God, or of finite glory, because He was in this state immediately after the resurrection; but the *residence*, and *home of the blessed*, where He presents Himself to the blessed for them to look upon Him face to face, and fills the souls of the saints by His most joyful visible presence with divine and heavenly comfort, John 14: 2; Luke 23: 43. The goal, properly speaking, is *ὑπεράνω πάντων οὐρανῶν* (above all heavens), Eph. 4: 10, viz., at the very right hand of God, at which He sat down, where *ὑψηλότερος τῶν οὐρανῶν γενόμενος* (He is made higher than the heavens), Heb. 7: 26. We have a great High Priest, says Paul, Heb. 4: 14, *διεληλυθότα τοὺς οὐρανούς* (that is passed into the heavens)." Concerning the passage just cited, GRH. remarks, "To penetrate the heavens is not to pass through a visible mechanism of the heavens diversified by distinct circuits of spheres, so as to be contained in the last heaven, as though, according to a physical sense, to be circumscribed in a certain place; but, in accordance with scriptural language, to become higher than all heavens, and to enter and take upon Himself divine glory." We have above proved that Christ ascended to the where of the blessed. But since this is not a circumscribed and physical locality, the ascension itself is not a local and physical passing over to it. Christ is also in heaven, yet not according to local circumscription, but definitively and according to the manner of a glorified body.

GRH. (XIX, 152): "We in no wise affirm that the ascension of Christ was an *ἀφάνισμος*, disappearance or evanescence; nor any mere *ἀορασία* [invisibility], just as before by divine virtue He had at different times rendered Himself invisible: but we sincerely believe and confess that Christ's *ἀνάληψις* [being taken up] was a *τοπικὴ μετάστασις*, a local transfer, a visible elevation, a true and real ascension, by which Christ, on Mount Olivet, was visibly lifted up on high from the earth, and, the infirmities of this life being laid aside, was transferred to heaven, and placed at the Right Hand of

God, the ultimate goal of His ascension. But what we deny is this, viz., that Christ, when the cloud had withdrawn Him from the eyes of the disciples, by a successive departure passed first through a sphere of fire, and then through circles of planets and the firmament, or the first movable and crystalline heaven, until in the progress of time He came to His Father in the empyreal heaven, in which, residing in a local and bodily manner, He is held restrained from being present upon earth in an invisible and illocal manner before the day of judgment."

[27] Cf. Form. Conc., Sol. Dec., VIII, 28. Br. (487): "God's Right Hand is not any definite place, but the omnipotent power of God itself, which fills heaven and earth, Matt. 26: 64; Ex. 15: 6; Heb. 1: 3; 8: 1; 12: 2; Eph. 1: 20–23; Ps. 139: 10." Holl. (787): "To sit at God's Right Hand means to use fully and incessantly the royal omnipotence and majesty imparted from the Father through the exaltation, for universal and most glorious governing in the kingdom of power, grace, and glory; or, what is the same, to sit at God's Right Hand is, by virtue of the personal union and the exaltation following this, to govern all the works of God's hands most powerfully, most efficaciously, and most gloriously, 1 Cor. 15: 25, 27; Ps. 110: 1, 2; Heb. 2: 7, 8."

Grh. (III, 509): "(*a*) *The Right Hand of God.* The sitting at the Right Hand of God must be understood to be of like nature with the right hand of God. Now the Right Hand of God is not a bodily, circumscribed, limited, definite place, but it is the infinite power of God and His most efficacious majesty in heaven and earth; it is that most efficacious dominion by which God preserves and governs all things. For thus the Right Hand of God is described in Holy Scripture, that it has been magnified in power, and breaks to pieces its enemies, Ex. 15: 6; Ps. 18: 35; 44: 3; 108: 6; 63: 8, etc. From these and similar passages of Scripture such a representation of God's Right Hand is inferred, as that it is the infinite power of God, everywhere, in heaven and earth, most efficaciously and most powerfully governing, controlling, and administering all things. Hence it is also called the right hand, *δυνάμεως*, of power, Matt. 26: 64; Luke 22: 69; and the right hand of majesty, Heb. 1: 3; the throne *μεγαλωσύνης*, 8: 1; the right hand of the throne of God, 12: 2; the throne of His glory, Matt. 25: 31. Therefore the sitting at God's Right Hand is to be explained and understood in such a manner as that through it, participation in divine power, majesty, and dominion in heaven and earth are understood."

"(*b*) *Sitting at God's Right Hand.* This is most correctly and

simply explained according to that manner and sense in which Scripture itself explains the sitting at God's Right Hand. Now Scripture itself explains the sitting at God's Right Hand as the most efficacious and powerful dominion of heaven and earth. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is proved by a comparison of passages. The apostle, in 1 Cor. 15: 25, citing Ps. 110: 1, infers: 'He must reign till He hath put all enemies under His feet.' What sitting at the Right Hand of God is to David, that the reigning and having all things under Him is to the apostle. Thus Mark 16: 19: 'The Lord Jesus was received up into heaven, and sat on the Right Hand of God.' With this passage we compare the expression of the apostle in Eph. 4: 10. Therefore to sit at the Right Hand of God and to fill all things, *i. e.*, with the presence of majesty, are convertible terms. And because the power and presence of majesty exercise themselves in a special way through works of grace, in the collection, preservation, and protection of the Church, therefore, according to Mark 16: 20, the consequence is, the 'apostles preached everywhere, the Lord working with them,' and, according to Paul, Eph. 4: 11, 'He gave some apostles,' etc., and 4: 8 precedes, 'He gave gifts to men.' Peter, likewise, Acts 2: 33, states that the miraculous outpouring of the Holy Ghost was a fruit and consequence of this sitting at the Right Hand of God: 'Being by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, He hath shed forth this which ye now see.' The emphatic description of the sitting at the Right Hand of God given by Paul, Eph. 1: 20 sq., and by Peter, 1 Pet. 3: 22, are especially to be noted. Take notice that in the latter words, 'He gave Him to be head over all things to the Church,' this presence and power to the Church is not limited or restricted, but by these are described the effect and fruit of the dominion over all things conferred upon Christ. For, as God preserves the whole world because of the Church, so also the divine power and majesty are imparted to Christ, according to His human nature, in order that He may be king and protector of the Church. Finally, this also must be noticed, that when Christ shall come in the clouds of heaven to judgment, He will nevertheless sit upon the seat of His majesty, and the Right Hand of God's power, Matt. 24; 30; 25: 31; 26: 64. Therefore, the Right Hand of God is not any finite and circumscribed place in heaven; otherwise Christ coming in the clouds to judgment would no longer sit at the Right Hand of God. Likewise, all men are to be brought before His judgment-seat, and to see Christ as their judge, Zech. 12: 10; Matt. 24: 30; Rev. 1: 7. But if Christ, with His glorified body, personally united to the λόγος,

and taken up to the right hand of God, were so confined to a determinate place in heaven that He could not be present and be seen except in that one place, how could all men, innumerable in multitude, see Him in that one place at one and the same time? If the seat of majesty on which Christ will sit when He comes to judgment has been removed so many miles from earth, how will all men, at one and the same view, be able to see Him?"

It is here to be observed that this sitting at the Right Hand of God is described as the last and highest act of the exaltation; hence CHMN. (Loc. Th.) remarks: "Scripture, therefore, explains Christ's sitting at the Right Hand of God the Father Almighty, as referring to the exaltation of the human nature in Christ to the highest majesty and power over all things." Rightly, therefore, QUEN. also, in harmony with all the Dogmaticians, remarks (III, 385): "The *subject* sitting at the Right Hand of God is the incarnate λόγος, Matt. 26: 64; Mark 14: 62; Luke 22: 69. The subject *by which* He sits, is human nature, Rom. 8: 34; Phil. 2: 8, 9; Rev. 5: 9, 12, 13. This is proved . . . from the preceding self-renunciation and subsequent exaltation of Christ. According to that same nature, in which Christ was first humbled and afterwards exalted, He sits at the Right Hand of God; but Christ was first humbled and afterwards exalted, not according to His divinity, but only according to His humanity; for only the latter is capable of self-renunciation and exaltation." It is to this sitting, that the remark of HOLL. refers (788): "Holy Scripture ascribes the sitting at God's Right Hand, it is true, to *Christ's entire person*, but according to His human nature;" *i. e.*, the thing itself, the sitting at the Right Hand of God, is ascribed, indeed, to the entire person; but an exaltation, such as is implied in the conception of "sitting at the Right Hand of God," can be predicated only of the human nature of Christ, for only this is capable of it. The Dogmaticians are so in the habit of associating the conception of exaltation with that of the "sitting," that, in this connection, they make a further distinction between "sitting at God's Right Hand, and reigning." QUEN. (III, 384): "To sit at the Right Hand of God the Father, is not altogether the same as to reign with God the Father. For (1) Christ while yet ἀσαρκος [unincarnate] reigned with the Father and Holy Ghost from eternity, yet He did not then sit at God's Right Hand; for this sitting first began from the time of exaltation. (Christ as God, together with the Father and Holy Ghost, reigns from eternity by means of His essential omnipotence; Christ as man, or according to His assumed human nature, reigns not from eternity, but from the time of His exaltation, through His sitting

at the Right Hand of God. Mentzer shows this accurately in *Anti-Martin*, where he admonishes that the major premise* [*i. e.*, 'to sit at the Right Hand of God is to reign,' *vide* note], which receives the word, to rule, in too general a sense, is to be thus restricted: *to sit at the Right Hand of God is to reign, namely, in such a manner that the sitting at the Right Hand of God is the cause, manner, and mode of the reign itself*, (2) To reign with the Father is an ἀποτέλεσμα [official act] of the royal office, issuing from the power of Christ's two natures; but to sit at the Right Hand of God the Father is not such a result."

[Reformed theologians, when not treating the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, often reach the same conclusions, or closely approach them (as may be seen from the following citations in Heppe's *Dogmatik* (1861, pp. 364, sq.): LEIDENER: "The Right Hand of God here cannot be received literally, since God is a spirit, and, accordingly, has not flesh and bones; but is taken metaphorically for the highest degree of glory, to which, after His passion and ascension, Christ was raised by the Father." RIIS.: "The session at the Right Hand of God can be understood not properly and literally, but figuratively and metaphorically, in order to designate the supreme dignity and power of Christ; the metaphor being derived from the custom of kings, who are wont to put at their right hands those to whom they concede a degree both of honor and power in governing next themselves. This phrase is understood of the *nearest degree of honor* in 1 Kings 2: 19, where Solomon, to show his mother especial honor, puts her at his right hand; and in Ps. 45: 10, the wife of the king, *i. e.*, the Church, is said to stand on the right hand of the Messiah. It is also used of *power*, or the administration of government, Matt. 10: 21, where the mother of Zebedee's sons asks that they may sit on His right and left in His kingdom, *i. e.*, hold the highest offices. Hence, by the session at the Right Hand of God, two things especially are designated: 1. *Supreme majesty and glory*, whereby God supremely exalted Him, and through which He received a name above every name, Phil. 2: 9, 10. 2. *Supreme power*, which He powerfully exercises towards all creatures, and especially displays in the government and defence of the Church." HEIDEGGER: "To sit is here a sign of honor and power." BUCAN: "But did He not always reign with the Father, and thus does He not perpetually sit at the Right

* [This cannot be understood without a reference to the context of QUEN., a portion of which Schmid here omits. It is this: "Martinius, the Calvinist, argues in this wise: 'To sit at the Right Hand of God is to reign. But Christ reigns according to both natures. Therefore—'"]

Hand of the Father? He reigned indeed, but purely as God, without flesh. But afterwards in time, as God clothed in flesh, after the completion of the period of His humiliation, He began to sit at the Right Hand of the Father, *i. e.*, to reign in heaven and earth. When did He begin to sit at the Right Hand of the Father? *By right*, from the very first moment of the hypostatic union; but *actually* or in *fact*, since His passion, resurrection and ascension."]

CHAPTER III.

Of the Grace of the Holy Spirit in the Application of Redemption.

§ 39. *Preliminary Remarks.*

BEFORE passing on to the consideration of the subject next in order, we preface the remark, that a number of dogmatic topics, belonging in this connection, were not further developed until by the later Dogmaticians, and were by them for the first time assigned a special place in the system; these are the topics of *Vocation, Illumination, Conversion and Regeneration, Mystical Union and Renovation,* which all the earlier Dogmaticians mention only occasionally, and usually in the section concerning *Free Will*, but have not more fully elaborated. Not until the time of Cal. did the Dogmaticians begin to arrange these topics together; by so doing they seek to collect, under one general topic, all that is to be said concerning what God, or, more accurately, the Holy Ghost, does, in order to induce fallen man to accept of salvation through Christ, and what takes place in order to bring about the designed change in man. From the time of Quen. this was all embraced under the head, *The Grace of the Holy Spirit in the Application of Redemption.* [1] It cannot be denied that thereby an advance was made in the systematic development of Dogmatics; and, as the earlier Dogmaticians did so little towards giving definite shape to the conceptions here in question, we find ourselves limited to the later Dogmaticians for our statements in illustration of this subject. Yet the intro-

duction of an independent development of these conceptions led to an arrangement of the entire doctrine which we cannot call a happy one. After the above mentioned topics, to which that of justification is attached, have been treated under the head of "The Grace of the Holy Spirit in the Application of Redemption," they discuss faith and good works (Holl. adding, besides, that of *penitence*), but only after the doctrines concerning the *Divine Word* and the *Sacraments;* and they distinguish these [faith and good works] as the *means of salvation on the part of man*, from the Word and the Sacraments as the *means of salvation on the part of God.* [2] According to this arrangement, we meet with especially this difficulty, that the full discussion of the doctrine of *faith* is delayed so long. If we were not, indeed, justified in departing from this arrangement for this reason alone (since our task is simply historical fidelity, and we have no other interest to serve), yet from another quarter a reason arises that does justify us in so departing. For, according to the arrangement introduced by the later Dogmaticians, the articles concerning *Justification* and *Faith*, which had been so closely connected together at the time of the Reformation, and by the earlier Dogmaticians, are too widely separated; as, upon the whole, the topics formerly placed in the foreground here find (though it be only in the arrangement) a less favorable place. And, as we regard ourselves called upon to pay equal attention to the earlier and to the later Dogmaticians, we think we are compelled to deviate from the arrangement employed by the later Dogmaticians, if for no other reason, simply to do equal justice to both classes. For this reason, therefore, and not with the view of originating a more excellent dogmatic arrangement (for that is not our mission), we adopt the plan of treating first of *Faith* and *Justification* (both of which may be comprehended under the topic of, "The Grace of the Holy Spirit in the Application of Redemption," since both are effected only through the power of the Holy Spirit), and after that, of *Vocation, Illumination, Conversion and Regeneration, Mystical Union and Renovation;* so that we may be regarded as treating first of the topics with which the earliest Dogmaticians commenced their discussion of this general subject, and then

proceeding to treat of the topics more fully elaborated by the later Dogmaticians.

[1] Quen. (III, 461) defends the arrangement thus: "The Triune God is very desirous of our salvation, and all the three persons of the Godhead are actively engaged in securing our eternal salvation. God the Father appointed everlasting happiness and the peace of heaven for us, of His own most gracious will and in His eternal counsel; Christ, the Son of man and of God, purchased for us the appointed salvation by His blood-bought redemption, and the Holy Spirit offers and applies the purchased salvation and spiritual blessings through the Word and Sacraments. As we have hitherto considered the *grace of the Father's commiseration and love, and the grace of the fraternal redemption*, it remains for us to treat of the *applying grace of the Spirit*, which is completed in several distinct acts." (Holl. (791): "The *applying grace of the Holy Spirit* is *the source* of those divine acts by which the Holy Spirit, through the Word of God and the Sacraments, dispenses, offers to us, bestows and seals the spiritual and eternal favors designed for man by the great mercy of God the Father, and procured by the fraternal redemption of Jesus Christ.")

[2] This arrangement is employed by nearly all the later Dogmaticians, some of them slightly changing the order of the topics. Br. alone considers faith and works separately from the means of salvation. His plan is this: after the Offices of Christ, he introduces Faith in Christ, Regeneration and Conversion, Justification, Renovation, and Good Works. Holl. subjoins to the articles concerning calling, illuminating, converting, regenerating, justifying, indwelling and renewing grace, the following, viz., *preserving grace* (Holl. (963): "Preservation is that act of grace by which the Holy Spirit, dwelling in justified and renewed men, defends them by supernatural strength against the temptations of the devil, the world, and the flesh, which solicit to sin and apostasy from God, and sustains and increases their faith and holiness, that they may not fall from grace, but persevere in it and be eternally saved;") and *glorifying grace* (Holl. (790): "Glorification is the act of grace by which God transfers those who are justified, and who remain faithful until death, from the kingdom of grace to the kingdom of glory, that they may obtain eternal happiness and praise God eternally.")

The earlier Dogmaticians treat only of Justification, Faith, Good Works, Repentance, and Confession, without attempting a systematic arrangement, and in the free form of unconnected topics, as had been done by Melanchthon.

§ 40. *The Agent, the Means, the Result.*

As it was Christ who accomplished the work of redemption, so it is the Holy Spirit who offers us the means whereby we can appropriate that redemption to ourselves. The means is *Faith,* the effect of faith is *Justification.*

§ 41. I. *Faith.*

After reconciliation with God has been brought about through Christ, inasmuch as, in man's stead, He fulfilled the Law and made satisfaction for the sins of the world, thenceforward this new salvation is preached unto men, and through it the forgiveness of sin is offered to them (Luke 24: 47 ; Acts 2: 38 ; 5: 31 ; 10: 43 ; 13: 38 ; 26: 18). To become a partaker of it, there is now no need of any meritorious work on the part of man, for Christ has done everything that was necessary to secure it ; but this alone is necessary, that man receive the salvation that is offered him, and that he appropriate to himself the promise that is given ; and this is done alone by faith. [1] Man cannot, however, attain this faith unless, after the redemption purchased by Christ has been preached and offered to him, he recognize the existence of this salvation, and the truth of this promise, as well as the comfort it contains for him, and can have the confidence that this salvation is designed, not for this or that one alone, but also for himself ; for a joyful message can benefit a man only when he has no doubt of its truth, but can convince himself that he, too, is meant by it. [2]

Faith, considered with reference to its individual elements, consists accordingly of—

1. "*Knowledge, and that explicit,* of things to be believed, especially concerning Christ and His merit, concerning the grace of God, or the remission of sins, and concerning the salvation to be obtained thereby from God." Br. (503). [3]

2. "*Assent, i. e.,* an approving judgment of the intellect, by which we believe that those things which the Scriptures say concerning Christ and His merit and atonement for our sins, and concerning the grace of God and the promises of the free forgiveness of our sins for Christ's sake, are certainly and indubitably true, and by which we absolutely acquiesce in them." [4] Quen. (IV, 283).

3. "*Confidence*, an act by which the will rests in Christ, the Mediator, both as our present good and as the cause of another good, namely, the remission of sins and the attainment of eternal life." Br. (506). [5]

None of these elements dare be wanting, and no one of them alone constitutes the faith of which we here speak. [6] A real knowledge of the promises is essential to faith. A mere informal or *implicit* faith (such as says that it believes what the Church believes) is not sufficient, but there must be an *explicit* faith. [7] Faith consists, further, not in the mere recognition and crediting of that which is promised, while the person may be inwardly indifferent towards it (*fides historica*); it is therefore not sufficient simply to regard as true the preaching of salvation. Therefore is neither a *general assent* sufficient (a belief, in general, that God is just and merciful, and has sent His Son into the world as Redeemer, but without any specific application of these truths, James 2: 19); but the assent must be *special* (in which the sinner decides that these general promises apply to himself individually). [8] Finally, salvation becomes really one's own when he truly and with confidence embraces it and appropriates it to himself; and this last mentioned is, therefore, to be regarded as the most essential element of faith. [9]

Faith is, accordingly, the firm confidence which any one has attained that he dare trust in the salvation of Christ. [10] As such it is called *special*, also *saving* or *justifying* faith, [11] and it is the only means whereby we become partakers of salvation. [12] But this faith man cannot beget within himself, in any manner, by his own power: for man's natural want of confidence in God can be overcome only by God Himself. If, therefore, a man believe, this faith is to be regarded as a work of God in him, [13] and the Word and Sacraments are the means which God employs for this purpose. [14]

But where such faith is wrought by God in man, there also, along with it, there has occurred a moral transformation; for *he* who has not recognized the comfort that is embraced in the offered salvation would not think of embracing it. But this comfort presupposes knowledge of sin and abhorrence of it. Where, therefore, this faith exists, there is always along with

it a disposition towards that which is good; [15] and this so necessarily, that where this is wanting we may assume that the faith is not of the right kind, and that the offered salvation has not really been appropriated. (Saving faith is true and living, not false or dead.) [16] But it must here be carefully noted, that, although we cannot conceive of faith unaccompanied by a moral disposition, yet the latter is only something that in the very nature of things accompanies faith; salvation itself can be attained only through hearty confidence. The moral disposition is, therefore, in no sense the ground upon which salvation through Christ is imparted to men. [17] As, finally, there is no lack of indications whereby a man can recognize the existence of faith in himself, he may thoroughly satisfy himself whether the true faith that justifies has been wrought in him; [18] and this is designated as stronger or weaker, just in proportion to the strength or weakness of the confidence with which he embraces the offered salvation. [19]

[1] Br. (502): "Although through the passion and death of Christ there was truly offered whatever of satisfaction could be demanded from all the men in the world for the extinction of the debt incurred through their offences, and thus to appease God and reconcile them to Himself; nevertheless, God wished that sinners should acknowledge the satisfaction offered to Him for them by the Son of God, and make it their own by faith; and so He wished that whoever embraces the Saviour by faith may enjoy His merit." Faith, in this sense, is "*subjective*, or that by which one believes (faith, properly so-called, which dwells in a believing man as a subject), and, as such, is distinguished from *objective* faith, or that which is believed (which is the doctrine of faith, and which is figuratively called faith, because it is the object of faith. Acts 6: 7; 13: 8; 16: 5; Rom. 12: 7)."

[2] Ap. Conf. (II, 48): "The faith which justifies is not merely historical knowledge, but assent to the promise of God, in which remission of sins and justification are freely offered through Christ. Lest any one should suppose that it is mere knowledge, we add further: it is to wish to receive the proffered remission of sins and justification.—81. Thus we are reconciled to the Father and receive the forgiveness of sins when we exercise confidence in the mercy promised in Christ."

Chmn. (Loc. c. Th., II, 270): 1. "The Scripture calls faith

knowledge* (γνώσις), Luke 1: 77; Col. 2: 3; Eph. 3: 19. To faith must be presented, and upon it enforced, from the Word of God, the decree and history of redemption, the gratuitous and universal promise that God, on account of that victim, desires to receive sinners who betake themselves by faith to the Mediators. 2. Because many who hear these things and understand and know them, either neglect, or doubt, or resist, turn away from and oppose, it is necessary that assent should be united to this knowledge: not merely a general assent, but that by which each one determines with firm persuasion, which Paul calls assurance (πληροφορία, Heb. 10: 22), that the universal promise belongs privately, individually, and specifically to him, and that he also is included in the general promise. 3. Then, after this knowledge and assent (which are in the mind), the heart or the will, under the Spirit's influence, experiences such an inward groaning or desire, that, because it feels grievously the burden of its sins and of the anger of God, it wills, seeks, and asks that those blessings which are offered in the promise of the Gospel may be granted. . . . 4. When, in this way, thou turnest thyself, with mind, will, and heart, from the contemplation of sin, and the consciousness of the wrath of God, and lookest unto the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sins of the world, *i. e.*, when, from the sentence of damnation, which is denounced against thee by the Law, thou fleest to the throne of grace and to the propitiation which our Heavenly Father offered in the blood of Christ, it is necessary to superadd confidence, which, with full assurance, determines from the Word of God, that God then gives, communicates, and applies to thee the benefits of the promise of grace, and that thou thus truly apprehendest and receivest, unto justification, salvation, and eternal life, those things which the gratuitous promise of the Gospel offers."

[3] Br. (503): "Belief can take place only in regard to those things which are mentally conceived or embraced in simple apprehension. Hence, knowledge is commonly regarded as the first step of faith, or the first part or the beginning of faith. That knowledge is necessary to faith in Christ, is proved by John 6: 69; 17: 3; Luke 1: 77; Acts 17: 23, 30; Eph. 4: 18; Gal. 4: 9."

[4] Quen. (IV, 283): "The second act of faith (viz., assent) is more distinctive than the first (viz., knowledge), for even heretics may have knowledge and yet not yield assent to the Word known. But this assent is not superficial, doubting, vacillating, but should be decided and strong, on which account it is called *the evidence of*

* [Notitiam et scientiam.]

things not seen, Heb. 11: 1. This act of faith does not depend upon the evidence of things, or upon the knowledge of causes and properties, but upon the infallible authority of God's Word."

[5] Holl. (1178): "Confidence is an act of the will, by which the sinner, converted and regenerate, earnestly desires and seeks the mercy of God, secured by Christ's merit, and embraces Him both as his own present good, and as the cause of the forgiveness of sins and of eternal salvation, relies upon Him against all terrors, and securely reclines and rests upon Him."

Quen. (IV, 284): "Thus confidence is nothing else than the *acceptance* or *apprehension* of the merit of the God-man, appropriating it to ourselves individually. The following passages indicate the *apprehension:* John 1: 5, 12; 17: 8; Rom. 5: 17; Gal. 3: 14; Luke 8: 13; Acts 8: 14; James 1: 21; Acts 10: 43; 1 Tim. 1: 15. *Appropriation* is indicated by the applicative and possessive pronouns *my, me, mine*, as is evident from Job 19: 25; Is. 45: 24; John 20: 28; Gal. 2: 20 sq. It belongs, therefore, to confidence, to seek Christ, Is. 55: 6; Amos 5: 4; earnestly to seek, Ps. 42: 1, 2; to apprehend Him with His righteousness, Rom. 9: 30; to embrace Him with all acceptation, 1 Tim. 1: 15; to appropriate His merit to one's self, Gal. 3: 26; Phil. 1: 21; and sweetly to rest in Him, Rom. 4: 21; Heb. 10: 22. This apprehension belongs to the will and is practical; it involves the reclining of the whole heart and will upon the merit of Christ; it denotes desire for and access to Christ, and the application and confident appropriation of His merit: and this is truly confidence."

[6] Br. (508): "This, therefore, is the faith which is said to apprehend Christ or His merit, particularly as it is assent joined with confidence, or confidence joined with assent, consisting of these acts united, and is designated now by the name of the former, and then by that of the latter, the other always being implied. Whence it appears how faith exists in different faculties; in the understanding and will, namely, as something compounded and united in divers acts directed to the same object, and preserving a certain order amongst themselves and towards that one and the same object."

Holl. (1166): "Faith is in the intellect with respect to knowledge; and assent, in the will with respect to confidence."

Quen. (IV, 282): "These three parts of faith are expressed by John 14: 10, 11, 12, where verse ten speaks of knowledge, verse eleven of assent, and verse twelve of confidence." The three constituents of faith are conveyed in the phrases *credere Deum*, *credere Deo* and *credere in Deum*. "*Credere Deum* signifies, to believe that

God exists; *credere Deo* signifies, to believe that those things which He speaks are true; *credere in Deum* signifies, by believing to love Him, by believing to go to Him, by believing to cling to Him and to be incorporated into His members. Heretics can have the first, the second the orthodox alone, the third the regenerate; and therefore the latter always includes the former, but this order cannot be reversed. The former two pertain to the intellect, the third to the will; the first and second have respect to the entire Word of God, the third to the promise of grace and the merit of Christ." (QUEN., ib.)

[7] BR. (503): "*Explicit* faith is that by which the thing to be believed, although it be not clearly known, or although all the things in it that are cognizable be not intelligibly apprehended, yet is in itself known distinctly, or in such a manner that it can be distinguished from other objects. With this is contrasted an *implicit* knowledge by which any one, *e. g.*, is said to believe that Christ is the Redeemer, when he believes that those things are true which the Church believes, although he has no knowledge whatever as to what those things are which the Church believes."

[8] HOLL. (1178): "By *general* assent, the universal promises of the grace of God and the merit of Christ are regarded as true. By *special* assent, the converted, regenerate sinner regards these general promises as pertaining to him individually. In 1 Tim. 1: 15, the general and special assent of faith are united. By the *general assent* it is admitted as true that Christ Jesus came into the world to save all sinners. From this universal proposition the apostle descends to himself in particular, and believes that he has on Christ's account obtained the mercy of God to salvation. From this it appears that Christ's merit is universal, and the promises concerning the gratuitous remission of sins to be obtained through Christ are indeterminate. But that they may become actually profitable to one or another individual, it is necessary that the universal merit of Christ, and the indeterminate promises, should be applied and determined *by special assent* to this or that penitent sinner."

[9] QUEN. (IV, 284, from CHMN., ex.): "It may be proved that *confidence is the principal part of faith.* (1) From *etymology.* Faith and confidence (*fides* and *fiducia*, πίστις and πεποίθησις) have one and the same origin; both come from a Greek word (πείθω), which means I persuade, I convince, cf. John 2: 24." ("From a comparison of passages in the Old and New Testaments, what in the Old Testament is attributed to those exercising trust, and to confidence, in the New Testament is applied to those believing, and to

faith." Holl. (1182).) (2) From *synonymics.* Faith, Heb. 11: 1, is called substance (ὑπόστασις), which denotes a confidence of the heart subsisting firmly and immovably. (Comp. Ps. 39: 4; 2 Cor. 9: 4; 11: 17; Heb. 3: 14.) Faith is also called confidence (πεποίθησις), 2 Cor. 3: 4; Eph. 3: 12; a sure and immovable persuasion (πληροφορία), Rom. 4: 20, 21; Col. 2: 2; Heb. 10: 22; boldness (παῤῥησία), Eph. 3: 12; 1 John 3: 21; 4: 17. (3) From *explanatory declarations.* Faith is represented by the reception of Christ, John 1: 12; by the apprehension of the merit of Christ, Rom. 3: 30; by confidence, 1 John 5: 13; Matt. 9: 22; 15: 28; 1 John 5: 4. (4) From *explicit declarations*, in which faith must be regarded as confidence, as in Matt. 9: 22; 15: 28; 1 John 5: 4. (5) From what are represented as *its opposites.* To faith is opposed hesitation, Rom. 4: 20; James 1: 6; Luke 8: 50; Mark 5: 34; Matt. 8: 26; 14: 31. (6) From *reason.* For that by which justifying faith is constituted and distinguished from other species of faith, is its essential element. But, by the confidential reception of Christ and His merit, justifying faith is constituted, John 1: 12; Rom. 3: 25, and is distinguished from an historical faith, James 2: 19, and a miraculous faith, which regards another kind of promise, Mark 16: 16. Therefore, "etc.

[Chemnitz, Examen (Preuss' ed. I: 192), much fuller:

"1. From the nature and property of a gratuitous promise. For my confidence in my salvation does not depend upon the fact that the perspicacity of my understanding, by its acuteness, can penetrate the heaven of heavens, and scrutinize what is decreed concerning me in the secret counsel of the Trinity, but that God coming forth from His secret light, has revealed His will to us in His Word, as Paul, in 2 Cor. 2: 16, does not hesitate to affirm that 'we *have* the mind of Christ.' If eternal life were to be apprehended by doubt, no promise would be more fitting than that of the Law; for because of the condition of perfect fulfilment attached, it leaves consciences in perpetual doubt. But since it is not doubt, but faith which justifies, and not he who doubts, but he who believes, has eternal life; God has set forth the gratuitous promise of the Gospel, which depends not on our works, but on the mercy of God, because of the obedience of His Son, our Mediator. Why this promise was set forth, Paul shows: 'To the end that the promise might be sure,' Rom. 4: 16. But does he mean that it should be sure only in general, and of itself? In no wise, but, as he says, that it might be sure to all the seed. But how? It was written, he says, to us, to whom it shall be imputed if we believe, v. 24. For the promise of the Law is in general, and of itself, sure. But in order

that it might be sure to us, it is according to grace, and of faith. So in Heb. 6, we have that most comforting declaration, that God added an oath to His gratuitous promise, 'that by two immutable things,' etc., 'that *we* who have fled for refuge might have a strong consolation.' From such foundation, John derives his argument, 1 John 5: 10; and that by this he does not mean mere general assent is clear from v. 13; 'That ye may know that ye have,' etc. For if I believe in the Son of God, and yet doubt whether I have eternal life, I do not believe the promise: 'He that believeth in the Son of God hath everlasting life.'

"2. From the peculiar office of Justifying Faith. John had a special purpose in saying of faith (1 John 3: 14): 'We *know* that we have passed,' etc. (5: 13): 'That ye may *know* that ye have.' In Heb. 6, there occurs the most beautiful metaphor of the anchor. For when an anchor falls upon treacherous ground, it cannot hold the ship securely; but when upon a firm foundation, it holds it against all waves. So, he says, the anchor of our hope has been cast into heaven itself, where Christ our High Priest is, who grasps, holds and supports it, as he says in John 10: 28; Phil. 3: 13. . . . A most firm argument also against doubt is that of 2 Cor. 13: 5. Notice that every one is to prove himself whether he be in the faith, and that they who do not acknowledge that Christ is in them, are reprobates.

"3. The doctrine concerning the use of the Sacraments furnishes the most consoling arguments concerning the certainty of the salvation of believers. For it is certain that the Son of God has added, by His own institution, to His promise of grace, the seals which are called sacraments; viz., that the promise of the Gospel be presented not only in general, but that, in the sacramental action, the general promise is offered, applied, and sealed to every one using it in faith; and that too, so that the weakness of faith which can feebly sustain itself by a general and naked promise, may be sustained and comforted by the efficacy of the Sacraments. Thus, Rom. 4, circumcision is called a seal of the righteousness of faith. Gal. 3: 27: 'As many of you as have been baptized into Christ,' etc. 1 Pet. 3: 21: 'Baptism is the answer of a good conscience,' etc. In the use of the Lord's Supper, the Son of God applies: 'Take, eat,' etc. Of absolution, how precious the promise: 'Whosoever sins,' etc. Christ says, Luke 7: 30: 'Thy faith hath saved thee; go in peace,' Matt. 9: 2.

"4. From the testimonies of Scripture concerning the sealing of believers by the Holy Ghost, Eph. 1: 13; 2 Cor. 1: 22; Eph. 4: 30. For sealing is without controversy applied to those objects which

we want to be held without doubt by those to whom they belong. . . . Nor is the sealing only a general persuasion, but that each one may determine that the promise is firm and certain unto himself, and that, too, in opposition to the doubt which naturally inheres in our minds."

Another term is *arrhabo*, a word of Hebrew origin, signifying a pledge whereby suretyship is ratified and confirmed, not certainly that there may be doubt concerning it, but that faith in it may be undoubted. . . . For, since we are saved, but as yet only by hope, Rom. 8, and meantime faith is agitated by various temptations; in order, therefore, that we may not doubt concerning God's good will towards us, the forgiveness of sins, adoption, salvation, and eternal life, He has given us as a pledge, not an angel, nor any creature, but the Holy Spirit Himself, con-substantial with Father and Son, so that, against every doubt, we may rest in the confidence of that salvation which shall be revealed in us. These metaphors are explained elsewhere in manifest declarations, 1 John 5: 10; Rom. 8: 16; Gal. 4: 6; 1 Cor. 2: 12; Eph. 1: 18.

"5. From the examples of the saints: Abraham, Rom. 4: 20; David, Ps. 23: 4; 27: 1; 31: 1; Paul, Rom. 8: 33 sqq.

"6. Doubt, conflicting with confidence, is reproved in Scripture, in explicit terms, Matt. 6: 30; 14: 31; Luke 12: 29; James 1: 6. In Rom. 14: 'Whatsoever is not of faith,' and 'Whatever is of a doubtful conscience,' are synonyms."]

[10] Faith can therefore equally well be defined as "Confidence in mercy for Christ's sake, or assent to the promise of grace through Christ, or apprehension of Christ or of His merit, or the confident and individual application of the doctrines of salvation, rightly learned from the Word of God, and approved with a firm consent, made in order to obtain forgiveness of sins and eternal salvation through and on account of Christ's merit." (Cf. note 1.)

Holl. (1163): "Faith in Christ is the gift of the Holy Spirit, by which the converted and regenerated sinner savingly recognizes, with firm assent approves, and with unwavering confidence applies to himself, the Gospel promise of the grace of God and of the forgiveness of sins and eternal salvation, to be obtained through the atonement and merit of Christ, so that he may be justified and eternally saved."

The object of *special faith* is, accordingly, Holl. (1166), "Christ the Mediator, so far as He is offered to us in the promise of the Gospel as the meritorious cause of the grace of God and of the remission of sins (1 John 2: 2; Rom. 3: 25; Acts 16: 31); or, what is the same thing, the grace of God, on account of the satisfaction

of Christ, remitting sin, and promised in the Gospel (Rom. 3: 24); or, what is of similar import, the Gospel promise concerning the grace of God, and the remission of sins to be obtained through the satisfaction of Christ (Rom. 4: 16; Gal. 3: 22; 1 Tim. 1: 15)." Holl. (1167) remarks further: "The object of confidence is the same in substance, whether you represent it as Christ the Mediator, or as grace bestowed on account of Christ the Mediator. The difference lies only in the mode of conception and expression."

[11] *Special faith* distinguished from *general.* Holl. (1164): "General faith is that by which man, who needs salvation, believes all things to be true which are revealed in the Word of God. Of this species of faith we are not now speaking, because we are treating of faith as the means of salvation, and therefore in reference to a special qr peculiar object, which has the power of recovering salvation lost by sin, and in consideration of which, faith may be considered among the means of salvation. Special faith is therefore that by which the sinner, converted and regenerated, applies to himself individually the universal promises in reference to Christ, the Mediator, and the grace of God accessible through Him, and believes that God desires to be propitious to him and to pardon his sins, on account of the satisfaction of Christ, made for his and all men's sins. It is therefore called special faith, not because it has any special promise as its object, which is made specially to the believer, but on account of the application by which, under the universal promise of the grace of God and the merit of Christ, it reaches him individually. Ap. Conf. II, 44: "This special faith, therefore, by which an individual believes that for Christ's sake, his sins are remitted him, and that for Christ's sake, God is reconciled and propitious, obtains remission of sins and justifies us." On the relation of general and special faith, Chmn. (Loc. c. Th., II, 268): "Justifying faith (special) presupposes and includes general faith, which, with a firm persuasion, determines that those things are most certainly true which are disclosed in the Word of God. For when this general foundation totters, then a firm confidence in the evangelical promise cannot be conceived, nor can it be retained in time of trouble. Justifying faith has thus many properties in common with general." Against the objections of Catholicism, he says: "The Papists constantly traduce our doctrine, as if we invented a partial faith which is not Catholic, because it may be detached from the other articles of belief and the entire Word of God, and restricted to the single item of Christ, the Mediator; as if the assent to other parts of the Word of God were not necessary, but arbitrary. To

refute this calumny, therefore, at the very beginning of the definition, the declaration is made, that we do not exclude the other parts of the heavenly doctrine when we say that the promise of grace is the proper object of justifying faith. But as the sum, end, scope, and goal of the entire Scriptures is Christ in His mediatorial office, so faith, when it assents to the entire Word of God, regards the scope of the entire Scriptures, and refers all the other articles to the promise of grace."

[12] Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., III, 38): "It is faith alone, and nothing else whatever, which is the means and instrument by which the grace of God and the merit of Christ in the promise of the Gospel are embraced, received, and applied to us."

Holl. (1173): "For justifying faith is the receptive organ and, as it were, the hand of the poor sinner, by which he applies and takes to himself, lays hold of, and possesses those things which are proffered in the free promise of the Gospel. God, the supreme Monarch, extends from heaven the hand of grace, obtained by the merit of Christ, and in it offers salvation. The sinner, in the abyss of misery, receives, as a beggar, in his hand of faith, what is thus offered to him. The offer and the reception are correlatives. Therefore the hand of faith, which seizes and appropriates the offered treasure, corresponds to the hand of grace which offers the treasure of righteousness and salvation."

[13] Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., III, 10): "Faith is the gift of God, by which we apprehend aright Christ, our Redeemer, in the Gospel." Gru. (VII, 162): "We are so corrupted and depraved by sin, that we not only need redemption, the pardon of sins, the gift of salvation and eternal life, but that we also cannot of ourselves and from our own power produce even faith through which to become partakers of divine grace and heavenly blessings. God, therefore, pitying us, acted as a faithful physician, who not only carries medicine to the patient to cure him, but in addition, if there be occasion, and the invalid cannot do it, attends to the administration of it himself."

Quen. (IV, 281): "God is the principal efficient cause of saving faith. John 6: 29; Phil. 1: 29. Hence faith is called the gift of God, Eph. 2: 8, and it is said to be of the operation of God, Col. 2: 12. This shows that faith proceeds from God, who regenerates, and is not the product of our own will; it is not meritorious. It has its origin in grace, not in nature; it is adventitious, not hereditary; supernatural, not natural. That which, in respect to its commencement, its increase, and its completion, is from God, cannot depend upon our will and the powers of nature. But faith

is of God in its commencement, Phil. 2: 13; 1: 6; in its increase, Mark 9: 24; Luke 17: 5; and in its completion, Phil. 1: 6; 2 Thess. 1: 11. Therefore, etc." Br. (721): "The moving *internal* cause is the goodness of God, or His mercy and gratuitous favor (Phil. 1: 29); the *external* is the merit of Christ."

[14] Ap. Conf., II, 73: "We do not exclude the Word or the Sacraments. We have said above that faith is conceived from the Word, and we honor the ministry of the Word in the highest degree."

Grh. (VII, 163): "He does not wish to produce faith in the hearts of men immediately, or by enthusiastic raptures of the Holy Spirit, but mediately by the preaching, hearing, and reading of the Word, and meditation upon it. Therefore the *instrumental cause of faith* is the preaching of the Word. The Holy Spirit not only offers in the Gospel the vast benefits procured by the passion and death of Christ; but operates also through the Word upon the hearts of men, and kindles in them faith by which they embrace and apply to themselves the proffered mercies." The difference in regard to the order in which the Word and Sacraments influence adults and children is thus laid down by Quen. (IV, 282): "The conferring means in adults are, *first*, the Word preached, heard, read, and devoutly considered. John 17: 20; Rom. 10: 17; 1 Cor. 1: 21; 2 Cor. 4: 6; and *afterwards* the Sacraments. In infants, however, Baptism is first as a source generating faith."

Agreeably to this, Holl. (1186) distinguishes "faith (which essentially and absolutely considered is one), in relation to the mode of knowledge, as *direct*, which directly leads to Christ and the grace of God afforded in Him (for example, infants believe, but they cannot yet prove their faith [*explorare fidem suam*] for want of ripened judgment), and as *reflex and discursive*, by which a man regenerated believes and perceives that he believes, so that he can say with Paul, 2 Tim. 1: 12: 'I know whom I have believed.'"

[15] Ap. Conf. (II, 45): "Because faith comforts and lifts up the heart in repentance, *i. e.*, in its distresses, renews us, and brings the Holy Spirit, enabling us to obey the Law of God."

Ib. (64): "But when we say of such faith, that it is not mere idle thinking, but that it delivers us from death and begets new life in our hearts, and is a work of the Holy Spirit, it does not co-exist with mortal sin, but produces good fruits only so long as it is really present."

Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., IV, 10): "As Luther writes in the introduction to St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans: 'Faith is a divine work in us which changes us, divinely regenerates, mortifies

the old Adam, makes of us altogether different men (in heart, soul, and in all our powers), and confers the Holy Spirit upon us. Oh, it is a living, efficacious, energetic power that we have in faith, so that it cannot exist without always producing good works! It does not inquire whether good works are to be performed, but, before any such inquiry, has already performed many, and is always busy in the performance of them." Br. (518): "Confidence is always attended with love. For, when our will has respect to Christ as a present good, and to God as appeased for Christ's sake and rendered propitious to us, it renders to Him a love not only of complacency, but likewise of benevolence; its impulses are good will to Him, a desire to perform what will be good and grateful to Him."

[16] Holl. (1163): "A *false, or vain and dead, faith* is equivocally called faith, as it is only an empty persuasion and boasting of faith, or a bold presumption upon the mercy and grace of God on account of the merit of Christ, in an impenitent man, indulging himself in sin. Concerning this, see James 2: 20. We speak of true and living faith, which receives its vitality from Christ, and when it justifies the converted sinner exerts and displays its vital energy in love and good works." Ap. Conf. (III, 128): "(James says) that (faith) is dead which does not produce good works; living, that which does produce them. (III, 21 and 22.) The faith of which we speak exists in repentance, that is, it is conceived amid the terrors of conscience, which perceives the wrath of God against our sins and seeks their remission and to be liberated from sin. Faith ought to increase and be confirmed amid such terrors and other distresses. It can not therefore exist in those who live after the flesh, who delight in carnal lusts and obey them."

[17] Ap. Conf. (II, 56): "Faith does not justify or save because it is a meritorious work, but only because it accepts the proffered mercy." Ibid. (74): "Love, also, and good works ought to follow faith; wherefore, they are not so excluded that they should not follow it, but confidence in the meritoriousness of love or works is excluded in justification." Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., III, 41): "That which Luther has well said remains true, 'Faith and works agree well and are inseparably connected, but it is faith alone which receives the blessing without works, and yet it is never alone.'" 42: "In regard to the question, how faith justifies, this is Paul's doctrine on this point, that faith alone without works justifies, inasmuch as it applies and communicates to us the merit of Christ. But when it is asked how and by what indication a Christian man can recognize and distinguish either in

himself or in other men a true and living faith, and likewise a feigned and dead faith, since, in place of faith, many torpid and secure Christians indulge in a vain opinion without having true faith, the APOL. answers: 'James calls that a dead faith which is not followed by good works of every description and the fruits of the Spirit.'" The distinction of HOLL. (1172) is very striking: "The power and energy of faith are twofold, *receptive*, or apprehensive, and *operative*. The former is that by which faith passively receives Christ and everything obtained by His merit (John 1: 12; 17: 8; Col. 2: 6; 1 Tim. 1: 15; Rom. 5: 17; Acts 10: 43; James 1: 12; Gal. 3: 14). The latter is that by which faith manifests itself actively by works of love and the practice of other virtues. Gal. 5: 6. *Note:* 'The epithet, working by love (in Gal. 5: 6), is an attribute of a faith which has justified, not of one which will in the future justify, much less the form or essence of justifying faith *so far as* it justifies. For the Apostle does not describe the office of justifying faith, so far as it justifies, but another office, to wit, its operation by love;" and the passage from Brentz (*Apology of Würt. Conf.*): "Faith, so to speak, has two hands. *One, which it extends upwards* to embrace Christ with all His benefits, and by this we are justified; *the other, which it reaches downwards* to perform the works of love and of the other virtues, and by this we *prove the reality of faith*, but are not thereby justified."

QUEN. (IV, 281) thus combines the various statements in regard to faith; "If you inquire after the *origin* of justifying faith, it is heaven-derived; if in regard to the *means by which it is proffered*, it is begotten by the Word of God and the Sacraments; if in regard to the *effects*, it attains the pardon of sins; if in regard to the *consequences*, they are shown through the holy works of love; if in regard to the *reward*, it is recompensed in eternal salvation; if in regard to the *relation to virtues*, it is the root and foundation of the rest."

[18] HOLL. (1187): "Certainty belongs to faith in Christ, (*a*) on the part of the object believed, in which there can be no falsehood. For the Word of God, which is received by the assent of faith, is most true, on account of the authority of God who reveals it; (*b*) on the part of the subject, or of him who believes, and who most firmly adheres to and depends upon the divine promises. For faith is the evidence of things not seen, Heb. 11: 1; a firm assent and a full confidence, Rom. 4: 21; Col. 2: 2; Heb. 6: 11; a firm persuasion, Eph. 3: 12; 1 Cor. 6: 17." Id. (1188): "Converted and regenerated men can and do know with an infallible certainty that they truly believe, both from the *συμμαρτυρία*,

or the concurring testimony of the Holy Ghost with the testimony of their own spirit, or of their soul enlightened and renewed (Rom. 8: 16; 1 John 5: 9), and likewise from the examination and proof of faith (2 Cor. 13: 5)."

[19] Holl. (1186): "Faith is *weak or infirm*, when either a feeble light of the knowledge of Christ glimmers in the intellect, or the promise of grace is received with a languid and weak assent, or confidence struggles with an alarmed conscience. So Mark 9: 24. But yet a weak faith may be true; as a spark concealed under the ashes is true fire, and a tender infant is a true human being. A *strong* or *firm faith* is a clear knowledge of the divine mercy, offered in Christ, a solid assent, an intrepid confidence overcoming all terrors. Comp. Rom. 4: 18." Chmn. (Loc. c. Th., II, 270): "The essentials should be marked. For we are justified by faith not because it is a virtue so firm, robust, and perfect; but on account of the object, because faith apprehends Christ. When then faith does not err in its object, but apprehends that true object, although with a languid faith, or at least endeavors and desires to apprehend it, it is genuine and justifies."

§ 42. (2) *Justification.*

The effect of faith is justification; [1] by which is to be understood that act of God by which He removes the sentence of condemnation, to which man is exposed in consequence of his sins, releases him from his guilt, and ascribes to him the merit of Christ. Br. (574): "Justification denotes that act by which the sinner, who is responsible for guilt and liable to punishment (*reus culpæ et pœnæ*), but who believes in Christ, is pronounced just by God the judge." [2] This act occurs at the instant in which the merit of Christ is appropriated by faith, [3] and can properly be designated a *forensic or judicial act*, since God in it, as if in a civil court, pronounces a judgment upon man, which assigns to him an entirely different position, and entirely different rights. [4] By justification we are, therefore, by no means to understand a moral condition existing in man, or a moral change which he has experienced, but only a judgment pronounced upon man, by which his relation to God is reversed, [5] and indeed in such a manner, that a man can now consider himself one whose sins are blotted out, who is no longer responsible for them before God, who, on the other hand, appears before God as accepted and

righteous, in whom God finds nothing more to punish, with whom He has no longer any occasion to be displeased.

Through this act of justification emanating from God we receive,

1. Remission of sins (Rom. 4: 7; Ps. 32: 1, 2; Rom. 3: 25; Luke 11: 4; 2 Cor. 5: 19).

2. The Imputation of the righteousness of Christ [6] (Rom. 5: 9; 2 Cor. 5: 21; Gal. 3: 6; Phil. 3: 9; Rom. 4: 5); for God, from the moment in which faith is exercised, regards all that Christ has accomplished, as if it had been done by man, and attributes the merit of Christ to him, as if it were his own. [7] From this can be seen what we are to designate as the ground of our justification, and what is the means by which it is attained. The ground lies alone in the merit of Christ, for by this our sins are blotted out, and God is enabled to receive us again into favor. [8] The means, however, through which we attain justification is faith. [9] In no wise, therefore, is any merit or worthiness on our part demanded as the condition for the impartation of justification, as if upon that our justification should depend. It is not denied, indeed, that a moral change takes place in man, with the entrance of faith, and therefore also with that of justification; yet this is to be regarded as only an attendant to justification and contemporaneous with it, but in no wise as the condition upon which we attain justification; [10] and this the less, as it is only the grace of God which displays itself in justification, that furnishes the ground and possibility of such a change. [11] The moral worthiness of man cannot be made account of in the inquiry concerning the reasons of his being received into the favor of God, [12] and it is highly important to assert this firmly, as we would deprive ourselves of the firm footing on which our justification rests, if we regarded it as in any degree dependent upon anything done by us. [13] Justification is, accordingly, to be regarded throughout as a free gift of grace on the part of God, which is offered to us gratuitously and without requiring any addition to it on our part, and which can be received and accepted only by faith, as it is expressed in the declaration that we are justified, *gratuitously*, by faith alone, [14] and for Christ's sake. [15]

This doctrine, according to which, in the act of justification, all man's works are excluded and the whole is considered as effected by God's grace, constitutes the central point of the knowledge which we owe to the Reformation; [16] in it there is offered man a sure and firm foundation upon which he may build his hopes of salvation, and a sure way pointed out to him of obtaining it. [17]

[1] QUEN. (IV, 286): "The immediate effect of faith is the remission of sins, adoption, justification, union with Christ, access to God, and peace of conscience. Among these effects of faith, *justification is the principal*, to which all the rest can be referred."

[2] QUEN. (III, 526): "Justification is the external, judicial, gracious act of the most Holy Trinity, by which a sinful man, whose sins are forgiven, on account of the merit of Christ apprehended by faith, is accounted just, to the praise of God's glorious grace and justice and to the salvation of the justified."

[3] BR. (574): "For with and through faith man is at once justified; so that the act by which faith is conferred upon man, and the act by which man is justified, are simultaneous, although faith is by nature first in order and justification subsequent to it."

[4] BR. (574): "Justification has a *forensic sense*, and denotes that act by which God, the judge, pronounces righteous the sinner responsible for guilt and liable to punishment, but who believes in Jesus."

CHMN. (Loc. c. Th., II, 250): "Paul everywhere describes justification *as a judicial process*, because the conscience of the sinner accused by the divine Law before the tribunal of God, convicted and lying under the sentence of eternal condemnation, but fleeing to the throne of grace, is restored, acquitted, delivered from the sentence of condemnation, is received into eternal life, on account of the obedience and intercession of the Son of God, the Mediator, which is apprehended and applied by faith." According to this, justification signifies to pronounce righteous. FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., III, 17): "The word justification signifies in this matter to pronounce righteous, to absolve from sins and the eternal punishment of sins on account of Christ's righteousness, which is imputed to faith by God." BR. (575): "Although the Latin word *justificare* is compounded of the adjective *justus* and the verb *facere*, it does not denote in general usage, and especially in the Scriptures when sinful man is said to be justified before God, the infusion *of an habitual righteousness*, but, according to the import of the Hebrew word הִצְדִּיק (2 Sam. 15: 4; Deut. 25: 1), and the word

δικαιοῦν in the Septuagint and Paul (Rom. 3 and 4), the Latin *justificare* is also transferred from an outward to a spiritual court, at which men are placed as before a divine tribunal, and are acquitted after the case has been heard and sentence has been pronounced." According to the Catholic doctrine, "justify" is equivalent in import to making righteous; making a righteous person out of a wicked one. In opposition to this, Ap. Conf. (III, 131): "Justification signifies not to make a wicked person righteous, but in a forensic sense to pronounce righteous." Quen. (III, 515): "These words δικαιοῦν and הִצְדִּיק, nowhere and never in the whole Scriptures, even when not used in reference to the justification of the sinner before God, signify justification by the infusion of new qualities; but whenever they are used of God justifying the wicked before His tribunal they have a forensic signification." Grh. (VII, 4 sq.) thus gives the Scripture proof in detail: "The forensic signification (of the word δικαιοῦν) is proved, (1) because *it denotes a judicial act*, not only without reference to the doctrine of gratuitous justification before God (Is. 5: 23; Deut. 25: 1; 2 Sam. 15: 4; Ps. 82: 3; Is. 43: 9), but also in the very article of justification (Ps. 143: 2; Job 9: 2, 3; Luke 18: 14); (2) because *it is opposed to condemnation* (Deut. 25: 1; 1 Kings 8: 32; Prov. 17: 15; Matt. 12: 37; Rom. 5: 16; 8: 33, 34); (3) because its *correlatives are judicial.* For a judgment is mentioned, Ps. 143: 2; a judge, John 5: 27; a tribunal, Rom. 14: 10; a criminal, Rom. 3: 19; a plaintiff, John 5: 45; a witness, Rom. 2: 15; an indictment, Col. 2: 14; an obligation, Matt. 18: 24; an advocate, 1 John 2: 1; an acquittal, Ps. 32: 1. The Law accuses the sinner before the judgment-seat of God, that he may be subject to the judgment of God. Rom. 3: 19. Conscience concurs with this accusation of the Law, Rom. 2: 15. Since, in consequence of sin, the whole nature of man and all his works are miserably contaminated, he discovers nothing to oppose to the judgment of God; the Law therefore hurls the thunder of its curse and condemnation upon man convicted of sin, but the Gospel presents Christ the Mediator, who by His most perfect obedience has atoned for our sins. To Him the sinner, terrified and condemned by the Law, flees by true faith, opposes this righteousness of Christ to the sentence of God and the condemnation of the Law, and in view of, and by the imputation of this, he is justified, that is, freed from the sentence of condemnation and pronounced righteous; (4) because *the equivalent phrases are judicial.* To be justified is to be not called into judgment, Ps. 143: 2; to be not condemned, John 3: 18; not to come into condemnation, John 5: 24; not to be judged, John 3: 18. The publican went down to his house justi-

fied, that is, acquitted of his sins, Luke 18: 14. Paul explains justification by 'imputing for righteousness,' Rom. 4: 3, 5; by 'covering iniquities'; by 'not imputing sin,' 5: 7; by 'remitting sins,' Rom. 3: 25; by 'forgiving trespasses,' Col. 2: 13. Here belong the phrases: 'to be reconciled to God,' Rom. 5: 10; 'to be made righteous,' 5: 19; 'to partake of the blessing,' Eph. 1: 3; 'to receive remission of sins,' Acts 10: 43; 'to be saved,' Acts 4: 12. Comp. the parable, Matt. 18: 27."

[5] Br. (577): "Justification does not mean a real and internal change of man." Holl. (928): "Justification is a judicial, and that, too, a gracious act, by which God, reconciled by the satisfaction of Christ, acquits the sinner who believes in Christ of the offenses with which he is charged, and accounts and pronounces him righteous. *Since this action takes place apart from man, in God, it cannot intrinsically change man.* For, as a debtor for whom another pays his debt, so that he is considered released from the debt, undergoes not an intrinsic but an extrinsic change in regard to his condition, so the sinner who is reputed and pronounced free from his sins, on account of the satisfaction of Christ applied by true faith, is changed, not intrinsically, but extrinsically, with respect to his better condition. *The point from which* this external change takes place (*terminus a quo*) is the state of being responsible for guilt and liable to punishment; because thereby the sinner remains in a state of sin and wrath (Rom. 4: 7; Eph. 1: 7; 2 Cor. 5: 19). *The point to which* it conducts (*terminus ad quem*) is the state of grace and righteousness; because God, remitting the offenses of the sinner who believes in Christ, receives him into favor, and imputes to him the righteousness of Christ (Rom. 4: 5, 6; Gal. 3: 6; 2 Cor. 5: 21; Phil. 3: 9; Rom. 5: 19)." To the last, Br. (579) remarks in addition: "Some refer to this place the privileges of the sons of God, and the inheritance of eternal life, which is conferred or adjudged to us in God's account. Some add the dignity of the reward of righteousness which we obtain in this act of justification. But others, and probably the majority, distinguish the act by which the sonship, or the inheritance, or the privilege of reward is conferred on the faithful from justification, and consider them as its consequences. . . . The Scriptures also frequently distinguish between these two things, viz., freedom from the condemnation of sin, with power to become the sons of God, and the heavenly inheritance, of which the latter implies the former, and is furnished to the justified by a subsequent and new gift, viz., that when the judgment is finished, the sonship or adoption referred to in Rom. 8: 15, 23; Gal. 4: 5; Eph. 1: 5 will take place."

[6] QUEN. (III, 524): "*Our justification before God consists in the remission and non-imputation of sins and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ.*" The FORM. CONC. sometimes presents both these expressions conjointly, and sometimes it describes the sentence of justification as having reference only to the remission of sins. It says (Epit., III, 4): "We believe that our righteousness before God consists in this, that the Lord forgives us our sins through mere grace. . . . For He gives and imputes to us the righteousness of the obedience of Christ; on account of this righteousness we are received into favor by God, and are accounted just." And it says (Sol. Dec., III, 9): "Concerning the righteousness of faith, we confess that the sinner is justified before God, *i. e.*, is absolved from all his sins and from the sentence of most righteous condemnation, and adopted into the number of the children of God and regarded as an heir of eternal life." . . . The same course is adopted by other Dogmaticians. No difference is thereby intended in the matter itself. BR. mentions, as the form of justification, only the forgiveness of sins, because he presupposes the imputation of the righteousness of Christ as that upon which the forgiveness is based. He says (588): "It is certain that, when we call the form of justification the forgiveness or non-imputation of sins, the imputation of the righteousness of Christ is not excluded, . . . nor the imputation of this faith itself for righteousness. That is, we mean to say, that the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, and of faith itself, is *only logically prior to that forensic act of justification* by which men are absolved from the guilt of sins; for to the question, Why does God justify man? the *a priori* explanation is given, Because God imputes to man the righteousness or merit of Christ apprehended by faith, or so judges it to belong to man that he is on this account absolved from the guilt of his sins." Other Dogmaticians express themselves differently in regard to the relation existing between the forgiveness of sins and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ.

QUEN. (ib.): "These parts (so to speak) are not different or distinct essentially (τῷ εἶναι), but merely logically (τῷ λόγῳ); for the imputation of Christ's righteousness is essentially nothing else than the remission of sins, and the remission of sins is nothing else than the imputation of Christ's righteousness, so that either word separately taken expresses the whole nature of justification. Whence the apostle Paul, Rom. 4, interchanges the *forgiveness of sins* and the *imputation of righteousness* in his description of justification, which he sometimes defines as the forgiveness of sins, and sometimes as the imputation of righteousness. For, as it can properly be said

that at one and the same time, and by one and the same action, the expulsion of darkness from the atmosphere is the introduction of light, so one and the same wicked man, at one and the same time, and by the very same act of justification, is both freed from guilt and pronounced righteous." Holl. (915): "Remission of sins and the imputation of Christ's righteousness are inseparable and closely-united acts; but distinct, indeed, in form, as the first is privative, and the other positive, and as the one results immediately from the passive obedience of Christ, the other from His active obedience. We do not deny, meanwhile, that the one may properly be inferred from the other, for there is no sinner, whose sins are pardoned, but has the righteousness of Christ imputed, and the reverse."

In earlier times, indeed, the definition of *renovation* or *regeneration* was also included in that of justification. Thus Mel. says (Loc. Com. Th., II, 207, sq.): "The first (degree) of evangelical liberty is that the forgiveness of sins, reconciliation, justification, or the imputation of righteousness and acceptance to eternal life, and the inheritance of eternal life, are bestowed upon us freely on account of the Son of God. . . . The second degree is the gift of the Holy Spirit, who enkindles new light in the mind and new emotions in the will and heart, governs us, and begins in us eternal life." And the Ap. Conf., II, 72: "Because to be justified signifies that the wicked are made righteous through regeneration, it signifies also that they are pronounced or reputed as righteous. For the Scripture uses both these methods of speaking." Ib., III, 40: "Although it is generally admitted that justification signifies not only the beginning of renovation, but the reconciliation by which we are afterwards accepted." When, afterwards, these phrases were taken separately, and in the definition of justification only the forgiveness of sin and the imputation of Christ's righteousness were included, no change of doctrine was thereby introduced. Mel. and the Ap. meant thereby only to say that as faith, by which one apprehends the merit of Christ, is wrought by the Holy Spirit, regeneration in its beginnings is at the same time implied in it. Ap. II, 45: "This special faith, by which any one believes that his sins are forgiven for Christ's sake, and that God is reconciled and rendered propitious for Christ's sake, attains the forgiveness of sins and justifies us. And because in penitence, *i. e.*, in our spiritual distress, He comforts us and encourages our hearts, regenerates us and bestows the Holy Spirit, so that then we can obey the divine Law." To this statement the later theologians also adhered. See Note 10. They were influenced, however, by the controversies that

afterwards arose with the Roman Catholics, and also already with some Lutheran theologians (A. Osiander), in the definition of justification, to guard against the appearance of admitting that the renovation thus introduced in its beginnings along with the forgiveness of sins was in any sense a condition of the bestowal of the forgiveness of sins. And with this the APOL. entirely accords.

[7] QUEN. (III, 525): "The form of imputation consists in the gracious reckoning of God, by which the penitent sinner, on account of the most perfect obedience of another, *i. e.*, of Christ, apprehended by faith according to Gospel mercy, is pronounced righteous before the divine tribunal, '*just as if this obedience had been rendered by the man himself.*'" AP. CONF. (III, 184): "To be justified here signifies, according to forensic usage, to absolve a guilty man and pronounce him just, but on account of the righteousness of another, viz., of Christ, which righteousness of another is communicated to us by faith. . . . Because the righteousness of Christ is given to us through faith, faith is righteousness in us imputatively, *i. e.*, it is that by which we are caused to be accepted of God in consequence of the imputation and ordination of God." The expression: *the righteousness of Christ*, is explained as follows in the FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., III, 14): "The righteousness (of Christ), which is imputed before God out of pure grace to faith, or to believers, is *the obedience, passion, and resurrection of Christ*, by which He satisfied the Law for our sake and atoned for our sins." Synonymous with the expression: "the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us," is that other: "the merit or obedience of Christ is imputed to us." And also this one: "*faith is imputed to us for righteousness*," Rom. 4: 5, which is thus explained: "only in so far as it apprehends and applies to itself the righteousness of Christ." *The righteousness of faith*, then, "is nothing else than the forgiveness of sins, the gratuitous acceptance of the sinner solely on account of the obedience and most perfect merit of Christ alone." (Ib. 54.)

CHMN. (Loc. Th., 274) vindicates the doctrine of imputation, against the Papists, as follows: "There is an imputation which is based upon and has reference to a foundation in the person working, to whom the imputation is made, and this is done not as a matter of grace, but as a matter of debt. But there is another imputation, which neither has nor refers to a foundation, in view of nor by reason of which the imputation is made, but is based upon the grace and mercy of God, who justifies the wicked. And in this, that he says by this imputation the wicked man is justified, he shows that the foundation is altogether different in the believer to whom this imputation is gratuitous; to whom, namely, not

righteousness but guilt would be imputed, if God wished to enter into judgment. Paul, therefore, distinctly and clearly shows that he wishes this word, imputation, in the doctrine of justification, to be understood not in the former, but in the latter sense. And the same thing he also shows more fully and proves from David, who describes the blessedness of the man to whom God imputes righteousness without works. Therefore the foundation of this imputation, concerning which Paul speaks, is not in him to whom the imputation is made, for he says, 'without works.' And in Eph. 2: 8 he more expressly says: 'not of yourselves.' But he adds, that sins in this imputation are forgiven, that iniquities are covered, that crimes are not imputed. There is, thus, in those who believe, to whom this gratuitous imputation is made, an altogether different foundation, if God should wish to enter into judgment with them. The imputation of righteousness consists, therefore, in the grace and mercy of God, which, for the sake of Christ, cover up the inherent foundation, viz., sin, so that it may not be imputed, and impute to the believer, through grace, the foundation which is not in him, just as if the righteousness were inherent in that perfection which he owes. These three things, therefore, we now infer from the true premises which belong to the word imputation in this article: 1. There is no basis in believers, in view and by reason of which righteousness is imputed for happiness, not even in Abraham, although adorned by the Holy Spirit with distinguished gifts of renewal. 2. A very different basis is discovered, if God wish to enter into judgment, viz., sin, which is to be covered up, so as not to be imputed. 3. But that imputation is a referring act (*relatio*) of the divine mind and will, which, through gratuitous mercy for Christ's sake, does not impute their sins to believers, but imputes to them righteousness, *i. e.*, they are regarded before God, in His judgment, as if they possessed perfect inherent righteousness, and thus salvation and eternal life are bestowed upon them as if they were righteous. But what the fourth point is, which also belongs to imputation, and wherefore it is added, can be understood from what follows. When a judge, by his own referring act (*relatio*), imputes the sentence of righteousness to a guilty person without any foundation, this is an abomination (Prov. 17: 15; Ex. 23: 1; Deut. 25: 1; Is. 5: 23; 1 Chron. 8: 32). Some may reply, God is a perfectly free agent, and as such can justify whom He will and as He will. But God has revealed His will in the Law, and this cannot be broken. . . . Therefore, in accordance with that revealed will, God does not wish to justify any one without righteousness, *i. e.*, unless accord-

ing to the Law satisfaction has been made for sin, and the Law has been fulfilled by a perfect obedience. And Paul says, when faith is imputed for righteousness, the Law is not made void, but established; *i. e.*, to use the scholastic terminology, the act of the divine mind imputes to the believer the sentence of righteousness for eternal life, not without a basis. But that basis is not in believers. But God has offered to us His Son as Mediator, made under the Law, to which He rendered satisfaction both by bearing our sins and by perfect obedience. . . . Thus we will obtain a perfect referring act whose foundation is in obedience and redemption, in Christ Jesus our Lord. The referring act (*relatio*) is the grace and mercy of God; the object of it is the believer, to whom, on Christ's account, sins are not imputed, but who is through Christ accounted righteous before God unto eternal life, the righteousness of Christ being imputed to him." . . .

"This exposition explains the whole doctrine and refutes many cavils. . . . The Jesuits say, a referring act (*relatio*) without a foundation is an empty phantasm and an illusion, as if Crassus, burdened with debt, were saluted as rich. Such, they say, is imputative righteousness, which has no foundation inherent in ourselves. But these cavils are abundantly refuted by what we have already said. For we do not teach that God, through any levity, imputes righteousness to believers without any foundation; but we affirm, from the Word of God, that there needs to be ever so firm a foundation of gratuitous imputation—that the righteousness inherent even in Abraham and David could not be the foundation of that referring act (*relatio*) and imputation, but there was need that the Son of God should become incarnate. . . . The righteousness of faith is, therefore, not of the least but of the greatest reality, for Christ is our righteousness; nor is it an empty phantasm, for it is the result of the divine thought and judgment." In regard to the meaning of the word justification, Holl. further remarks (914): "Imputation, in the doctrine of justification, is not taken in a *physical sense*, so as to signify to insert, to implant, but in a *moral, judicial, and declarative sense*, so as to signify to adjudicate, to attribute, to ascribe, to transfer, confer, devolve upon another the effect of a voluntary act by one's own estimate and decision."

The reality of imputation Br. shows as follows (581): "It is called imputation, not *as an empty or imaginary transfer of the merit of one to another, destitute alike of a basis and fruit;* but because it is an act of the intellect and will of him who exercises the judgment, by which he adjudges that the merit of one, which is offered for

another, and is apprehended by the faith of him for whose benefit it has been offered, can be legitimately accepted as if it were his own merit, and is willing to receive it in such manner as if he had of himself offered it, whatever it is. Paul himself uses this argument in Rom. 4: 3–6." QUEN. (III, 525): "This imputation is most real, *whether respect is had to the righteousness which is imputed*, or to the *act of imputation*. The righteousness of Christ, or His obedience, active and passive, which is imputed to us, is most true and real; for it corresponds entirely to the mind and will of God expressed in the Law. The act of imputation, also, or the imputation itself, is real; because its measure is the infallible intellect of God. Whence God cannot repute or consider him just to whom true righteousness has not been appropriated; nor can there proceed from the divine will, the rule of all excellence, approbation of an imaginary or fictitious estimation or righteousness. They, therefore, to whom the righteousness of Christ is imputed, are truly righteous, though not *inherently*, or by inherence, but *imputatively*, and by an extrinsic designation at least they are such; for even from that which is external a true designation may be derived. It is, therefore, an idle question, whether, on account of that imputation, we are really righteous, or are merely considered righteous. For the judgment of God is according to truth. Wherefore, he is truly just who, in the judgment of God, is regarded as just."

[8] The Dogmaticians distinguish (QUEN., III, 517): "The *impulsive internal* cause of our justification, which is the purely gratuitous grace of God (Rom. 3: 24; 11: 6; Eph. 2: 8, 9; 2 Tim. 1: 9; Tit. 3: 4–6)," and the "*impulsive, external, and meritorious* cause, which is Christ the Mediator, by virtue of His active and passive obedience (Rom. 3: 24; 2 Cor. 5: 21)," (BR., 583). "The impulsive external cause does not annul the gratuitous favor of God, in the matter of justification, nor is it excluded from it; since, rather, the fact is due to divine grace, that God sent His Son to make satisfaction for us, so that we could be justified, and that He accepts this merit belonging to another as if it were our own." Whence it appears in what sense it is said that the ground of justification is exterior to man. MEL. (Loc. c. Th., I, 179): "If they duly consider these (alarms, that accompany true penitence), they would know that thoroughly terrified minds seek consolation outside of *themselves*, and this consolation is the confidence with which the will acquiesces in the promise of mercy, granted for the sake of the Mediator." QUEN. (III, 525): "This imputation has a most firm foundation, not in man, who is justi-

fied, but *without him*, namely, in God Himself, who imputes, and in Christ the Mediator, who earned the imputation by rendering satisfaction." The contrary doctrine is that of the Roman Catholic Church, which, by justification, understands, "*to make a righteous out of an unrighteous person.*" According to this doctrine, the ground of our salvation does not lie in the appropriation of the merit of Christ, but in our moral transformation. It is then said: "That, on account of which man is justified and constituted an heir of eternal life, is an infused habit of righteousness and love, or newness of life, or righteousness inherent in us, by which we observe the Law." (QUEN., III, 540.) When the Romanists use the phrase, "the righteousness of Christ," they employ it in a sense entirely different from that in which it is employed in the Lutheran Church; for, while in the latter the righteousness of Christ is understood to mean that righteousness which Christ, by obedience towards the Father, has secured *for us*, the Romanists understand by the phrase the moral perfection of Christ Himself, the righteousness inherent in Him. This, however, is carefully distinguished, by the Lutheran Dogmaticians, as *the essential*, from the other, the *habitual and meritorious* righteousness. Even the Lutheran divine, ANDREW OSIANDER, understood by the righteousness of Christ His essential righteousness, and thus confounded Justification and Sanctification, like the Romanists. He says in his CONF. ET DISP., A. D. 1549: "That the fulfilment of the Law, effected by Christ, and obedience and remission of sins, prepare for righteousness; but the righteousness by which we are accounted righteous before God, is the divine nature of Christ entering into us by faith, and abiding in us, or the essential and eternal righteousness of God, which, dwelling in us, enables us to act righteously." Hence the decision of the FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., III, 55): "As in our churches it is considered beyond controversy by the divines of the Augsburg Confession, that all our righteousness is to be sought outside of ourselves and apart from the merits and works, virtues and dignity of men, and that it exists alone in our Lord Jesus Christ, it is carefully to be considered in what way, in the matter of justification, Christ is said to be our righteousness. For our righteousness does not consist in His divine nature (Osiander), nor in His human nature (Stancarus), but in His entire person, for He, as God and man, in His entire and most perfect obedience, is our righteousness."

[9] HOLL. (903): "The receptive means, or that on the part of the sinner which receives Christ's merit, and the grace of God founded upon it, is faith." Faith is thus, indeed, considered a cause, but

an impulsive cause subordinate, or an *instrumental cause*, *organic* and *receptive;* only in the sense, however, that by faith the merit of Christ, justifying grace, etc., must be received, and by no means in the other, that in faith there is an effective cause of justification. This is contained already in the general statement of the APOL. (II, 53, German): "Wherefore, whenever we speak of *the faith that justifies*, or justifying faith, these three things always concur. First, *the divine promise;* second, *that this offers grace gratuitously, without merit;* third, *that the blood and merit of Christ constitute the treasure through which sin is paid for.* The promise is received through faith. The fact, moreover, that it offers grace without merit utterly excludes all our worthiness and merit, and exalts the great grace and mercy; and the merit of Christ is the treasure, for that must indeed be a treasure and noble security through which the sins of all the world are paid for." More specifically, FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., III, 13): "Faith does not justify because it is so good a work, so illustrious a virtue, but because it apprehends and embraces the merit of Christ in the promise of the Gospel." HOLL. (903): "Faith justifies not by itself, by its own dignity or value, by moving God to justify the believer, but because, as an instrument or receptive means, it lays hold of the merit of Christ, in view of which and without the least detriment to His justice, God, of His mere grace, is moved to pardon and consider righteous the penitent sinner believing in Christ. For the energy or internal power of justifying faith is the receiving of Christ, of the grace of God based upon Christ, pardoning sin, offered in the Gospel promise, together with the remission of sins dependent on this, John 1: 12; Rom. 5: 17; Gal. 3: 14; Acts 10: 43. Faith receives the effects of Christ's satisfaction, the remission of sins. From these sacred oracles we gather that faith is the receptive means by which the satisfaction of Christ, and the grace of God obtained by it, are received." QUEN. (III, 518) distinguishes, therefore, "between the *causality of faith, which consists in apprehending and receiving*, which is nothing else than an organic and instrumental one, and the *ground of that causality, or justifying power*, which pertains to faith not in itself and in its own nature, or in so far as it is an act of apprehension. It might appropriate its own merits, or imaginary merits, or human righteousness, and yet it would not in this way justify. Justifying power does not pertain to it from the generous estimation or acceptance upon the part of God, as if God considered faith of so much value as to impart to it the dignity and power of justifying; but solely on account of the justifying object apprehended, or on account of the object, viz., so far as it apprehends

the merit of Christ. Paul expressly mentions this, Rom. 3: 25, to wit, that the entire justifying power of faith depends on the object apprehended. As, for example, when the hand of a hungry person takes the offered bread, that taking, as such, does not satisfy the man, for he might receive clay, or a stone, or other things, which could not satisfy him; but the entire satisfaction depends on the object apprehended and eaten, namely, the bread. So the man hungering for righteousness, Matt. 5: 6, apprehends indeed by faith, or with the beggar's hand, the bread that comes from heaven, John 6: 50, 51. Yet the apprehending, as such, does not drive away spiritual hunger; but the entire effect of the apprehension depends upon the object apprehended by faith, that is, the redemption and the blood of Jesus Christ."

[10] Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., III, 32): "It is properly said that believers, who are justified by faith in Christ, in this life at first obtain indeed an *imputed righteousness of faith*, but then also they have an *incipient righteousness of new obedience* or of good works. But these two things are not to be confounded or intermingled in the doctrine of justification by faith in the sight of God." Chmn. (Ex. c. Trid., I, 233): "It is certain that the blessing bestowed through the Son of God is twofold, namely, *forgiveness of sins* and *renovation*, in which the Holy Spirit enkindles new virtues in believers. For Christ by His passion merited for us not only the remission of sins, but, in addition, this also, that, on account of His merit, the Holy Spirit is given to us that we may be renewed in the spirit of our mind. These benefits of the Son of God we say are so united, that *when we are reconciled, at the same time the spirit of renovation is also given us.* But we do not on this account confound them, but distinguish them, so as to give to each its place, order, and character; as we have learned from the Scriptures, that reconciliation or remission of sins goes before, and that the beginning of love or of new obedience follows, and especially that faith concludes that it has a reconciled God and the forgiveness of sins, not on account of the subsequent and commenced renovation, but on account of the Son of God, the Mediator."

[11] Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., III., 27): "It is necessary that a person should be righteous before he can perform good works." Ap. Conf. (II, 36): "It is very foolishly asserted by adversaries, that men, deserving of eternal wrath, merit the pardon of sin by an act of love which they put forth, since it is impossible to love God unless beforehand the pardon of sins has been apprehended by faith. For the heart truly perceiving God to be angry, cannot love Him unless He is shown to be appeased; human nature cannot

raise itself to the love of an angry, condemning and punishing God, while He terrifies and seems to cast us into eternal death. It is easy for the indolent to fancy these dreams of love, that one guilty of mortal sin can love God above all things, because they do not perceive what the anger or judgment of God is; but, in the agony and stings of conscience, the conscience itself perceives the vanity of these philosophical speculations."

[12] CHMN. (Ex. c. Trid., I, 234): "This is the principal question, this the point, this the matter to be decided: what that is, on account of which God receives the sinner into favor; what can and ought to be opposed to the judgment of God, that we may not be condemned according to the rigid sentence of the Law; what faith ought to seize and present, on what to depend, when it desires to treat with God that it may be pardoned; what should intervene for which God may become appeased and propitious to the sinner who has merited wrath and eternal damnation; what conscience should determine that to be, on account of which adoption is granted us, which affords a sure ground of confidence that we shall be received to eternal life; whether it be the satisfaction, obedience, and merit of the Son of God, the Mediator, or the renovation commenced in us, love, and the other virtues."

[13] MEL. (I, 192): "As it is of much importance that this exclusive particle (*gratis*) should be properly understood, I will explain the four reasons on account of which it is necessary to retain and defend it: (1) That due honor be ascribed to Christ; (2) that conscience may retain a sure and firm consolation (if this exclusive particle be ignored, doubt is strengthened, to wit, if you suppose that there is no pardon unless you have a contrition or a love sufficiently worthy, doubt will adhere, which produces at one time contempt of God, at another hatred and despair); (3) that true prayer may be offered; (4) that the difference between the Law and the Gospel may be seen."

[14] FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., III, 36): "Paul means this when he urges with so much diligence and zeal, in the matter of justification by faith, the exclusive particles by which works are excluded from it, such as these: 'without works,' 'without the law,' 'without merit,' 'by grace alone,' 'gratis,' 'not of works.' But all these exclusives are embraced in these words, when we teach, '*we are justified before God, and saved, by faith alone.*' For in this way our works are excluded, not indeed in the sense that true faith can exist without contrition, or as if good works did not necessarily follow true faith (as its most certain fruits), or as if believers in Christ ought not to perform them; but *works are excluded from the*

doctrine of justification before God, lest they may be introduced and mixed in the matter of the justification of the sinner before God, as if necessary and absolutely pertaining to it. This is the true meaning of the exclusive particles in the doctrine of justification, which must be firmly and sedulously retained and urged in its discussion." CHMN. (Loc. Th., II, 283): "Should the inquiry be made why we contend so strenuously for the particle '*alone*,' and are not rather contented with those exclusive particles which are contained in the Scriptures (the terms '*by grace, freely, without works, imputation*'), the reasons are weighty and true. For as the Church, in all its periods, has used freely some modes of speaking that things might be most plainly propounded, explained, defended, and retained against the various artifices of enemies; so, in the article of justification, we give a prominent place to the exclusive particles of Paul. If it be asked for what purpose and on what account we have adopted and desire to retain the particle '*alone*' we answer, the reasons are true and weighty. *This particle 'alone' embraces at once, and that very significantly, all the exclusive particles which the Scriptures use.*"

In order to specify very particularly the sense in which the phrase, "*we are justified by faith alone*," is used, and to guard against misunderstandings, the Dogmaticians append a number of explanations, from which we select the following. QUEN. (III, 552 sq.): "(1) We do not here speak of that energy (*ἐνεργεία*) of faith, or of that operation of justifying faith, which manifests itself in various acts of virtues, as love, hope, etc.; but of the operation which is peculiar to it, *native* and *singular*, and is entirely incommunicable to all other moral excellencies, namely, the apprehension and application of the merit of Christ. (2) The exclusive particle '*alone*' *does not exclude different kinds of causes, but subordinates them.* For it is not opposed (*a*) to the grace of God, the principal efficient cause of justification; (*b*) nor to the merit of Christ; (*c*) nor to the Word and Sacraments, which are the instrumental causes of our justification, on the part of God offering and granting; *but* (*d*) *to our works*, for it is they that are excluded by this proposition, so that the proposition, faith alone justifies, is equivalent to this, faith without works justifies. (3) Distinguish between the exclusion of works with respect to their actual presence, and with respect to the communication of efficiency. Works are excluded not from being present, but from the communication of efficiency; not that they are not present to faith and the justified, but that they have no energy or causation in connection with faith in the justification of man. (4) Distinguish between faith considered *in*

respect to justification itself (and then it is only the instrument apprehending the merit of Christ, and it alone justifies) and considered *in the person justified*, or after justification (and thus it is never alone, but always attended with other graces, and, indeed, the root and beginning of them all). (5) Distinguish between faith alone and a *solitary* faith. Faith alone justifies; that is, it is the only organ by which we lay hold of the righteousness of Christ and apply it to ourselves. But it never exists alone, nor is solitary, that is, detached and separated from the other virtues; because true faith is always living, not dead, and therefore it has good works present with itself as its proper effect."

[15] The most correct and common expression is, "*we are justified by faith;* that is, *through faith.*" Synonymous in import are the expressions, "we are justified by grace, by the merit, by the obedience of Christ." (Comp. Form. Conc., Sol. Dec., III, 9 and 12.) If the expression be used, "faith alone justifies," to avoid all misunderstanding, this is explained as follows. Musæus (in Holl.): "When it is said concerning faith, in the nominative case, that it justifies, the language seems to be figurative. The meaning is not that faith absolves a man from sins and accounts him righteous; but faith is said to justify, because God, in view of it, regards us righteous, or because faith (not by its own, but by the worth of Christ's merit) moves God to justify us." Holl. (ib.). "Osiander justly remarks: 'If we wish to speak accurately and according to Scripture, it must be said that God alone justifies (for it is an act of God alone), but by faith man is justified.' For faith of itself does not justify, because it is merely apprehensive. The mode of speaking, because it has become so common to say, faith alone justifies, can be retained, if the phrase be properly explained in accordance with Scripture usage."

[16] Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., III, 6): "This article in regard to the righteousness of faith is the chief one in the entire Christian doctrine, without which distressed consciences can have no true and firm consolation, or rightly appreciate the riches of Christ's grace. This is also confirmed by the testimony of Luther, when he says, if this one article remains uncorrupted the Christian Church will remain uncorrupted, in harmony, and without party divisions; but if it is corrupted, it is impossible successfully to oppose a single error or a fanatical spirit."

Chmn. (Loc. Th., II, 216): "This one point mainly distinguishes the Church from all nations and superstitions, as Augustine says: 'The Church distinguishes the just from the unjust, not by the law of works but by the law of faith.' Yea, this article is, as

it were, the citadel and chief bulwark of the entire Christian doctrine and religion, which being either obscured, or adulterated, or subverted, it is impossible to retain the purity of the doctrine in other points. But, this doctrine remaining untouched, all idolatries, superstitions, and perversions in all the other doctrines destroy themselves."

[17] The later theologians add further: "The effects and properties of justification." As *effects*, QUEN. (III, 526) enumerates: "(1) our mystical union with God, John 15: 4–6, 14, 23; Gal. 2: 19, 20; 3: 27; Eph. 3: 17; (2) adoption as sons of God, John 1: 12; Rom. 8: 14; (3) peace of conscience, Rom. 5: 1; (4) certain hearing of prayer, Rom. 8: 32; James 1: 5–7; (5) sanctification, Rom. 6: 12; (6) eternal salvation, Rom. 4: 7, 8." As *properties:* (1) *Immediate efficacy*, for it is not gradual and successive, as renovation, but in a moment, an instant, simultaneously and at once. (2) *Perfection*, because all sins are perfectly pardoned, so that there is need of no satisfaction of our own, 1 John 1: 7; Rom. 8: 1; Heb. 10: 14. (3) *Identity* in the *mode of justification*, in respect to all that are to be saved. A common salvation of all presupposes a common faith and a common and the same mode of justification. Acts 4: 12; 15: 11; Rom. 3: 22–26. (4) *Assurance* in us, not conjectural, but infallible and divine. Rom. 8: 25, 38, 39; 5: 1, 2; Eph. 3: 12; 1 John 3: 14. (5) *Growth*, not as to the act, which is instantaneous, but in regard to faith and the consciousness of justification. 2 Cor. 10: 15; Col. 1: 10; 2 Pet. 3: 18; Eph. 4: 14, 15; (6) *Constant continuance.* For as the forgiveness of sins, so also our justification is renewed daily, and not only in the first beginning, but faith daily is imputed to the believer for righteousness, and thus our justification is continuous, Rev. 22: 11; (7) *Amissibility*, Ez. 18: 24; Heb. 6: 5, 6; John 15: 2; (8) *Recoverableness*, John 6: 37; Rom. 5: 20. The prodigal son is an example, Luke 15."

§ 43. *Concomitants and Consequences of Justifying Faith.*

Having discussed *faith* as the means by which we partake of salvation, and *justification* as the effect of faith, there remain to be described the internal conditions and the moral change which occur in man at the same time with and after justification. But these, however, are also operations of the Holy Ghost. Agreeably to the order in which the Holy Spirit produces them [1] we enumerate: 1. *The Call;* 2. *Illumination;* 3. *Regeneration and Conversion;* 4. *Mystical Union;* 5. *Renovation.*

§ 44. (1.) *Vocation.*

"The *Call* is the act of grace by which the Holy Spirit manifests by means of the Word of God His will in regard to the salvation of sinners to those persons who are out of the Church, and offers them benefits from Christ the Redeemer, that they may be led to the Church, converted, and obtain eternal salvation." Holl. (803). [2] The grace of God, through which He desires to effect man's salvation, begins with the *Call*, for God must present salvation to man, since uncalled, man would not even desire it. It is distinguished as *indirect* and *direct*, or, what is here equivalent, as *general* and *special*. [3] By the former is understood the call which reaches man through conscience and the natural knowledge of God, and thus awakens only in general an undefined longing for salvation, which is yet unknown to him; by the latter, the call which comes through the preaching of the Gospel, and directly invites to entrance into the kingdom of God, to conversion, and to the reception of salvation in Christ. It is only the latter which is here discussed. It is not merely an external call, but is invariably accompanied by the influences of the Holy Spirit, of such a kind that the person so called cannot fail to perceive the drawing of the Holy Spirit, and that his conscience testifies that he has great reason to follow this call; it is, therefore, at once as seriously intended as it is always efficacious. [4] As, in the preaching of the Gospel, the only possibility is afforded, by which man can obtain salvation through Jesus Christ (the instrumental cause is the external preaching of the Word. Rom. 10: 17; 2 Thess. 2: 14), [5] God makes use of this as the means through which He sends the call to men; and, according as He calls them through men whom He appoints and urges to do this, [6] or immediately, and without their instrumentality, the call is designated as *mediate* or *immediate*, and consequently as *ordinary* or *extraordinary*. [7] Only in extraordinary cases, however, does God call otherwise than through human instrumentality. The reason of God's calling is to be found altogether and only in His pity for the wretchedness in which men lie so long as they do not partake of the salvation of Christ. [8] Therefore, as all men are in the same condemnation,

this call is addressed to all without distinction, and is therefore *universal;* and this (*a*) *on account of the purpose of God,* who earnestly wishes that all men should come to the knowledge of the truth, 1 Tim. 2: 4 ; 2 Pet. 3: 9 ; (*b*) *on account of the command of Christ,* Matt. 11: 28 ; (*c*) *on account of the message itself,* for all men in the whole world have been called, Mark 16: 20 ; Rom. 10: 18. The universality of the call consists, however, not in that God has called all individuals in the different ages of the world ; but in that He provides that the preaching through which the call is to be extended to men, could, in general, in some way reach all nations, and thus also all individuals. [9]

The call is, therefore, extended equally to all men, inasmuch as saving grace is offered to all men through the same means. But an inequality occurs in regard to the order, the manner, and the time of the call : to some it comes earlier than to others ; for some it continues longer than for others ; some receive the preaching of the Gospel immediately from heralds sent by God, while others receive it at third hand. [10]

The proof that the call has reached all nations and all individuals it is not indeed easy for us to produce, but from history and revelation we know the following : First, that there were three times in which God caused the news of salvation to be solemnly proclaimed in such a manner that thereby, upon each occasion, opportunity was given to all then living to hear it ; whereby, at the same time, it became possible for them to hand down these glad tidings to all their posterity. These periods were, the days of Adam, of Noah, and of the Apostles. [11]

If then, in the course of time, some people be found who are entirely ignorant of the preaching of the Gospel, this does not militate against the *universality of the call,* but arises from this, that these people did not faithfully preserve the truth preached to them or did not lay it to heart, in consequence of which their posterity have to suffer. It is through their guilt that the *call* which God designed to be *universal* became *particular.* [12]

Moreover, we know that God did not limit His solemn call to the three occasions we have cited, but that He also adopted all kinds of expedients whereby the call afterwards could reach nations and individuals. [13] Why God, however, caused

the call to be more directly addressed to some nations than to others is indeed unknown to us; for the purposes and ways of God are confessedly unfathomable. But this cannot confuse us in regard to the doctrine that God's purpose in the call was universal; for this purpose is most clearly declared in Scripture. [14]

[1] Holl. (795): "The acts of applying grace, according to the order in which they cohere, and follow one another, are the call, illumination, conversion, regeneration, justification, mystical union with the Triune God, renovation, preservation of faith and holiness, glorification." Thus they are enumerated by nearly all the later Dogmaticians. Justification, which we have already discussed, we now omit. Holl. (ib.) thus vindicates this arrangement: "This order, and, as it were, concatenated series of acts of applying grace, we learn from Acts 20: 17, where Christ says to Paul, 'I send thee to the Gentiles;' behold the grace of the call! 'That thou mayest open their eyes;' behold the illumination! 'To turn them from darkness to light;' behold the act of conversion! 'And from the power of Satan unto God;' behold regeneration itself, through which we become the sons of God! 'That they may receive forgiveness of sins;' behold justification! 'And have inheritance among them which are sanctified through faith in me;' behold union with Christ by faith, sanctification, the preservation of holiness, and glorification!" In the Symb. Books the same order is indicated (as also now and then by the Dogmaticians of the period next following their preparation), but only in passing, viz., in the Small Catech., Art. 3, and Form. Conc., Sol. Dec., II, 50. The "three ways of the Mystics" are rejected, according to which "he who is called to the Church can expeditiously reach the sacred mount of perfection and deification by three ways: the purifying, the illuminating, and the uniting." The reason for this rejection: "because neither are these arranged in proper order, nor do the men who pursue them certainly reach the goal fixed by the Mystics."

[2] Quen.'s extended definition (III, 466): "Calling is the act of the applying grace of the Holy Spirit, by which He manifests towards the whole race of fallen man the most gracious will of God through the external preaching of the Word, in itself always sufficient and effective, and offers to all men the benefits obtained through the merit of the Redeemer, with the serious intention that all may be saved by Christ, and be presented with eternal life."

[3] In the former manner Kg. and Quen. distinguish; in the

latter, Holl. Quen. (III, 461): "*Taken widely, it includes likewise the indirect call*, which arises from the consideration of the universe, its government, and the divine beneficence towards creatures, Rom. 1: 19, 20; 2: 14, 15; Acts 17: 27; likewise by the general and obscure rumor concerning a certain assembly in which it is said the true God is known and worshiped, 1 Kings 10: 1; 2 Kings 5: 2, 3; 1 Thess. 1: 8. The methods of vocation just enumerated are rather invitations and incitements to inquire about the true worship of God and the assembly in which it flourishes, than the call properly so called; the reason is, they have not for their proximate and immediate end the eternal salvation of man or the knowledge of Christ, the Redeemer, and the mysteries necessary for the attainment of eternal salvation, but only the leading of man to the gate of the true Church."

The term is *strictly* taken, as it signifies the *direct* call by which God calls men to faith and repentance, by means of the Word read or preached, and offers to them the grace of conversion by which they may be converted and partake of salvation.

Holl. (803): "A *general* and *pedagogical* call to the Church is that by which God more obscurely and from afar invites sinners who are out of the Church to inquire in regard to the true worship of God and the assembly in which it flourishes, and leads them to the gate of the Church. The general call occurs: (*a*) Objectively, by the manifestation of the government and the divine beneficence toward creatures; (*b*) Efficaciously, by the efficacious divine influence and impulse, by which, both from theoretic and practical innate notions, and from proofs of the divine benignity, practical conclusions are produced in the minds of unbelievers to inquire, although in an unequal degree, concerning the true worship of God; (*c*) Cumulatively, through the rumor concerning the Church spread over the world."

[4] Quen. (III, 463): "The form of the call consists in a serious (Matt. 23: 37) and by the divine intention always sufficient (Rom. 8: 30) and always efficacious (Rom. 1: 16) manifestation of the will of God and offer of the blessings procured by Christ." (Id. 464): "No call of God, whether of itself and its intrinsic quality or of the intention of God, is inefficacious, so that it cannot and should not produce a salutary effect; but every call is efficacious (for the preached Word of God has a divine and sufficient power and efficacy to effect regeneration, conversion, etc., by the ordination and appointment of God Himself), although it may be prevented from attaining its effect by *men presenting an obstacle, and thus becomes inefficacious by the fault of the wicked and perverse will of*

men." The distinction made by the Calvinists between an external and an internal call is therefore rejected. QUEN. (III, 466): "The Calvinists make a distinction between an external and internal call, and exhibit both: (*a*) In reference to their origin: because the former is made through the ministry of the Word offered to all or some externally, the other by the Holy Spirit illuminating and guiding within the hearts of the elect. (*b*) In reference to their subjects: because the former is common to the elect and the reprobate, the other peculiar to the elect, so that the reprobate never partake of it. (*c*) In reference to the efficacy: because the latter, alone being efficacious and irresistible, not only enlightens the mind, but also bends the will, and never, when it once takes possession of the mind, can be abolished or extinguished; but the former without this would be useless and ineffectual to salvation. We admit the distinction, but not so as to oppose the external to the internal call, nor to separate one from the other, as the external call is the medium and instrument of the internal, and by this God works efficaciously in the hearts of men. If the external did not exactly correspond to the internal call, if a person might be called externally and not internally, it would be vain, fallacious, illusory."

[5] In regard to the call which comes to men by the preaching of the Gospel and by that of the Law, HOLL. (807): "God calls poor sinners directly and savingly to the Church by the Gospel (2 Thess. 2: 14), to which also Baptism pertains (John 3: 5). Nevertheless the divine Law contributes something to the call of sinners, but only indirectly, negatively, and accidentally."

AP. CONF. (V, 51): "God terrifies by the Law, that there may be place for consolation and vivification, because hearts secure and not perceiving the wrath of God despise consolation."

[6] QUEN. (III, 463): "The ministerial cause is either the ordinary minister of the Word, Matt. 22: 3, or whenever any other person out of the usual order, with whatever intention, shall have announced the Word, 2 Kings 5: 7."

[7] QUEN. (III, 462): "The *mediate* call is that by which God in the Old Testament called some by the ministry of angels, or men, and now, since the institution of the Gospel ministry, calls by men alone. We use the term *immediate*, not with reference to the medium or Word, without which no salutary call can take place, but in reference to men, because God Himself presented the Word without human assistance. Thus Gen. 12: 1; Acts 9: 3: 4."

"*Ordinary* vocation is that which is accomplished by the divinely appointed means, that is, by the external and visible ministry of the Word. *Extraordinary* is when any one is called to the light of

the Gospel, not by the ordinary ministry, but by miracles, trances and other extraordinary means. Thus the Magi, Matt. 2: 1; the robber, Luke 23: 42. The extraordinary call is special and very rare: formerly, indeed, under the Old Testament and in the commencement of the New, it occurred; but now, since the Gospel has been universally preached and the Church planted by the apostles, it has clearly ceased. Further, a distinction is made between the *solemn* call, which occurs through the preached Word, and the *less solemn*, which occurs through the read Word or that which may be read."

[8] Quen. (III, 463): "The impelling and moving *internal* cause is nothing but the mercy and goodness of God founded in the merit of Christ, 2 Tim. 1: 9; the *external* is the utter misery of man." Holl. (806): "Human wretchedness is not the cause of God's gracious call, but it gave occasion to His commiseration."

[9] Holl. (809): "When we say that the call to God's kingdom is universal, we do not assert that the doctrine of the Gospel was actually announced to each and every man openly and immediately by ministers specially sent; but that God most merciful has so clearly made known the doctrine of the Gospel concerning obtaining salvation by faith in Christ, that all men, without exception, can arrive at the knowledge of it, so that God has not by a divine decree denied to any nation or any person the benefit of the doctrine or the way by which he may attain to its knowledge."

[10] Holl. (816): "Ordinary calling is *equal* in substance, or so far as it is essentially considered (because we are called by grace equally salutary; because the same powers of believing are offered to all; because we are called by the same means, by the same Gospel, by the same baptism of equal efficacy, if you regard the divine purpose); but it is *unequal* in regard to order, mode, degree, time, and interval. *As to the order*, the Gospel was first to be preached to the Jews and afterwards to the Gentiles, Acts 13: 46. *As to the mode and degree*, some have received more, others less light. Some nations are called by the Word solemnly preached, others by the Word written and read, others by the diffused rumors of the Church, of which some are nearer and clearer and others more remote and obscure. *In regard to time and interval*, some nations are called earlier, others later. To some the light of the Gospel shone for a longer time, to others it became obscure after a few years. Inasmuch as we cannot, in this present mortal state, entirely fathom this accidental inequality, let us acquiesce in God's dispensation of the means of salvation; let us acknowledge and admire, but not anxiously explore, the abyss of the divine judgments inscrutable to human minds. Rom. 11: 33."

[11] Hutt. (Loc. Com., 788): "God has revealed His Word at least three times to the whole world. First, after the creation of the world, in the Adamitic Church. Then, after the deluge, in the house and family of Noah. Then, after the ascension of Christ to heaven, in the departure and dispersion of the apostles into the whole world. (Concerning the apostolic age it was said: 'Where the Apostolate does not come, the Epistle does.'—*quo non venit ἀποστολή, eo ἐπιστολή.* Rom. 10: 18.) Here doubtless it became altogether easy that the Word of divine grace should be always retained by their posterity, and, what could just as well happen, be similarly propagated to others." N. B.—Very properly, the Dogmaticians do not date the call from the time of the New Testament revelation, since the antecedent revelations have the same end in view, and together constitute but one revelation; wherefore, also, when they designate the Church as the *terminus vocationis ad quem*, *i. e.*, the place to which we are called, they understand this in the widest sense, embracing Israel, also, as belonging to it.

[12] Grh. (IV, 188): "The call is universal, as to God who issues it, but it becomes special through the fault of man: First, inasmuch as some reject it with Epicurean contempt; some also persecuting and violently repelling it. Then, inasmuch as, by the fault of ancestors, the lost Word is not always in fact preached in all nations and places." Holl. (810): "That the Gentiles were formerly, and many nations now are, destitute of the preaching of the Gospel, is their own fault, not the will and plan of God, denying them arbitrarily the light of the Gospel. For, (1) Those nations despise the Word of God and maliciously reject it: (2) They neglect the call and knowledge of Christian doctrines and rites in general, *known by report to all the world;* (3) They do not apply to a proper use the instructive and effective call, viz., so as to inquire after the true worship of God and the assembly in which it prevails. For which reason they deprive themselves, by their own faults, of the salutary call which is made by the preaching of the Gospel." To the objection, the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, Hutt. (789) replies: "The meaning of our thesis is this, that the descendants suffer on account of the fault of their parents in this, that they are born without the Church; but not that, on account of the ingratitude of their parents, all power of hearing the divine Word, or even salvation itself, is cut off from or denied to them. The former we assert, the latter we deny. The former is merely a temporal punishment, which still does not exclude or prevent them from coming to the Church and hearing the Word of God, although born without the Church. . . . For now, just as formerly, God

has placed the Church in a prominent position, so that the tidings concerning God and the religion of Christians diffuse themselves among all nations and people that are under heaven. But now, because those people partly cling contumaciously to the idolatrous folly of their parents and ancestors, and partly ridicule the true worship of God, and treat it with contempt, they surely do not now bear the sins of their parents, but are to be regarded as perishing and being condemned by the just judgment of God for their own fault."

And Grh. (IV, 190): "If the case of Gentile children be adduced, the answer to this and similar things is: The judgments of God may be hidden; they can never be unjust. Many things pertaining to this head of doctrine are beyond our reach by the light of nature and of grace, which we will at some time understand better by the light of glory. These children not only derive a taint of corruption from their parents, but likewise spring from such ancestors as were intrusted with the precious deposit of His Word, that was to be handed down to their descendants, and of the Sacraments, by which also their children might be received to the grace of God. Let them accuse, therefore, the sins of parents, not the justice and mercy of God. Nor do we improperly require that such objectors should satisfy us that these children, if they had attained maturity, would have received the proffered grace of God, and not rather have imitated the sins of their parents."

[13] Hutt. (Loc. Com., 789): "So foul was the ingratitude of the greater portion in this matter (at the time of the preaching in those three great periods), that it cast away that treasure, as well to its own loss, as what is worse, by its own fault. But nevertheless, in the midst of this stupendous ingratitude of the world and contempt of the Word, God still wished that the rays of His mercy should shine forth in this, that the Church of God (or the people who for the time being carefully cherished the incomparable treasure of the divine Word) was always assigned a prominent place in the world, so that any nation or people, if not extremely unconcerned, could readily be acquainted with the preaching of the divine Word. As indeed, even to-day, the Christian religion cannot but be sufficiently accessible to Jews and Turks, as those who are everywhere living in the midst of Christians, unless they themselves prevent it by extreme obstinacy." Holl. (810): "Although, except in most recent times, the universal, stated and actual preaching of the divine Word, did not always and everywhere extend to all nations; yet God did not altogether withhold the universal call from any nation, nor refuse to any man access to the Church. For God calls many nations, (*a*) by a less formal

call; (*b*) through the tidings concerning the Church, diffused far and wide; (*c*) through the proofs of the divine goodness everywhere obvious in the kingdom of nature; (*d*) through an effective divine impulse, by which practical inferences are suggested and consciences are stimulated to inquire concerning the true worship of God and the assembly in which it flourishes."

[14] QUEN. (III, 465): "That God bestows the light of the Gospel upon one nation, while another is neglected; that some Turks, Americans, and other barbarians are converted to the faith, others who are their equals are left in their unbelief — this must also be ascribed to the hidden and unsearchable judgment of God. It must be acknowledged that God does some things in regard to the order, mode, time, and degree of the call according to His sovereign pleasure." But GRH. (IV, 191): "But let us admit, that in these and similar special cases, we cannot find out and explain exactly the causes of the divine counsels; nevertheless we must by no means have recourse to the absolute decree of reprobation, but *adhere firmly to those asserted general statements*, 1 Tim. 2:4; Ez. 33:11."

The Symbolical Books abide by the simple statement: "That not only the preaching of repentance, but likewise the promise of the Gospel is universal, that is, it pertains to all men" (FORM. CONC., II, 28), and that the call is effected by the Word, without investigating further special cases which occur, and which present a seeming contradiction to the doctrine of the universality of the call."

§ 45. (2.) *Illumination.**

As, to the natural man, everything spiritual is foolishness, and he cannot perceive it, but, on the other hand, many prejudices and doubts prevent him from rightly understanding that which is spiritual, the call would be fruitless, if the Holy Spirit did not so operate that the Gospel should appear in its true light and significance to man. [1]

On this account the further operation of the Holy Spirit aims at the removal of this folly of the natural man, at displacing his doubts and prejudices, and furnishing him correct knowledge and comprehension of the substance and meaning of the Gospel. The aim, therefore, here is not only an exter-

* HOLLAZIUS alone discussed Illumination at length under a separate head; and the reason of this no doubt was, that the questions here treated of acquired a special importance just at that time, partly in opposition to Mysticism, and partly to Pietism, which was then making its appearance. Earlier Dogmaticians either have no separate *locus* for illumination, or they treat of it very briefly, as CALOVIUS, who places it among the features of the call.

nal knowledge of the plan of salvation, but an internal knowledge; [2] the opening of man's mind for the due appreciation of the Gospel, the removal of all hindrances, which might conceal from him God's gracious plan of salvation, and that it may become internally clear to him how miserable is his sinful condition, as shown in the Scriptures, and what a remedy and comfort have been afforded for it in the grace which is in Christ Jesus. [3]

The Holy Spirit having brought about such a result, everything is done on the part of God, and it remains for the will of man to determine whether this salvation is to be received. [4] This is the effect which the Holy Spirit designs to produce by *illumination*. "Illumination is the act of applying grace, by which the Holy Spirit, through the ministry of the Word, teaches a man who is a sinner and called to the Church, and continues to instruct him in an ever-increasing measure, with the earnest purpose to remove the darkness of ignorance and error, and imbue him with the knowledge of the Word of God, by instilling from the Law the conviction of sin, and from the Gospel the apprehension of divine mercy, founded upon the merit of Christ." [5] Holl. (819). Illumination is, accordingly, more immediately an operation of the Holy Spirit upon the intellect of man; He addresses Himself however in this act at least mediately to the will, in as far as this illumination is designed, by the conviction of the misery of sin which it produces, and by presenting the grace of God, to conduct to conversion and the sanctification of the will. [6] It takes place in every man who lays to heart the call of the Holy Spirit, and opens his ear and heart, but not without this, as the Holy Spirit never works by constraint and never when man resists; [7] and He never comes to men except through the divine Word, [8] of which its ministers are the vehicle, [9] and which those who desire to be illuminated must permit to work in them in prayer and religious meditation. [10]

As the Word of God is divided into Law and Gospel, so can illumination, as it is effected by the one or the other, be distinguished as *legal* or *evangelical;* and, according to the diverse missions intrusted to the Law and the Gospel respectively, the former will reveal to man only his sins and the wrath of God

consequent upon them, and the other grace in Christ; [11] and the effect will be different in these respects, that the one will cause only terror and the other comfort in view of the proffered salvation. Hence, it is only the influence proceeding from the Gospel that is really efficient in securing salvation, while that proceeding from the Law is rather preparatory to the former. [12]

Like all other knowledge, that produced by the Holy Spirit is not instantaneous, but gradual, as may be seen from this, that the knowledge here spoken of consists of various particulars, which follow one another in natural order. [13] And as, in the order of nature, external precedes internal knowledge, so here the Holy Spirit produces an external, which is preparatory to the internal knowledge, and then produces the internal; so that there may be further a distinction between a *literal and pedagogic illumination*, and one that is *spiritual and entirely saving*. [14] But as man attains the one as well as the other kind of knowledge only upon proper conduct on his part in reference to the grace ministered to him, the operation of the Holy Spirit, if the will of man do not proceed further, may also be restricted to the first; or, the operations of the Spirit may be restricted to the intellect, and not extend to the will of man as they should, [15] in which case the object of the Holy Spirit is not entirely accomplished in man, and the illumination is not perfect; [16] yet it still cannot be denied, that this first stage of illumination is effected by the Holy Spirit. [17]

[1] Holl. (850): "In an unilluminated man there is not merely a negative ignorance, but also an ignorance of depraved inclination, which is error contrary to true knowledge, because the natural man not only does not receive the things of the Spirit of God, but they are foolishness unto him, 1 Cor. 2: 14. Therefore, not only mere ignorance, but likewise carnal-mindedness (Rom. 8: 6) and the wisdom of this world (1 Cor. 1: 20), are opposed to a saving knowledge. The world has its wisdom, but it is immersed in the darkness of arrogance, so as to array itself against the wisdom of God, 2 Cor. 10: 5."

[2] Holl. (819): "An *objective* illumination is not intended here, presenting externally the light of the divine Word, but an *effective* one, in which the Holy Spirit enkindles the light of knowl-

edge, and *subjective* illumination, in which the blind sinner permits himself to be enlightened by the operation of the Holy Spirit. (Id. 851.) When we represent illumination as the impartation of knowledge, we do not mean merely *external*, which is produced by the tongue or pen of the minister of the Church, but likewise *internal*, by which the Holy Spirit, by His own special and gracious concurrence, enkindles the light of supernatural wisdom, through the divine Word preached or read, in the hearts of hearers or readers who do not maliciously oppose it."

[3] Holl. (850): "Blindness of the intellect, filled with the darkness of ignorance and error (Eph. 4: 18), is *the starting-point of illumination*. The light of saving knowledge is its goal. By the Law is the knowledge of sin, Rom. 3: 20. The knowledge of the glorious grace of God, unveiled in the face of Jesus Christ, proceeds from the Gospel, 2 Cor. 4: 6. Assent attends this knowledge, by which man enlightened regards as sure and beyond doubt all that is revealed in the Word of God, particularly the Gospel message concerning the remission of sins and the eternal salvation to be secured through Christ; which undoubting assent is called ἔλεγχος, conviction of the intellect, Heb. 11: 1."

[4] Holl. (820): "The first and principal design of illumination is to prepare man for conversion. For thus the natural darkness, the ignorance of the mysteries, and the errors opposed to them, are expelled by grace from the mind of man, and he is imbued with a knowledge of God and of sacred things, and illuminated, as if by a light, so that he is prepared to receive justifying grace. This illuminating grace, therefore, precedes the completion of conversion."

[5] Holl. (850): "Divine illumination consists formally in the instruction of the Holy Spirit by means of the read or preached Word, not merely external, but likewise internal, and penetrating efficaciously the inmost recesses of the human heart, so that the darkness of ignorance and error is expelled, and the light of supernatural knowledge is infused into it." Id. (819): "Enlightening grace is called *teaching grace*, because the Holy Spirit, in enlightening, teaches all things necessary to salvation, John 14: 26; likewise *anointing grace*, from 1 John 2: 20, 27; opening of the eyes of the mind, Acts 26: 18, for, as a blind person obtains the power of seeing by the opening of his eyes, so the sinner, filled with the darkness of ignorance, receives, by the illumination of the Holy Spirit, the power of knowing the true God."

[6] Holl. (828): "First, the intellect of the sinner led to the Church is immediately enlightened (2 Cor. 4: 6; Eph. 1: 18); sub-

sequently and mediately, the will also, Tit. 2: 11, 12. The saving grace of God which, like the beneficent sun, has appeared to all men, teaches the intellect of the sinner, and sheds upon it the light of knowledge, so that this light is diffused upon the will to enable it to flee from wickedness and choose holiness of life. Therefore the apostle desires for the Colossians illumination, that they may be sanctified, Col. 1: 9, 10." The difference between illumination and regeneration is this (832): "The former has respect more to the intellect, regeneration more to the will; the former consists formally in knowledge concerning sacred things from the divine Word, the latter consists formally in the gift of faith. The effect of the former is a knowledge of the divine mysteries; the effect of the latter is confidence in the merits of Christ. The former precedes, the latter follows." The difference between illumination and sanctification is (ib.): "All Christians agree that sanctification, taken in a broader sense, embraces all the acts of applying grace; taken in a narrower sense, it differs from illumination (1) in regard to the particular subject, because by illumination the intellect, proximately and formally, and by sanctification the will, is made perfect; (2) in regard to the extent, because more men are illuminated than sanctified; (3) in regard to their peculiar effect and design, because the effect of illumination is γνώσις, or the supernatural knowledge of God and divine things, Eph. 1: 18; 2 Cor. 4: 6, but the effect of sanctification is holiness and righteousness, Eph. 4: 24."

[7] Id. (827): "The most gracious God seriously designs to illuminate all men, but only they are actually illuminated who, called and led to the Church, receive the grace of the Holy Spirit, and listen attentively to the divine Word, read it, and meditate upon it. The grace of the Holy Spirit is not irresistible, for the sinner, if obstinately perverse, may hinder the supernatural illumination of the Holy Spirit by opposing a veil or malicious obstacle, 2 Cor. 4: 3, 4. But the sinner not obstinately opposing is efficaciously enlightened by the Holy Spirit through the Word of God, Ps. 119: 130."

[8] Id. (820): "The Holy Spirit does not immediately, but by means of the divine Word, enlighten us, 2 Pet. 1: 18, 19." (Qualified, however, with great care (825), "the power of illumination which pertains to the divine Word is not accurately confined to the acts of hearing, reading, or meditation; but the Word of God heard, read, or conveyed to the mind, and retained by it, always retains its illuminating power.") (821): "God hath not promised in His Word that any man by ecstasy shall be illuminated,

his faith be confirmed, and a foretaste of eternal life be imparted; in opposition to the Platonics, the Quakers, the Mystics." Definition of ecstasy (trance): "It is a rare and extraordinary operation either of God, or of a corrupt imagination, or of the devil, alienating the mind of a man from his bodily senses, so that, the use of the latter ceasing, he becomes more ready and quick to receive the objects of imagination. It differs from rapture, because ecstasy simply denotes a departure of the mind from the senses, but rapture adds violence."

[9] Id. (826): "The Holy Spirit truly and really enlightens the souls of men in darkness in regard to sacred things by means of ministers of the Word, performing in the right way the public office of teaching, Eph. 3: 8, 9; 2 Cor. 4: 6; Acts 26: 18; John 5: 35; Matt. 5: 14."

[10] Id. (844): "To obtain spiritual illumination, three auxiliaries are necessary: prayer (Luke 11: 13; Eph. 1: 17, 18), meditation (John 5: 39), trials (Ps. 119: 71). The following positions are, in addition, opposed to the erroneous views of the Mystics and Quietists:

"I. The illumination and regeneration of the sinner do not take place by the purgation or abstraction of the soul from created objects, and the turning of it in upon itself." The following explanations are added:

"(*a*) We do not disallow all abstractions of the mind from foreign objects and secular cares in the actual use of the Word and in godly meditations and prayers. We oppose that abstraction or annihilation by which the mind is presumed to be withdrawn from all creatures and from the divine gifts, and loses itself in God.

"(*b*) We do not condemn all resignation, since our divines inculcate a temperate and godly resignation (*Gelassenheit*). We reject that resignation which involves the destruction of all the affections, desires, and thoughts.

"(*c*) We must distinguish from the descent into the heart or soul for the purpose of bringing to remembrance sin, or the state of misery, and searching for repentance and faith, that introspection whose object is to apprehend the inner light immediately revealing. . . . The present controversy has respect to the introversion of the mind upon itself, to wait for, and observe, and apprehend the internal light, immediately making revelations."

II. (847): "So far from expecting in silence a supernatural divine light, the external Word of God, which is a most clear light, is on the contrary to be earnestly preached, carefully heard, frequently read, attentively pondered, and, in addition, devout pray-

ers, mingled with sacred hymns, are to be raised to heaven, that the light of saving knowledge may arise in our hearts, and continually increase." We add also the following remarks:

(848): "(*a*) When the Mystics distinguish between silence of words, thoughts, and desires, we approve of the first silence, *i. e.*, of words in a certain respect; for meditation on the divine Word is aided by silence in our houses: but we disapprove of the silence of desires and thoughts.

"(*b*) The expectation of divine assistance, united with silence, is proper for true Christians, but not the *silent expectation* of directly revealing light.

"(*c*) The doctrine of an internal Sabbath of the soul, so far as it denotes (α) cessation from works of the flesh, (β) rest of the soul in God, (γ) meditation on the divine mercies, (δ) the desire and expectation of the eternal Sabbath, is retained and inculcated in our churches. But an internal Sabbath is rejected, so far as it denotes not only a silence of words, but of all the thoughts and senses."

[11] Id. (824): "Illumination, in respect to the illuminating means, is either *legal* or *evangelical*. *The former* is that which manifests to us sin, the wrath of God, and the temporal and eternal punishments of sin (Rom. 7: 7). *The latter* reveals to us the grace of God, founded on the merit of Christ, righteousness accepted by God, and eternal life (2 Cor. 4: 4)."

"*The Gospel* illuminates the hearts of men, that they may know the glory of Christ, raised indeed upon the cross, but also conveyed to heaven and sitting at the Right Hand of God the Father. The Gospel, therefore, declares and manifests the mercy, the wisdom, and the justice of God the Father, in the open face of Christ, who is His express image."

[12] Id. (825): "*The divine Law*, like lightning, has a terrible, slaying and condemning light. But the Gospel, like the beneficent sun, diffuses an exhilarating and vivifying light, 2 Cor. 3: 6–9. The Law possesses salutary powers of pedagogical illumination, Gal. 3: 24 (the divine Law shows us and exposes both the native leprosy of the soul and the diseases contracted voluntarily, and thus affords us the occasion of seeking Christ, the physician of souls and the author of righteousness and salvation). *But from the Gospel* a perfectly saving illumination arises to those who properly use the evangelical doctrine according to the divine purpose (which makes known the knowledge of salvation by remission of sins, and reveals the tender mercy of our God, whereby the Dayspring from on high hath visited us, Luke 1: 77, 78)."

[13] Id. (851): "Ordinary illumination is not accomplished instantaneously, but by intervals, by degrees, by acts frequently repeated, that man may be disposed and prepared to admit continuously more and more light of the truth, so that if he should repel the first degree of illumination, the Holy Spirit may deny him the next, for it cannot occur without the first."

"NOTE.—We speak now of ordinary, not of extraordinary illumination. We do not doubt that God, by special and extraordinary grace, and by His absolute power, can entirely illuminate a man at once, so that he may be acquainted with all the articles of faith, since we know that the Holy Spirit infused the gift of tongues into the apostles instantaneously."

[14] Id. (840): "Illumination in regard to the man receiving the heavenly doctrine is either *literal and pedagogic* or *spiritual and completely saving*. The former is that operation of the Holy Spirit by which, through His grace externally assisting and preparing the way, He instructs with a literal knowledge of the doctrines of religion the intellect of an unregenerate man, who is nevertheless inclining towards regeneration, and produces an historical assent to the Gospel, so that he may be more and more disposed to receive saving faith (John 1: 9; 2 Pet. 1: 19; Ps. 25: 8; Eph. 3: 9). The latter is the operation of the Holy Spirit by which, entering and dwelling in the contrite heart of man, He enkindles in him a saving knowledge of the divine mercy established in Christ, produces a confiding assent to the Gospel, and confirms and seals it by His internal testimony."

QUEN. (II, 77), expresses the distinction thus: "*Pedagogic illumination is merely literal and external*, when any one is instructed in the knowledge of divine truth, and is convinced of its certainty in his conscience, but has not this known truth as yet sealed in his heart with the seal, or confirmed by the gracious indwelling, of the Holy Spirit: *spiritual, gracious, and internal*, when any one, for instance, truly regenerate, not only has a literal understanding of the evangelical doctrine, but is at the same time the temple of the Holy Ghost, inhabited graciously by Him; or, when the truth is not only known and admitted, but at the same time is strengthened, confirmed, and sealed by the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit graciously dwelling in the heart."

[15] HOLL. (829): "As supernatural illumination is a successive act of applying grace, therefore, without the sanctification of the will, the illumination may be imperfect in the intellect. This is in opposition to all the mystic writers, who regard the purgative process as antedating the illuminative."

[16] Id. (843): "The sinner is illuminated pedagogically to the end that he may be disposed and prepared for spiritual illumination, by which not only his intellect is enlightened, but his will directed to the love of God and his neighbor. If the sinner who is to be converted does not attain this spiritual illumination, his knowledge of the letter is insufficient, unfruitful, not saving, because it is not applied to its proper use; therefore it may be called *finally* false, because the true end designed by God is frustrated." Imperfect illumination, and pedagogical, is moreover ascribed by many divines to the grace of God assisting, and perfect illumination to the grace of God indwelling. Illumination is *perfect* only when grace dwells in man, and he permits his will to be sanctified by it, in which case progress is made from it to sanctification.

[17] Imperfect and pedagogical illumination is also not natural, but supernatural; (id., 831): "because (*a*) it proceeds from the light of a special revelation; (*b*) it is obtained by us through a supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit; (*c*) it is occupied with the mysteries of faith; (*d*) and is divinely designed for a spiritual end. We cannot but particularly notice that divines, truly orthodox, have never divided illumination into natural and supernatural."

§ 46. *Regeneration and Conversion.*

These are the terms descriptive of the state of one who has really entered into the new kingdom of grace. Both are used in the Holy Scriptures, sometimes in a wider, at others in a narrower sense, and often interchangeably. In the former case they describe the entire state of acceptance of the pardoned sinner, with all the moral powers which are now at his command, and embrace, therefore, in them justification and sanctification; in the latter case, in which indeed they do not directly exclude one another, but yet are also not exactly identical, they describe simply the internal change which has taken place in the entire condition of man, without including the power to lead a holy life. The two conceptions may be distinguished thus, that by regeneration is understood only the actual presence of the new spiritual life, as it is effected in man by the operation of the Holy Spirit; by conversion, the conditions also which must be performed on the part of man in order that he may attain such a spiritual life.[1] As thus the two expressions diverge in a certain sense, they may also be considered separately.

I. "REGENERATION *is the act of grace by which the Holy Spirit gives the sinner saving faith, that, his sins being pardoned, he may become a son of God and an heir of eternal life.*

[2] HOLL. (876): *i. e.*, that work by which God overcomes the spiritual blindness of the natural man, and his spiritual inability to believe in the gracious plan of salvation, and creates in him the power of exercising faith. [3] There takes place, therefore, in the regeneration of man, a change [4] which consists in this, that, instead of the former blindness in spiritual things, there is spiritual knowledge; in place of unbelief there is faith, so that this entirely altered spiritual condition of man is represented figuratively by the term, a *new birth*, and the regenerate man as a *new creature*. [5]

As *regeneration* is conditioned by the conduct of man in regard to the influence exerted upon him, it will take place at once, or gradually, as man's resistance is greater or less. The former takes place with children, in whom there is no other resistance than that which dwells in every natural man, which, however, is overcome by the Holy Ghost, operating in Baptism; the latter occurs with all adults, in the case of whom resistance only gradually disappears. [6]

But the operation of the Holy Spirit is always, however, efficacious, in such a sense that on God's part all the energies which are needed to enable man to believe and lead a spiritual life are readily and altogether sufficiently offered to him; but this grace is not compulsory, therefore not *irresistible*, for its acceptance depends on the free will of man. [7] Therefore regeneration is likewise on the part of God indeed perfect, since He endeavors to effect regeneration perfectly in man, and to transform him into an entirely new creature; on the side of man, however, only more or less perfect as he permits this grace of the Holy Spirit to be entirely or only partially efficacious *in* him. [8]

It depends, too, upon the fidelity of man, whether he will persevere in the new condition of regeneration or not, and thus regeneration is also amissible; but, at the same time, it is recoverable by the grace of God, for the way of return to the state of regeneration, so long as life lasts, is open to him who has fallen from grace. [9]

II. Conversion.—There is no other way of attaining to faith and a spiritual life than by God's turning man from sin to Himself, and "*conversion is thus the act by which the Holy Spirit is said to convert the sinner, and the sinner is said to be converted.*" (Holl. 852). [10.]

Conversion, then, is to be called a work of God, so far as this change cannot at all be produced without the agency of divine grace. So far, however, as this change cannot occur without an internal movement in man, which is conditioned by his own will, conversion in another point of view can be regarded as proceeding from man. Conversion is accordingly distinguished as *transitive* and *intransitive*. [11] In the latter sense it is identical with repentance, a movement of the mind excited by the converting and regenerating grace of the Holy Spirit, by which the sinner detests with unaffected sorrow his sins recognized from the divine Law, and at the same time lays hold by true faith of the satisfaction and merit of the Mediator Christ and the mercy of God obtained thereby and promised in the Gospel, and applies it to himself that, having freely obtained the pardon of his sins, he may be eternally saved." (Holl. 1141.)

The acts preceding conversion are more particularly the following:

1. The unconverted and unregenerate man being from his birth under the dominion of sin and his sinful propensities, manifesting themselves boldly in actual sins, the first act of grace aims to divert him from this state of sin, and, with this end in view, to beget in him real pain for past sins, and a desire to be freed from the dominion which sin has exercised over him, viz., *contrition* ("a serious and holy sorrow of heart, leading the sinner to hate the sins made known to him by the Law of God.") [12]

2. The second act of divine grace is this, that it drives man, alarmed on account of his sins, to take refuge in the merit of Christ, which covers his sins and is accounted as his merit; [13] so that *conversion*, which commences in *contrition*, is finished in *faith*. The former is produced by the preaching of the Law, the latter by the preaching of the Gospel. [14]

From what has been said, it follows that *conversion*, like *re-*

generation, does not take place at once, but is brought about by repeated acts of one and the same grace. [15] This grace is variously designated, as it produces the beginning or the progress of conversion, and as it is efficacious with or without human co-operation. [16] In the beginning of *conversion* man is thus altogether passive; [17] in the further progress of it, however, in so far active as the powers produced by grace must in it be operative. [18] But as these powers are called forth by grace, and man can do nothing at all by his natural powers, conversion is therefore to be considered as produced by grace alone. [19] It is equally true of *conversion* as of *regeneration*, that it is indeed *efficacious*, but not *irresistible;* of both it is true that the *impulsive internal cause* is the *mercy of God*, the *impulsive external or meritorious cause* is *Christ's merit.*

[1] Holl. alone deviates from this distinction, who first treats of conversion, then of regeneration, and so separates them that the form of conversion strictly taken consists in the excitation of contrition, the form of regeneration in the donation of faith. (856): "As it is one act of applying grace by which God produces *contrition*, and another act of grace by which He imparts to the contrite sinner a *confidence* that relies on Christ's merit; so the former act of grace is called *conversion* (taken in the strictest sense), and the latter act is called *regeneration*. *Contrition* is the effect of converting grace, *faith* is the effect of regenerating grace. *Penitence*, taken in a wide sense, is the effect of both acts of grace, viz., conversion and regeneration conspiring to accomplish one end." In this way, doubtless, the one idea is clearly distinguished from the other; but nevertheless Holl. is not able, in its further discussion, to retain this distinction, and is compelled to connect faith with conversion. Most of the other divines pursue the order of our text, and desire, in treating the two aspects separately, rather to bring out two phases of one and the same conception than to keep them altogether apart from each other. Ordinarily this alone is given as the difference: "The two differ: (1) in regard to the subjects; regeneration pertains to adults and children; conversion properly to adults, as children cannot properly be said to be converted; (2) in regard to the means: regeneration is effected by the Word and Sacraments; conversion by the Word alone."

[2] Br. (532): "Regeneration is an action of God, by which He endows man, destitute of spiritual strength, but not obstinately resisting, out of His mere grace for Christ's sake, by means of the

Word and Baptism, on the part of the intellect and the will, with spiritual powers to believe in Christ, and thus to commence a spiritual life; or, He produces these in him in order that he may attain justification, renovation, and eternal salvation." This is regeneration in the stricter sense, as it is set forth in Gal. 2: 20; John 1: 13; 1 John 5: 1. From this, regeneration in the more comprehensive sense is distinguished." Quen. (III, 477): "It is taken in the wide sense for the restitution of the spiritual life *in general;* and in this way regeneration comprehends under it, also, justification and the renovation which follows it, in which sense the Form. Conc. (III, 19) also uses it. It is taken *strictly* for remission of sins or justification, in Gal. 3: 11, in which sense the Form. Conc. states it to be very frequently used in the Ap. Conf.; or for renovation, as it shows it to be frequently used by Luther." Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., III, 19 and following): "The term regeneration is sometimes taken as embracing both the remission of sins and the subsequent renovation which the Holy Spirit produces in those who are justified by faith; and it sometimes signifies nothing more than the remission of sins, and adoption as sons of God. In this last sense the word is very frequently used in the Ap. Conf.; for instance, when it is said, justification is regeneration. But Paul, too, uses these terms with discrimination (Tit. 3: 5). Moreover, the term vivification is sometimes so used as to denote remission of sins. For when a human being is justified by faith, that is in fact a regeneration, because he becomes from a son of wrath a son of God, and in this way is transferred from death to life. Hence, likewise, regeneration is often used for sanctification and renovation (which are subsequent to justification)."

[3] Therefore Quen. (III, 482): "The *point from which it proceeds* generically is the death of sin, not taken in its entirety (ὁλικῶς), as it introduces, in addition to a privation of powers of believing, likewise a deficiency of strength for holy living, together with the dominion and guilt of sin; but taken partially (μερικῶς), so far as it affirms the want of the power of savingly knowing and embracing the justifying object. In particular, on the side of the intellect, the starting-point is the great blindness and multiform debility in regard to the saving knowledge of the saving object, Eph. 5: 8; John 1: 5; 1 Cor. 2: 14. On the part of the will, the like incapacity of embracing savingly the good offered in the Gospel, Rom. 8: 7. Its goal is, generally speaking, a spiritual life, not viewed in its totality, as including, besides the attainment of the powers of believing, immunity from the dominion and guilt of sin; but taken partially, so far as it denotes the supernatural powers imparted for the

exercise of faith. In particular on the part of the intellect, it is both a spiritual capacity of the mind savingly to know the object which brings salvation, 2 Cor. 4: 6, and then an actual saving knowledge of it; on the part of the will, a confident reclining of the heart on the known good, Rom. 6: 11." HOLL. remarks further (881): "We discuss now principally the regeneration of the intellect and will of adult sinners; the regeneration of the intellect of children is somewhat more difficult of comprehension. But we do not doubt that the intellect of infants in regeneration is imbued with a saving knowledge of God by the Holy Spirit in Baptism, and their will is endowed with confidence in Christ. We agree here with the views of CHMN. in Ex. c. Trid.: 'Although we do not sufficiently understand, and cannot explain, what the action and operation of the Holy Spirit is in infants who are baptized; yet that it exists and is effected through the Word of God, is certain. We call that action and operation of the Holy Spirit in infants faith, and assert that infants believe. For the means or organ, by which the kingdom of God offered in the Word and Sacraments is received, the Scripture calls faith, and it says that believers receive the kingdom of God. And indeed (Mark 10: 15) Christ affirms that adults receive the kingdom of heaven as infants receive it.' The *form of regeneration* consists, according to this, 'in the gift of spiritual life; that is, in the bestowment of the power of believing, and of saving faith; or, in the illumination of our mind, and the production of confidence in our heart;' or, as it is otherwise expressed, 'in the gift itself of faith.'"

[4] But this spiritual change is not a *substantial* one (for there is not another substance of intellect and will introduced by regeneration, the pre-existing natural substance having been destroyed), but an *accidental* one (introducing new qualities into the intellect and will of man, not merely enlightening and exciting the pre-existing). QUEN. (III, 484): "As in the resurrection of the body the flesh, numerically the same which we have borne, shall be reproduced, furnished, however, with different properties; so, in regeneration, the same natural substance of our body remains, the properties only being changed. Regeneration does not destroy nature, but perfects and directs it; it does not change it so that it ceases to be nature. The antithesis is (*a*) that of the Fanatics, who assert that by regeneration the substance of the former body is destroyed, and, the same soul remaining, a new body is given differing essentially from the former; (*b*) that of the Flacians, who assert that God, in regeneration and conversion, so creates a new heart and a new man, that the substance and essence of the old Adam,

and particularly the rational soul, is entirely destroyed, and a new essence of soul is created from nothing."

[5] QUEN. (III, 485): "'A new man' and 'new creature,' 2 Cor. 5: 17; Gal. 6: 15, on account of the new spiritual strength imparted in regeneration and renovation, by which the image of God is repaired, consisting in the knowledge of God, Col. 3: 10, in righteousness and true holiness, Eph. 4: 24." Expressions of similar import are, quickening, Eph. 2: 5; raising again, Eph. 2: 6. But it is to be noticed particularly that all these expressions are used only figuratively, to which fact special attention is called in opposition to the Mystics. Thus, by HOLL. (890): "*Literally speaking*, neither Christ is born in us, nor is there a new man in us, nor by the gift of regeneration is there flesh produced of our flesh."

[6] HOLL. (885): "The regeneration of infants is *instantaneous*, but the ordinary regeneration of adults is *successive*. In infants, as there is not an earnest and obstinate resistance, the grace of the Holy Spirit accompanying Baptism breaks and restrains their natural resistance that it may not impede regeneration; wherefore, their regeneration takes place instantaneously. In the regeneration of adults there are many difficulties to be removed by care, and illumination and instruction extended over a long time are to be afforded from the divine Word, until a full faith is enkindled in the mind."

QUEN. (III, 483): "Regeneration is successive, not always instantaneous, but gradual and increasing; and although the quickening takes place in the moment in which faith is produced in us, and Christ, the true sun of righteousness, arises in our hearts, yet the spiritual life displays itself in successive acts." BR. (530): "Nor is there any contradiction to this in the name, *regeneration*, whose force and signification are to be estimated from the analogy of generation, which takes place, indeed, in an instant; for that comparison must not be extended too far. . . . Those who say that regeneration is instantaneous, seem to understand by it either justification or the conferring of the beginning of faith as to the first holy thought and pious desire."

[7] HOLL. (885): "Regeneration is the action of the Holy Spirit, efficacious and sufficient to produce faith, but it is not irresistible (Acts 18: 5, 6)." QUEN. (III, 483): "The regenerating grace of God is always *efficacious* in itself, although it does not always proceed to the second act, on account of the resistance of the subject to be regenerated. Its efficacy *is limited and mediated*, exerting itself through the mediation of the Word and Sacraments;

not physical, such as exists in medicine, but hyperphysical, illustrated, however, in the Scriptures by physical actions, illumination, generation, the sowing of seed, irrigation," etc.

[8] QUEN. (III, 483): "Regeneration on the part of God regenerating is *perfect*, and so does not admit of a greater and less any more than carnal generation; on the part of men receiving, it is *imperfect* (because sinners imperfectly receive the influence of the Holy Spirit), because moral evil is always near them, Rom. 7: 23; because sin still dwells in them, verses 17, 18; and because faith can grow and increase in them."

[9] HOLL. (886): "The grace of regeneration is lost when sins subversive of conscience are deliberately committed (1 Tim. 1: 19). But regeneration lost may be recovered by the penitent (Gal. 4: 19). Men regenerate, aided by the preserving grace of God, should be carefully on their guard, lest, by the malicious repetition of sin, they do injury to conscience; but if, nevertheless, they are overcome by the machinations of the devil, the enticements of the world, and the suggestions of the flesh, and fall three or four times, or oftener, into mortal sin, they need not at all doubt of the converting and regenerating grace of God. (Examples in Ex. 4: 24; 32; Numb. 20: 12; 12: 1, 2; 2 Sam. 11: 4, 15; 24: 1; comp. 1 Chron. 21: 8.)"

[10] QUEN. (III, 500): "Conversion is the action of the applying grace of the Holy Spirit, whereby, together with the Father and Son, of absolutely pure grace, founded in the merit of Christ, through the preaching of the Word, He transfers the adult spiritually dead from his state of sin to a state of faith, successively as to the preparatory acts, but in an instant as to the ultimate act, by a divine and supernatural but resistible power, so that, repenting, he may obtain by faith the remission of his sins, and partake of eternal salvation." Conversion may here be considered in a broader or narrower sense.

QUEN. (III, 489): "Conversion is used either *in a wide sense* as embracing not only transfer from a state of sin to one of faith, but likewise justification and renovation, and the continuation of this new state in its entire extent, Acts 26: 20." Thus the FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., II, 70): "This is most certain, that in true conversion a change, renovation, and movement ought to take place in the intellect, in the will and heart of man, that the mind of man may clearly recognize his sins, may fear the anger of God, may turn himself from sin, may recognize and appropriate the promise of grace in Christ, may be occupied with devout thoughts, may form good purposes, and may display diligence in moral im-

provement, and strive against the flesh;" to which, however, Holl. remarks (854): "Many divines abstain from this more extended sense of conversion, since from it error and confusion may easily enter into incautious minds, for in this way distinct acts of grace are united under one term; or, *in a narrow sense*, as distinguished from justification and renovation, and this is its usage in this place."

Holl. (854) distinguishes still further: "Conversion taken *in a special sense*, as the act of grace by which the Holy Spirit excites in the sinner sincere grief for his sins by the word of the Law, and enkindles true faith in Christ by the word of the Gospel, that he may obtain remission of sins and eternal salvation;" and (in accordance with what was said under the head of Regeneration, note 1), "Conversion in the *most special sense*, as the act of grace by which the Holy Spirit restrains, subdues, and breaks the will and heart of the sinner in the midst of his sins, that he may detest his sins with grief of mind and thus be prepared for receiving faith in Christ."

[11] Br. (533): "The word conversion is taken in a double sense in the Scriptures, inasmuch as at one time God is said to convert man, and at another man is said to convert himself, although as to the thing itself the action is one and the same." The first is called "*transitive conversion*, because it does not terminate in God who is the agent, but passes from Him to another subject, to wit, to the sinner," and is distinguished as "*active*, so far as it proceeds from God, and as *passive*, so far as it is received by man, Jer. 31: 18." Holl. (853). The other is called *intransitive conversion*. Br. (534): "Although the acts by which the sinner is said to convert himself depend for their efficacy upon the Holy Spirit, yet because they are the acts of the intellect and will, and do not pass from the potencies whose acts they are into another subject, but are terminated in the potencies themselves, in this respect they are classified with immanent or intransitive acts." Holl. (854): "Conversion (intransitive) is the goal and effect of transitive conversion, and is the penitence by which the sinner is said to convert himself by means of the strength imparted by converting grace, and passively received. In regard to intransitive conversion, Acts 3: 19. For which reason the sinner, repenting, converts himself *not by his native, but by imparted powers.*" Holl. remarks, finally (853): "As we are here employed in unfolding the acts of divine grace applying salvation, it easily appears that we are not designedly taking into consideration the intransitive conversion, or the repentance of the sinner."

[12] Holl. (868): "The starting-point is sin, both *actual* sins, so far as, after they are committed, they remain morally as if ratified or not retracted; and *habitual*, so far as they not only imply the want of that habitual perfection which ought to exist, but likewise the propensity to all the evils which are the fountain and cause of actual sins." Br. (539): "That *actual* sins may be abolished by conversion, it is necessary first, that they should be retracted by the sinner, and that they be recognized *by the intellect*, not only with the speculative judgment that they are truly sins, but likewise with the practical, that efforts are to be made for the abolition of sins, and circumspection employed in regard to the mode and means by which they may be abolished; *on the side of the will*, efficacious dissatisfaction with sins, or a detestation of them united with grief, is required." (543): "Conversion tends to abolish *habitual* sins by the same acts by which it tends to abolish actual sins; yet in such a way, that they should be abolished or expelled not only morally, but physically* and really—if not thoroughly, yet relatively and as to their dominion."

Quen. (III, 492) more exactly: "The *starting-point* in general is the state of sin, Eph. 2: 1, sq., and this viewed not in its totality, as it includes also the guilt and dominion of sin, but taken partially, in so far as it expresses a deficiency of strength to return to God by repentance, united with obstinate depravity." Grh. (VI, 252): "Contrition embraces (1) the true knowledge of sin; (2) the sense of the divine anger against sins; (3) anguish and fear of conscience; (4) true humiliation before God; (5) frank confession of sin; (6) the serious hatred and detestation of sin. It is, however, to be observed in this place: (1) although true contrition is required in all true and saving repentance, yet there are grades of contrition, as the terrors and anguish are not equal in all, but in some they are greater and in others less; (2) the promise of the remission of sins does not depend upon the dignity and quantity of our contrition, but alone upon the merit of Christ. . . . (3) the knowledge of sin never becomes so perfect that it embraces specifically the knowledge of all sins."

[13] Br. (541): "It is necessary, moreover, that the mind should aim at the abolition of actual sins, both with respect to the offense against God and the obligation of sinners to make satisfaction to God, which indeed can be effected solely by faith in Christ, the Mediator, and in His merit and satisfaction for our sins; and, when faith lays hold of this, the mind turns to God,

* [Br. explains physically: "So far as conditions of absence or habits are expelled from their subjects."]

who, although offended with our sins, yet embraces us in His love and grace, and is now fully reconciled by the satisfaction of Christ. *The end to be accomplished* is faith in Christ, by which the sinner is reconciled to God, who is offended by his sins." Holl. (869): "The *proximate* end is contrition; the *remote*, faith in Christ." In addition, the observation (871): "Contrition is not the positive or causal means of enkindling faith, but is only the privative means, by which the incapacity of the subject and the obstacles which otherwise would impede the enkindling of faith are removed. Therefore faith in Christ is the remote end of conversion, because the Holy Spirit, producing contrition by the Law, proposes to prepare the heart for the excitation in it of saving faith by the Gospel. When I call it remote, I do not wish that any one should suppose that faith is to be far removed or separated from contrition, for contrition in the discourses of Christ is united with faith by the closest tie, (Mark 1: 15; Acts 2: 38; 2 Cor. 7: 10); but thereby it is only indicated that the light of faith arises not through conversion, by means of the Law, but from another quarter, through regeneration by means of the Gospel. (1 Pet. 1: 23; James 1: 18.)"

[14] Ap. Conf. (V, 28): "We maintain that repentance consists of two parts, viz., contrition and faith." Grh. (VI, 234): "The number of leading divisions of the heavenly doctrine, by the ministry of which the Holy Spirit proclaims true and saving repentance and produces it in the hearts of men, is the same as the number of essential parts of repentance. There are now two general classes of heavenly doctrine by which the Holy Spirit preaches and produces repentance, viz., the Law and the Gospel. Therefore there are two essential parts of repentance. The connection of the major premise is plain, because each of these two doctrines produces its peculiar and proper effect in converting man; these two effects, although different from each other, nevertheless concur harmoniously to the production of the one common end of repentance. The Law produces pain, by manifesting the atrocity of sin and the anger of God against it, and accusing man on account of his transgression. The Gospel offers to terrified and contrite man Christ, the Mediator, who died on the altar of the cross for our sins."

The Ap. Conf. adds further (V, 28): "If any one desire to add a third (part), namely, fruits worthy of repentance, that is, a change of the whole life and conduct for the better, we will not oppose;" and Mel. (Loc. c. Th., II, 4): "The parts are contrition and faith. New obedience ought necessarily then to follow; if any one desire to call this a third part, I have no objection." From

the times of Grh. (VI, 245) it was more explicitly stated: "That, properly and accurately speaking, good works do not constitute a part of repentance." Holl. (1147): "New obedience is not a part but an effect of repentance." But (1148): "New obedience inseparably follows repentance, and cannot be severed from it even in the case of the dying." With reference to the Roman Catholic distinction between contrition and attrition, the Ap. Conf. (V, 29) says: "From contrition we exclude those idle and endless disputes, as to when we grieve over our sins from love to God and when from fear of punishment."

The later divines discuss more particularly the two parts of conversion, contrition and faith, under the head of penitence as intransitive conversion, which generally follows the doctrine of the Sacraments. As the contents are similar and the difference only this, that transitive conversion is considered the operation of God, repentance, that is, intransitive conversion, as the movement inwardly taking place in man as the consequence of this operation, we therefore unite both articles into one. The Symbolical Books, likewise, and the earlier divines, treat of this subject only as one topic, viz., under the head of repentance. *Contrition* is defined by the later divines as "the first act of repentance by which the sinner, struck by the lightning of the Law, aroused by the sense of divine anger on account of the sins that he has committed, is sorry after a godly sort, is thoroughly alarmed, and earnestly detests his sins. Ps. 51: 4; Jer. 3: 13; Ps. 6: 1; 38: 1, 3, 4, 6." *Faith*, as "the second penitential act, by which the sinner, rendered contrite by the wounds of his conscience, seeks a remedy from the wounds of Jesus Christ, exhibited in the Gospel, confidently appropriating them to himself as an individual (Quen., III, 581)." As "*the requisites of true contrition*" are cited (Holl., 1152): "antecedently, the knowledge of sin, not only theoretical but likewise practical; formally, an efficacious displeasure or hatred of sin, united with serious grief on account of it." The "*marks of true contrition*" are (1155), "1, *internal:* (*a*) the renunciation of the evil purpose and the omission of the intended sin; (*b*) a legal and pedagogic desire for a most approved physician or a most beneficent and powerful deliverer, Acts 2: 37; 2, *external*, (probable, but not infallible): which are discovered (*a*) in the mouth of the sinner (the confession of sin *of the entire Church*, which takes place ordinarily in public prayers, and also extraordinarily in public calamities, or *of a private person* who confesses his sins before God (Ps. 51: 5, called by Luther the confession of faith), before the Church (Josh. 7: 19, formerly called ἐξομολόγησις),

before a minister of the Church (Matt. 3: 6), before a neighbor (James 5: 16, the confession of love); (*b*) in the face and external appearance (tears, sackcloth, the sprinkling of ashes, smiting of the breast and thigh, rending of garments, lying upon the earth); (*c*) in outward works (fasting and satisfaction, which is rendered to our injured neighbor or to the Church offended by a public scandal)." Concerning *Confession* it is said: "The private confession of sins before a priest to obtain forgiveness has no sure divine warrant, neither is the enumeration of all and each of the transgressions, with the circumstances modifying or aggravating them, and the communication of them to the ears of a priest, necessary or possible (QUEN., III, 601)." In regard to satisfaction, however, which the Catholics define as prayer, fasting, and alms, and of which they say that they are a payment of punishment still to a large extent due, although the guilt has already been pardoned, this is applicable: "After remission of sin no punishment, strictly speaking, pertains to the converted and justified; but sometimes there remains a paternal chastisement and remedial affliction." Upon both comp. AP. CONF., Art. VI, concerning Confession and Satisfaction.

[The term "*auricular*," as applied to confession, is used in two senses. As a confession made orally, and received by the ear of the confessor, it is applicable to Lutheran confession. But as the term is ordinarily used for the compulsory enumeration of details by the Romish Church, our Lutheran theologians most emphatically repudiate it. "It would, manifestly, be a logomachy, were it to be asserted that the kind of confession here understood is not auricular. In the conferences at Augsburg in 1530, an agreement had so far been reached that the controversy on this point might have been regarded as ended (see Coelestine's History, § III, p. 55). But it is well known that the Council of Trent silently receded from the concessions previously made by the Catholic theologians, prescribed the necessity of the confession of all sins (even of thoughts), and declared it godless to deny the possibility of the complete confession of all sins, or to name it spiritual tyranny. It is clear that, in this sense, the Lutherans could not admit of auricular confession. They allowed, indeed, a confession of sins entering into details, and gave this the preference above a merely general or summary confession; yet for this they applied no constraint, but left it to the conscience of everyone, whether he should confess individual sins to his pastor, or be satisfied with the general declaration that he was a sinner, and desired forgiveness." See "Apology," ut supra, Augusti's *Christliche Archæologie*, III, 93 sq.]

[15] Chmn. (Loc. Th., I, 199): "Conversion or renovation is not a change that is accomplished and perfected always in a single moment in all its parts, but it has its beginnings and its advances, through which, in great weakness, it is perfected. It is not, therefore, to be understood that I am to wait, with a secure and indolent will, until renovation or conversion have been accomplished, according to the stages already described, by the influence of the Holy Spirit, or without any movement on my part. Nor can it be shown with mathematical accuracy where the liberated will begins to act."

[16] Br. (563): "That divine operation by which conversion is produced in man by the Law and the Gospel is usually called grace." This one and the same grace is usually distinguished as prevenient, operating, and co-operating, though even here the distinctions are not always uniform. Br. (563). "By *prevenient* grace is understood the divine inspiration of the first holy thought and godly desire. This grace is called prevenient, because it is prior to our deliberate consent, or because in this way the will of the person to be converted is anticipated. *Operating* grace is that which directly follows the commencement of conversion and has reference to its continuance; by which it comes to pass that man by an effort, although weak, inclines to Christ, the Mediator, and the promises of gratuitous pardon for Christ's sake, and resists doubts. According to *others*, indeed, operating grace is referred to the commencement of conversion, and coincides with prevenient and exciting grace as to the effect, and is called operating because without us and without our free consent it operates in us. *Co-operating* grace is that operation which aids and strengthens or corroborates the intellect already in some measure assenting to the divine promises, and the will trusting in Christ, and so operates with the will, which concurs by the yet weak powers before received. By *others*, again, the co-operating grace of God is described as that by which God concurs with man already converted, in preserving the powers conferred upon him, increasing them, and assisting so that his faith may not fail" (in which case co-operating grace is more applicable to sanctification). Quen. (III, 494) and others divide into "*assisting grace*, which acts exterior to man, and *indwelling grace*, which enters the heart of man and, changing it spiritually, inhabits it." To the former belong "incipient or prevenient grace, exciting grace, operating grace, and perfecting grace," of which the first three operate as preparatory acts, but by the latter the act of real conversion is accomplished; indwelling grace occurs only after conversion, in sanctification. "The grace of God acts before conversion, in it, and after it. *The*

first is called prevenient, preparative, and exciting; *the second*, operating and completing, in the first sense; *the last*, co-operating, assisting, and completing, in the second sense. But grace, effecting and completing conversion by means of the Word, produces (1) the knowledge of sin, which is the first stage of conversion; (2) compunction of heart, that there may be detestation of sins committed and grief on their account; (3) the act of faith itself and confidence in Christ, viz., belief in Christ and the embracing of His merit by true faith; which act of faith is immediately followed by a transfer from a state of wrath to one of grace, which is the final act of conversion, and takes place instantaneously, as it cannot be that a man should be in a state of wrath and of grace, under death and in life, at the same time (497)."

[17] Br. (564): "It is properly said that man is merely passive in the commencement of conversion." Quen. (III, 508) presents the thought more fully thus: "Conversion is taken either *in a wide sense*, so that it includes also the preparatory acts, and thus man is passive in reference to each act or degree; or *in a narrow sense*, for the transfer from a state of wrath to one of grace, which is instantaneous by means of the gift of saving faith, and in which undoubtedly God alone works, man being subjected to this divine action as a passive object." This statement naturally flows from the doctrine of the state of corruption (compare § 28, Note 8, sq., and Form. Conc., Sol. Dec., II, 7), and thus an answer is furnished to the question, "In what way does the will of man act in his conversion?"

Hutt., who very thoroughly discusses this question in his Loc. Com., makes this preliminary remark (p. 281): "Occasion for this question is given by the fact that, in the conversion of an unregenerated man, the change cannot take place unless good actions concur and spiritual exercises intervene, such as struggling with the flesh, contending with unbelief, assent to the divine Word, and such like. It has been therefore asked, and is to-day asked, whether these exercises, or even any part of them, can be attributed to the power of human ability. But that this question may be rightly answered, it must first be observed, in general, that the conversion of man to God is not always one and the same thing, but may be of two distinct kinds, according to the two distinct subjects who are converted. Some of those who are to be converted are altogether beyond the limits of the Church, commonly known as infidels, and such are all they who live without any connection with the Church; others, however, live in the midst of the assembly of the called, and were brought into connection with the

Church by Baptism, and were at one time regenerate, but afterwards fell from the grace of regeneration through sins committed against their conscience. Hence it happens that the conversion of unregenerate unbelievers is one thing, and the conversion of those once regenerated, but now fallen, is another. And there is a great difference between these two kinds of conversion; inasmuch as he who has hitherto been standing in the covenant of divine grace, or, it may be, has yielded to the temptation of the devil and fallen from the grace of God, yet in some measure has received and possessed the first-fruits of the Holy Spirit, very widely differs from him who for the first time is called and admitted to faith in Christ and the grace of the covenant. The latter are changed from unregenerate to regenerate, from unbelievers to believers. But the condition of the lapsed in the Church is such that, although, seduced by the devil, they have become subject to divine wrath and eternal damnation, nevertheless they have not yet altogether fallen from the covenant itself and from the right of adoption of the sons of God, so far as God is concerned; nor do they absolutely fall away from that, unless they persevere to the end in sin. Their conversion, then, is nothing else than a return to the use or complete fruition of pristine grace, and this by serious repentance. Beside these two forms of conversion, mention is made, in the schools of the divines, of a third kind also, which is called the repentance or conversion of the standing, *i. e.*, of those who are regenerate, but who, on account of the adhering infirmities and failings of sin and the flesh, are from time to time, as it were, revived through repentance; so that their conversion is nothing else than a perpetual mortification of the flesh and a daily struggle between the flesh and the Spirit. . . . And concerning the two last-mentioned kinds, namely, the conversion of the lapsed and of the standing, there is here no controversy or discussion whatever. . . . The only question here in dispute is, *What can an unbelieving man, hitherto unregenerate, do, by his own strength, in his original conversion?* To which we reply, *that man can do absolutely nothing, not even the very least thing, towards beginning or effecting his conversion; and that the beginning, the progress, and, in short, the whole development of his conversion, is to be ascribed altogether and alone to the operation of the Holy Spirit.*" . . . Then he continues: "Various difficulties and many questions arise in regard to this purer doctrine of our churches; and, unless these be clearly explained, a very abundant harvest of manifold and very grave errors may arise."

"For it is asked (1) *Whether, since the Fall, all the powers have been so broken, or rather extinguished, in spiritual matters, that not the*

least capability (ἱκανότης), *aptitude, or capacity has remained?* In regard to this question a very sharp controversy arose among certain divines, some interdicting the words 'aptitude' and 'capacity' in this connection, and others admitting them; neither party, perhaps, being very dexterous in their explanation. For this strife is easily settled, if we will only reflect that these terms can be taken in a double sense, viz., an active and a passive: an *active* sense, if by aptitude and capacity you understand such an efficient (ἐνεργητικὴ) faculty, as can enable man to apprehend the grace of conversion offered in the preached Word; a *passive* sense, on the other hand, if man be described as a susceptible (παθητικὸς) subject, that is able to receive conversion, or fitted for conversion, which passive capacity or aptitude cannot be predicated of a block or a stone. And in this latter sense our sainted Luther ascribes capacity to man, *i. e.*, as having susceptible capacity (δύναμις παθητική). . . . As to this passive capacity, however, there is here no controversy, but only concerning the active capacity, which we so totally deny to unregenerated man, that we do not assign to it even that trifling amount which some are pleased to suggest. But it is inquired (2) Since *the will of unregenerate man* can do nothing, not even the very least, towards his conversion, *what is his attitude, then, in conversion?* This question is answered differently by different persons. (*a*) Some assert that he is merely and purely passive; thus Luther was not horrified at this phrase, for he wrote (Comm. on Psalms): 'It is an error, that the free will has any activity in a good work, when we speak of an internal work; for to wish, to believe, to hope, to love, are movements, drawings, and leadings of the divine Word, and a continued purifying and renovation of the mind, and though this passion be not always equally intense, yet it is always a passion [a being wrought upon].' . . . (*b*) There are others who answer this question, that man in conversion is like a block. This opinion seems very harsh and horrid to many, especially to the patrons of Synergism. But this way of speaking, properly understood, has no inconvenience whatever. For, although man differs greatly from a block, both as to the faculty by which he acts in choosing among things external and subject to reason, and from the fact that conversion cannot take place with a block or a stone as it can with man, however corrupt; yet, nevertheless, if that δύναμις, power, or faculty be considered, by which conversion can be begun and completed, there certainly is in this respect no difference whatever between man and a block, for man can do nothing more by his own powers towards his conversion than a block, but is as clay in the hands of the potter. . . . Why? Because in this

respect the condition of a block is even better than that of man; for, as it lacks the power of willing, so it is also destitute of sin and wickedness, which cling to the unregenerate man." . . . But even the very fact, that man in conversion is only purely passive, is of itself a work of grace; for naturally man resists it. CAL. (X, 15): "Unregenerate man has, indeed, a passive power, and so a certain aptitude, which you should, however, more correctly call a power of non-resistance, or an obedientiel power, with respect to his conversion; *nevertheless, the Holy Spirit must produce even this non-resistance in us, since the nature of man, on account of congenital depraved concupiscence, is in itself hostile to the Holy Spirit, and is not able to refrain from resisting.*"

Here the question, however, arises: How then can conversion be effected in man otherwise than against his will or without his knowledge? Both these inferences are rejected. HUTT. (Loc. Com., 284): "There have been those who asserted that the will of unregenerate man in conversion is in a hostile attitude, so that the Holy Spirit effects conversion by violent drawings, or by a kind of force, in those who are unwilling and resisting. This opinion has elements of both truth and falsehood in it. For it is true that the natural man can do nothing of himself but resist the Holy Spirit. . . . Thus it is also true, that some have been converted when they were violently raging against God. But what is hence inferred is most false, viz., that they were converted while repugnant and reluctant. For it is most certain that they in whom this resistance does not cease never are converted to God. . . . Others answer, that man in conversion not only does nothing, but is converted while unconcerned and not knowing what is being done with him. This opinion manifestly savors of Enthusiasm. . . . For, although unregenerate man cannot know of himself and of his own powers what is being done with him, yet the Holy Spirit removes this stupor and illuminates his mind, so that now he knows what is being done with him and yields his consent to the Holy Spirit." The Word of God is designated as the means which God employs for conversion, and to the unregenerate nothing more is ascribed than the power to hear or to read this Word of God. FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., II, 53): "This Word of God man, while yet unregenerate, can hear with his outward ears or read. . . . Through this means or instrument, namely, the preaching and hearing of His Word, God operates, softens our hearts, and draws man, so that through the preaching of the Law he recognizes both his sins and the wrath of God, and experiences true terrors and contrition in his heart. And through the annunci-

ation of, and meditation upon the Gospel . . . the little spark of faith is enkindled in his heart . . . and in this way the Holy Spirit, who does all these things, is sent into the heart." HUTT. (Loc. Com., 285): "In every conversion, the Word of God must intervene as the organ, or, as the Fathers said, as the vehicle of the Holy Spirit. Not that new emotions are impressed upon those who are to be converted, as a seal upon wax; nor is this conversion something irrational, as when Balaam's ass spoke, Numb. 22: 28; nor is it anything violent, as when a stone is hurled; nor is it anything enthusiastical, as where the professedly inspired (who are led astray by the devil) utter oracles, or when many things take place with the possessed, without the application of the mind and will. But the beginning of every conversion is made through the ministry of the Word; to this men must give place, and they must admit the Word that is heard, if any conversion at all is to occur. Now, although, indeed, man, not yet regenerate, can hear and read the Word of God, can discuss it at length, can receive through it a kind of historical faith, not less than the devils themselves, as James testifies, 2: 19; yet he cannot in any way embrace or understand the Word of salvation, since it is foolishness unto him, unless the illumination of the Holy Spirit be added—so far is he from being able in any way to accomplish the matter of his salvation of his own accord, or even to make a beginning of it. But, as the ancients said, those efforts are fruitless if they be not aided by grace; yea, they are absolutely of no account, unless they be divinely excited: but the Holy Spirit excites good emotions when by His grace He inspires godly thoughts and anticipates man by instilling the emotion of a good purpose. Hence, the beginning and the whole operation of conversion is altogether and entirely to be ascribed to the Holy Spirit alone, who, in man that hears the Word, is not idle, but moves and impels the will, so that from the very beginning of conversion it fluctuates and inclines and begins to struggle with the flesh, until from being hostile it yields assent, *i. e.*, from being enslaved it becomes free; from being unwilling, it becomes willing; so that now to will is present with man, and he delights in the Law of the Lord, not by constraint or unwillingly, but willingly, Rom. 7: 18, 22; Philem. v. 14." By these statements we still do not, indeed, ascertain clearly enough, whether conversion can be effected in any person, otherwise than without his will; whether, therefore, an excuse may be framed for him who is not converted. And yet we are warranted so to interpret what has already been cited, that, according to the conception of these theologians, the Word of God,

even where it is heard only outwardly, begets, through a gracious influence, no doubt irresistible, not indeed at once conversion itself, but still that freedom of the will which makes it possible for the individual not only to resist grace, as he heretofore always did, but now also to let it operate in him. Thus God still remains the sole, efficient cause of conversion; this proceeds, however, thenceforth, no longer against and without the will of man. Thus, at least, the later theologians express themselves. They assume a prevenient grace, which produces unavoidable good emotions in man. Quen. (III, 513): "We grant that man, aroused at first by prevenient grace, is so affected by the preaching of the Word, that he cannot escape the presence of God, and receives an inward impulse; nevertheless it does not follow hence, nor is it true, if the first movement of prevenient grace be unavoidable, that, therefore, its issue, viz., conversion itself, is unavoidable, and that we are irresistibly converted. For, though man cannot prevent this first movement from taking place, he still has the liberty of resisting in this first movement itself, as he has also in the second and third (though not indifferently, *i. e.*, equally, to be converted and not to be converted; for the ability of a man already influenced by prevenient grace inclines rather to the latter than to the former), and he can, through a stubborn will, impede prevenient grace, repel it, and by resisting it prevent his own conversion." [Chmn. Loci Theol., 186: "For Saul had the Word of God, and the good Spirit of God led him. But since he interposed a contrary act of his will, the Holy Spirit departed from him, 1 Sam. 16: 14. So Matt. 23: 37."]

And Holl. (873): "When man lies dead in sins, lives along securely, never thinking about his conversion, God, most merciful, comes to him anticipatingly, and by means of the Word, either heard or read or retained in his mind, thereupon excites good emotions in his mind which the divines call *unavoidable*, because he cannot evade their presence and perception; which also, in a certain way, can be called *irresistible*, as to their origin and their perception, because the sinner is in no way able to oppose himself to the excitation of them by the Word, or to his own perception of them, but can only withhold his acquiescence in them. 'The first emotions,' says J. Musaeus, 'can be called irresistible, so far as they precede our thinking, so that it is not in our power to prevent them from arising; although, after they have arisen, they can be resisted, so as not to take root, and they can be hindered or altogether suffocated.'"

[18] Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., II, 65): "It follows, as soon as the Holy Spirit, through the Word and Sacraments, has begun

His work of regeneration and renovation in us, that we then can and should truly co-operate through the power of the Holy Spirit, although much infirmity is joined therewith. But this fact, that we co-operate, does not arise from our carnal and natural powers, but from those new powers and gifts which the Holy Spirit begins in us in conversion." CHMN. (Loc. Theol., I, 199): "No one can show the mathematical point, in which the liberated will begins to act. When prevenient grace, *i. e.*, the first beginnings of faith and conversion, are given to man, at once there begins the struggle of the flesh and the Spirit, and it is manifest that this struggle cannot occur without the movement of our will. For the Holy Spirit struggled in Moses against his flesh, while yet living, far otherwise than Michael contended with the devil for the dead body of Moses. Thus at first the desire is very obscure, the assent very languid, the obedience very feeble; and these gifts should increase. They increase in us, however, not as a block of wood is carried along by a violent impulse, or as the lilies grow without having to labor or care; but by effort, struggling, seeking, praying, knocking, and this not of ourselves, it is the gift of God, Luke 19: 13; Matt. 25: 26; 2 Tim. 1: 6. This is, then, the import of what has been taught concerning prevenient, preparatory, and operating grace, that not our part is the first in conversion, but that God anticipates us with the Word and the divine afflatus, moving and impelling the will. But, after this emotion of the will, divinely occasioned, the human will is not purely passive, but, moved and assisted by the Holy Spirit, does not resist, but assents, and becomes a co-worker (*σύνεργος*) with God." [CHMN. continues: "Augustine has presented an excellent example in his own conversion, in which we see a living answer to this question, how amidst the hidden sparks and feeble beginnings of prevenient grace, the will is not inactive, but the strife between the flesh and the Spirit begins. For questions of this character should be decided from individual cases; they are best known, not from idle disputations, nor from the examples of others, but from personal experience, as perceived in the serious exercises of our own repentance. But as many live, without any exercise of faith or prayer, they collect many inexplicable things." The passages cited from Augustine are those of his "Confessions," that give the history of his conversion. "I quote these words of Augustine, because from this example the matter can be better understood than from many arguments."]*

[*See a translation of the entire argument of Chemnitz in *Evangelical Review* (Gettysburg) for 1867. Vol. xviii. 536 sqq.]

[19] Quen. (III, 498): "The conversion of man is the action of divine grace alone operating, and is accomplished by the same infinite power by which God creates anything from nothing and raises from the dead; and it is, moreover, effected through the means of the Word, which has that supernatural and divine power inherent in it, and which it exerts in the conversion of man, Eph. 1: 17, 19; Phil. 2: 13; John 15: 4, 5; Col. 1: 12, 13; 2: 12, 13." The question, "Whether conversion, once begun in man by the power of the Holy Spirit, afterwards is perfected and preserved by the powers of human nature alone?" is answered in the negative. Hutt. (Loc. Com., 286): "For, neither by this operation of the Holy Spirit is corrupt nature so restored, as to have it in its power to change itself for the better, or to no longer need the aid of the Holy Spirit, but be able to stand in grace by its own power, and to persevere unto the end. But all these things, no less than the beginning of conversion, are to be ascribed to the Holy Spirit, who works in us not only to will, but also to do, and who consummates and perfects the good that He begins in us, and by His own power guards and preserves the regenerate unto the end, Phil. 1: 6; 2: 13; 1 Pet. 1: 5; 5: 10." And the statement is firmly maintained that the causes of our conversion are only two, Hutt. (Loc. Com., 284): "Again, the theologians differ widely in their views, some holding that there are only two, viz., the Holy Spirit and the Word of God, and others three, adding to those already mentioned also a third, namely, the will of man; which divergence has occasioned great commotions in the Church of God. This strife, however, it seems could be readily controlled and quieted, if we would accurately distinguish between the two kinds of men who are to be converted, and so also of conversion itself. . . . For the question is either concerning the original conversion, which is that of the ungodly, or unbelievers and those never regenerated, or concerning the second conversion, which is the daily repentance of believers and of the regenerate. If the question be concerning original conversion, surely neither more nor less causes of conversion can or ought to be assigned than two, so that those who here add a third, and insist upon the will of man, are partakers of the synergistic error. . . . Whence, if an unbelieving man who has never been regenerate is to be converted, we assert that only two causes concur, but vastly differing in kind: the one truly efficient, which is solely and alone the Holy Spirit; the other the organic or instrumental cause, which is the Word of God preached and heard, as also the right use of the Sacraments." Cal. (X, 16): "Our orthodox theory

is stated in the FORM. CONC., mainly in opposition to the Synergists; . . . to whom are to be added also PH. MELANCHTHON, as also, later, the Helmstadt divines; . . . although there is a difference between the old and new Synergists, that *the latter* ascribe *the beginning* of conversion to the natural powers, and its *progress and completion* to the supernatural grace of the Holy Spirit; while *the former* invert the matter, ascribing the beginning to *the Holy Spirit*, and the completion to *the natural powers.*"

§ 47. (4.) *The Mystical Union.*

The Holy Scriptures assert that God dwells in the believer, and express by this a peculiar union of God with him, which Dogmatics distinguish as a mystical union. This takes place at the instant in which man is justified and regenerated, and is inseparably united with justification and regeneration, so that, as we associate with justification the forgiveness of sins, and with regeneration the power to believe, so in the mystical union we describe the direct operation of both these acts of divine grace, which consists in this, that God makes His abode in a peculiar manner in the justified or regenerate. [1] By this mystical union more is expressed than a mere agreement of the will of man with the will of God, or a mere union of both in love, or a mere influence and communication of spiritual gifts on the part of the Holy Ghost. [2] The passages, John 14: 23; 1 Cor. 6: 15, 17; Eph. 5: 30; 2 Pet. 1: 4; Gal. 3: 27; 2: 19, 20, prove, moreover, that this union is not merely figurative, but literal and actual, so that it cannot be described otherwise than as the union of the substance of God with the substance of man, in consequence of which God pours out the fulness of His gracious gifts upon the regenerate. [3] It is therefore carefully to be distinguished from that indwelling which is mentioned in Acts 17: 28; for, although in this passage a substantial union of God with man is expressed, it must be of a different character from the other, as the one is common to all creatures, the other belongs to believers. Therefore the one, as a *special union*, is distinguished from the other as a *general union*. [4] This union is characterized further as a "*mystical union* (because it is a great mystery (Eph. 5: 32), the specific mode of which is unsearchable), also as *spiritual* (since it is brought about not in a carnal or corporeal, but in

a spiritual and supernatural manner, by the Holy Spirit graciously dwelling in the regenerate)." Holl. (934). As we are unable to give a more specific representation of the nature and manner of this union, we limit ourselves to the removal of erroneous views of it. It would be wrong to suppose that in this union the two substances, the divine and the human, are united in such a manner that the two substances become one, or that the one is absorbed in the other; or, as if out of the two persons, God and man, one person were constituted, as in the case of the two natures in Christ. The *mystical union* is therefore not a substantial[5] and not a personal union.[6]

[1] In regard to the order in which the mystical union follows upon the preceding regeneration and justification, Quen. (III, 621): "Regeneration, justification, union, and renovation are simultaneous, and, being more closely united than the ingredients of an atom (*quovis puncto mathematico arctiores*), so cohere that they cannot be separated or rent asunder. Yet, according to our mode of conceiving of them, justification and regeneration are prior in order to the mystical union. For when, in regeneration, a man receives faith, and by faith is justified, then only does he begin to be mystically united to God. But renovation is subsequent to union, for from good works, which are the effects of renovation, the existence of both justification and the mystical union is inferred, *a posteriori;* therefore they follow each other in this order, according to our conception. Regeneration precedes, that faith may be attained. Justification follows, which is of faith. The mystical union then occurs, which is succeeded by renovation and sanctification."

According to another mode of considering this, it may be said that union precedes justification, inasmuch as faith precedes justification; and in faith, as the organ by which the union is effected, its beginning is already presupposed. Therefore Holl. (933), after consenting to this view, adds: "Although the mystical union, by which God dwells in the soul as in a temple, may, according to our mode of conception, follow justification in the order of nature, it is however to be acknowledged that the formal union of faith, by which Christ is apprehended, put on, and united with us, as the mediator and the author of grace and pardon, logically precedes justification. For faith is imputed for righteousness, so far as this receives the merit of Christ, and so unites it with ourselves as to make it ours."

The union may be conceived *as an act*, inasmuch as it takes

place instantaneously, and is then more particularly to be defined as a uniting (*unitio*) "or the act of union, which is transient and momentary, and takes place at the same time with regeneration and justification;" or, "*as a state*, which is properly and specifically called union (*unio*), and remains unbroken as long as the justified person avoids voluntary sins."

[2] QUEN. (III, 623): "The mystical union does not consist merely in the harmony and tempering of the affections, as when the soul of Jonathan is said to be united to David, 1 Sam. 18: 1, but in a true, real, literal, and most intimate union; for Christ, John 17: 21, uses the phrase, 'to be in some one,' which implies the real presence of the thing which is said to be *in*, not figuratively, as a lover in the beloved. The mystical union does not consist alone in the gracious operation of the Holy Spirit in believers. For when Christ says, John 14: 23, 'I and my Father,' etc., and 5: 16, 'the Holy Spirit,' etc., these are not names of operations but persons. And it is entirely wanton to convert such emphatic words, expressing a reality (ὑπαρκτικὰ), by which this mystical union is described, into mere energetic expressions (ἐνεργητικὰ); for example, to come, to be sent into hearts, to dwell, to remain, to live in any one. For these are personal properties, and not attributes of operations."

[3] HOLL. (932) defines: "The mystical union is the spiritual conjunction of the triune God with justified man, by which He dwells in him as in a consecrated temple by His special presence, and that, too, substantial, and operates in the same by His gracious influence." QUEN. (III, 622): "The mystical union is the real and most intimate conjunction of the substance of the Holy Trinity and the God-man Christ with the substance of believers, effected by God Himself through the Gospel, the Sacraments, and faith, by which, through a special approximation of His essence, and by a gracious operation, He is in them, just as also believers are in Him; that, by a mutual and reciprocal immanence they may partake of His vivifying power and all His mercies, become assured of the grace of God and eternal salvation, and preserve unity in the faith and love with the other members of His mystical body." While QUEN. thus, already in his definition of the mystical union, incorporates with it union with Christ, the God-man, CAL. (X, 526) distinguishes between the spiritual union of the regenerate with the triune God and the conjunction with Christ, the God-man; and he thus defines the latter: "The mystical union of Christ with the believer is a true and real and most intimate conjunction of the divine and human nature of the theanthropic Christ with a regen-

erated man, which is effected by the virtue of the merit of Christ through the Word and Sacraments; so that Christ constitutes a spiritual unit with the regenerated person, and operates in and through him, and those things which the believer does or suffers He appropriates to Himself, so that the man does not live, as to his spiritual and divine life, of himself, but by the faith of the Son of God, until he is taken to heaven." And he specifies, as the accompaniments and consequences of the mystical union of believers with Christ (p. 568), "A spiritual anointing; the designation of Christians [the anointed] taken from this; the mystical espousal with Christ. The mystical anointing is that by which the regenerate, having been consecrated to the Holy Spirit by virtue of Christ's anointing, have been furnished with His gifts as spiritual prophets, priests, and kings. (P. 572): The espousal of Christ with believers is that by which He eternally marries Himself to believers through faith, so that they become one spirit, and by His power communicates to them, as to His spiritual bride, intimate and enduring love, all His blessings and all His glory, so as finally to lead them to His home, and dwell with them in His celestial and eternal kingdom." The Form. Conc. hints at the mystical union when (Sol. Dec., III, 65) it designates as false the assertion that "not God Himself, but only the gifts of God, dwell in believers." The extremes or limits of the mystical union are then thus defined: "The essence of the subjects to be united are, on the one part, the divine substance of the whole Trinity, 2 Pet. 1: 4, and the substance of the human nature of Christ, John 15: 1, 2, 4; 1 Cor. 6: 15–17; Eph. 5: 30; Gal. 2: 19, 20; on the other part, the substance of believers, as to body and soul, 1 Cor. 6: 15, 19; Eph. 5: 30." The *form* of this union consists "in a true, real, intrinsic, and most close conjunction of the substance of the believer with the substance of the Holy Trinity and the flesh of Christ." Quen. (III, 619) proves the Mystical Union "(1) from the promise of Christ, John 14: 23, 26; 15: 26. But formally to come to any one, denotes accession and approximation to him, and thus the advent of the sacred Trinity to believers, and *the presence not only of His gifts*, but likewise of His essence itself. (2) From the indwelling in believers, Eph. 3: 17; Rom. 8: 9; 2 Cor. 6: 16. (3) From the unity of believers with God, John 17: 21. The gradation which Christ uses in this place indicates that the spiritual union, whereby He (v. 23) is in believers, is more intimate than that by which the believers (v. 21) are one with God through the communion of the Spirit; and likewise in the mode and form it differs from that which is described in v. 22, where believers are said to be one with

each other on account of the unity of faith, love, and hope, for there is superadded a full statement of the consummation (which He explains in the words: 'I in them and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one.'). (4) From the partaking of the divine nature, 2 Pet. 1: 4."

This Mystical Union is further described in the Holy Scriptures by the expressions: the espousal of believers with Christ, Hos. 2: 19; the mystical marriage of Christ and the Church, Eph. 5: 32; the union of the members and of the Head, Eph. 1: 22, 23; the insertion of the spiritual branches in the spiritual vine, Christ, John 15: 4–7; the abiding of the whole Trinity with regenerate man, John 14: 23.

[4] CAL. (X, 511): "Although we do not admit an essential union after the manner of a graft that coalesces in one numerical essence with the trunk of the tree, yet we think that here there takes place not only that common union of men with the substance of God of which we are told in Acts 17: 28, nor only a union of human substance and accident, or operations, and of the divine movements; but we assert that the substance of the believer is united with the substance of the entire Holy Trinity through a conjunction of substance to substance, without extension or contraction of the divine or human essence, by a change of manner only, which according to God's gracious will is different in this life from what it will be in eternal life."

HOLL. (933): "The general union is that whereby all believers and unbelievers live and move and have their being in God. As fishes in water and birds in the air, so all men live and move and are in God, because He gives to all life and breath and all things." QUEN. (III, 614): "The general union of all men with the *substance* of God the Creator is indicated in Acts 17: 28, where the preposition '*in*' expresses the general presence of God with men. Hugo Grotius explains the particle ἐν by a Hebraism, so that *in Him* would be *by* Him, by His favor. But there is no necessity of departing from its ordinary acceptation. For neither is the origin only expressed, that we are of Him, but in addition the divine περιχώρησις, that in Him we live and move and are."

The *special union* is partly "a *gracious* one, in the Church Militant, whereby God dwells in the regenerate by His substantial presence, and operates in them by His special concurrence, John 14: 23; 17: 11, 21;" and partly a "*glorious* one, in the triumphant assembly of the elect, whereby God fills and delights the elect with the plentitude of His grace. 1 Cor. 15: 28." HOLL. (933). As, therefore, in the general union there is likewise assumed a connec-

tion of the divine substance with man, and not merely a gracious operation, the special union is distinguished from it in this way, that in it a new approximation of the divine essence and one different from the omnipresence is assumed, "which is so limited to the believer that the divine substance cannot be said to be present in this way to the wicked and other creatures; and thus the manner of the presence in this union is expressed by a new approximation of the substance." In reply to the objection: "Whatever as to its substance is already present, while it is present, is necessarily present and cannot be absent, and, therefore, it cannot be said that it comes, draws nigh, or approximates by its substance anew. But, as the Holy Trinity as to its substance, or the divine essence by the common and general presence, is already present to all creatures, and thus also to believers; therefore He cannot approach them by a new and special presence," QUEN. answers (III, 629): "(1) The substance of the Holy Spirit willed to unite itself in a peculiar manner of presence with the dove, and thus to manifest itself to the Baptist, so that where the dove might be, there it could correctly and truly be said that the substance of the Holy Spirit was present in that peculiar kind of presence. (2) That the divine essence, as essence, could admit of such an approximation without the danger of its losing immensity, the peculiar mode of its presence in Christ proves, in whom the divine nature is so united to the finite human nature, that in this way it neither is nor wishes to be anywhere else; which presence is determined, certainly not by a new mode of operating, but by the intimate immanence of one near substance in another. And although this presence is very peculiar, yet it cannot be denied, because it may be deduced from the hypostatical union, that such an approximation is not entirely repugnant to the divine essence." And the position is constantly maintained, that, as the union in general is not a mere gracious operation of the Holy Spirit, so the special union does not differ from the general merely by a new and special mode of operating, but by a new approximation of the essence, and that distinct from the common mode of presence.

[5] QUEN. (III, 624): "This union does not consist in *transubstantiation*, or the conversion of our substance into the substance of God and of Christ, or *vice versâ*, as the rod of Moses was converted into a serpent. Nor in *consubstantiation*, so that of two united essences there is formed one substance." HOLL. (939): "(*a*) God dwells in us as in temples, by the favor of the mystical union, 1 Cor. 3: 16; but the habitation is not changed into the inhabitant nor the inhabitant into the habitation; (*b*) By the mystical union

we put on Christ, Gal. 3: 27; but the garment is not essentially one with the person who wears it. (*c*) The divine nature is very distinct from the human, although God comes to us and makes His abode with us, John 14: 23, for He can depart from man to whom He has come. The mystical union is, therefore, indeed, called a union of substances, but, strictly taken, not a formal substantial union (such as is that of a graft which coalesces with the trunk into the essence of the tree numerically one), but it is an accidental union. If, then, it be called a substantial union, as by many, it is not "from the mode of union, but from the result attained, because a human substance is united to a divine."

[6] QUEN. (III, 624): "The mystical union does not consist in a personal union or a coalition of extremes united into one hypostasis or person, such as is the union of the divine and human nature in Christ; so that the believer, united to Christ, could say, I am Christ." HOLL. (939): "Paul teaches that Christ and believers being mystically united remain distinct persons, Gal. 2: 20." QUEN. (III, 624) adds: "The mystical union differs from the sacramental union and communion. The antithesis here is that of: (1) The Weigelians and Schwenkfeldians, who maintain that the mystical union with God, as to its mode, is essential and corporeal. (2) That of some Scholastics, Papists, Socinians, and Arminians, who deny that God remains in believers by a special mode of substantial presence." HOLL. (941).

§ 48. (5.) *Of Renovation.*

It is not enough that man learns to know his sins and hate them, nor that in regeneration he becomes able to grasp the merit of Christ by faith. God desires also that man should exercise this turning away from sin and this return to Him in a moral life, that he cease to be the old and become a new man, leading day by day a more holy life before God. And God Himself works in this direction by His divine grace, seeking to draw off man more and more from sin, and to encourage and strengthen him for that which is good. This operation, however, wrought by God in man, is called *renovation*, so far as through it a change is wrought in man, in consequence of which he may be called a new man; [1] also *sanctification*, so far as now his life begins to become holy. [2] HOLL. (946): "Renovation is an act of grace, whereby the Holy Spirit, expelling the faults of a justified man, endows him with

inherent sanctity. [3] The change that takes place in man consists further in this, that by the influence of divine grace the sin still cleaving to man disappears, more and more, and gives place to an increasing facility for doing what is good. [4] As, however, the sinfulness yet remaining in man yields only through a constantly repeated struggle against sin, this renovation is not a sudden, but a gradual one, susceptible of constant growth; [5] and as sin never entirely leaves man, it is never perfect, [6] although we are always to strive after perfection. Finally, it is a work of God in man, yet of such a nature that there is a free co-operation on the part of man, who now in conversion has received new spiritual powers." [7]

[1] Renovation, too, is taken in a wider and narrower sense. Br. (593): "Renovation *in general* denotes any action by which old things, or things which are injured or weakened or corrupted by age, or in any other way, are restored. So, in the spiritual renovation of man, taken more widely, the old man, as to his entire condition, that is, the deficiency of every kind of spiritual power, the guilt and dominion of sin, is destroyed; and the new man as to his entire extent, that is, his spiritual strength, freedom from guilt, and the habitual gift, by which the dominion of sin is subdued, is said to be produced, 2 Cor. 5: 17, sqq. (where men who are in Christ are said to be new creatures). To this is referred the reconciliation with God and justification by Christ, v. 19, 21." (In which wider sense renovation is taken in the Form. Conc., Sol. Dec., II, 70, in the Ap. Conf., III, 40.) In the Holy Scriptures the word is taken in this wider sense in Heb. 6: 6. Br. (594): "*Renovation, strictly speaking*, signifies a certain *real and intrinsic change in the regenerated or converted man.* This is taken *transitively* (as the action of God producing in us holy impulses and actions; as He is said to give a new heart and a new spirit, Ez. 36: 26, to renew the spirit within us, Ps. 51: 11); and *intransitively* (so far as men furnished with divinely imparted strength are said to renew themselves, making for themselves a new heart and a new spirit, Ez. 18: 31, to lay aside the old man and put on the new, Eph. 4: 22, 24"). To this Holl. remarks (950): "There is really no difference between transitive and intransitive renovation; because (*a*) it denotes the same change, by which from the old man the new comes forth, from a sinner a saint, which is called *transitive*, on account of its connoted dependence on God as the agent who produces it in another; but on the part of the subject, regarded as

a form of an immanent act, it is called *intransitive;* (*b*) both are accomplished by the same power, viz., not human but divine, which the Holy Spirit possesses originally and independently, the regenerate dependently and on account of the mystical union with God."

Quen. (III, 632) thus discriminates renovation from regeneration and justification: "Renovation differs (*a*) *As to the efficient cause.* Regeneration and justification are actions of God alone; renovation is indeed an action of God, but not of God alone, for the regenerate man also concurs, not in his own strength, but through divinely granted power. (*b*) *As to the subject.* Man altogether dead in sins is the subject of regeneration. The sinner, indeed, is the subject of justification, Rom. 4: 5, 17, yet one recognizing his sins and believing in Christ; but the subject of renovation is man already justified. (*c*) *As to the object.* Regeneration is occupied with the production of faith; justification with imputable righteousness; renovation with inherent righteousness. (*d*) *As to the form.* Regeneration consists in the bestowment of spiritual life, and a transfer from a state of wrath to a state of grace; justification in the remission of sins and the imputation of Christ's righteousness; but renovation in a reformation of the mind, will, and affections, and so of the whole man, or in a restoration of the divine image, commenced in this life and to be completed in the next. (*e*) *As to the properties.* Both regeneration and justification are instantaneous; renovation is progressive, from day to day." Grh. (VII, 294): "Regeneration, properly so called, like carnal generation, does not admit of degrees. But renovation does, because the interior man is renewed from day to day." "(*f*) *As to the order.* Regeneration precedes justification, and justification precedes renovation. Renovation is related to justification as an effect to a cause, and follows it, not in the order of time, but of nature. Therefore Paul does not use these words indiscriminately. Tit. 3: 5."

[2] It is likewise taken either *in a wider sense*, so that it embraces in its limits calling, illumination, conversion, regeneration, justification, and renovation, as Eph. 5: 26; Heb. 10: 10; or *in a narrower sense*, so that it coincides with renovation, strictly speaking, as in Rom. 6: 19, 22; 1 Thess. 4: 3, 4, 7. Br. (594): "The conferring and obtaining of *internal* (*or inherent*) holiness is here meant; for although, in another respect, there is indeed in the act of justification the imputation of another's holiness, namely, Christ's (to which the passages 1 Cor. 1: 30; Heb. 10: 14, may be referred), yet men themselves here are perfecting holiness in the fear of the Lord, 2 Cor. 7: 1." "In accordance with this the

predicate of sanctity can be ascribed to the new man, but he is holy, not of himself, but of grace, Ps. 86: 2; 1 Cor. 6: 11; not so much in himself as in Christ, Phil. 1: 1; 1 Cor. 1: 2; not by completed, but by commenced and continued holiness, Phil. 3: 12." Holl. (956).

[3] Holl. (947): "Renovation is an act of applying grace by which the Holy Spirit abolishes the inherent remains of sin in the justified man that it may not reign, and produces in him internal and external affections conformed to the divine will, and thus spiritually good, that, being endowed with the renewed image of God, he may live piously, soberly, and justly, to the glory of God the most holy."

Br. (607), (representing renovation more as a state): "Renovation is a combination of spiritual acts which the regenerate man, God assisting graciously by His Word and Sacraments, puts forth by means of the spiritual strength afforded him, as to his intellect, will, and sensual appetite, in order to destroy the remains of sin, and to acquire greater sanctity, in the way of salvation, to the glory of God."

[4] Quen. (III, 634): "The old man is the starting-point (terminus a quo), the new man the goal (terminus ad quem), Eph. 4: 22; Col. 3: 10." Holl. (553): "The remains of sin are *the starting-point* of renovation, *i. e.*, those remaining in justified men, after illumination, conversion, and regeneration, and which are to be abolished by daily renovation, that they may be diminished and suppressed, although they cannot in this life be entirely eradicated; to wit, some defect of the spiritual powers on the part of the intellect in regard to knowledge, on the part of the will to the pursuit of spiritual good, on the part of the sensual appetite to obey the higher faculties, together with a proclivity of these faculties of the soul to evil. The *point to which renovation tends* is those greater powers which, after illumination, conversion, and regeneration, are conferred upon the justified by the Holy Spirit, viz., a more clear and comprehensive understanding or knowledge of spiritual things, inherent righteousness and holiness in the will, a prompt obedience of the sensual appetite, rendered to the superior faculties; these things being unitedly conferred, the divine image is restored."

"The *form of renovation* consists in the expulsion of mental errors and the illumination of the mind, Col. 3: 10; Rom. 12: 2; in the rectification of the will and the renewing of righteousness and true holiness, Eph. 4: 24; in the restraining of the appetites inclined to evil; in the purity and chastity of the affections; in

the employment of the members of the body in works of righteousness, Rom. 12: 1; in the subduing of the dominion of sin, Rom. 6: 13, 19."

[5] Holl. (955): "As the body of sin in process of time is more and more weakened by the regenerate man, so the regenerate man is transformed more and more into the image of God from glory to glory by the Holy Spirit (2 Cor. 3: 18; 4: 16). The body of sin, Rom. 6: 6, is called figuratively the old man, as it is a compound of many sins, as of parts and members. As formerly criminals were affixed to the cross, and their limbs bruised, mortified, buried, and corrupted, so successively the old man is crucified when the desires of his flesh are restrained and as if bound; he is bruised, 1 Cor. 9: 27, so far as the flesh is kept under, the external pleasures of this world being removed; being bruised, he is mortified, Rom. 8: 13, so far as the strength to emerge is taken from sin; mortified, he is buried, Rom. 6: 4, inasmuch as the memory and the thought of illicit things are removed; buried, he corrupts, so that the entire body of sin is abolished, here inchoatively and continuously, in the life to come completely, Rom. 6: 6." Renovation is therefore to be considered a continually progressive action both on God's and on man's part. Quen. (III, 636): "The Holy Spirit renews man, while by means of the organs of grace, the Word and Sacraments, He enkindles in him various pious inclinations; indeed, renovation is nothing but those continuous acts by which actual sanctity is effected in man, carried on, continued, and preserved." Therefore, also, renovation is distinguished (Holl., 956) as "commenced, continued, and completed."

[6] Quen. (III, 636): "Renovation in this life is partial and imperfect, admitting degrees, and therefore it never attains the highest acme of perfection. For sin remains in the regenerate, affects their self-control, the flesh lusts against the Spirit, and therefore our renovation progresses from day to day, and is to be continued through life, 2 Cor. 4: 16. The want of perfection in renovation does not arise from the impotency of God, who renews, but from the incapacity of man, who is the recipient of the divine action." It can therefore have augmentations and diminutions. Quen. (III, 636): "Renovation is increased by godly acts and frequent efforts. These being intermitted or diminished, a diminution follows, so there is at one time an increase, at another a decrease. The Holy Scriptures expressly affirm that the renovation of the regenerate in this life ought continually to increase and grow, Eph. 4: 16."

The question whether the new man, if sin still cleaves to him,

can be considered spiritual, HOLL. (957) decides thus: "When a renewed man is called spiritual, the reason of the denomination is derived from that which is preponderant, to wit, from the prevailing spirit; but when *the same* is called carnal, the reason is derived from that which is subordinate, to wit, from the flesh, subdued indeed, but rebelling and resisting, with which man justified, placed in the way of life, is continually carrying on war."

[7] QUEN. (III, 633): "The first efficient cause is the entire Trinity (1 Thess. 5: 23; John 15: 4, 5); terminatively;* appropriatively, the Holy Spirit (Rom. 15: 16; Tit. 3: 5; Rom. 1: 4; Gal. 5: 22)." HOLL. (949): "The regenerate and justified man concurs in the work of his sanctification as a secondary cause, subordinate and moved by God, so that he renews himself daily by the powers which he has received from above. The Holy Spirit produces in man, without human concurrence, the power to produce good works and the first act of sanctification; but man concurs in the second act of sanctification, or in the exercise and continuance of it, when once introduced by the Holy Spirit. . . . The regenerate man co-operates with God in the work of sanctification, not by an equal action, but in subordination and dependence on the Holy Spirit, because he works, not *with native* but with *granted powers*. This is inferred from the words of the apostle, Phil. 2: 12, 13."

SUPPLEMENTARY.†

§ 49. *Of Good Works.*

Renovation makes itself known by good works. [1] By these we understand such acts as are performed by the regen-

* [For the ground of this distinction, see § 19, Note 22, last paragraph. As applicable to this article, HOLL. (344) has very clearly presented it thus: "Sanctification is, indeed, a divine action *ad extra*, and therefore is undivided, or, in other words, is common to all three persons of the Godhead, and accordingly is ascribed also to God the Father, John 17: 17, and God the Son, Heb. 9: 14. But in the Holy Scriptures and the Apostles' Creed the Holy Spirit is characterized by an outward mark of discrimination, as it were, so that he is said to sanctify us *terminatively*, Rom. 15: 16."—TR.]

† Most of the Dogmaticians discuss the doctrine of *good works* immediately after that of *faith*. GRH. (VIII, 1): "The article of good works conveniently follows the doctrine of justification by faith. For, although we are justified by faith

erate in accordance with the divine will, [2] whether they be outward visible acts or inward acts, impulses, and movements in man. [3] They are called good works, not as though they were good and perfect in themselves, [4] for such cannot be performed by sinful men, [5] but because they are the outgrowth of a good disposition, well pleasing to God, and because they proceed from the faith of one who is reconciled to God. [6] They cannot be produced, therefore, until man has been regenerated, because not until then does such a disposition, wrought by the Holy Ghost and well pleasing to God, dwell in man, and not until then has he become able to do what is good; [7] wherefore, even those acts of the unregenerate which externally correspond with the divine Law cannot at all be called good works. [8] Such good works, however, *must* be wrought by the regenerate; not, indeed, as though they had thereby to justify themselves before God, or to merit their salvation (for unless they were already justified, they could not perform good works), but because they thereby show their obedience toward God, whose will it is that He be honored by a holy life and good deeds, and at the same time, through them, demonstrate the actual existence of such a believing disposition. Where this exists it inwardly impels to the performance of good works with the same necessity with which the good tree produces good fruits. [9] This necessity is, therefore, no compulsion imposed from without upon man, nor does it destroy his Christian liberty; rather, this exhibits itself by the very fact that man now, with inward pleasure, and under promptings of his own, can accomplish what the Law of God demands of him. [10] And for this he has a right, too, to expect reward from God; but this is a gracious reward, and the prospect of such reward is not the leading motive for the performance of such good works. [11]

[1] Br. (607): "To the doctrine concerning renovation belongs

without works, and thence good works are to be removed from the forum of justification, yet that true and living faith by which we are justified is not without works, since the blessings of justification and sanctification, regeneration and renovation, are united in a constant and indissoluble bond.") We here follow, however, the arrangement of Br., because the connection of faith and justification would be too much broken by the introduction between them of the doctrine of good works.

that of good works, which partly are related to renovation as an end and effect, and partly have respect to its formal reason."

[2] Holl. (1190): "Good works are free acts of justified persons, performed through the renewing grace of the Holy Spirit, according to the prescription of the divine Law, true faith in Christ preceding, to the honor of God and the edification of men."

[3] Ap. Conf. (III, 15): "We profess, therefore, that there is a necessity for the Law to begin in us and to increase more and more. And we embrace both together, viz., spiritual emotions and external good works." Holl. (1190): "By works here are understood not only external visible actions (which proceed from the hand or tongue), but internal affections of the heart and movements of the will, and thus the entire obedience and inherent righteousness of the regenerate. A distinction is, therefore, to be made between internal and external good works. The former are seen by the eyes of God alone, and comprise the inner thoughts of the mind, the movements of the will, and the pure affections of the heart (such as love, the fear of God, confidence towards God, patience, humility). The latter are seen not only by God, but likewise by man, and manifest themselves by outward demeanor, words, and actions. It has seemed good to holy men of God to use the appellation of works rather than habits or affections, as all the praise of true virtue consists in action, and as external works are more known than internal qualities and affections; finally, as the works of the regenerate alone are deserving of the praise of good works." Quen. (IV, 306): "A good work is that which God commands, and which is done with the disposition, manner, and purpose for which it has been commanded." Holl. (1198) adds also: "A good intention is to be accounted among good internal works."

[4] Holl. (1190): "The works of regenerate and justified men are called good, not absolutely, as if they were perfectly good, but in their kind, because (*a*) they derive their origin from the good Spirit of God, Ps. 143: 10; (*b*) they proceed from a good heart, Matt. 12: 35; (*c*) they are in some degree conformed to the good will of God, expressed in the Law, Rom. 12: 2; and (*d*) they design a good end, the glory of God." Quen. (IV, 306): "The works of the regenerate, in themselves considered, are not perfectly good, but are rendered sordid and polluted by the stain of sin; but in Christ they are perfectly good, and in such a sense that what is not done in them is pardoned through and on account of Christ, and what is wanting to their perfection is compensated for by the imputation of the most perfect obedience of Christ."

[5] Much more, all good works are imperfect. Holl. (1199): "The good works of regenerated and renovated men do not reach that degree of perfection that they cannot increase (Eph. 4: 15), nor do they perfectly correspond to the divine Law (Rom. 7: 14), nor are they so complete that they can sustain the rigid scrutiny of divine justice (Ps. 143: 2), but they are imperfect (James 3: 2)." Br. (612): "Since sin has entered the world, and adheres tenaciously even to regenerated men, so that the flesh constantly strives against the Spirit, it happens that we do not do the things that we would (Gal. 5: 17). And so, sometimes, in the circumstances of good actions, we err and stumble, or do not operate with that promptitude and alacrity which are due, but with diminished zeal; or we pollute our works, however good, by an inordinate self-love attending or following." In this is already embraced the rejection of works of supererogation (works not due, to which man is not bound by the divine precept). Holl. (1202): "As the works of the regenerate, to the performance of which they are bound by the divine Law, are not perfect, much less are those which they are not bound to do performed in a perfect manner."

[6] Holl. (1191): "The source through which the renewed man performs good works is true and living faith in Christ (Gal. 5: 6), which is called the cause of good works by emanation (Matt. 5: 16)." The form or formal reason of good works is, therefore, "*when they are considered absolutely and in themselves*, the ἐυνομία or conformity with the Law of God (which is the rule and canon of good works); but, when reference is had *relatively* to the special favor of God, so far as, although they may not exactly correspond to the Law, they nevertheless please God, their form is faith in Christ." (Id. 1193.)

Grh. (VIII, 14): "Since the works of even the regenerate are imperfect and impure, therefore, that they may please God, it is necessary that faith in Christ should be added, on account of whom apprehended by faith, not only the person, but likewise the good works, of the regenerate please God. Hence it is said that faith is the form of good works in the regenerate." Ap. Conf. (III, 68): "'Works,' which although they are performed in the flesh not yet entirely renovated, which retards the motions of the Holy Spirit and imparts some of its own impurity, nevertheless *on account of faith* are holy and divine works, the offerings and administration (*politia*) of Christ, showing His kingdom before the world." Holl. (1193): "Although these works are imperfect and impure, they are nevertheless acceptable to God, because their stains are covered with the veil of Christ's most perfect obedience, which the

regenerate apply to themselves and make their own by faith." As the adequate and infallible rule of good works is designated: "The divine Law, comprehended in the Decalogue, which perfectly and sufficiently commands the things to be done, and prohibits the things that are to be shunned, Deut. 12: 32." Holl. (1192): But the conscience of the renewed (1 Cor. 4: 4) is discarded as a primary and simply infallible rule; much more the dictates of right reason, and the law of nature, though the former may have authority as a secondary norm, so far as it applies the divine Law to a particular or single action, and shows what is to be done here and now. Even the Gospel is not the norm or directive principle of good works, but rather a *conferring* principle (because it confers the Holy Spirit, through whose impulses, and communication of strength and co-operation we do good), and *productive* (because it produces faith, the basis of every good action). Comp. Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., VI, 10 sq.): "It is distinctly to be explained, what the Gospel contributes to the new obedience of believers, and what (as to the good works of believers) is the office of the Law. For the Law teaches that it is the will and command of God, that we should lead a new life; but it does not give us strength and faculties with which we can commence and afford the new obedience. But the Holy Spirit, who is given and received by the preaching not of the Law but of the Gospel, renews the heart of man. Afterwards the same Spirit uses the ministration of the Law, that by it He may teach the regenerate, and show them in the Decalogue what is that good and acceptable will of God (Rom. 12: 2), that they may know that good works are to be observed, as those which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them (Eph. 2: 10)."

[7] Ap. Conf. (III, 4): "Because faith brings the Holy Spirit and produces a new life in the heart, it is necessary that it should produce spiritual affections in the heart. After we are justified by faith and regenerated, we begin to fear God, to love, to ask and expect assistance of Him . . . we begin likewise to love our neighbors, because our hearts have spiritual and holy emotions. These things cannot take place unless, being justified by faith and regenerated, we receive the Holy Spirit. . . . Likewise, how can the human heart love God while it perceives Him to be dreadfully angry, and to be oppressing us with temporal and perpetual calamities? But the Law always accuses us, and constantly shows that God is angry. Therefore, God is not loved till after we have obtained mercy through faith."

[8] Form. Conc. (IV, 8): "Although those works which tend

to the preservation of external discipline (such as are performed also by unbelievers and men not converted to God, and are indeed required of them) have their dignity and praise before men, and are honored by God with temporal rewards in this world, yet as they do not proceed from true faith, they are really sins before God, that is, contaminated with sin, and are reputed as sins and impurity by God, on account of the corruption of human nature, and because the individual is not reconciled to God, Matt. 7: 18; Rom. 14: 23."

Holl. (1193): "The upright works of unregenerate men (whether they be out of the Church or have an external connection with it, Grh. (VIII, 6)), which contribute to external order and the preservation of society, are civilly and morally to some extent good; but they are not good theologically and spiritually, nor do they please God; and, therefore, inasmuch as they are destitute of the constituents of really good works, they are properly called splendid sins." When, for instance, on the basis of Rom. 2: 14, it is conceded, that even the unregenerate may do the things of the Law, this is thus restricted: "The will of man can in some measure attain civil righteousness, or the righteousness of works; can speak of God; can worship God in an external manner, obey the magistrate, and parents in the selection of worldly pursuit; can restrain the hands from slaughter, from adultery, from theft." Ap. Conf. (VIII, 70). But spiritually good works are thus characterized: "(1) They are the fruits of the Spirit, Gal. 5: 22. (2) They are performed by persons reconciled to God through Christ. (3) They proceed from a pure heart, a good conscience, and faith unfeigned. 1 Tim. 1: 5. (4) They are spontaneous and free actions. (5) They are directed to the glory of God." (Holl., 1194.) The requisites of truly good works are wanting, therefore, in the works of the unregenerate, and in addition, "This defect of their actions is not supplied by the imputation of another's righteousness, since the unregenerate do not accept and apply to themselves by faith the vicarious obedience of Christ." Holl. (ib.). Further it is admitted, that such an action is not only in its outward manifestation good and right, but that in addition good is done by it, yet it is not really good on that account, as it is not produced in the right spirit. Quen. (IV, 312): "Although, therefore, some of the actions of unregenerate men are not vicious in themselves and as to their substance, they are, nevertheless, by way of accident vicious, viz., because they are devoid of the requisites of really good works before God. Wherefore, when even the virtuous actions of unbelievers are called sins by Augustine, Luther, and

others, it is not in respect to the very matter or substance of the actions, nor so far as they are undertaken and performed according to the views of right and wrong remaining in this corrupt nature since the Fall (for in this manner we grant that they are good), but in respect to the efficient, formal, and final cause of works, by which their good or bad quality is to be estimated in God's judgment, to wit, because their works are polluted and contaminated by sins, as they are not performed by a person reconciled to God, and regenerated by the Holy Spirit, nor to the glory and honor of God."

[9] Ap. Conf. (III, 68): "The works are to be done on account of the command of God; likewise, for the exercise of faith; further, on account of confession and giving of thanks." Quen. (IV, 308): "Good works are not indifferent or arbitrary, but evidently necessary for every man, particularly for the regenerate, though not by a necessity of constraint. Good works should be spontaneous and free, not constrained. For they are necessary, neither to acquire salvation (as a means), nor to earn salvation (as a merit), nor to attain salvation (as an indispensable condition or cause), nor to reach it (as a mode of coming to a final goal), nor, finally, to preserve it (as a conserving cause). But we hold good works to be necessary, by the necessity, (1) of the divine command, Mal. 1:6; Matt. 5:44; (2) of our duty, or of gratitude due for the benefits of creation, redemption, etc.; (3) of presence (that believers may not lose the grace of God and faith, and fall from the hope of the inheritance, although not by reason of an efficacy of the work to obtain righteousness and salvation); (4) of a divinely appointed order and sequence to justification and faith, because as effects they necessarily follow their cause." The Form. Conc. (Epit. IV) decides in regard to the expressions: "Good works are necessary to salvation;" "good works are injurious to salvation," thus: "This is our belief, doctrine, and confession, I. That good works as surely and undoubtedly follow true faith as the fruits of a good tree. II. That good works are to be entirely excluded, not only when justification by faith is the subject, but even when our eternal salvation is discussed. III. All men indeed, especially when they are regenerated and renewed by the Holy Spirit, are under obligation to do good works. IV. And in this statement the words *necessary*, *due*, *ought*, are used correctly, for they do not conflict with regeneration and the form of sound words. V. But by the words *necessity*, *necessary*, when, for instance, the subject is the regenerate, constraint is not to be understood, but only that due obedience, which true believers, inasmuch

as they are regenerate, perform, not by compulsion or by the force of the Law, but with a free and spontaneous spirit. . . . VI. We confess that, when it is said, that the regenerate do good works with a free and spontaneous spirit, this is not to be taken in such a sense as though it were left in the will of regenerate man to do good or evil, as he thinks proper, and nevertheless to retain his faith although he may intentionally remain in sin." The two expressions (good works are necessary, injurious to salvation) are rejected as liable to misapprehension.

[10] Holl. (1203): "Good works are not actions free from the necessity of obligation or duty, but are said to be actions free from the necessity of constraint (because they are not extorted by the threats of punishment, or externally, and in appearance, performed contrary to the will), and of immutability (since the will is no longer determined to the constant thought and perpetration of evil, as before conversion; but can freely choose, and do good works by supernatural strength, received from the Holy Spirit; can likewise choose evil works by the remains of the flesh, still adhering to it, since it is not determined to good as the angels are); and are performed by the regenerate, freed from the servitude of sin by the Holy Spirit (John 8: 36; Rom. 6: 18; 2 Cor. 3: 17)."

[11] Ap. Conf. (III, 73): "We teach that rewards are proposed and promised to the works of believers. We teach that good works are deserving, not of pardon, grace, or justification (for we obtain these solely by faith), but of other bodily and spiritual rewards in this and a future life."

Holl. (1215): "The regenerate have respect in the performance of good works, first, to the glory of God (1 Cor. 10: 31); second, they may have respect with filial affection to the remunerations of this and a future life, not as a due reward or master's compensation, but as gratuitous gifts and divine blessings, to terminate ultimately in the glory of God (1 Tim. 4: 8)."

Remarks.—The greater part of the divines add further an article on the performance of good works, which Quen. has most fully developed. (IV, 309): "The performance of good works in its widest extent can be called the Christian warfare. For the life of the faithful Christian is a continual spiritual warfare, Job 7: 1; 1 Tim. 1: 18; 2 Tim. 2: 3. He fights by faith, hope, and patience. —The *enemies* against whom he must fight are the devil, the world, and the flesh.—The *arms* of the spiritual warfare are described, 2 Cor. 10: 4, 5; Eph. 6: 10–17; 1 Pet. 5: 8.—The *standard* under which we fight is the banner of the cross, Matt. 16: 24.—Definition: This Christian warfare is a daily contest, and an eternal enmity

to everything which is opposed to the will of God and His kingdom." Upon this follow the chapters, "(1) on the *cross*, which is painful suffering, sent by God, as a merciful Father, to believers for a limited time, to the glory of the author and the salvation of the sufferer (351); (2) on *prayer*, a religious act, by which the Christian calls as a suppliant on the Triune God and Christ the God-man, . . . with true confidence of heart, relying on the merit of the Mediator alone and His intercession, to the glory of God and his own and others' salvation." (354.) (HOLL. treats only of prayer, BR. of neither.)

PART IV.

OF THE MEANS OF GRACE.

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§ 50. *Preliminary Statement.*

THE Holy Ghost employs external and visible means, by which He produces in men the effects above described, [1] and appropriates to them salvation in Christ, and we can only then consider an effect as certainly produced by the Holy Spirit when it has been brought to pass through these external means. [2] These means of grace, as they are called, are *the Word of God* and *the Sacraments*. All those, then, who through these means have become partakers of the salvation in Christ, constitute an association which we call the *Church*.

Part IV, hence, treats, (1) Of the Word of God; (2) Of the Sacraments as the means of grace; (3) Of the Church. [3]

CHAPTER I.

Of the Word of God.

IN treating of the Word of God, [4] we consider its efficacy, and the division of its contents.

§ 51. *The Efficacy of the Word of God.*

As the Holy Spirit, through whom alone men are converted, operates only by the Word, this Word must possess the power of producing in man all those effects which are described in the preceding article, On the State of Grace. And this power

is of such a character that it is always attended with success when no opposition is made to it on the part of man. [5] Hence the Word is endowed with *efficacy*, i. e., "*it has an active, supernatural, and truly divine force or power of producing supernatural effects; in other words, of converting, regenerating, and renewing the minds of men.*" Hence the Word of God does not confine itself merely to teaching man externally the way of salvation and showing him the means whereby to attain it. [6] Its power is not to be compared to the convincing force which even an eloquent human discourse possesses; hence its power is not a natural one, such as dwells in every human word, but it is supernatural. [7] This power is inherent in the Word because the Holy Ghost attends it; from the moment that a Word of God is uttered, the Holy Ghost is inseparably and continually connected with it, [8] so that the power and efficacy of the Word is fully identical with that of the Spirit. [9] This is a truly divine efficacy; [10] and, just as we cannot conceive of the Holy Ghost as separate from this efficacy, so neither can we conceive of the Word of God as independent of it. [11] We are not, then, in any way to represent to ourselves the relation of the Word and the Spirit as though the Word were merely the lifeless instrument which the Holy Ghost employed, [12] or as though the Spirit, when He wished to operate through the Word, must always first unite Himself with it, as if He were ordinarily separated from it. [13]

[1] Quen. (IV, 1): "We have heretofore treated of the grounds of our salvation; we must now consider the *means* by which we attain to it. The means, properly so called, on the part of God, are the Word and Sacraments, the saving antidotes to our spiritual disease."

The Word and Sacraments are also designated as means of salvation under the general idea of *the Word* — as the Sacraments are designated as the *Visible Word.*

Conf. Aug. (V, 2). Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., XI, 76): "The Father will draw none to Himself without means, but He employs His Word and Sacraments as the ordinary means and instruments." Art. Smalcald. (VIII, 3): "We must firmly maintain that God bestows His Spirit and grace on none unless through the Word and by the external Word previously declared, that we may fortify ourselves against the Enthusiasts, who boast they have the Spirit

before the Word and without it, and therefore judge, bend, and distort the Scriptures, or oral Word, as they please, as Münzer did, and many others at present do, who wish to discriminate very acutely between the Spirit and the letter." Holl. (991): "The means of salvation are divinely ordained, by which God graciously offers the salvation acquired by Christ, the Mediator, to all men who have fallen into sin, and bestows and preserves true faith in them, and at last introduces all who embrace the merit of Christ and persevere in it into the kingdom of glory."

[2] Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., II, 56): "We should not and cannot always judge of the presence, operations, and gifts of the Holy Spirit from our feelings (the manner and time, viz., when they are experienced in the heart); but, inasmuch as these are often cloaked under much infirmity, we should be convinced from the promise that the Word of God preached and heard is assuredly the ministry and instrument of the Spirit, by which He truly and efficaciously operates in our hearts."

[3] From what was said in the remarks preliminary to the articles on Faith and Justification, it follows that we cannot entirely adhere to the systematic division of the Dogmaticians in this Part IV. They do not treat, namely, of Faith and Works until under this head, and they call Faith also a means of salvation, according to which, therefore, they embrace more than do we under the phrase, means of salvation. This they can do, because they distinguish between "the *means of salvation on the part of God*, δοτικὰ, or those *offering salvation* (the Word and Sacraments), and the *means of salvation on our part*, ληπτικὸν, or that *apprehending the offered salvation* (faith in the merit of Christ)." In this section the Dogmaticians also treat the subject of the last things (death, resurrection of the dead, etc.), inasmuch as they designate these as *means* "*in a general sense*, or executive and isagogical, that is, means divinely instituted, without the previous occurrence of which God does not accomplish the sentence of glorification, and by the final intervention of which men persevering in the faith are introduced into heaven."

As we have assigned to the article of *faith* another place, it also appears better to separate that of the last things from this section, so as to confine ourselves, in it, to the proper and limited conception of the means of grace.

[4] The Word, which, in the article *Of the Holy Scriptures*, was described as the source of knowledge, is here viewed as a means of grace.

Holl. (992): "The Word of God is here considered not as the

source of knowledge, but as the means of practice or action, by whose intervention the sinner is led by God to eternal salvation."

The Dogmaticians remark, in advance, that by *the Word* they do not understand the bare external letters of the written Word. QUEN. (I, 169): "We must distinguish between the Word of God as it is *materially* expressed and exhibited in the written characters, points, letters, and syllables adhering to paper or parchment . . . or also in the sound and the external words formed in the air . . . and *formally* considered, as the divine conception and sense which we find expressed in these written letters and syllables and in the words of the preached Gospel. In the former sense it is called the Word of God only figuratively (σημαντικῶς); in the latter, however, κυρίως, properly and strictly, it is the Word of God, the wisdom of God, the mind of God, the counsel of God. We ascribe not to the former, but to the latter, divine power and efficacy."

CAT. MAJ., DECAL. (101): "Such is its virtue and power that where it is recalled to mind, or heard and considered with serious attention and interest, it never passes away without fruit, but always engages, retains, and excites the hearer with some new intelligence, delight, and devotion, and purifies his feelings and thoughts. For the words are not putrid or dead, destitute of sap and vigor, but truly living and efficacious."

The Symbolical Books do not express themselves distinctly on the efficacy of the Word of God. The more fully stated views of the following Dogmaticians, according to which this efficacy or power is *supernatural*, if not precisely in the language of the Symbolical Books, are still in accordance with the opinions maintained in them.

[5] QUEN. (I, 170): "The innate power and tendency of God's Word is always to convince men of its truth, unless its operation is hindered and prevented by voluntary self-assertion and contumacy superadded to a natural repugnance." Hence the Word is to be regarded as producing an effect wherever it is used; but at the same time it depends on the conduct of men whether it has the special effect designed by its author. "The second act is considered either as the ἐνεργεία and operation or as the effect itself. If it be regarded as the energy and operation, then it always accompanies the Word of God preached, read, or heard, *i. e.*, it always exerts itself when legitimately used, since the Word of God is never inoperative, but always operative. But, if it be considered as the effect itself, this does not always follow, in consequence of the impediment interposed by the subject, or on account of the hardness of the hearts upon which it operates. Although, there-

fore, the effect of the preached Word is sometimes hindered, yet the efficacy or intrinsic virtue itself cannot be taken away or separated from it. And thus accidentally it may be inefficacious, not from a deficiency of power, but by the exercise of perverseness, which hinders its operation so that its effect is not attained." . . . Hence the power of the Word is not *irresistible*, but *resistible* (171). This *efficacy*, as belonging to the Word of God, generally, is predicated both of the Law and the Gospel, yet with a distinction.

Quen. (I, 170): "When we attribute to the Word a divine power and efficacy to produce spiritual effects, we wish not to be understood as speaking of the Gospel only, but also of the Law. For, although the Law does not produce these gracious results directly and *per se*, *i. e.*, kindle faith in Christ and effect conversion, since this is rather to be ascribed to the Gospel, still the letter is not on this account dead, but is efficacious after its kind: for it killeth, 2 Cor. 3: 6; it worketh wrath, Rom. 4: 15, etc."

[6] Holl. (992): "The efficacy of the divine Word is not only *objective* or *significative*, like the statue of Mercury, for instance, which points out the path, but does not give power or strength to the traveler to walk in it, but it is *effective*, because it not only shows the way of salvation, but saves souls."

[7] Quen. (I, 170): "The Word works not only by moral suasion, by proposing a lovely object to us, but also by a true, real, divine, and ineffable influence of its gracious power, so that it effectually and truly converts, illuminates, etc., the Holy Spirit operating in, with, and through it; for in this consists the difference between the divine and the human word."

Br. (123): "(The Holy Scriptures have an active, supernatural force or power) which is to be sought neither in the elegance of their style, nor in the sublimity of their thoughts, nor in the power of their arguments; but it is far superior to every created and finite agency."

It is a supernatural power in distinction from that which human eloquence possesses. But in another aspect it is also called *natural*, inasmuch as the Word of God cannot be conceived of without such an efficacy. Quen. (I, 172): "We say that there is a natural efficacy in the Word of God, because it naturally belongs to it, and its essence and nature are such that it could not be the true Word of God unless it contained within itself that divine power and virtue to convert men, etc., etc." Br. (124), however, observes: "To avoid ambiguity and disputes, we avoid the use of this term."

[8] Holl. (993): "A divine power is communicated to the

Word by the Holy Spirit joined with it indissolubly." Hence, there is a native or intrinsic power and efficacy belonging to the Word, deeply inherent in it. The Dogmaticians draw proofs of this, (1) From the qualities which the divine Word ascribes to itself, John 6: 63; Rom. 1: 16; Heb. 4: 12, 13; 1 Thess. 2: 13; 1 Pet. 1: 23; James 1: 21. (2) From the similar supernatural and divine operations which are ascribed to the Word of God and the Holy Spirit, *ex. gr.*, calling, 2 Tim. 2: 14; illumination, 2 Pet. 1: 19; conversion, Jer. 23: 29; regeneration, 1 Pet. 1: 23; justification, 2 Cor. 3: 9; sanctification, John 17: 17. (3) Holl. (ib.): "The Word of God, as such, cannot be conceived of without the divine virtue, or the Holy Spirit, who is inseparable from His Word. For if the Holy Spirit could be separated from the Word of God, it would not be the Word of God or of the Spirit, but a word of man. Nor is there any other Word of God, which is in God, or with which men of God have been inspired, than that which is given in the Scriptures or is preached or treasured up in the human mind. But, as it cannot be denied that that is the divine will, counsel, mind, and the wisdom of God, so it cannot be destitute of the divine virtue or efficacy."

[9] Quen. (I, 183): "We are to assume here not only a certain conjunction or union of distinct actions, or even a unity of aims or effects, but also a unity of energy and operation. For the Holy Spirit does not by Himself do something, and the Word of God by itself something else, in the conversion of men; but they produce *the one effect by one and the same action.* For such is the peculiar nature of the principal and subordinate causes, intrinsically united together, that they produce an effect by one and the same action. Thus the soul and the eye see by a single action, and not by distinct actions."

[10] Br. (124): "Truly that same infinite virtue which is essentially *per se* and independently in God, and by which He enlightens and converts men, is communicated to the Word, and, although it is communicated to the Word, yet it must be considered as divine." . . . But it by no means follows from this that there is a commingling of God and the Word in regard to this divine power; hence Br. (128) says: "They frequently and diligently impress it upon us that the same virtue belongs to God and the Scriptures, but not in the same way; for that of God is essential, fundamental, original, and independent, while that of the Scriptures is dependent and participative or derived." . . . Hence it is said of the Word that it exhibits its power and efficacy ὀργανικῶς, or *instrumentally.* . . . Quen. (I, 172): "The divine Word is not

the principal agent in the work of conversion, regeneration, and salvation, but it is only a suitable means or organ which God ordinarily uses in producing spiritual effects, not indeed by necessity or indigence, as if He so bound His efficacy in the conversion of men to His Word that He could not convert men without any means, or by any other means or organ than His Word if He wished, but of His own free will, because thus it pleased Him. 1 Cor. 1: 21."

[11] QUEN. (I, 170): "Whether the Word be read or not, whether it be heard and believed or not, yet the efficacy of its spiritual effects is always intrinsically inherent in it by the divine arrangement and communication, nor does this divine efficacy only come to it when it is used. For the Word of God, as such, cannot even be conceived of apart from the divine virtue and gracious working of the Holy Spirit, because this is inseparable from the Word of God."

HOLL. (993) uses the following figures: "It possesses and retains its internal power and efficacy even when not used, just as the illuminating power of the sun continues, although, when the shadow of the moon intervenes, no person may see it; and just as an internal efficacy belongs to the seed, although it may not be sown in the field."

In order to avoid misapprehension, it is expressly observed that the Word does not operate *physically* (by the contact of an agent, as opium, poison, fire, etc.), but *morally* (by enlightening the mind, moving the will, etc.); and a distinction is made between the efficacy of the Word considered in the first act and in the second act, or between efficacy and efficiency. When it is said that the Word operates *extra usum*, when not used, it is only meant that the power is constantly inherent in the Word, just as the power to give light always exists in the sun; so that, when the Word is to produce a certain effect, the power must not first come to it, but that the Word exercises its legitimate influence only where it is properly used."

QUEN. (I, 171): "The first act is the operating power *δύναμις ἐνεργητική*; the second act is the real operation. The Word does not exhibit its efficacy in the second act unless in the legitimate use of it."

QUEN. (ib.) (from his Theses against Rathman): "The distinction we make is not unreasonable, between the power, or the *first act*, and the divine operation, or *second act*, of the outwardly read or preached Word. *Per se*, and in itself, it always is a power, or has in itself a power, to move all readers and hearers, hypocrites as

well as believers and converted persons, which is not a *physical* power, physically included in the letter, like that of medicine, but a divine power, which is always communicated to the read or preached Word by the Holy Spirit. But this power, although it is always present in the preached Word, yet is not always operative on all." Holl. (994) illustrates this by the following example: "The hand of a sleeping man does nothing, yet neither is the power of action bestowed on it in vain, nor is the hand thus inoperative, dead."

The Lutheran theologians, in general, had reason to illustrate very particularly the doctrine of the operation of the Word of God, in order to oppose the Enthusiasts and Mystics, who held that the Holy Spirit operated rather irrespectively of the Word than through it; and to oppose also the Calvinists, who, led by their doctrine of predestination, would not grant that the Word possessed this power *per se*, but only in such cases where God chose. Hence the position that the Word also possesses a power *extra usum* was specially defended against Rathman (1628), who denied it, and who appears to have maintained only an *objective efficacy of the Word of God*. (Quen. (I, 174) gives the following opinions of Rathman: "Rathman compares the Word of God to a statue of Mercury, to a picture, to a sign, and even to a channel; namely, to instruments altogether passive and inoperative. He asserts, moreover, that the divine efficacy is external to the Word of God, separable from it at any moment, and merely auxiliary (παραστατικόν); that the Holy Spirit with His virtue joins Himself to the Word only in the mind or heart of man, and only then when it is legitimately and savingly used.") But an efficacy *extra usum* must necessarily be maintained, if the Word of God is not to be put on a precise level with every human word.

Holl. (992) thus sums up the doctrine: "The Word of God is the most efficacious means of salvation, for its power and efficacy are not only objective, but also effective; not consisting in moral suasion, but in supernatural operation; not external and coming to it when used by men, but intrinsic in the Word; not accidental, but necessary, by a divinely ordained necessity, and therefore not separable, but perpetual, inherent in the Word itself *extra usum*, as the *first act*. This efficacy is truly divine, producing the same effect as the Holy Spirit, who is perpetually united with the Word, which (effect) the Spirit influences together with the Word, by the divine power which belongs to the Holy Spirit originally and independently, but to the divine Word *communicatively* and dependently, on account of its mysterious, intimate, and individual union with the Spirit."

[12] Quen. (I, 171): "We must distinguish between the *mere natural instruments*, such as the staff of Moses, the rod of Aaron, etc., employed by God to produce a supernatural effect, and His *essential supernatural means*, such as the Word of God and the Sacraments. The former are destitute of a new motive or elevating power wherewith to produce a new effect beyond their proper and natural power; but the latter, from their very origin and production, are endowed with a sufficient, *i. e.*, a divine and supreme power and efficacy, nor do they need any new and peculiar elevating power beyond the ordinary efficacy already infused into them for producing the spiritual effect." The later theologians, therefore, prefer calling the Word a *means* rather than an *instrument* of the Holy Spirit, although they do not hold that the latter expression, which is used also in the Symbolical Books, is altogether inadmissible, provided that no mere lifeless instrument is thereby understood.

Museus (in Br., 131) distinguishes between "instruments which are not united with an operative cause, unless they be in use, such as an axe, hammer, etc., and instruments which always have an operative cause impliedly and virtually united with them even when not used;" and he holds that the expression *instrument*, in relation to the Word of God, is admissible only in the latter sense. Another distinction is that which is made between *passive* and *co-operative instruments*. But Quen. (I, 186) says: "We grant that the Word of God may be called the instrument or organic cause of conversion, etc., namely, when considered concretely and as administered, so far as the Word of God is externally read or preached. For these external means are truly organs, into which the Spirit enters with His virtue and efficacy."

[13] Hulsem. (in Quen., I, 186) says: "That elevation of the sense of the Word, as they call it, is by no means an accessory and separate power of the Holy Spirit, which may sometimes be absent from the Word; but the Word of God embraces in itself, by its own natural constitution, wonderful and inexplicable divine energy and power of penetration, far better adapted than the sentences of Seneca and Cato to arouse the minds of readers."

§ 52. *The Law and the Gospel.*

The Word of God is divided, according to the different results it produces in men, whose salvation it is to effect, into Law and Gospel. [1]

I. The Law, in which God, by command and prohibition, has made known His will to men, and to the fulfilment of

which He has obligated them, [2] is, according to its widest extent, partly general and applicable to all times, and partly given for a certain period and under certain circumstances. The former is called the *moral* Law, inasmuch as it contains the precepts of God relating to our moral conduct, which remain unchanged at all times, and concern all rational creatures. [3] The latter is called the *ceremonial* and *forensic* Law, inasmuch as it contains the ceremonial and civil precepts which were given to the Jews during the period of the Jewish theocracy. [4] We have here to consider only the former, as the other has already been abrogated by God. [5] The contents of this were written on the heart of man at the creation (hence it is also called the *Law of Nature*), and men, as long as they remained in their original state, had in it a perfect rule for their moral conduct; [6] but after the Fall, when their knowledge was obscured and they heard the voice of God in their hearts but imperfectly, it was necessary for God to adopt another method of making known His will to them, and that was most completely done at the delivery of the Law on Sinai. [7]

The Law there given contains the most perfect rule for our moral conduct, [8] and applies to us no less than to the Israelites. [9] It binds us to the most perfect obedience, and threatens temporal and eternal punishment in case of disobedience; [10] but also promises eternal life to him who perfectly observes it.

As, however, no one since the Fall is able perfectly to keep the Law, we cannot say that the Law avails for our salvation, [11] but it rather serves, first of all, to lead to the knowledge of sin, and render man receptive for the salvation that is in Christ. [12] The former the Law effects by teaching us the difference which exists between its requirements and our deeds; the latter, by alarming us the more we come short of the requirements of the Law, and by constraining and impelling us to long earnestly for a refuge from the wrath of God with which He has threatened every violator of this Law. Thus the Law drives us to Christ, who promises us such a refuge. It is also predicated of it that it contains a call to repentance, and hence we include within the Law everything which con-

tributes to repentance. [13] Besides this, the Law serves to maintain external propriety and morality in the unregenerate: but it is serviceable to the regenerate, because it contains the perfect rule of moral life, both internal and external. According to these different designs for which the Law was given, the use of it is divided into *political*, *elenchtical*, *pedagogical*, and *didactic*. [14]

II. The Gospel. As the Law contains the declaration of the divine will, promising a reward to him who keeps it, and threatening punishment to him who violates it, so the Gospel, in distinction from the Law, contains the doctrine of the gracious pardon of sins, which we receive as a gratuity for Christ's sake through faith. [15] Thus, in the preaching of the Gospel, the means are pointed out to men by which they may escape the condemnation which the Law suspends over them. And when men are brought to a knowledge of sin through the Law, the Gospel enters, holds forth the grace of God, the merit of Christ, and all the benefits therewith associated; [16] and aims at producing faith in them, by which they appropriate to themselves the salvation in Christ.

Different, then, as are the Law and the Gospel in their signification, [17] yet there is no contradiction between them. As they were both alike given by God, so they are both always and equally binding; they both alike have a work to accomplish in all men; they have in view the same final result, namely, the salvation of men, [18] to the attainment of which end each contributes its part. As, by the preaching of the Law, knowledge of sin and repentance are produced, so, by the preaching of the Gospel, faith is effected. The efficacy of the one follows that of the other; but the efficacy of the one does not hence entirely cease where the efficacy of the other begins, for the Law still continues to be a rule for the regenerate, to which he conforms his moral conduct, and it thus works in him a penitence which is renewed daily, inasmuch as it still continually convinces him of his sins. [19]

[1] The division of the Word of God, according to its historical publication in the world, into the Old and New Testaments, belongs to the section which treats of the Scriptures. The division specified above, *i. e.*, Law and Gospel, must be treated under this

article; for the design here is to derive from the Word, and to illustrate, the different operations which must be experienced before man is fully brought to a personal knowledge of salvation in Christ. The division is justified by John 1: 17 and 2 Cor. 3: 6. The Law was given by Moses, *e. g.*, "The letter killeth, but the Spirit giveth life." The *Law* and the *Gospel* are not then here identical with the *Old* and the *New Testament;* for the Old, as well as the New Testament, contains "a preaching of repentance, and a preaching of the remission of sins."

Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., v. 23): "These two kinds of doctrine, viz., repentance and faith, were held in the Church of God from the beginning of the world, yet with a proper distinction. For the posterity of the patriarchs, as well as the patriarchs themselves, not only carefully remembered that man in the beginning was created by God just and holy, and by the guile of the serpent disobeyed the command of God, and thus became a sinner; . . . but they also encouraged and consoled themselves by the most precious announcement concerning the Seed of the woman, . . . and concerning the Son of David who was to restore the kingdom to Israel and to become the light of the Gentiles."

[2] Holl. (996): "The divine Law is the command of God, in which this supreme Lord and Legislator prescribes that which is to be done by men, and prohibits that which is to be avoided, binding them to render a perfect obedience, or, in the deficiency of this, visiting them with punishment."

The term Law is also used in the sense "(1) of everything that is taught by God, Ps. 1: 2; (2) of the Scriptures of the Old Testament, John 15: 25; 1 Cor. 14: 21; (3) of the Mosaic Pentateuch, Luke 24: 44."

Holl. (ib.): "But here the words Law and Gospel are taken, as far as they are adequately contradistinguished."

[3] Holl. (997): "The divine Law is either universal and perpetual, or particular and temporary. The *universal* and *perpetual* Law is the immutable rule of all moral actions, by which God binds all men to do that which is honest and right, and to avoid that which is dishonest and unjust. It is called also the moral Law. The *particular* and *temporary* Law is that which God gave to the Israelites alone, binding them to the obedience of it; it is either ceremonial or judicial, and ceased with the cessation of the Hebrew polity."

[4] Holl. (1026): I. "*The Ceremonial Law* is the command of God, by which the supreme Lord and Legislator bound the people of the Old Testament, and through Moses prescribed to them a

certain form of external worship, that He might remind men of their sins, show from afar to the contrite a Redeemer, and apply and seal covenant grace by two sacraments and various sacrifices. The *external worship*, prescribed to the people of God in the Old Testament, consisted in certain rites to be observed about sacred persons, things, places, and times."

"*The chief end of the Ceremonial Law* is the signification and adumbration of the benefits of Christ, as well as their application by sacraments and sacrifices. The *subordinate end* is the admonition of sin, the observance of proper order in ecclesiastical assemblies and rites, and the separation of the Jewish Church from all association with the Gentiles." (Id., 1027.)

II. "The *Forensic* or *Judicial Law* is the command of God, by which He bound the Israelites in the times of the Old Testament, and through Moses prescribed to them a form of political government, so that external discipline might be preserved in civil society, and that the Jewish polity, in which Christ was to be born, might be distinguished from the polity of other nations. The forensic Law uttered precepts concerning all those things which pertained to the administration of the Israelitic republic, and came under the cognizance of the forum or court of the Jews." (Id., 1030.)

"The *design of the Forensic Law* is: (1) The preservation of external discipline in civil society. (2) The separation of the Jewish polity from that of other nations." (Id., 1031.)

[5] Quen. (IV, 1): "That the Jewish Law is abrogated is evident from the fact that, since the destruction of the Jewish polity and temple, there is no place for sacrifice or the execution of the forensic Law."

[6] Br. (389): "It is otherwise called the Law of Nature, because it is employed about those things which are naturally and *per se* either honorable or base; whether they be such as agree or disagree with rational nature. It is also called the *Moral Law*, in so far as it relates to morals, or to the mode of life which is becoming or unbecoming to a rational creature."

Holl. (997): "The *Natural Law* is the command of God impressed naturally on the minds of all, by which they are informed and bound to do those things which *per se* are right and honorable, and to avoid those things which *per se* are wicked and base."

Quen. (IV, 3): "It is the light and dictate of right reason divinely given to man, enabling him intellectually to discriminate between the common notions of what is just and unjust, honorable and base, that he may understand what is to be done and what is to be avoided."

[7] The Moral Law is therefore divided into the Natural or Connate Law and the Moral Law specially so called.

QUEN. (IV, 1): "In original, uncorrupted nature the natural and moral Laws were entirely the same, but in corrupted nature a great part of the Natural Law has been obscured by sin, and only a very small part of it has remained in the mind of man; and so a new promulgation of Law was instituted upon Mount Sinai, which Sinaitic law is particularly called the Moral Law, and does not in kind differ from the Natural Law."

HOLL. (1002): "The *Moral Law, specially so called*, is the command of God superadded to the Natural Law in the divinely revealed Word, which was often repeated from the beginning of the world, and at last solemnly promulgated on Mount Sinai and reduced to writing, distinctly teaching what is right and forbidding what is wrong, directing all our actions and feelings, binding all men to the most perfect obedience, or, in the deficiency of this, to the most excruciating torments." MEL., Loc. Comm.: "The Law is doctrine divinely revealed, teaching what we ought to be, to do and to omit to do."

GRH. (V, 223): "The Moral Law is summarily comprehended in the Decalogue."

The Dogmaticians generally hold that a *primordial Law* preceded the Sinaitic Law, by which they understand those preparatory revelations which were given to primæval men and the patriarchs.

HOLL. (1003): "The *primordial Moral Law* is that which was given to our first parents, Gen. 2: 17, then revealed to their posterity by the voice of God, and afterwards expounded and taught more fully by the patriarchs, until the solemn promulgation of the Law on Mount Sinai. . . . The primordial Moral Law and the Sinaitic do not differ in substance of doctrine, but in the mode of revelation."

HOLL. (1002) thus states the difference between the Natural and the Moral Law: "The Natural Law does not differ *as to matter* from the Moral Law specially so called, for indeed the Natural Law is summarily contained in the Decalogue; but it differs from it *as to form*. For (1) the Natural Law is inwardly written by nature on the minds of men, the Moral Law is promulgated externally, uttered by the voice of God, and reduced to writing; (2) the Natural Law is more imperfect and obscure, the Moral Law is more perfect and clear. The former directs external discipline; the latter governs and rules the internal as well as the external conduct of men." Concerning the Natural Law, HOLL. (999) further admits, that "there nevertheless remain certain vestiges of it, namely,

universal principles, from which the difference between right and wrong is naturally apparent. Rom. 2: 15."

[8] We hence find in the Dogmaticians a very exact exposition of the Decalogue, comprehending the whole science of ethics.

Chmn. (Loc. c. Th., II, 23): "Such is the brevity of the precepts of the Decalogue that Moses calls them ten words. And yet in that brevity is comprehended everything that pertains to the love of God and our neighbor, and those short sentences are to be the rule and line by which we may ascertain what constitutes sin."

[9] Holl. (1019): "The Sinaitic Moral Law is the perfect rule of things to be done and things to be avoided, neither has it been enlarged by new precepts added by Christ, but only more fully declared and purged from Pharisaic corruptions or additions."

[10] Quen. (IV, 8): "The internal form of the Moral Law consists in a directive and constraining power with respect to doing or avoiding moral acts, binding the conscience to most perfect obedience, or, if this be not rendered, bringing the most dreadful punishment, temporal and eternal, on the violator. James 2: 10; Matt. 5: 19; Deut. 27: 26; Gal. 3: 10." And, indeed, "the Law demands conformity not only in external actions, but also in internal; neither is it satisfied with any interior effort of the will, but it requires love, *i. e.*, the most ardent feelings, and indeed from the whole heart, the whole soul, and all the strength."

[11] Br. (630): "The Moral Law has been given for eternal life, but upon the condition of its complete fulfilment (Luke 10: 28; Gal. 3: 12). But, since the Fall, no one can render this, and therefore no one can be saved by the Law." Whence Holl. (1007): "The aim of the Moral Law is (*a*) the glory of the Lawgiver; (*b*) eternal life, promised upon the condition of perfect obedience. The *accidental issue* is eternal death. Rom. 8: 10."

[12] Br. (636): "The Law, which teaches what is to be done and what is to be avoided, and binds to the most perfect observance of these things, charging the most grievous guilt upon all manner of transgressors, by so doing leads men to the knowledge of their sins and to grief concerning them, and so renders them desirous for a mediator." Quen. (IV, 9): "The subsequent aim is the knowledge of our inability, which fails to fulfil the Law (Rom. 8: 3), and the urging of us to seek a remedy." And the additional remark: "This powerlessness ascribed to the Law does not belong to it *per se* and by virtue of its own nature, but accidentally, by reason of our flesh, which weakens the Law of God, although it is in itself holy and good, and renders it powerless and unable to give us life, or to preserve it, since our flesh is not able to fulfil the

condition of the Law, *i. e.*, to render to it a perfect obedience, Gal. 3: 24; and this is the reason why the impossibility of saving is ascribed to the Law."

[13] FORM. CONC. (Epit. V, 4): "Whatever is contained in the Holy Scriptures that convinces of sins, that truly belongs to the preaching of the Law." Therefore, just as the Old Testament contains the Gospel, also (comp. note 1) in like manner the New Testament contains the Law.

FORM. CONC. (V, 11): "Yet, meanwhile, it is true and proper that the apostles and ministers of the Gospel should confirm the preaching of the Law, and begin with it in dealing with those who as yet do not feel their sins and are not disturbed by a sense of the divine wrath." Hence to the preaching of the Law can be reckoned, from a certain view of the subject, even the preaching of the death of Christ.

FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., V, 12): "For what more severe and terrible indication and declaration of the wrath of God against sin is there, than the passion and death of Jesus Christ, the Son of God? But yet, so far as this displays the wrath of God and alarms men, it is not properly a preaching of the Gospel or Christ, but of Moses and the Law against the impenitent."

[14] HOLL. (1021): "(1) *The political use of the Law* consists in the preservation of external discipline, that wicked and licentious men may be turned away from heinous offences, by presenting before them the penalties and rewards. According to this use, the Law is a bridle or barrier by which sinners are restrained. (2) The *elenchtical* use consists in the manifestation and reproof of sins, and also in the demonstration of the most severe divine judgment. Rom. 3: 20. According to this use the Law is the mirror of sin. (But the FORM. CONC. already properly observes that the Law does not fully impart the designed knowledge of sin until the coming of the Gospel. FORM. CONC. (Epit., V, 8): 'As to what relates to the revelation of sin, the matter stands thus: The veil of Moses is hung before the eyes of all men, as long as they hear only the preaching of the Law and nothing of Christ. Therefore they do not truly come to a knowledge of their sins from the Law, but either become hypocrites, inflated with an idea of their own righteousness, as were the Pharisees, or fall into despair in their sins, as Judas the traitor did. For this reason Christ undertook to explain the Law spiritually, and thus the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all sinners, that, the Law being rightly understood, they may learn how great is that wrath. Thus at length sinners, being led to the Law, properly ascertain the enormity of their guilt. But

such a recognition of their offences Moses alone could never have extorted from them.') (3) *The pedagogic use* of the Law consists in indirectly compelling the sinner to go to Christ. Although the Law formally and directly neither knows nor teaches Christ, yet by accusing, convincing, and alarming the sinner, it indirectly compels him to seek for solace and help in Christ the Redeemer. Wherefore the Law is our schoolmaster, to bring us unto Christ. Gal. 3: 24. (4) *The didactic use* consists in the instruction and direction of all internal and external moral actions. Thus the Law is a perpetual rule of life. Matt. 5: 17."

Quen. (IV, 10): "The first use pertains to unregenerate and obstinate sinners; the second and third to men about to be justified; the fourth to those who are justified and regenerate." The Form. Conc. and the earlier Dogmaticians favor only a threefold use of the Law, political, pedagogical, and didactic. The later Dogmaticians have divided the pedagogical use into two parts, one of which they call the elenchtical use. The question introduced in the Antinomian controversy, whether the Law is to be inculcated to the regenerate, and its observance urged on them, is thus determined by the Form. Conc. (Epit., 6: 4): "Although they are regenerated and renewed in the spirit of their minds, yet regeneration and renovation are not perfect in all respects in this life, but only begun. Believers are constantly struggling in the spirit of their minds with the flesh, *i. e.*, with their corrupt nature, which cleaves to us even to our death. And on account of the old Adam who yet dwells in the understanding, the will, and all the powers of man, it is necessary that the Law of God should always shine before us." . . . When, however, the Law is still held before the regenerate, its significance is thus more particularly described: "That the Law here means only one thing, namely, the immutable will of God, according to which all men ought to regulate their mode of life."

[15] Form. Conc. (V, 5): "We hold the Gospel to be specifically that doctrine which teaches what man should believe, who has not kept the Law, and is therefore condemned by it; namely, that Jesus Christ has expiated and made satisfaction for all sin, and thus has procured remission of sin, righteousness before God, and eternal life, without any merit intervening on the part of the sinner." Form. Conc. (V, 21): "Everything that consoles terrified minds, everything that offers the favor and grace of God to transgressors of the Law, is properly called the Gospel, *i. e.*, the cheering message, that God does not wish to punish our sins, but for Christ's sake to forgive them."

Br. (631): "The Gospel is the doctrine of the grace of God and of the gratuitous pardon of sin for the sake of Christ the Mediator, and His merit apprehended by faith." Hence, as far as this grace is declared in the Old Testament, so far does it also contain the Gospel. (Note 1.) Hence, Br. (ib.): "This doctrine was revealed not only in the New Testament, but also in its own way in the Old Testament (in the New more clearly)." Such intimations in the Old Testament are cited as occurring, not only in the protevangelium to the patriarchs and prophets, but also in the Ceremonial Law. Br. (632): "It is certain that those things which were contained in the ceremonial laws, had the force of Law, so far as they commanded certain acts and rites; yet as far as they represented Christ the Mediator, and His merit to be apprehended by faith, by certain rites, such as types and shadows, they are properly to be considered as Gospel." As to *the relation of the Law and Gospel to the Old and New Testaments*, Quen. (IV, 61) says: "The Old Testament and the Law, and the New Testament and the Gospel, are not identical, but distinct; for they differ as the containing and the contained. For the Old Testament contains the Law as its part, but not to the exclusion of the Gospel, and the New Testament contains the Gospel as its portion, but not to the exclusion of the Law; and thus the evangelical intention of God respecting the remission of sin, grace, and salvation through the death of Christ, is declared not only in the books of the New, but also in those of the Old Testament."

The word Gospel can also be used in various senses. Holl. (1032): "*Generally*, but with less propriety, the word is used to designate the whole doctrine of the New Testament, taught by Christ and the Apostles, Mark 1: 1; 16: 15. *Specially*, for the doctrine of grace and the gratuitous remission of sin to be obtained by faith in Christ, whether proposed in the Old or New Testament, Rom. 10: 15; Heb. 4: 2. *Most particularly*, for the doctrine concerning the Messiah already manifested, Rom. 1: 1." Here the word is taken in the second sense, for we are to describe that effect of it, which is different from the effect of the Law. (Holl. (ib.): "In this *special* sense, the Gospel is sufficiently contradistinguished from the Law.") In the proper discrimination of these senses, the question is also settled, whether the Gospel also preaches repentance. Form. Conc. (ep. V, 6): "We believe, etc., that if by the word *Gospel* be meant the whole doctrine concerning Christ [taken, therefore, in *the general* sense] which He taught in His ministrations, that we properly say and teach, that the Gospel *is* a preaching of repentance and the remission of sins. But when the Law

and the Gospel, Moses himself, as a teacher of the Law, and Christ Himself, as a teacher of the Gospel, are compared together, we believe, teach, and confess, that the Gospel does not preach repentance or reprove sin, but properly is nothing else than a more cheering message and an announcement full of comfort."

On the whole Antinomian controversy, which properly belongs in this connection, see Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., V), in which also the different statements in the preceding Symbolical Books, in regard to the Law and the Gospel, are explained according to the different senses given above.

[16] Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., V, 24): "We believe and confess that these two heads of Christian doctrine should be diligently taught and enforced in the Church of God even to the end of time, yet with a proper distinction. For, by the preaching of the Law and its severe threatenings, through the Gospel ministry, the hearts of impenitent men are to be alarmed and brought to a knowledge of their sins and to the exercise of repentance; yet not so that they may despair on account of their sins, but that they may flee to Christ. . . . Wherefore, after they have come to a knowledge of their sins by the Law, their alarmed consciences are to be so directed that they may receive solid consolation from the preaching of the Gospel of Christ." Holl. (1038): "The Gospel preaches and offers to us the grace of Christ, the merit of Christ, and all the benefits derived from Him." Quen. (IV, 6): "The form of it is the gratuitous promise of grace, Rom. 3: 24; 4: 13, 14, 16; Gal. 3: 18, given to produce faith, John 3: 16; Mark 16: 16; Acts 10: 43; Rom. 10: 9, 10."

[17] The distinctions are stated by Holl. (1039) as follows: "The Moral Law and the Gospel differ: (1) *As to the manner of their revelation and recognition.* The Law is in some measure known from the light of Nature; for it was communicated to the mind of man at his creation, and it was not entirely extinguished by the Fall, Rom. 2: 15. But the Gospel is a mystery plainly concealed from human reason, brought to us from the bosom of the eternal Father by the Son of God, and revealed to us. (2) *As to the object.* The Law is the doctrine of works; it prescribes and commands what is to be done and avoided, hence it is called the law of works, Rom. 3: 27. But the Gospel is the doctrine of faith; it holds forth Christ as the Mediator, His merit, the righteousness and salvation derived therefrom to be apprehended by faith: therefore it is called the law of faith, Rom. 3: 27. (3) *As to the difference of the promises.* The promises of the Law are conditional and compensatory; they indeed promise life, but under the condition of individual, perfect

and perpetual obedience. But the promises of the Gospel are gratuitous, because they promise life, not on account of our own obedience, but of another's, namely, of Christ, apprehended by true faith. The promises of the Gospel are, therefore, absolute and unconditional, not simply, but in respect to legal and meritorious condition, although they do not exclude the evangelical condition or faith, which is destitute of all merit, and the use of the means of faith. (4) *As to the subject, to whom they are declared.* The Law is to be uttered and sharply inculcated to wicked and contumacious sinners, that they may be brought to contrition; the Gospel is to be applied to the contrite, that they may believe in Christ. (5) *As to the disparity of the effects.* The Law accuses delinquents of disobedience, convicts, condemns, alarms, Rom. 3: 20; 4: 15; 2 Cor. 3: 2; but the Gospel exhibits the Saviour, consoles, absolves, vivifies, Luke 2: 10; 4: 18; 2 Cor. 3: 6." Holl. (996) makes another distinction, which may be here quoted. "The divine Law is not the causative or conferring means of salvation to fallen man, but it is only the pedagogic means to a sinner seeking the causative means of salvation, Gal. 3: 24. The Law leads to Christ not directly, but as disease leads to the physician, indirectly and on account of the manifested inability of obtaining salvation by the Law."

[18] Br. (633): "The Law and the Gospel agree (*a*) as to the author of both, who is God; (*b*) as to the subject to whom they are given, namely, all men; (*c*) as to their design, which is eternal salvation; (*d*) as to their duration, which is to the end of the world."

[19] Holl. (1041): "The Law and the Gospel practically are united, as if in a certain mathematical point. They concur in producing: (1) the *repentance of sinners* (repentance consists of two parts, contrition and faith, and so it is the ἀποτέλεσμα, or the common function of converting and regenerating grace. The Law, in converting man, does its part by exciting and producing *contrition.* The Gospel, in regenerating man, also does its part by enkindling *faith* in Christ. There results, therefore, repentance, as the effect, from the concurrence of the Law and the Gospel); (2) *the renovation of a justified person* (in sanctification, the Law is at hand as a *normative principle,* or the rule of a holy life; it prescribes and teaches what is to be done and what omitted, and binds to obedience, but it does not confer new strength for a spiritual and holy life: therefore the Gospel comes in as a succor and productive principle, which furnishes strength and power to men, enabling them rightly to walk in the ways of God. Wherefore the Law and the Gospel concur in producing one holy act in the work of

renovation); (3) *the preservation of the renewed man* in perseverance of faith and godliness (the *Law* by its threatenings moves the renewed man the more strictly to suppress his carnal desires, lest, conquered by the flesh, he should lapse into mortal sin, and fall away from the faith; the *Gospel*, by constantly affording new strength, confirms and increases his faith, so that the renewed man perseveres in faith and holiness. Add to this, that the Gospel alone shows the difference between mortal and venial sin. The Law prohibits both, that the renewed man, conscious of his imperfection, may practice a daily repentance. The Gospel consoles his mind, grieving under a sense of his imperfect obedience and sin, by teaching him that there is no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit, Rom. 8: 1)."

CHAPTER II.

Of the Sacraments.

§ 53. *Of the Sacraments in General.*

SAVING grace is imparted to man not only through the Word, but also through the Sacraments; [1] and, as in the case of the Word, so also in the case of the Sacraments, an external and visible element, which in the sacred rite is offered to man, becomes the vehicle of the Holy Ghost. [2] A Sacrament is, therefore, a holy rite, appointed by God, through which, by means of an external and visible sign, saving grace is imparted to man, or, if he already possess it, is assured to him. [3] The Evangelical Church enumerates only two such rites, Baptism and the Lord's Supper; for only through these two rites, in accordance with the direction of Christ, is such saving grace imparted, and, among all the sacred ordinances prescribed in the Scriptures, it is only in these two that these two distinguishing characteristics of a sacrament are combined, viz., (1) a special divine purpose, in accordance with which, in the sacred rite, an external element is to be thus employed; and (2) the promise given in the divine Word that by the application of this element evangelical saving grace shall be im-

parted. [4] By these marks these two sacred rites are distinguished from all other religious services, and hence, for the purpose of thus distinguishing them, are called Sacraments. [5] In the element thus consecrated by the Word, we have presented to us then no longer merely that which is obvious to the senses, but we have, at the same time, to assume something invisible and more exalted as present and operating through the elements; so that, therefore, the Sacrament consists of both something visible and something invisible. [6] From what has been said, it follows, further, that just as a religious service can be called a Sacrament only when both the above-mentioned marks are combined in it, so also it is not a Sacrament, and does not operate as such, unless it be administered exactly in the mode prescribed by its Founder, and for the purpose designed by Him. [7]

Hence (1) the words of the institution must be uttered during the administration of the ordinance, according to the direction of the Founder, for, before that, the element is only an external, simple, and inoperative object; (2) it must be administered and received in the manner prescribed by the Founder; [8] and (3) it must be administered only to those who already belong to the Church, or to those who desire to be received into it through the Sacrament. Finally, order requires that, except in extraordinary cases, it be administered only by regular ministers of the Church. [9] When all these things are observed in this sacred act, according to the instruction of its Founder, then it is a Sacrament; nor is the moral character or the internal intention of the administrator, [10] or the faith of the recipient, [11] necessary to constitute the act a Sacrament. Still, the good or evil effect of the Sacrament depends on the faith or unbelief of the recipient, just as in the case of the good or evil effect of the divine Word. [12] The immediate design of the Sacrament is to impart saving grace to man, or to establish those in it who already possess it. [13] At the same time, however, the Sacraments, as they are administered only within the Church, serve as a mode of recognizing those who partake of them as members of the Church; they serve, likewise, to remind the recipients of the blessings of salvation that are imaged forth in them, to stimu-

late those who have come together with this same purpose to new mutual love, and excite them to cultivate that internal spiritual life which is symbolically indicated in the Sacraments. [14].

[1] Br. (639): "Since, besides the Word of God, the Sacraments also are means of regeneration, conversion, and renovation, and therefore of conferring, sealing, and increasing faith, we must also treat more particularly of these."

[2] Quen. (IV, 73): "God has added to the Word of the Gospel as another communicative (δοτικὸν) means of salvation, the Sacraments, which constitute the visible Word." Strictly speaking, there is but *one* means of salvation, which is distinguished as the *audible* and *visible* Word; through both one and the same grace is imparted to man, at one time through the mere Word, at another through the external and visible element.

Chmn. (Ex. Trid., II, 35): "For God, in those things which pertain to our salvation, is pleased to treat with us through certain means; He Himself has ordained this use of them, and instituted the Word of Gospel promise, which sometimes is proposed to us *absolutely by itself* or *nakedly*, and sometimes *clothed* or *made visible* by certain rites or Sacraments appointed by Him." The two *means* of salvation are thus distinguished only by the manner in which they operate on men. Ap. Conf. (VII, 5): "As the Word enters the ear that it may reach the heart, so the external rite strikes the eye that it may move the heart." The effect of both is the same. Ap. Conf., l. c.: "The effect of the Word and of the rite is the same, as Augustine has forcibly expressed it, viz., a Sacrament is a visible word, because the rite is presented to the eyes, and is, as it were, a picture of the Word, signifying the same thing as the Word. Wherefore, the effect of both is the same." Comp. below, Note 13.

[3] Ap. Conf. (VII, 3): "(The Sacraments are) rites commanded by Christ, and to which is added the promise of grace." Ap. Conf. (XII, 18): "A Sacrament is a ceremony or work in which God holds out to us that which the promise annexed to the rite offers."

Br. (650): "A Sacrament in general may be defined as an action divinely appointed through the grace of God, for Christ's sake, employing an external element cognizable by the senses, through which, accompanied by the words of the institution, there is conferred upon or sealed unto men the grace of the Gospel for the remission of sins unto eternal life."

Grh. (VIII, 328): "A Sacrament is a sacred and solemn rite, divinely instituted, by which God, through the ministry of man, dispenses heavenly gifts, under a visible and external element, through a certain word, in order to offer, apply, and seal to the individuals using them and believing, the special promise of the Gospel concerning the gratuitous remission of sins."

Hutt. (Comp. Loc. Th., 221, 214): "A Sacrament is a sacred action, divinely instituted, consisting partly of an external element or sign, and partly of a celestial object, by which God not only seals the promise of grace peculiar to the Gospel (*i. e.*, of gratuitous reconciliation), but also truly presents, through the external elements, to the individuals using the sacrament, the celestial blessings promised in the institution of each of them, and also savingly applies the same to those who believe." By the grace of the Gospel is understood "the applying grace of the Holy Spirit, secured by the merit of Christ, and promised in the Gospel, namely, grace that calls, illuminates, regenerates, etc." The differences of these definitions, and the reason why we have quoted so many of them, will appear in Note 6.

[4] Grh. (VIII, 207): "We say that two things are absolutely requisite to constitute a Sacrament, properly so called, viz., the Word and the element, according to the well-known saying of Augustine: 'The Word is added to the element, and it becomes a Sacrament.' This assertion is based upon the very nature and aim of the Sacraments, since the Sacraments are intended to present to the senses, in the garb of an external element, that same thing that is preached in the Gospel message; from which it readily follows that neither the Word without the element, nor the element without the Word, constitutes the Sacrament. By the Word is understood, first, the *command and divine institution* through which the element, because thus appointed by God, is separated from a common, and set apart for a sacramental use; and, secondly, the *promise*, peculiar to the Gospel, to be applied and sealed by the Sacrament. By the element is meant not any arbitrarily chosen element, but that which has been fixed and mentioned in the words of the institution."

[5] It is generally acknowledged that the question as to what sacred rites can be called Sacraments, cannot be decided merely by the signification of the word Sacrament, for this word has been somewhat arbitrarily used to designate these two sacred rites. According to its etymology, it is derived from *sacrare* (Varro, Book IV), and signifies every *consecrated thing*, hence the money deposited by contending parties with the priest, "to the end that he

who gained the suit should receive his own, and he who lost it should have his money confiscated;" and also an oath, particularly that of soldiers, by which they *consecrated* themselves to death if they proved unfaithful. The Vulgate translates the Greek word μυστήριον by *sacramentum*. But Tertullian first uses the word in relation to Baptism in the sense of *juramentum*. *Accordingly*, in the language of the Church, there is a threefold meaning of the word *Sacrament*. QUEN. (IV, 73): "The word Sacrament is understood (1) in a *very general sense*, for any hidden or secret thing. Thus, the incarnation of Christ, 1 Tim. 3: 16; the union of Christ and the Church, Eph. 5: 32; the calling of the Gentiles, Eph. 3: 3, etc., are called μυστήρια, which the old Latin interpreter translated *sacramenta*. Thus also the Fathers called every mystery and every sacred doctrine that was not very plain *a sacrament*, as the *sacrament* of the Trinity, the *sacrament* of the incarnation and of faith. (2) It is understood in a *special* sense, for the external sign of a sacred and heavenly object, thus seed, grain, pearls, are *sacraments* or signs of the kingdom of heaven, Matt. 13: 24, etc. (3) In a *very particular* sense, for a solemn action instituted, prescribed, and commanded by God, in which, by an external and visible sign, invisible benefits are graciously offered, conferred, and sealed." We cannot then determine from the meaning of the word Sacrament *per se*, what sacred services are to rank as *Sacraments*, but the marks which belong to the two services by common consent designated as Sacraments, Baptism and the Lord's Supper, are examined, and all other rites are excluded from this conception of a Sacrament which do not present similar marks. In doing this, it is not affirmed that the idea of a Sacrament *per se* does not belong to them, but it is maintained that it is not applicable to them in the same sense as to the two genuine Sacraments. CHMN. (Ex. Conc. Trid., II, 14): "We will not contend about the definitions of this or that man, of the ancients or the moderns, but we shall assume the ground which is beyond controversy, and acknowledged among all. Baptism and the Eucharist are confessed by all to be truly and properly Sacraments." BR. (641): "Thus, therefore, from the commonly received conceptions of the marks in which those rites agree that are undoubtedly Sacraments, it is apparent that those which may perchance be called Sacraments, but have not these common requisites, are not Sacraments in the same sense and reality as those which are properly so called, but are only equivocally designated as such."

According to this canon, the doctrine of seven Sacraments, held by the Church of Rome, is rejected. Luther, as early as his Larger

Catechism (1529), retains only two, but the APOL. still retains three (VII, 4): "Therefore these are truly Sacraments, viz., Baptism, the Lord's Supper, and Absolution, which is the Sacrament of penitence." And MEL. (Loc. c. Th., I, 307) is inclined to regard *ordination* also as a Sacrament: "I add also ordination, as they call it, *i. e.*, the vocation to the gospel ministry and the public approbation of that call, for all these are commanded in the Gospel." From this it is plain that in the early period of the Reformation there was still some hesitation about the number of the Sacraments, which is explained from the fact that both absolution and ordination possess some of the marks which we find in Baptism and the Lord's Supper. CHMN. (Ex. Conc. Trid., II, 14) thus explains himself on absolution: "Our theologians have often said that they would not contend, but willingly grant that absolution should be ranked among the Sacraments, because it has the application of a general promise to the individuals using this service. But still it is certain that absolution has not an established external element, or sign, or rite instituted or commanded of God. And although the imposition of hands or some other external rite may be applied, yet it is certainly destitute of a special and express divine command. Nor is there any promise that through any such external rite God will efficaciously apply the promise of the Gospel. We have, indeed, the promise that through the Word He wishes to be efficacious in believers; but in order to constitute anything a Sacrament, not only is a naked promise in the Word required, but that, by a divine appointment or institution, it be expressly clothed with some sign or rite divinely commanded. But the announcement or recitation of the Gospel promise is not such a sign, for in that way the general preaching of the Gospel would be a Sacrament. . . . *Therefore absolution is not properly and truly a Sacrament in the way or sense in which Baptism and the Lord's Supper are Sacraments;* but if any one, with this explanation and difference added, would wish to call it a Sacrament on account of the peculiar application of the promise, the Apology of the Augsburg Confession declares that it would not oppose the idea."

CHMN. (Ex. Trid., II, 14) treats it most extensively: "Any ordinance that is to be properly regarded as a Sacrament of the New Testament must have the following requisites: (1) It must have an external, or corporeal and visible, element or sign, which may be handled, exhibited, and used in a certain external rite. (2) The element or sign, and the rite in which it is employed, must have an express divine command to authorize and sanction it. (3) It must be commanded and instituted in the New Testa-

ment. (4) It must be instituted not for a certain period or generation, but to be in force until the end of the world. (5) There must be a divine promise of grace as the effect or fruit of the Sacrament. (6) That promise must not only simply and by itself have the testimony of God's Word, but it must by the divine ordinance be annexed to the sign of the Sacrament, and, as it were, clothed with that sign or element. (7) That promise must not relate to the general gifts of God, whether corporeal or spiritual, but it must be a promise of grace or justification, *i. e.*, of gratuitous reconciliation, the remission of sins, and, in a word, of all the benefits of redemption. (8) And that promise, in the Sacraments, is either signified or announced not in general only, but on the authority of God is offered, presented, applied, and sealed to the individuals who use the Sacraments in faith."

The later theologians say: "There is required for a Sacrament (1) that it must be an action commanded by God; (2) it must have a visible element divinely prescribed (united with the celestial object through the medium of the words of the institution (Holl., 1054)); (3) it must have the promise of evangelical grace."

[6] By this the early Dogmaticians mean as yet nothing more than that the element thus consecrated by the Word must not be regarded as ordinary or common; hence Hfrffr. cites as the *substantials of a Sacrament*, the *element* and the *Word*, and in this sense Luther also appears to have taken it, when in Cat. Maj. (IV, 17) he says of Baptism: "It is not mere natural or common, but divine, celestial, sacred, and saving water . . . and this just for the sake of the Word, which is the divine and sacred Word." But the later Dogmaticians unite another sense to it. (See the history of the origin of the later modes of expression in Br., p. 670, who proves that occasion for a different mode of expression was for the first time given at the Mümpelgard Colloquy (1586) in consequence of the controversy which there arose between Beza, on the one side, and Jacob Andreæ and Luke Osiander on the other.) They distinguish, for instance, in a Sacrament, "a twofold material, a terrestrial and a celestial, and they understand by the *former* the element or external symbol, which is the corporeal visible object . . . ordained to the end that it might be the vehicle and exhibitive medium of the celestial object (water in Baptism, bread and wine in the Lord's Supper). By the *latter* they understand an invisible and intelligible object (presented in an earthly object, as the divinely instituted medium), on which the effect of the Sacrament principally depends;" yet they remark that for the latter the word *materia* or *matter* is not an adequate one (since the Sacrament

is not a corporeal substance, it is plain that it does not consist of matter properly so called; yet analogically matter is ascribed to that with which the Sacrament is employed). (Holl., 1059.) They mean, then, that the terrestial material is the vehicle of something more exalted and divine, which is imparted through the medium of the external element. What this divine thing is, we learn in each Sacrament, for it is different in each.

Quen. (IV, 75): "But what that is which comes in each sacrament under the name of *res cælestis*, can and should be known in its proper place, *i. e.*, from the words of the institution of each Sacrament." This *materia cælestis* is not in their opinion identical with the grace of the Gospel; hence, they do not (as in the passages above referred to in Cat. Maj. and Hfrffr.) adopt as the essence of a Sacrament the Word and element, but they still carefully distinguish the Word from the *materia cælestis*, and hold that the latter is imparted by the word of consecration. (Hutt. (Loc. c., 597): "The Word is never sacramentally joined either with the terrestrial or the celestial part; and, hence it does not enter into the substance of the Sacrament. Therefore, the Word cannot be called either the material or the form of the Sacrament. . . . Thus I say, that this Word is the effective cause (αἴτιος ποιητικὸς), *i. e.*, it causes that these two essential parts constitute one Sacrament in the use of the Sacraments.") Neither do they regard the *materia cælestis* as identical with evangelical grace, which the earlier Dogmaticians also teach is conferred through the Sacrament; but they believe that that grace is conveyed only through the medium of the *materia cælestis*. While the earlier Dogmaticians only maintain that, with the word of consecration, the external element ceases to be a common and external one, without distinguishing the imparted divine material as something separate from the Word, the later theologians regard the two as distinct. It is easy to understand how they were led to this conclusion. In the Lord's Supper, namely, the body and blood of Christ are communicated; there is, therefore, through the word of consecration, something added and brought to man which is as different from the Word as it is from saving grace. Something corresponding to this they think must be assumed in regard to Baptism also, and in both cases they designate it as a celestial material.

When we compare the views of the earlier Dogmaticians with those of the more modern, we find their difference to consist in this, that the earlier Dogmaticians are solely concerned to prove the analogy of the Word and Sacraments as the two means of salvation, according to which in the one case, evangelical grace is

communicated by the Word, and in the other by the external visible sign. In this view, however, there is no notice taken of the fact, that, above all, in the Lord's Supper, besides grace, there is something in addition present and communicated, viz., the body and blood of Christ. The later theologians, on the other hand, keep this particularly in view, that even if by the Sacraments, as well as by the Word, the grace of salvation (*i. e.*, conversion, justification, regeneration, etc.) be conferred, yet that this grace is not the first and proximate object conferred in the Sacraments, as it is in the Word, but that in the Sacraments there is something else which precedes it (in the Lord's Supper, body and blood), the design of which is to impart saving grace. It is this, then, that they mean to convey by the general expression, *materia cœlestis*, applicable to both Sacraments, but it is difficult for them to show the *materia cœlestis* in Baptism in the same way as in the Lord's Supper. And, in this view of the subject, the force of the analogy also between a *Sacrament* and the *Word* as the two means of salvation, is weakened. In assuming a *materia cœlestis*, they assumed also a particular union of the *materia cœlestis et terrestris.*

Quen. (IV, 75): "As a Sacrament is composed of a terrestrial and a celestial object, there must necessarily be a certain union and κοινωνία which we properly call sacramental. For that union is neither essential, nor natural, nor accidental, but, in view of the material united, it is extraordinary; in regard to the design, it is sacramental. Therefore, one does not exist without the other, for instance, water without the Spirit, nor the Spirit without water, because these two are most intimately united in the sacramental act, nor can one be a Sacrament without the other." This method of developing the doctrine, which from the times of Grh. was generally adopted, though with many diversities of statement as to what constitutes the celestial material in Baptism, was opposed only by Br. and several other theologians of Jena. As, namely, the celestial material, which has to be assumed in Baptism, is altogether different from that which is found in the Lord's Supper; inasmuch, also, as the union of the material and the element in the two Sacraments is very different; and, finally, inasmuch as those who hold this doctrine neither agree as to what is meant by this celestial material, nor use the term in the same literal sense as in the case of the Lord's Supper; therefore, Br. contends that the expression, celestial material, should be entirely ignored in the doctrine of the Sacraments in general, and we should adhere to the simple doctrine of the earlier Dogmaticians, who do not mention it at all. He speaks, therefore, only of a terrestrial material (644):

"By the material of a Sacrament two things are meant: first, an external and visible element; secondly, an action performed with the element (*e. g.*, washing, distributing, etc.) (645). As to what some call the other part of the Sacrament (*i. e.*, the words of the institution), . . . viz., the celestial and invisible material of the Sacrament, it must be acknowledged, that this is rather the form or formal part of the Sacrament, than the material. And when some understand, that by the name, celestial material, something else is signified, relatively opposed to the element as a sign—not the fruit itself of the Sacrament, but that upon which the operation and fruit of the Sacrament depend; they nevertheless confess that this same thing which they call the celestial material is sometimes, indeed, not even really present. But it is difficult to consider anything as the material, and therefore an essential part of a Sacrament, which, when the Sacrament exists, does not for this reason then itself exist. Otherwise, also, if that be indeed present, which is regarded as the celestial material, yet some again maintain, that from the presence to the material is not a valid inference; but that it is required, that what can be called material must be present after the manner of a material. They do not even explain sufficiently what it is to be present after the manner of a material in a Sacrament, so far as the Sacraments in general are concerned; but what it is to be thus present in the individual Sacrament, they leave to be learned from the institution of each. Whence you may infer that the celestial material of a Sacrament in general cannot be known, unless this knowledge be drawn from the Sacraments individually. And, since in the Lord's Supper the body and blood of Christ are called the celestial material, . . . it will be confessed that the celestial material is not in the same way present in all the Sacraments. Therefore, most especially if, when we are treating of Sacraments in general, we assume a celestial material, the term must be taken in so wide a sense, that one thing will not be, after the manner of a material, in one Sacrament, just in the same way as another thing is, after the manner of a material, in the other Sacrament. Whence it further follows, that there is something, after the manner of a material, present in one Sacrament literally, and in the other figuratively."

[7] Hfrffr. (465): "It is especially required that in each Sacrament, *the whole action*, as instituted and ordained by Christ, should be observed; neither is the use of the Sacraments to be applied to foreign ends and objects. Hence the rule: 'Nothing has the authority or nature of a Sacrament beyond the application and action instituted by Christ.' For example, if the water of Baptism

be employed for the baptism of bells, or for the cure of leprosy; or when the consecrated bread is not distributed and taken, but is either stored away in the pyx, or offered in sacrifice, or carried about in processions, this is not the use, but the abuse and profanation of the Sacraments."

[8] Holl. (1060): "The form of a Sacrament is the external action (and that entirely occupied about the terrestrial and celestial part of each Sacrament), which is constituted of three formal observances, immediately following each other: (1) The recitation of the words of the institution (consecration). (2) The sacramental dispensation (δόσις). (3) The reception of the Sacrament (λῆψις)."

1. "The *consecration*, *i. e.*, the separation from a common to a sacred use, which is made by reciting and pronouncing the words of the institution." Grh. (VIII, 240): "The consecration is not, (1) a mere recitation of the words of the institution directed only to the *hearers*, (2) nor is the change of symbols, which consecration effects, a mere change of names, a significative analogy, a representation of an absent celestial thing, . . . but it is a sacred and efficacious action, by which the sacramental symbols are truly sanctified, *i. e.*, separated from a common and set apart for a sacramental use. But there is no (*a*) magical or superstitious action dependent on the dignity or quality of the person, *i. e.*, on the power and character of the minister, who renders the Sacrament valid by the force of his intention; nor (*b*) is it to be thought that there is a certain occult subjective power in the sound or number of words, by which the consecration is accomplished; (*c*) nor that by it the external elements are essentially changed and transubstantiated into the heavenly object: but the presence of the heavenly, and its union with the earthly object, depend altogether upon the institution, command and will of Christ, and upon the efficacy of the original institution continuing in the Church even until the present day, which the minister, or rather Christ Himself by the voice of the minister, continually repeats. The minister, therefore, in the consecration, (1) repeats the primitive institution of the Sacrament according to the command of Christ: 'Do this,' etc., etc.; (2) he testifies that he does this not of his own accord, nor celebrates a human ordinance, but, as the divinely appointed steward of the mysteries, he administers the venerable Sacrament in the name, authority, and place of Christ; (3) he invokes the name of the true God, that it may please Him to be efficacious in this Sacrament according to His ordinance, institution, and promise; (4) he separates the external elements from all other uses to a sacramental use, that they may be organs and means by which celestial benefits may be dispensed."

2. As to the dispensation: "We must distinguish between the *thing itself* and *its mode;* between the δοσις and λήψις themselves (the giving and receiving) and the δόσεως και λήψεως τρόπος (the manner of giving and receiving). The δοσις και λήψις, *i. e.*, the administration, dispensation, presentation, and reception of the Sacrament are essential, nor do they allow of any exception; but *the mode* of the administration and reception admits of some liberty and variation. A few examples will render it more plain. In Baptism, it is absolutely necessary that a person should be baptized with water, *i. e.*, washed in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; but it is no matter whether this ablution be performed by immersion into water or by affusion with water." Holl. (1057): "The Church cannot change anything in the *substantials* of the Sacraments, yet she rejoices in the liberty of making some change in the *circumstantials.*"

[9] Holl. (1056): "God has intrusted the right of dispensing the Sacraments to the Church, which commits the execution or exercise of this right, for the sake of order and propriety, to the called and ordained ministers of the Gospel. But in case of extreme necessity, where the Sacrament is necessary and could not be omitted without peril of salvation, any Christian, whether layman or woman, may validly administer the Sacrament of Baptism or initiation. 1 Pet. 2: 9, Rev. 1: 6." [*Nothtaufe, Jachtaufe.*]

[10] Ap. Conf. (IV, 47): "The Sacraments are efficacious, even if they be administered by wicked ministers, because the ministers officiate in the stead of Christ and do not represent their own person."

Quen. (IV, 74): "The Sacraments do not belong to the man who dispenses them, but to God, in whose name they are dispensed, and therefore the gracious efficacy and operation of the Sacrament depend on God alone, 1 Cor. 3: 5, and not on the character or quality of the minister. The dispute about the intention of the minister is more intricate. Propriety requires that he who administers the Sacraments should bring to the altar a good intention of performing what God has commanded and instituted: a mind not wandering but collected and fixed. It is *absolutely necessary* that the intention of Christ be observed in the *external act.* I say in *the external act*, for the intention of the minister to perform the internal act is not necessary; that is performed by the Church. On the other hand, the Church of Rome teaches that the intention of the minister is necessary to the integrity, verity, and efficacy of the Sacrament; that this intention has respect not only to the external act of administering the Sacrament according to the form of

the institution, but to the design and effect of the Sacrament itself. Thus the Council of Trent: 'If any one declare that the intention of doing what the Church does is not required in the ministers, while they dispense the Sacraments, let him be anathema'" (78).

[11] Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., VII, 24): "We thus conclude and declare that even if a bad and vicious man should take or distribute the Lord's Supper, he yet takes the true Sacrament, *i. e.*, the body and blood of Christ, not less than the man who takes or distributes it in the most worthy manner. For this Sacrament is not founded on the holiness of man, but on the Word of God . . . 27 . . . It is conclusively demonstrated that this presence is to be understood not only of the eating by believing and worthy persons, but also by the unbelieving and unworthy."

Holl. (1061): "Faith is not required to the substantial integrity of a Sacrament (just as the Word of God, which hypocrites hear, is the true Word, so also that is a Sacrament which adult hypocrites, destitute of faith, receive)."

[12] The Evangelical Church herewith most distinctly opposes the Romish doctrine of the efficacy of the Sacrament *ex opere operato*. (Ap. Conf., VII, 18): "We condemn the whole crowd of Scholastics, who teach that the Sacraments confer grace on him who places no hindrance in the way, *ex opere operato*, even though there be no good impulse in the recipient. This is plainly a Jewish notion, to suppose that we are justified by a mere ceremony or external work, without any good impulse of the heart, *i. e.*, without faith. . . . We teach that faith is necessary to the proper use of the Sacraments: a faith which believes the promises and receives the things promised, which are here offered in the Sacrament. And the reason of this is plain and undeniable. A promise is useless to us unless it be embraced by faith. But the Sacraments are signs of the promises. Therefore faith is necessary to their proper use."

Chmn. (Ex. C. Trid., II, 36): "The instrumental cause in this doctrine is twofold: one is, as it were, the hand of God, by which, through the Word and Sacraments, He offers, presents, applies, and seals the benefits of redemption to believers; the other is, as it were, our hand, by which we in faith ask, apprehend, and receive those things which God offers and presents to us through the Word and Sacraments. The efficacy of the Sacraments is not such as though through them God were to infuse and impress grace and salvation even on the unbelieving or those receiving them without faith."

Holl. (1061): "Faith is necessarily required in order to the reception of the salutary efficacy of the Sacrament." Id. (1064):

"The Sacraments confer no grace on adults, unless when offered they receive it by true faith, which existed in their hearts previously. In infants, the Holy Spirit kindles faith by the Sacrament of initiation, by which infants receive the grace of the covenant."

[13] HOLL. (1062): "The primary design of the Sacraments is the offering, conferring, applying, and sealing of Gospel grace." "Gospel grace is offered to all who use the Sacraments; it is conferred on those who worthily use them; it is applied and sealed to adult believers." Hence the Sacraments are not merely *significative signs* but such as also *present* and *tender* what they set forth; for this is included already in the idea of a Sacrament as a means of salvation. When in the Symbolical Books (AP. CONF., V, 42, A. C., XIII) they are called "signs and testimonies of the will of God toward us," they are such "not essentially, as if their whole nature and essence were limited to signifying, or as if the very nature of the earthly and the heavenly object in all the Sacraments were merely significative." (GRH., VIII, 213.)

Of the false views of the word, *Sacrament*, CHMN. (Ex. C. Trid., II, 33) says: "In our times some take too low a view of the Sacraments. They hold that the Sacraments are nothing else than signs and marks of the Christian profession, by which Christians are distinguished from Jews and the heathen. . . . Some have thought that the Sacraments are only the symbols of Christian society, by which we may be excited and bound to the mutual performance of duties. Others see nothing else in the use of the Sacraments than mere allegories or representations of Christian mortification unto sin, regeneration, and quickening, etc. . . . There are those who seem desirous of appearing to entertain exalted views of the Sacraments, and yet teach that the Sacraments are only signs of grace, offered and exhibited before, and irrespective of the use of the Sacraments; so that through the Sacraments God confers and presents nothing to those who with faith use them, but that they are only the signs of grace offered before and in another way. Allied to this is the opinion of those who think that the use of the Sacraments is only by way of commemoration, to excite faith which elsewhere and in another way, but not in the true use of the Sacraments, seeks and receives grace; just as such commemoration can be derived also from pictures."

GRH. (VIII, 215): "Those who follow Calvin hold to a twofold signification in the Sacraments: one by which the terrestrial object signifies the absent celestial object; the other, by which the entire Sacrament signifies the spiritual grace."

Chmn. (II, 35): "The Ap. Conf. correctly declares that the effect, virtue or efficacy of the Word, and of the Sacraments, which are the seals of the promises, is the same. . . . As, therefore, the Gospel is the power of God unto the salvation of every one that believeth, not because there is any magical force in the letters, syllables, or sound of the words, but because it is the means, organ, or instrument by which the Holy Spirit is efficacious, proposing, offering, presenting, distributing, and applying the merit of Christ and the grace of God to the salvation of every one that believeth; so also is power and efficacy attributed to the Sacraments, not because saving grace is to be sought in the Sacraments above and beyond the merit of Christ, the mercy of the Father, and the efficacy of the Holy Spirit, but that the Sacraments are instrumental causes in this way, that through these means or organs the Father desires to present, bestow, and apply His grace, the Son to communicate His merit to believers, and the Holy Spirit to exercise His efficacy for the salvation of every one that believeth. As, according to this, the Sacraments effect the same grace as the Word, the question may arise, Why has God employed a twofold means to this end? Chmn. (Ex. C. Trid., II, 29) answers: "To such attacks and to the clamors of fanatics, we properly reply from the Word of God, that the Sacraments which God has instituted to be aids to our salvation can in no way be considered either useless or superfluous, or be safely neglected and despised. . . . And, indeed, (as Chrysostom says) if we were angels, we would need no external sign; but our carnal infirmity hinders, disturbs, distracts, and weakens our faith. For it is hard to continue firmly persuaded of those things proposed in the Word which are not apparent to the senses. . . . Moreover faith, when it determines that the divine promise is in general a living one, is yet principally concerned about the question, Does this promise belong to me individually? . . . *God, therefore, who is rich in mercy . . . desires to present His grace to us not only in one way, that is, by His mere Word; but He desires also to help our infirmity by certain aids*, namely, by Sacraments instituted and annexed to the promise of the Gospel, *i. e.*, by certain signs, rites, or ceremonies obvious to the senses, that by them He might admonish, instruct, and make us sure that what we see performed in a visible manner, externally, is effected internally in us by the power of God."

"In this way the Sacraments are, in respect to us, signs *confirming our faith* in the promise of the Gospel; in respect to God, they are organs or instruments, through which God in the Word presents, applies, seals, confirms, increases, and preserves the grace of

the Gospel promise in believers. *The grace tendered in the Word is not different from that tendered in the Sacraments*, nor is the promise in the Gospel different from that in the Sacraments; but the grace is the same and the Word one and the same, except that in the Sacraments the Word is rendered visible, as it were, on account of our infirmity, by signs divinely appointed." The question of the necessity of the Sacraments is thus decided by CHMN. (Ex. C. Trid., II, 30): "The Sacraments are necessary both by reason of the infirmity of our faith, which needs aids of this kind, and by reason of the divine institution. . . . And in this sense we not unwillingly grant that the Sacraments are necessary to salvation, as the instrumental cause; but yet this declaration is to be added, that the necessity of the Sacraments to salvation is not so precise as that of faith and the Word. . . . But if any one have true faith in Christ from hearing the Word, and if the ability to use the Sacraments according to the divine institution be not conceded him, in such a case surely the necessity of the Sacraments to salvation is not to be considered as absolute; for then salvation would be denied to those who have no ability to use the Sacraments, although they embrace Christ as their Saviour by faith in the Word."

HOLL. (1065): "The Sacraments are necessary by the *necessity of the precept* and *of the means*. They have no *absolute*, but an *ordinate* or *conditionate* necessity." QUEN. (IV, 77): "Baptism is necessary *in infants*, not only by the necessity of the precept, but by the necessity of the means, because there is no other means by which they may be regenerated; but in adults it is necessary by reason of the precept, because in that case it requires faith. The Eucharist is necessary to all Christian adults by the necessity of the precept."

[14] HOLL. (1062): "The secondary designs of the Sacraments are: (*a*) That they may be marks of the Church, by which it is distinguished from unbelievers" ("and symbols of confession by which we separate ourselves from other sects." QUEN., IV., 77). "(*b*) That they may be monuments of the benefits of Christ. Luke 22: 19. (*c*) That they may be bonds of love and the nerves of public assemblies. Eph. 4: 5; 1 Cor. 10: 17. (*d*) That they may be incitements to the exercise of the virtues (Baptism signifies the burying of the old Adam, Rom. 6: 4; the Lord's Supper excites us to a grateful remembrance of the death of Christ, 1 Cor. 11: 26)."

Observation.—As the Old Testament also contains the Word of God as a means of salvation, the Dogmaticians hold also that there are Sacraments in it, and regard as such circumcision and the passover, the types of Baptism and the Lord's Supper. CHMN.

(Ex. C. Trid., II, 18): "God, in all ages of the world, by giving a certain Word, revealed His will concerning the mystery of redemption to the human race, concerning the gratuitous reconciliation and acceptance of believers to life eternal through faith, because of the sacrifice of His Son as Mediator. He also added to the Word, by His own divine institution, certain external signs, by which to seal and confirm more clearly the promise of righteousness by faith. The institution and use of Sacraments did not, therefore, first begin in the time of the New Testament; but the fathers in the time of the Old Testament, even before the publication of the Law, had their certain signs or Sacraments divinely instituted for this use, which were the seals of the righteousness of faith. Rom. 4. But though it is the same God, the same Mediator, the same grace, righteousness, promise, faith, salvation, etc., yet those external signs or seals are sometimes changed for others, substituted in their place by divine institution, so that the mode of revelation was constantly rendered more clear, which at first was like a lamp shining in a dark place; afterwards the morning star succeeded, until at length, the night being past, the Sun of righteousness arose." On the relation of the Sacraments of the Old Testament and the New, QUEN. (IV, 84) says: "By the Sacraments of the New Testament, the grace of Christ is more clearly, fully, perfectly, and abundantly dispensed to believers; but from this it does not follow, as the Romanists maintain, that by the Sacraments of the Old Testament divine grace and the remission of sins were not clearly presented nor conferred on believers. For now, the work of redemption being consummated, truth succeeds to figures, substance to shadows." Ger. IX, 4: "In those of the New Testament, the present Christ is tendered and given; in those of the Old Testament, He was signified and prefigured."

§ 54. *Of Baptism.*

Of the two Sacraments, Baptism precedes the Lord's Supper. [1] We are to treat of the *nature* of Baptism, the *form* in which it is to be administered, and the *design* of its institution.

1. Baptism is an act enjoined by the Lord, and accompanied with a promise, Matt. 28: 19. Hence we have in Baptism not merely water, and not common water, but also the Word of God. But there is superadded to this a higher efficacy than exists in mere natural water, [2] and it is this which, by means of the water, effects saving grace. [3]

2. But if we expect such a result from Baptism, it must be

administered precisely according to the instructions of the Lord. The consecration must be according to His will, and the act itself administered to the baptized person agreeably to the prescribed mode. [4] If all this be done, then the Baptism is to be regarded as valid, whether the officiating minister be a believer or not, or whether the person baptized believe in the Sacrament or not. [5]

3. The immediate design of Baptism is, finally, to work saving grace in man. [6] But, as also the Word of God has the like effect, Baptism is intended to produce this result only in such cases in which it is applied at an earlier period than the Word; this is the case with infants who are not yet susceptible to the preaching of the Gospel. [7] But in adults who, with their already developed reason, can understand the preaching of the Gospel, the Word has precedence, and produces its results *before* the Sacrament. But, in such instances, Baptism serves to seal and establish the gracious result already accomplished by the Word. [8] Hence in the case of adults, who are yet to be baptized, faith must be demanded as the condition on which the ordinance effects this blessed end. [9] This cannot be expected of infants; but it does not follow that they are for that reason to be deprived of Baptism, for they need grace as well as adults, and are invited to it by God. It is, therefore, God's will that they be baptized, and Baptism serves also to create in them this faith. [10] The efficacy of Baptism is not limited to the moment of its administration, but it continues to confer strength upon its subject. Nor is this efficacy lost if, in its administration, the intended result, because of some hindrance on man's part, be not immediately produced; for still, if the ordinance were properly administered, a covenant has been entered into with God, and thereby there is forever established a disposition on God's part to produce the gracious effect to its full extent, when the individual no longer strives against it. [11] At the same time, in repentance man still has the means to appropriate to himself the blessed efficacy of Baptism, of which he has hitherto by his own neglect been deprived; for repentance is nothing else than a continuation or renewal of that which was symbolically indicated in Baptism, namely, crucifying the old man within

us, so that in repentance we can recover that which was neglected on man's part in Baptism. [12] On this ground, also, the repetition of Baptism is as unnecessary as it is inadmissible. [13]

Finally, Baptism is necessary, because it is commanded by God; but, as God can save us through other means also, we hope that the children of Christian parents who, without their own fault, are prevented from being baptized, will not be lost. [14]

As Baptism, at the same time, distinguishes us from the great mass of those who do not belong to the Church, and imposes on us the obligation to be faithful to our baptismal covenant, the following may be considered as secondary designs of Baptism: (1) The distinction between Christians and Gentiles, and the union of the former with the Church, 1 Cor. 12: 12. (2) The obligation to true faith and a godly life, 1 Pet. 3: 21. [15]

[1] Grh. (IX, 67): "The Sacrament of Baptism must be considered first, as it precedes the Lord's Supper in (1) the time of its *institution*, for it was divinely established in the very commencement of the New Testament dispensation; (2) in *administration*, for John and the disciples of Christ baptized before the Lord's Supper was instituted; (3) in *order*, for Baptism is the first portal to grace, the Sacrament of *initiation;* the Lord's Supper is the Sacrament of *confirmation*. By Baptism we are regenerated; by the Lord's Supper we are fed and nourished to eternal life. As therefore in nature, so also in grace, we must be born before we are fed; we must be begotten before we can grow. By Baptism we are received into the covenant of God; by the Lord's Supper we are preserved in it. By Baptism faith and the other gifts of the Spirit are excited in us; by the Lord's Supper they are increased and confirmed. Baptism was prefigured by circumcision; the Lord's Supper, by the paschal lamb. No one can have access to the Lord's Supper unless he has been baptized; as in the Old Testament none but the circumcised were permitted to eat the paschal lamb."

The Dogmaticians have extensively discussed the question, What relation did John's Baptism sustain to that of Christ? Chmn. (Ex. C. Trid., II, 66): "The same difference that exists between the Word concerning Christ to come, Christ coming, and Christ offered [to men in the preaching of the Gospel], exists also between

circumcision, the Baptism of John, and the Baptism of Christ. But although as to the mode of the publication of the doctrine concerning Christ there may be some difference, yet as to its substance it has been the same and has had the same effects on believers in every age. As it is then with the Word, so also is it with circumcision, the Baptism of John, and of the apostles. Nor are these to be too nicely discriminated. For if these subtleties be allowed, in this way we can also establish the difference between the Baptism performed by the apostles before the passion and resurrection of Christ, and that which they administered afterwards." The question, *Whether it was necessary for those who were baptized by John to receive afterwards the Baptism of Christ?* CHMN. leaves undetermined. All the Dogmaticians agree in not referring the words "fire and spirit," in Matt. 3: 11, to actual Baptism, because Christ, Acts 1: 5, long after Baptism was administered, refers their fulfilment to a later period; but they understand them as relating to the effusion of the Holy Ghost on Pentecost and the gifts of the Spirit connected with it.

[2] CAT. MAJ. (IV, 14): "If you be asked, What is Baptism? answer, that it is not mere water, but such as is *comprehended and included* in the Word and command of God, and sanctified by them, so that it is nothing else than a water of God, or a divine water; not that it is in itself of more value than other water, but that God's Word and commandment are added to it." (See ART. SMALCALD, V, 2, 3.) The earlier Dogmaticians were satisfied with this simple expression, and hence designate, as the substance of the Sacrament, the external element of water and the Word of the institution and promise. (CHMN. (Loc. c. Th., III, 161): "The distinction is to be retained, viz., that the substance of Baptism consists in the act and in the words, 'I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.'") But the later writers (see *Of the Sacraments in General*, note 6, p. 544 sq.) speak of a double matter in Baptism: the earthly object, which is natural, pure water, everywhere at hand; and the heavenly object, by which they designate *that* which they suppose is superadded by the words of the consecration. This most of them consider to be the *whole Trinity*, others *the Holy Spirit*, and others *the blood of Christ*. These different views arise from the fact that some of them regard the heavenly object as indicated in the baptismal formula, others in John 3: 5, and others again in 1 John 5: 6. But there is as little contradiction in these different views of the heavenly object as there is in the passages just cited. (QUEN. (IV, 110): "The opinions of the orthodox on the heavenly object

are indeed diverse, but not contradictory, only subordinate and may easily be harmonized.") The sense in which the heavenly object is by some regarded as the whole Trinity, by others as the Holy Spirit, and by others as the blood of Christ, is thus explained by Grh. (concerning the presence of the Trinity) (IX, 133 sq): "As the name of God is nothing else than God Himself, and the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is, according to the institution of Christ, joined with the water of Baptism, it hence follows that the whole Trinity is present by His grace in Baptism, and by the water of Baptism is efficacious to the salvation of men; . . . therefore the other substantial part of Baptism is the name of the whole adorable Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; that is, the infinite majesty, the ineffable sanctity, the unspeakable goodness, the admirable virtue and grace of the whole Trinity, which, with all its virtue and the benefits of grace, are efficacious by water united to and sanctified by the Word." (Concerning the presence of the Holy Spirit): "As the Holy Spirit is the third person of the Trinity, and as Baptism is administered not only in the name of the Father and the Son, but also of the Holy Spirit, it follows that the Spirit acts efficaciously in, with and by the water of Baptism, works faith, regeneration, and renovation in those who do not strive against God, and seals the covenant of grace in the hearts of the baptized. (The Holy Spirit is named alone, because regeneration is attributed to Him as His peculiar work. He makes the water of Baptism a salutary means of regeneration, not as though the other persons were excluded, for the works of the Trinity *ad extra* are undivided, yet with the order and distinction of persons preserved.) As the Holy Spirit was supernaturally and peculiarly united with the dove in which He descended on Christ at His Baptism, so even at the present day is He supernaturally and peculiarly united with the water of Baptism." (Concerning the presence of the blood of Christ): "As the Son of God in the fulness of time assumed true human nature, and personally and inseparably united it to Himself, it follows that Christ is present in Baptism, not only according to His divine nature, but also in His human nature, and hence that the blood of Christ is by no means to be excluded from Baptism." But Grh. (IX, 137) adds: "Although Christ the God-man is present in Baptism, and by His blood, through the medium of faith, washes us from our sins, yet the most distinguished theologians maintain that the blood of Christ cannot very well be called the other material part of Baptism." The most of the Dognaticians agree in saying, "*the heavenly object of Baptism is analogically called the whole sacred Trinity,*

but peculiarly and terminatively the Holy Spirit. (Holl., 1085.)" Calov. (IX, 166) attempts to combine the three expressions: "The heavenly object, considered as a whole, is the most holy Trinity, namely, the *Father, the Son of God* . . . (to whose entireness, not the divine nature alone, but also the human nature contributes, as that to which alone also the *blood* belongs, and of which He became a partaker for our sake), and also *the Holy Spirit;* and this [*i. e.*, the most holy Trinity] in one expression is called the Word and the name of God, *i. e.*, God Himself, threefold and one, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, according to the well-known rule handed down from Augustine: 'The Word is joined to the element and it becomes a Sacrament.' This Word of the institution is found in Matt. 28: 19." The fluctuation of the Dogmaticians in these definitions is also manifest in this, that some suppose the expression, "the heavenly object is the whole Trinity," signifies nothing more than the other earlier one, viz., "the second essential part [of Baptism] is the Word," since in the Word God is included; while the others (Hutt., for instance) expressly maintain that the *Word* is not a substantial part, but only the active (ποιητικὸν) principle of Baptism, which, from this point of view, appears the more correct. It is from this diversity of views that the difference in the expression of the earlier and later Dogmaticians, as noticed in the previous section, note 6, proceeds. The opposition of Br. to this mode of expression we have mentioned in the preceding section. In relation to Baptism, he says (683): "When it is acknowledged (1) that the words of the institution, besides the water, belong to the substance of Baptism; and (2) from the force of these words it is further acknowledged that the Holy Spirit and the whole Trinity are the author of this Sacrament as a means of grace; and when (3) it is acknowledged that the Holy Spirit and the triune God, wherever and whenever Baptism is rightly administered, is present in the same way, by virtue of His measureless essence; and (4) is present by His grace in such a manner that, being present, He not only seriously offers spiritual benefits through this Sacrament, and (5) enters into the covenant of grace, with the person baptized, never to be broken on His part, and seals it through Baptism; but also (6) in the person baptized who does not resist the divine grace accomplishes, in this act itself, the work of regeneration and renovation through this Sacrament in such a manner that, (7) not *by a separate and peculiar action*, but jointly with the water of Baptism, and through it by one undivided action, He enkindles and confirms faith; and *that* (8) on account of the merit of the God-man, Christ, truly present as to

both natures, and on account of His blood shed for our sins (for, (9) since faith is conferred by baptism, by this also the blood of Christ is sprinkled, as far as His merit is applied by faith), when, I say, these things are acknowledged and maintained, we may well, as far as the rest is concerned, with the more ancient theologians, be silent about the name, heavenly object, and its almost inexplicable nature, and rather confess a cautious ignorance than profess false knowledge." The assumption of a heavenly object involves that of a "*sacramental union*, which is the union of true water with the Holy Trinity, and therefore not only with the Father, but also with the incarnate Son and with the Holy Spirit. For, neither is the water given or received without the most Holy Trinity, or without the Holy Spirit, nor the latter or the former without the water; because these two are most closely united in the sacramental act, nor can one be a Sacrament without the other. And this union is not relative only, or figurative, or typical, such as it was in the Sacraments of the Old Testament, but it tenders the celestial object, and is really and truly present; whence water, in its sacramental *form*, is not to be regarded as mere water, but the laver of regeneration in the Word, and as united with the most Holy Trinity in an ineffable manner, John 3: 5; Eph. 5: 26; Titus 3: 5; 1 Pet. 3: 21; 1 John 1: 7." QUEN. (IV, 112).

[3] BR. (693): "Baptism may be defined as a sacred action, instituted by Christ, by which men are washed with water, in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and are thus regenerated and renewed, that they may secure eternal life."

ART. SMALCALD (V, 1): "Baptism is nothing else than the Word of God with washing in water, according to His institution and command; or, as Paul says, Eph. 5: 26, the washing of water by the Word."

HOLL. (1080): "Baptism is a sacred and solemn action, divinely instituted, by which sinful men, living and actually born,* without distinction of sex and age, are washed in water in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, that by this washing of water divine grace, promised in the Gospel, may be applied, conferred upon, and sealed to them."

[4] GRH. (IX, 137): "The form of Baptism consists in the action, that is, *in the mersion of the person baptized into water*, or, what is just as well, in the affusion of water, and in the *recitation of the words of the institution:* 'I baptize thee in the name of the Father,' etc.; so that there are, in general, three substantial parts

* [This is in opposition to the baptism *infantum nondum in lucem editorum.* See GERHARD, IX, 209: "Those not yet born, cannot be born again."]

of Baptism to be maintained, which cannot be separated or changed, viz., water, the Word, and the action, which latter embraces mersion of the person into water, or the aspersion of water, and the recitation of the words of the institution. . . . We do not ascribe to the external recitation of the Word any magical or secret power, when we assert that there would be no Baptism unless it be done in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; but by this we teach and assert that it is incumbent on the true disciples of Christ to adhere with godly simplicity to His Word, and observe His institution with inviolable accuracy."

The signification of the words of the institution employed in the administration of Baptism is thus explained by Grh. (IX, 132): "When the officiating minister says: 'I baptize thee,' etc., the words are to be taken in this sense: (1) That Baptism is not a ceremony devised by man, but an ordinance of the true God, and a holy Sacrament divinely instituted. . . . (2) That he does not administer this Sacrament of his own private will, but in the place of God, the dispenser of whose mysteries and whose minister he is. . . . (3) That on this water of Baptism the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the one true God, is invoked, that in this action, commanded by Him, He may be present, according to His promise, and receive the baptized person into favor. . . . (4) That the water of Baptism is no longer simply and merely water, but water through which the whole blessed Trinity desires to be efficacious to the salvation of the subject baptized, and therefore through which the Trinity, in this very action of the baptizing minister, operates efficaciously according to His promise, 'I baptize thee,' etc., *i. e.*, I testify that by this Sacrament thou art received into the covenant of grace, that the Father accepts thee as his child, that the Son washes thee from thy sins in His blood and clothes thee with the garment of righteousness, that the Holy Spirit regenerates and renews thee to eternal life, so that in this way thou mayest become a child of God the Father forever. . . . (5) That the person baptized, being thus received by His Sacrament into the covenant of grace, is obligated to know the one true God through His Word, to supplicate, worship, and serve Him alone." . . .

To the act, as above described, there is added a series of ceremonies and usages more or less important, all of which are, however, not essential to Baptism, but are intended only to render the act more solemn. Grh. (IX, 308, sq.) specifies these as usual in our Church: "The admonition concerning original sin [since John admonished those coming to his baptism, of the fruitlessness of their lives, Matt. 3: 10], the giving of the name [as in circum-

cision, Luke 1: 59], the minor exorcism, the sign of the cross ["to testify that the infant's reception into grace occurs only by the merit of Christ crucified"], prayers [after our Lord's example, Matt. 19: 14; Mark 10: 14], recitation of the Gospel, the imposition of hands, recitation of the Lord's Prayer, the use of sponsors." Here belongs also the renunciation of Satan ("by which those who are to be baptized solemnly and in express words renounce Satan and all his pomp"). Concerning exorcism, GERHARD (ib. (310) says: "It is a testimony: 1. Of the spiritual captivity of infants in the kingdom of Satan, because of sin. 2. Of the fact that the Messiah has come, and of the redemption wrought by His work; that the strong man armed is overcome, and the spoils are distributed through Word and Sacraments. 3. Of the divine efficacy belonging to baptism, whereby infants are transferred from the power of darkness into the kingdom of God's Son. 4. Of the chief end of the ministerial office, consisting not only in the application of the benefits of Christ to believers, but also in unceasing warfare against Satan. 5. It is a public confession of the Church against the errors of Pelagians, Anabaptists, Zwinglians. It is approved by the testimonies of the primitive Church. But our exorcism differs from that of the Papists: 1. Ours rests on human authority, and is an adiaphoron, and of free observance; that of the Papists pretends to rest on apostolic authority. 2. Ours is emblematic, signifying original sin and deliverance therefrom by Christ; to that of the Papists efficacious operation is ascribed." CHMN. (Loc. c. Th., III, 161): "Those who omit or reject exorcism with the opinion of and for the same reason as the Anabaptists and Sacramentarians, because they think that infants either have no sins, and therefore are not by nature the children of wrath, or under the power of Satan; or that they, although born in sin, yet on account of their birth according to the flesh from believing parents, even before Baptism and without Baptism, are not out of the kingdom of heaven or under the power of darkness, indeed deserve to be rebuked and blamed. . . . But if this doctrine of original sin, of the power and kingdom of Satan and the efficacy of Baptism, be granted by an open confession, the substance, integrity, and efficacy of Baptism are not dependent on that prescribed rite of the words of exorcism; but the Church has the liberty of propounding and explaining that doctrine in other words more agreeable to the Scriptures." The formula in the ancient Church was this: "I adjure thee, thou unclean spirit, that thou come out of this servant of Jesus Christ, in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost." BR. (692), however, observes:

"The words have, it is true, the form of a command, but they are to be taken in the sense of a *prayer* to God, with confidence, and with innate animosity hence begotten against the enemy to be expelled."

[5] Cat. Maj. (IV, 53): "If the Word is connected with the water, Baptism must be regarded as proper and valid, *even if faith be not connected with it.* For my faith does not constitute Baptism, but it receives and apprehends it. Baptism is not vitiated or corrupted by men abusing it or not properly receiving it; for it is not bound to our faith, but to the Word of God."

The same is true with regard to the state of mind of the person who administers it, and Baptism even by a heretic is not invalid. Holl. (1084): "If Baptism be administered by a heretic, who retains the substantials of the ordinance, we must not doubt its efficacy. But if it may be administered in a flourishing church, where an orthodox minister can be procured, it is a great sin to ask it of a heretic. But in a church under oppression, in a case of urgent necessity, it may be asked for and received without blame from a heretic who uses the customary formula of Baptism; but then a protest must be added that the infant is not to be bound by this Baptism to embrace false doctrine." Baptism by others than ministers, in case of necessity (*Noth-taufe*), is also valid. Holl. (1081) says: "Ordinarily, ministers of the Church, legitimately called and ordained, orthodox and of a blameless life, administer Baptism. Extraordinarily, however, and in case of necessity, any godly Christian, skilled in sacred rites, whether male or female, can administer the ordinance."

[6] Cat. Maj. (IV, 24): . . . "Hence, conceive of the whole thing as simply as possible, namely, that the power, work, fruit, and end of Baptism is *to save men.* . . . But to be saved, we know, is nothing else than to be delivered from the tyranny of sin, death, and the devil, to be transferred into the kingdom of Christ, and to dwell with Him forever."

Grh. (IX, 148, 157): "As Baptism is not simply water, but water comprehended in, sanctified by, and united to the Word of God, it is not therefore used to wash away the impurity of the body, but it is a divine and salutary means and organ by which the whole sacred Trinity efficaciously operates for the salvation of man. Although the effects of Baptism are various and multiform, yet, following the apostle, Tit. 3: 5, we reduce them all to these two heads: that Baptism is the washing of *regeneration* (John 3: 5), which embraces the gift of faith (Tit. 3: 5), the remission of sins (Luke 3: 3; Acts 2: 38; 22: 16; Rom. 6: 3), reception into the

covenant of grace (1 Pet. 3: 21), adoption as the sons of God (Gal. 3: 26), the putting on of Christ (Gal. 3: 27), deliverance from the power of Satan and the possession of eternal life (Col. 1: 13, 14; Mark 16: 16); and *renewal* (Tit. 3: 5), that is, the Holy Spirit is given to him, who begins to renew the intellect, the will, and all the powers of the soul, so that the lost image of God may begin to be restored in him, that the inner man may be renewed (2 Cor. 4: 16) that the old man may be put off, and the new one put on (Col. 3: 10), that the Spirit may oppose the flesh and rule over it, so that sin may not obtain dominion in the body."

Holl., more generally (1095): "The primary design of Baptism is the offering, application, conferring, and sealing of evangelical grace." Hfrffr. (497): "The fruit or effect of Baptism is regeneration and the remission of sins (John 3: 5; Tit. 3: 5; Mark 1: 4; Luke 3: 3; Acts 2: 38; 22: 16; Eph. 5: 26), salvation and participation in all the benefits of Christ, into whom we are ingrafted by Baptism (Tit. 3: 5; 1 Pet. 3: 21; Rom. 6: 3; Gal. 3: 27; 1 Cor. 12: 13), a good conscience toward God, or the assurance of faith as to the forgiveness of sins (1 Pet. 3: 21; 2 Cor. 1: 21), newness of life (Rom. 6: 3; Col. 2: 11)."

In opposition to the assertion of the Papal Church, that "sin is destroyed by Baptism, so that it no longer exists," the doctrine of the forgiveness of sins by Baptism is thus more particularly defined: "The guilt and dominion of sin is taken away by Baptism, but not the root or incentive (*fomes*) of sin." (Holl., 1096) Ap. Conf. (I, 35): "(Luther) always thus wrote, that Baptism removes the guilt of original sin, although the material of sin, as they call it, may remain, *i. e.*, concupiscence. He also affirmed of this material, that the Holy Spirit, given by Baptism, begins to mortify concupiscence and creates new emotions in man. Augustine speaks to the same effect when he says: 'Sin is forgiven in Baptism, not that it does not exist, but that it is not imputed.'"

[7] Grh. (IX, 236): "There is no other ordinary means of regeneration than the Word and the Sacrament of Baptism. By the Word infants cannot be influenced, but only adults, who have come to years of discretion. It remains, therefore, that they are *regenerated*, cleansed from the contagion of original sin, and made partakers of eternal life, through *Baptism*."

[8] Br. (690): "But here, as regards the immediate design [of Baptism] a diversity exists in respect to the different subjects. For faith is at first *conferred upon* and *sealed to* all infants alike by Baptism, and by this faith the merit of Christ is applied to them. But adults, who receive faith from hearing the Word before their

Baptism, are only sealed and confirmed in their faith by it. (Examples, Acts 2: 41; 8: 12, 36–38; 16: 14, 15, 31, 33; 18: 8.) And not only now, when Baptism is received, but afterwards, and throughout their whole life, it efficaciously contributes to the confirmation of their faith and further renewal."

GRH. (IX, 169): "To infants Baptism is, *primarily*, the ordinary means of regeneration and purification from sin; . . . *secondarily*, it is the seal of righteousness and the confirmation of faith. To adult believers it serves principally as a seal and testimony of the grace of God, sonship and eternal life; but in a less principal sense it increases renovation and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Infants by Baptism receive the first fruits of the Spirit and of faith; adults, who through the Word have received the first fruits of faith and of the Holy Spirit, procure an increase of these gifts by Baptism."

HFRFFR. (500): "But what? Suppose one is regenerated by the Word. Has he need of Baptism also? And can Baptism be said to be to him the laver of regeneration? Answer: Both. For believers, too, ought to be baptized, unless they be excluded by a case of necessity. And when they are baptized, Baptism is truly to them the laver of regeneration, because it augments regeneration, wrought by the Word, by a wonderful addition; because, also, the sacramental act seals the regeneration of faith to absolute certainty."

[9] Although Baptism, where it is rightly performed, is a Sacrament and offers saving grace, without any respect to the faith of the recipient, yet it is also true that, in the case of adults, a beneficial result follows only where Baptism is received by faith. The question: Is a hypocrite, therefore, also regenerated, if he receives Baptism? is thus answered by HFRFFR. (499): "In such a case we must distinguish between the *substance* of Baptism and its *fruits*. For a hypocrite, if he be baptized, receives indeed true Baptism, as to its substance, which consists in the legitimate administration of the Sacrament according to the words of the institution and in the promise of divine grace. But as long as he perseveres in his hypocrisy and infidelity, he is destitute of its salutary fruits and effects, which only believers experience. Therefore, God really offers His grace and forgiveness of sins to him who is baptized, and desires on His part to preserve that covenant perpetually firm and entire without any change, so that the grace promised in the covenant may always be accessible to him who is baptized, and that he may enjoy it as soon as he repents; but as long as he remains a hypocrite and impenitent, he is destitute of it." QUEN. (IV, 117): "Even to all hypocrites Baptism offers spiritual gifts,

as regeneration and whatever is comprehended under it, the gift of faith, remission of sins, etc., . . . but some adults, by actual impenitence, hypocrisy, and obstinacy, defraud themselves of the saving efficacy of Baptism; and hence, although these gifts be offered to them, they are not actually conferred: yet, in the meantime, it is and remains in itself a salutary organ and means of regeneration, since the deprival of the first act does not follow from the deprival of the second act through some fault of the subject." Cat. Maj. (IV, 33): "Faith alone makes the person worthy to receive profitably this salutary and divine water. For, as this is offered and promised to us in the words together with the water, it cannot be received otherwise than by cordially believing it. Without faith, Baptism profits nothing; although it cannot be denied that in itself it is a heavenly and inestimable treasure."

From this follows the antithesis against the Romanists, who maintain: "That Baptism confers grace *ex opere operato*, *i. e.*, by virtue of the sacramental action itself, so that faith is excluded by the efficiency of sacramental grace."

[10] Br. (686): "That infants are to be baptized, is plain from the testimony of John 3: 5, and Mark 10: 14, taken together, thus: 1. Whom Christ desires to come to Him for salvation, but who cannot attain to eternal life in the ordinary way except through the medium of Baptism, upon these Baptism should be conferred, as the ordinary means, and to them it should not be denied. But, Christ desires infants to be saved (Mark 10: 14), who cannot attain to eternal life in the ordinary way unless through the medium of Baptism (by virtue of the general assertion, John 3: 5). Therefore, etc. 2. Whom Christ desires to be brought to Himself, that they may enjoy His spiritual blessings, they are to be brought to Him by Baptism as the ordinary means. But Christ desires infants to be brought to Him, that they may enjoy a spiritual blessing (Mark 10: 14). Therefore, etc. 3. The command, Matt. 28: 19, to baptize all nations, is properly extended to infants also, who constitute a portion of the nations. 4. The examples which show that whole families were baptized, *e. g.*, Acts 16: 15, 33; 18: 8; 1 Cor. 1: 16, are properly believed to embrace infants, who doubtless constituted a part of the families. 5. Add also the analogy of circumcision, which was administered to infants; and, 6. That, as the promise of the covenant of grace, Acts 2: 39, belongs to infants, so also does the seal of the covenant, which is Baptism. Finally, 7. As the whole Church is cleansed by the washing of water through the Word (Eph. 5: 26), this properly refers to infants also, for they too, although unclean by nature, are nevertheless to be engrafted into the Church."

Cat. Maj. (IV, 49): "That the Baptism of infants is pleasing and grateful to Christ is abundantly manifest from what He Himself has done, viz., because God has sanctified, and made partakers of the Holy Spirit, many of those who were baptized immediately after their birth. But there are many also, at the present day, of whom we perceive that they have the Holy Spirit, as they give certain proof of this, both in doctrine and life; just as by the grace of God there is granted to us the ability to interpret the Scriptures and know Christ, which every one knows to be impossible without the aid of the Holy Spirit. . . . But if the Baptism of children were not pleasing to Christ, He would not give to any of them the Holy Spirit, nor even a particle of it; and, that I may say in a word what I think, there would not have been among men a single Christian through all the ages that have elapsed until the present day."

The objection of the opponents, viz., "The Sacraments are of no advantage without faith, but infants have no faith," is considered untenable; for faith is taken into the account only in the case of adults, who are already capable of being influenced by the Word. Stated generally, however, the proposition, "that the Sacraments are operative only when faith is present," is false; for the Sacrament, as a means of salvation and as the visible Word, is designed, just as the audible Word, to produce faith, and really produces it when there is no hindrance opposed to it on the part of man, which is the case in children. Br. (690) says: "Infants, on account of their age, cannot put any hindrance in the way of divine grace, or maliciously oppose it, and hence they immediately obtain grace by the use of the constituted and unimpeded means." Grh. (IX, 246): "We therefore invert the argument: Infants have no faith, viz., with respect to their corrupt nature, because, on account of their carnal generation from their parents, they are flesh; therefore, they are to be baptized, that they may secure faith and salvation." The Dogmaticians accordingly maintain most positively, upon the authority of Tit. 3: 5, that faith is produced in children through Baptism (Grh. (IX, 246): "Baptism is the washing of regeneration; but regeneration cannot take place without faith"), although they confess that they cannot clearly understand what kind of faith this is. Grh. (IX, 275): "We are not solicitous about the mode of this faith, but we simply acquiesce in the fact that infants really believe." [Chemnitz, Formula 1567, quoted by Grh. (IX, 273): "When we say that infants believe or have faith, it must not be imagined that infants understand or perceive the movements of faith; but the error of those is rejected who imagine

that baptized infants please God and are saved, without any action, within them, of the Holy Spirit, while Christ clearly says: 'Except a man be born,'" etc. "The Holy Spirit also is always given with the remission of sins, nor can any one, without the Holy Spirit, please God, Rom. 8. Since, therefore, it is certain that baptized infants are members of the Church, and please God, it is also certain that the Holy Spirit is efficacious within them, and that, too, in such a way that they can receive the kingdom of heaven, *i. e.*, the grace of God, and the forgiveness of sins. Although we neither understand nor can explain in words of what nature is that action or operation of the Holy Spirit in infants who are baptized, nevertheless, from the Word of God it is certain that this occurs. This action or operation of the Holy Spirit in infants we call faith, and say that infants believe. For the means or instrument whereby the kingdom of God, offered in the Word and Sacrament, is received, Scripture calls faith, and says that believers receive the kingdom of God."] . . .

QUEN. (IV, 153) calls attention to a difference between the *primary* and *immediate* act or operation of justifying faith, "by which it reposes in Christ the Mediator and apprehends His benefits by the operation of the Holy Spirit, which is the internal and formal faith which we attribute to children; and the *secondary* and *mediate*, by which faith is drawn out externally towards our neighbors in acts of charity, which we deny to infants." . . . The objection, that infants are incapable of faith because their reason is not developed, he opposes with the distinction "between an intelligent and rational soul, and its operation and use. Faith requires an intelligent and rational soul as its subject, and hence faith cannot be excited in brutes; yet this faith does not depend on the operation and use of the same."

CHMN. (Loc. c. Th., III, 160): "We by no means grant that infants who are baptized are either without faith or *are baptized on the faith of others*. The faith of others, indeed, that is, of parents or those offering them, leads children to Christ in Baptism, Mark 10: 13, and prays that they may be endowed with faith of their own. But there is no doubt that, through the washing of water by the Word, Christ operates by His Spirit in children who are baptized, and causes their reception into the kingdom of God, although we do not understand in what manner this is done. For Baptism is the laver of regeneration and the renewal of the Holy Spirit, who is poured out upon those baptized, that, being justified, they may become heirs of eternal life, Tit. 3: 5; Matt. 10: 15; and this is called the faith of infants. For, as the circumcision of children,

in the Old Testament, was the seal of the righteousness of faith, so, because in the New Testament baptized infants please God and are saved, they cannot and ought not to be cast out among unbelievers, but are properly reckoned among believers; though faith cometh of hearing in another way in intelligent, sensible, willing adults, than in infants, not yet having the use of their reason." Br. (690) adds to this: "It is not to be supposed that the actual benefit of regeneration, or the production of faith in infants, is to be deferred to years of discretion, and that they meanwhile are in no way received into grace." Hence Confirmation cannot be considered the completion of Infant Baptism. The Ap. Conf. (VII, 6) says of it only this: "Confirmation and extreme unction are rites received from the fathers, which, however, the Church never requires as necessary to salvation, because they are not commanded by God." Chmn. (Ex. C. Trid., II, 113): "Our theologians have often shown that the rite of confirmation, when the useless, superstitious, and unscriptural traditions respecting it have been laid aside, may be used piously and to the edification of the Church in this way: viz., that those who were baptized in infancy, when they come to years of discretion, should be diligently instructed by a clear and simple setting forth of the doctrines of the Church; and, when they seem moderately grounded in the rudiments, they should be presented before the bishop* and the church; and then the child, having been baptized in infancy, should *first* be admonished in a short and simple address concerning his Baptism. . . . *Secondly.* The child itself should make a personal and public profession of this doctrine and faith. *Thirdly.* He should be questioned concerning the principal doctrines of the Christian religion. . . . *Fourthly.* He should be reminded, and should show by his profession, that he differs from all heathen opinions. *Fifthly.* A serious and solemn exhortation should be added. . . . *Sixthly.* Public prayer should be made for these children; . . . to which prayer, without superstition, the imposition of hands may be added. Nor would such prayer be fruitless, for it is supported by the promises concerning the gift of perseverance and the grace of confirmation."

[11] Br. (690): "Baptism efficaciously contributes to the con-

* [The "Reformation of Cologne," prepared by Bucer, Melanchthon, Sarcerius, etc., in 1543, says: "It is not the prerogative of bishops so that no one else may administer it, since Baptism, which is far higher, is administered by ordinary ministers, yea, in case of necessity, by any Christian. It is assigned to bishops only that they may learn to know their people." So the Mark-Brandenburg Agende of 1540: "Since, thank God, the population in our lands is great, and since the bishops are few, so that there will be too many for them to hear and instruct individually, they may commit this to their pastors."]

firmation of the faith of believers and their further renovation, not only when it is received, but throughout their whole life. (For the covenant of grace, of which Baptism is the seal, will continue firm and ratified forever on the part of God.)"

CHEMNITZ (Examen, Preuss. ed., p. 276): "Christ Himself affirms that the action of Baptism respects not merely either the past or the present, but He uses the future in Mark 16: 16. It is noteworthy how Scripture extends the efficacy of Baptism for believers to all times, present (1 Pet. 3: 21), past (Tit. 3: 5), and future (Mark 16: 16; Eph. 5: 26, 27). The purifying and sanctifying virtue, efficacy and operation of Baptism, therefore, according to Scripture, remain and work throughout the entire life of the Christian; as Paul clearly teaches in many words, Rom. 6. The compact of grace and covenant of peace which God makes in Baptism is not merely for the past, or for that moment; but it is an eternal covenant, as He says in Is. 54: 10. For the covenant was not made upon the condition that, if we should fall from it by sin, it would be so broken that, even though we should return to it in true repentance by faith, God would no longer keep it. For see Rom. 3: 3; 2 Tim. 2: 13, and that most charming description, Jer. 3: 1 sqq. That this comfort is rightly applied to Baptism, is shown by the marriage illustration in Eph. 5. Lest there might still be doubt, Paul recalls the Galatians who had fallen after Baptism to the promise made in their Baptism, Gal. 3: 27, as he also did the Corinthians in 1 Cor. 12: 13. . . . Baptism is the solemn seal and perpetual attestation that communion and participation in Christ's blessings are presented and given us if we believe; 'for he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved.' But there is true faith, not only when in the very action of Baptism one apprehends the promise of grace, but even when after Baptism he retains it; yea, when after a fall he again in repentance lays hold of it, the faith is true, and what Christ says, remains true, viz., 'He that believeth,' etc."

CAT. MAJ. (IV, 76): "In Baptism, grace, the Spirit, and the power are given to the baptized, to subdue the old man in us, that the new man may come forth and be strengthened. Hence Baptism always remains the same; and, although any one driven by the storms of sin may fall away from it, yet the way of access to it is always open, that we may again subject the old man under the yoke of repentance. But it is not necessary to be again sprinkled with water; for, if we were immersed in water one hundred times, yet it would be only one Baptism. But the work and the signification continues and is permanent."

Holl. (1097): "Baptism is of such wonderful efficacy, in consequence of its divine appointment, that God, on His part, in view of the baptismal covenant, recalls the sinner to Himself and forgives his offences, if he be penitent; and the contrite sinner, on his part, panting after the grace of God, can encourage himself by the remembrance of his Baptism."

Hefele. (497): "But 'Do we not often sin again after Baptism?' True, but that requires no repetition of Baptism; for God, who, in this ordinance enters into a covenant of grace with us, is unchangeable in His will and promises, and on His part seriously and earnestly desires to preserve it perpetually inviolate, firm, and unbroken. Only let us return by repentance to Him who in Baptism has promised us grace and forgiveness of sins; and thus, in the newness of life we shall finally enjoy the fruits of Baptism, of which we have in the meanwhile been deprived by impenitence."

[12] Cat. Maj. (IV, 64): "Finally, we must not omit to mention, or fail to understand, what is signified by Baptism, and why God has commanded this Sacrament, whereby we are first admitted to the Christian communion, to be administered with such external signs and acts. The work, moreover, or act, is, that we who are to be baptized are plunged into water, by which we are covered, and, after having been immersed, we are again drawn forth. These two things, to be plunged into the water and to come out of it again, signify the power and efficacy of Baptism, which are nothing else than the destruction of the old Adam and the resurrection of the new man. *These two things are to be unceasingly practiced by us throughout our whole life; so that the Christian life is nothing else than a daily Baptism, begun indeed once, but continually perpetuated.*" (74): "From this you see very clearly that Baptism, both by its efficacy and its signification, embraces also the third Sacrament, which they are accustomed to call penance, which really is nothing else than Baptism, or its exercise. For what is penitence, unless it be earnestly to attack the old man, that his lusts may be subdued, and to put on the new man? Wherefore, if you are living in penitence, you are living in Baptism, which not only signifies this new life, but also produces it, both beginning and carrying it on." (79): "So that repentance or penitence is nothing else than a return and re-approach to Baptism, that what had before been begun, but negligently intermitted, may again be sought and practiced."

[13] Quen. (IV, 117): "Baptism, properly administered, is not to be repeated and reiterated: (1) because it is the Sacrament of

initiation, for, as we are born but once, so also we are but once born again; (2) because there is no precept, no promise, no example, in Holy Scripture for such repetition; (3) because *the fruit of Baptism is perpetual*, and the unbelief of man does not make the faith of God of no effect." CHEMNITZ, Examen, Preuss, p. 279: "This doctrine concerning the non-repetition of Baptism, has been given, not only that we should dispute that it should not be repeated, but that the sources of consolation might be shown, so that even after a fall, when again converted, we have re-access to the covenant of peace, made and sealed unto us in our Baptism."

[14] GRH. (IX, 282): "(We teach) that Baptism, as the ordinary Sacrament of initiation, and the means of regeneration, is necessary for regeneration and salvation to all without exception, even to the children of believers; yet, meanwhile, that, in case of deprivation or of impossibility, the children of Christians may be saved through an extraordinary and peculiar divine dispensation. For the necessity of Baptism is not *absolute*, but *ordinate*. On our part, we are bound to receive Baptism; yet an extraordinary act of God is not to be denied in the case of infants brought to Christ by godly parents and the Church through prayer, and dying before the blessing of Baptism could be brought to them, since God will not so bind His grace and saving efficacy to Baptism, but that He is both willing and able to exert the same extraordinarily in case of deprivation. . . . We neither can, nor ought to, rashly condemn those infants that die either in their mother's womb, or suddenly for any cause before receiving Baptism; we should rather conclude that the prayers of godly parents, or, if the parents in this matter are neglectful, the prayers of the Church, poured out before God for these infants, are mercifully heard, and that they are received into favor and life by God."

HOLL. (1098): "Baptism is necessary, through the necessity of precept and means, *i. e.*, through an ordinate and not an absolute necessity; inasmuch as we believe that the children of Christians dying without Baptism are saved."

[15] KG. (244) thus compendiously states the designs of Baptism: "There is a supreme design of Baptism, and an intermediate one. The *supreme* design is either absolutely supreme, viz., the glory of the divine wisdom and goodness; or secondarily supreme, viz., the salvation of souls. The *intermediate* design is either primary or secondary. The *primary*, in infants, is the conferring of faith and of covenant grace; in adult believers, the confirmation and sealing of faith and grace; with respect to all kinds of candidates for Baptism, the offer of faith and grace, and the spiritual

blessings belonging thereto. The *secondary* design is (1) the distinguishing of Christians from the assemblies of the Gentiles; (2) an admonition with respect to natural depravity; (3) the commemoration of the love of Christ; (4) an exhortation to newness of life."

§ 55. (2.) *The Lord's Supper.*

As in Baptism, so in the Holy Supper, we distinguish *essential nature, form,* and *design.*

1. Its Essential Nature.—This is expressed in the words of the institution, to which alone we are referred; [1] and these declare, if we interpret and understand them agreeably to the language (and we dare not adopt any other mode, [2]), that we are to partake therein not only of bread and wine, but at the same time also of the body and blood of Christ. [3] According to this, bread and wine are only the external visible elements through which the body and blood of Christ are communicated, and the Holy Supper is the sacred act in which this takes place. "*The Sacrament of the Altar is the true body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, in and under bread and wine, instituted and commanded by the Word of Christ to be eaten and drank by us Christians.*" Cat. Maj. (V, 8). [4] But, in order most distinctly to state the meaning of such a participation of the body and blood of Christ, we add:

(*a*) That, as by bread and wine real and true bread and real wine are understood, so also, by the body and blood of Christ, the real and true body and the real and true blood of Jesus Christ, as He possesses both since His glorification, must be understood; [5] and, as the bread and wine, so also this body and this blood of Christ are really and truly present. [6]

(*b*) That in the same sense, and in the same manner, in which we partake of bread and wine, so also we partake of the body and blood of Christ; so that therefore in both cases the participation is not to be understood in a metaphorical, but in a literal sense. As there is therefore an oral and real participation of bread and wine, so there is also of the body and blood of Christ; [7] but yet so that, in the mode of the participation, the same differences which naturally exist between bread and wine and body and blood are here also to be

observed, according to which, therefore, our mouth receives the purely material elements of bread and wine in a different way from that in which it receives the glorified body and glorified blood of Christ. [8]

Inasmuch as, according to this, we cannot partake of bread and wine in the Holy Supper without at the same time partaking of the body and blood of Christ, and inasmuch as we can partake of the body and blood of Christ only through the medium of the participation of the bread and wine, we perceive from this, that in the Holy Supper a peculiar union of the body and blood of Christ takes place with the bread and wine. [9] But we are not able to describe this union, according to its essential nature, for it is unique in its character and incomprehensible; hence we must limit ourselves to removing false representations of it. It would be a false representation of it if we believed in a change of one substance into the other, as the Romish Church does in the dogma of transubstantiation, which is altogether a false doctrine, for the Holy Scriptures declare both that the bread and wine, and that the body and blood, are present in the Holy Supper; or, if we believed in the combination of both substances into one; or, if we thought that this union were one extending beyond the Lord's Supper and continually existing; or, if we maintained that the body and blood were somehow locally included in the bread and wine; or, finally, if we held that this union is of the same nature as that between the divine and the human nature of Christ. [10]

2. The Form.—In the bread and wine the body and blood of Christ are communicated to us only when the mode prescribed by the Lord in this solemnity is perfectly observed. There must be, therefore: (*a*) The consecration. (*b*) The consecrated elements must be really distributed and partaken of; for only in these cases do bread and wine cease to be common and ordinary elements, and at the same time the body and blood of Christ are comprehended in and by them. [11] Where all this is done, there also the Holy Supper is a real Sacrament, and neither the faith of the communicant [12] nor the state of mind of the officiating minister [13] is a condition of the real presence of the body and blood of Christ.

3. The Design.—According to the express command of the Lord, Christians are to partake of the Holy Supper in remembrance of Him. [14] The believing participation will have the effect that the communicants, with the body and blood of Christ, will receive also all the benefits which Christ procured by the offering of His body on the cross. All the benefits, then, which Christ procured for us by His death, are communicated to us in the Holy Supper, [15] but yet in such manner that faith is presupposed as already existing in those who partake of the Holy Supper; and therefore the effect of the Supper does not consist in the production, so much as in the more thorough establishment and confirmation and more cordial appropriation of those benefits. [16] The most prominent result is: (*a*) The sealing of the Gospel promise of the remission of sins, and the confirmation of our faith, for no surer and more certain pledge can be given us than the body and blood of Christ; (*b*) The ingrafting into Christ and spiritual nourishment to eternal life, for it is in the Supper that the closest union with Christ takes place. [17] In the participation of the Holy Supper, Christians acknowledge themselves as belonging to one Head, and thus the Holy Supper, at the same time, serves to strengthen the bond of love among them. [18]

[1] Holl. (1107): "The norm of the whole doctrine of the Sacrament of the Eucharist is given in the words of the institution, which are found in Matt. 26: 26; Mark 14: 22; Luke 22: 19; 1 Cor. 11: 23. The Capernaitic discourse of Christ, John 6: 26 sq., is by no means the norm or foundation of knowing or establishing this doctrine."

Chmn. (de c. Dom., 9): "As some dogmas of the Church and single articles of faith have, as it were, their proper foundation in certain particular passages of Scripture where they are expressly taught and explained, so that their true and genuine meaning may be properly sought and surely gathered from those passages; so, beyond controversy, the correct doctrine of the Lord's Supper has its peculiar place and proper foundation in the words of the institution. All confess and yield this to the words, but when the *thing* spoken of comes to be treated, there is plainly a difference. For all the Sacramentarians, however many there may be, do not derive what they wish to think and believe concerning the Lord's

Supper from the words of the institution, understood literally and simply as they stand; but they take their opinion from other passages of the Scriptures, most of which say nothing about the Lord's Supper, each one choosing other passages, according to some analogy of his own, as his fancy may dictate. And often they gather from other Scripture passages what they wish to believe on this subject, then at last they go to the words of the institution, and then comes the tug and toil of intruding upon the words of the institution, by a figurative and violent interpretation, their opinion elsewhere conceived. And thus among those arguments which the Sacramentarians accumulate to establish and confirm their opinion of the Lord's Supper, the words of the institution have properly no place. But when, in refutation, those things which seem to oppose their asserted opinion are to be overthrown, then at last these words are heard, viz., 'this is my body;' yet so as to signify, not that which they declare, but so as to be compelled to serve a presumptuous opinion derived elsewhere."

[2] Form. Conc. (Epit. VII, 7): "We believe, etc., that the words of the Testament of Christ are not to be taken in any other sense than as the words sound to the very letter." Holl. (1111): "We must not depart from the obvious meaning of the words of the Holy Supper, but they are to be understood most simply and literally as they stand. *Note:* We do not here speak of all the words of the institution, but of the substantial and constitutive words: 'This is my body, this is my blood.'"

Br. (703) very briefly condenses the proof as follows: "That these words of Christ are to be taken in their native force and intention, and that we are not to pervert them from their proper signification to a figure, appears: (1) From the common and natural rule of interpretation, which retains the literal signification, unless urgent necessity compel us to adopt a figurative one; which rule is indeed most solicitously to be observed in regard to supernatural subjects and those which pertain to faith. (2) That when the three Evangelists and Paul, at different times and places, speak of the institution of the Lord's Supper, not one of them ever intimates that the words have a figurative meaning, or that we are to believe that we eat, not the body, but a sign of the body; that we drink, not the blood, but a sign of the blood. (3) From the harmony of 1 Cor. 11: 27, 28, and 10: 16. In the former passage the unworthy communicant is said to be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord, received in an unworthy or contumelious manner, because the bread and wine are the communion of the body and

blood of Christ, as is taught in the latter passage. But this communion is not a mere significance, but a real union. (4) From the nature of testaments, in which literalness and perspicuity of language are particularly required; and least of all is it to be supposed that Christ, in His testament, has either designedly or imprudently given occasion of dispute and strife by figurativeness of language." Others derive an additional argument from the absurdity of the figurative meaning. FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VII, 43–60.)

[3] The literal sense is thus explained by HOLL. (1108): "In the former proposition (this is my body) the demonstrative pronoun *this* denotes the entire sacramental complex, consisting of bread and the body of Christ; in the latter proposition (this is my blood) it likewise denotes the entire complex, consisting of everything in the Sacrament composed of the wine and the blood of Christ, mysteriously united." (Inasmuch as the pronoun *this* is employed with regard to both the bread and the body, the Romish doctrine of a transubstantiation is excluded.) "The substantive verb *is* connects the predicate with the subject, and denotes that that which is offered in the Holy Supper is really and truly not only bread, but also the body of Christ."

The meaning of the words then is this: "*This* which I offer to you, which you are to receive and eat, *is not only* bread, but it is besides my body. *This* which I offer to you, and which you are to receive and drink, *is not only* wine, but besides it is my blood." Or, as it is most frequently expressed: "In, with, and under the bread and wine, Christ presents His true body and blood to be truly and substantially eaten and drank by us." This mode of expression is confirmed by the FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VII, 35) thus: "Besides those phrases used by Christ and Paul [viz., that the bread in the Supper is the body of Christ, or the communion of the body of Christ], we employ other forms of speech also, *e. g.*, when we say that the body of Christ is present and presented under the bread; this we do for weighty reasons. For, first, we use these phrases in order to reject Romish transubstantiation. In the next place, we wish also in this way to teach the sacramental union of the substance of the unchanged bread with the body of Christ. In the same way, the passage, John 1: 14, 'The *Word was made flesh*,' is repeated and declared in other analogous passages, *ex. gr.*, Col. 2: 9; Acts 10: 38; 2 Cor. 5: 19. These passages, besides the one quoted from John, repeat and declare, viz., that by the incarnation the divine essence was not changed into the human nature, but that the two natures are personally

united without confusion." Still another mode of expression is this: "This, which is exhibited through the medium of bread, is the body of Christ."

[4] Hutt. (Loc. Th , 230): "The Lord's Supper is a Sacrament of the New Testament instituted by Christ, in which the true body and true blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, in and under bread and wine, is truly distributed to all who eat and drink, and the promise of grace is applied and sealed to every believer."

Kg. (248): "The Lord's Supper is the second New Testament Sacrament, in which God, to-day, by the hand of the regular minister of the Church, through the medium of the consecrated bread, truly and really presents to the communicants His true and substantial body to be eaten by the bodily mouth, yet in a supernatural way; and through the medium of the consecrated wine, He truly and really presents to the communicants His true and substantial blood, to be drank *by the bodily mouth*, yet in a *manner hyperphysical* and unknown to us; and by this He confirms their faith and seals to them His covenant grace, to the praise of His goodness and wisdom, and the salvation of those who partake."

In the Scriptures this Sacrament is called the Lord's Supper, δειπνον κυριακὸν, 1 Cor. 11: 20; the table of the Lord, τράπεζα τοῦ κυριου, 1 Cor. 10: 21; communion, κοινωνία, 1 Cor. 10: 16; the new covenant, καινὴ διαθήκη, Luke 22: 20; 1 Cor. 11: 25. In the writings of the Church Fathers, the eucharist, εὐχαριστία; a religious service, σύναξις; a love-feast, ἀγάπη; a liturgy, λειτουργία; a sacrifice, θυσία; an offering, προσφορὰ; a mystery, μυστήριον. In the writings of the Latin Fathers, the Sacrament of the altar—the mass—*missa*.

The Dogmaticians accordingly distinguish between the celestial and the terrestrial matter in the Lord's Supper. Holl. (1116): "The *terrestrial* matter of the Lord's Supper is partly bread; in regard to its substance, genuine. It is not important, however, in regard to its quantity, whether it be more or less, or whether it be round or oblong; in regard to its quality, whether it be unfermented or fermented; in regard to the kind of grain, whether it be wheat, rye, or barley. It is partly wine; in regard to its substance, genuine; but it is of no account whether it be red or white, pure or somewhat diluted with water. The *celestial* matter is the true and substantial body of Christ, and also the true and substantial blood of Christ."

[5] Chmn. (d. c. D., 14): "When, in speaking of the *bread* in the Lord's Supper, we say that it is the body of Christ, the word *bread* has and retains its literal signification. And when to the word *body* is added the phrase, 'which is given for you,' we are

compelled to take it in no other than in its literal and natural meaning, namely, of that substance of Christ's human nature, which was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary, and suspended on the cross." Holl. (1118): "It is readily inferred that in the Eucharist with the consecrated bread there is given us to eat not a *typical* body, or a *figurative* one, such as was the body of the paschal lamb, so far as it shadowed forth and prefigured the body of Christ; not a *mystical* body, which is the Church, Eph. 1: 23; not the *sign of a body*, for that was not crucified for us; but the true and personal body of Christ, belonging to the Son of God, and therefore full of God, and majestic. . . . It is the now glorified and most glorious body of Christ. For, although we always partake of the crucified and dead body of Christ, as to its merit, yet it is now no longer in that condition; but we partake of it in the state in which it now is. It is not therefore to be circumscribed by the laws of nature."

[6] Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., VII, 9): "It is taught, that in the Holy Supper the true body and blood of Christ are truly present, and distributed and received under the form of bread and wine."

Grh. (X, 165): "After it is demonstrated that the words of the Holy Supper are to be taken κατὰ τὸ ῥητόν, according to their genuine, literal and natural meaning, the opinion of our churches concerning the true, real, and substantial presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Supper cannot be doubtful or uncertain, since it immediately flows from the words of the institution κατὰ ῥητόν, and taken literally." This presence is called *sacramental* (ib., 168), "because the celestial object in this mystery is bestowed and presented to us through the medium of external sacramental symbols; it is called *true* and *real*, to exclude the figment of a figurative, imaginary, and representative presence; *substantial*, to exclude the subterfuge of our opponents concerning the merely efficacious presence of the body and blood of Christ in this mystery; *mystical*, *supernatural*, and *incomprehensible*, because in this mystery the body and blood of Christ are present, not in a worldly manner, but in a mystical, supernatural, and incomprehensible manner. Some of our theologians have called it a *corporeal* presence, but only with respect to the object and not at all to the mode; they wish to say by this, that not only the virtue and efficacy, but the substance itself of the body and blood of Christ, is present in the Holy Supper; for they oppose this word to spiritual presence as it is defined by their opponents, but by no means wish to say thereby that the body of Christ is present in a corporeal and quantitative manner."

In order to reply to the charge, that the Lutheran Dogmaticians had only inferred the doctrine of this presence from their doctrine of the person of Christ, HUTT. (Loc. c., p. 716) remarks: "We must consider, that in this controversy concerning the Eucharist, not one, but two different questions are mooted. One of these is concerning the will and intention of Christ: 'Whether He wished really to present His body to be eaten in the Supper and His blood to be drank, and so to be most closely present by His body and blood in the Eucharistic bread and wine?' In regard to this Luther maintained, and we agree with him, that beyond all doubt the decision of this question is to be sought nowhere else than in the article concerning the Lord's Supper. The other question is concerning the power of Christ: 'Whether He be really able to be present, by His body and blood, in all places where this Sacrament is dispensed?' In regard to this, he must be stupid who maintains that the decision is to be sought anywhere else than in the article concerning the person of Christ." If, namely, in the article just mentioned, the possibility, at least, of an omnipresence of Christ was proved, in general (comp. § 33, note 20, at the end), then nothing of consequence can any longer be objected to this mode of special presence which takes place in the Lord's Supper.

The Dogmaticians take pains to distinguish carefully between this kind of presence and other kinds of presence. Luther, already, made three distinctions of this kind. Comp. FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VII, 99): "Christ could be anywhere: first, in a comprehensible and corporeal manner, which He employed when He sojourned corporeally upon earth, when He was quantitatively circumscribed in a certain place. . . . Secondly, He can be present anywhere in another, incomprehensible and spiritual manner, so as not to be circumscribed by a place, but to penetrate all creatures, by virtue of His own perfectly free will; just as my sight penetrates the air, or the light penetrates the water, and is in these things, and yet is not circumscribed by a place. . . This manner of being present Christ employed when, in His resurrection, He came forth from the closed and sealed tomb, . . . *and thus He is also in the bread and wine of the Supper.* . . . Besides, He can be anywhere present in a divine and celestial manner, according to which He is one person with God. In this way creatures are much more nearly present to Him and more easily penetrated than according to the second kind of presence." In addition to the distinction made between the presence assumed in the Lord's Supper and the general presence (by virtue of which Christ, the

God-man, is illocally present to all creatures), QUEN. adds also the following distinctions (IV, 193): "We are not inquiring (1) concerning the *glorious presence*, by which He is present in heaven, in a peculiar manner, among angels and saints; nor (2) concerning the *hypostatic presence*, by which the λόγος is everywhere near to His assumed flesh, and this in turn near to Him; nor (3) concerning the *spiritual presence* (operative or virtual), *i. e.*, whether Christ be present in the Holy Supper effectually or operatively, as the sun is present to us through light and heat; (4) nor is the question, *whether the body and blood of Christ be present in the Holy Supper through a sign, figure, or image of Him;* nor (5) does the question concern the Holy Supper that is celebrated in heaven; nor, finally, (6) concerning a *presence through apprehension*, through faith soaring to heaven; but the question is: *Whether the body and blood of Christ, in the administration of the Supper, be so present in their own substance, that with the distributed bread there is at the same time given the very substance of the body of Christ, and in the presented cup there is at the same time presented that very blood which was poured out for us upon the altar of the cross?*" This is maintained. The presence, however, is "not physical, local, and circumscriptive, such as belongs to natural bodies," but a "hyperphysical or supernatural (which we cannot recognize by natural perception)." HOLL. (1120) distinguishes still further a double method of the hyperphysical presence: "*Definitive presence* is that of a being which is present somewhere, without the local occupation of space. In this way angels are present, who, because they are spiritual essences, cannot be measured by any interval of space. This definitive mode of being present will be common to our bodies also, in the life to come. This method Christ also employed when He came forth through the sepulchral stone from the tomb, etc. In this method, we may rightly conclude, the body of Christ is present also in the elemental bread, in the administration of the Lord's Supper; although there is, besides this, also a sacramental union of the bread with the body of Christ, which depends not precisely or simply upon that definitive mode of the presence, but upon a special divine promise. The *repletive presence* is omnipresence, which belongs to God alone, *per se* and essentially, and to the human nature of Christ by virtue of its union with the divine, and personally."*

Other erroneous conceptions are guarded against by CAL. (IX, 307), as follows: "We maintain that the body and blood of

[* See Appendix II. *Circumscriptiva.*]

Christ are present in the Supper; not, indeed, through μετουσία, or by substantial transmutation, as the Papists hold; nor by συνουσία, or consubstantiation, which the Calvinists calumniously charge upon us; nor by local inclusion, namely, impanation, as flesh is in a meat-pie, and invination, as they are accustomed to charge against us; nor in the way of a descent from heaven and from the Right Hand of God, to be followed again by an ascent to heaven and to the Right Hand of God." . . .

The objection urged by the Zwinglians against this presence, viz.: "If the body of Christ be present at the same time in Heaven, and upon earth in the Lord's Supper, it necessarily follows that it is not a true and human body, for such majesty can be attributed to God alone, but the body of Christ is not at all capable of it," is set aside by the doctrine of the *Communicatio Idiomatum* (Genus III), to the fuller development of which the Lutheran Church was led by these very objections on the part of the Reformed. (Comp. FORM. CONC., VIII, *De Persona Christi.*) QUEN. (IV, 200) replies to this objection: "There is no contradiction; the body of Christ is finite, and the same is substantially present everywhere (and especially in the Lord's Supper) without any extension and division. Both these statements agree with the Scriptures; both are to be believed, nor is the one to be opposed to the other. The axiom which our adversaries here usually bring up against us, viz., 'a natural and finite body cannot be at one and the same time in many places,' avails only in so far as a natural mode of presence is concerned, and is therefore incorrectly applied to articles of mere faith, or is rather used in opposition to the words of Christ. And if the human nature of Christ, without any prejudice to its reality and finiteness, could be assumed into the infinite person of the Logos, why, therefore, may not the body of Christ be substantially present everywhere (and especially in the Lord's Supper) without any prejudice to its reality? Place is an accident; it does not constitute a body, but is accidentally consequent upon some other accident, for instance, quantity, for the explanation of which no actual limitation is required, but for which the quality of being limitable is of itself sufficient. And, accurately speaking, it is not locality, but locability, not *the being in a place*, but *the ability to be in a place*, that is the quality of a physical body. The multiplication of the limit of the presence is not the multiplication of the subject that is present; the variety of the mode is not the multiplication of the thing. The same Christ is present in the Eucharist without the multiplication of Himself, as the same God is present in all believers without multiplication.

We must distinguish, moreover, between a body merely human and left to itself, and the body peculiar to the λόγος and personally united with Him. The philosophical axiom, 'A natural body cannot be at one and the same time in many places,' is true of a merely human body, but not of the body united with the Logos."

Further objections are the following: "(1) That the doctrine of the omnipresence of Christ according to His human nature is opposed to the doctrine of the real, peculiar, divine presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Holy Supper." To this HOLL. (1125) replies: "We distinguish between the general and special presence. There is no contradiction in maintaining that He is omnipresent, and nevertheless is presented to a particular person by a special kind of presence. For thus we read that the omnipresent Holy Spirit descended on Christ in the form of a dove, Matt. 3: 16; was bestowed upon the disciples by an external breathing, John 20: 22; was communicated to the apostles under the form of fiery tongues, Acts 2: 3; and dwells truly and by His gracious presence in the bodies of the godly, 1 Cor. 3: 6. Although, therefore, a general omnipresence is communicated to the assumed flesh of Christ by reason of the personal union, yet that does not prevent or destroy a special and sacramental presence of the body of Christ. (2) 'The substantial presence of the body of Christ in, with and under the bread is contrary to the first institution and administration of the Supper: for when Christ took the bread from the table, broke, and distributed it, He was reclining, together with His disciples, at the table. He was not in, with and under the bread, nor did He break Himself in, with and under the bread, nor did He carry Himself in His hands.' We reply: It is not contrary to the first institution and administration of the Supper. When Christ took bread from the table, brake, and distributed it, He was of course reclining at the table with His disciples; and, when He distributed the bread, He at the same time caused His body to be sacramentally in, with, and under the bread, not by removing from the table, but by the presence of His body multiplied by the divine omnipotence." (3) A third objection was based upon the ascension of Christ to heaven. For an answer, comp. § 38, Note 26, and GRH., X, 147: "Christ thus ascended to heaven that He might ascend also above all heavens, and sit down at the Right Hand of God, *i. e.*, according to the statement of the AUG. CONF., III, 'That He might powerfully reign and have dominion over all creatures.' This explanation is drawn from the Scripture itself, Ps. 8: 6; Matt. 28: 18; Eph. 1: 20; 4: 10; 1 Cor. 15: 25. By the power which is given to Christ,

exalted as to His human nature to the Right Hand of the Father, He is able to subject all things to Himself, Phil. 3: 21; by this same power, therefore, He is able to give His body to be eaten by us in the Supper. Where, notice that the ascension of Christ to heaven is described in the Holy Scriptures not only abstractly and separately, as if it were only a movement of ascent, by which the body of Christ by a local removal (μεταστάσις) had been carried away from the earth, and by degrees lifted up on high to heaven; . . . but also concretely and conjointly, so that the ascent at the same time embraced the exaltation of Christ to the Right Hand of God. Wherefore, since, after the ascent according to the flesh, Christ was elevated to the omnipotent and omnipresent Right Hand of God; therefore, from the ascent, which is inseparable from the sitting at the Right Hand of God, we are by no means to infer any infirmity or any kind of absence of the flesh of Christ, but rather His infinite majesty and the effects of His divine power."

[7] Holl. (1130): "The body and blood of Christ, in the proper administration of the Lord's Supper, are received, eaten, and drank by the communicants, not only by the mouth of faith, but also by the mouth of the body."

Chmn. (d. c. D., 19): "It is certain that not bread alone is eaten in the Lord's Supper, for of that which is received and eaten in the Supper, Christ says, 'This is my body.' Therefore, in the Holy Supper there is eaten the body of Christ also; but not simply mentally and spiritually, by faith alone. For, if the word *eat* in those words of the Holy Supper meant that faith ascended above all heavens in its thoughts, the Lord's Supper might be celebrated without the external oral reception of anything, which no one has ever dared to imagine. The word *eat*, therefore, in this place, has and retains its *literal and natural signification*. For Christ commanded *a taking* in His Supper when He said, 'Take;' and He defines the mode of reception to be *with the bodily mouth*, when He adds, 'Eat.' But of that which is taken by the mouth and eaten, the Son of God Himself adds, 'This is my body.' *But it is impossible that one and the same word, in the same proposition, should at the same time have both a literal and a figurative meaning.*"

But from this oral manducation, which, because it occurs only in the Lord's Supper, is called *sacramental*, there is to be distinguished the *spiritual manducation*. Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., VII, 61): "There is a twofold eating of the flesh of Christ; one is spiritual, of which mainly Christ speaks in John 6, which occurs in no other way than in spirit and in faith, in the hearing of and meditation upon the Gospel, not less than when the Lord's Supper is

received worthily by faith. This spiritual manducation is useful and salutary in itself, and necessary to the salvation of all Christians in all ages, without which spiritual participation the sacramental manducation in the Lord's Supper, or that which occurs with the mouth only, is not only not salutary, but prejudicial also, and is a cause of condemnation. This spiritual eating, therefore, is nothing else than believing the preached Word of God, in which Christ, true God and man, is offered to us, with all the benefits which He procured by His flesh delivered up to death for us, and by His blood shed for us. These benefits are the grace and mercy of God, the forgiveness of sins, righteousness, and eternal life. He who hears these things set forth from the Word of God, receives them by faith, applies them to himself, and trusts wholly in this consolation—he spiritually eats the body and drinks the blood of Christ. The other manducation of the body of Christ is *oral* and *sacramental*, when, in the Lord's Supper, the true and substantial body and blood of Christ are orally received and partaken of by all who eat and drink the consecrated bread and wine." Thus the spiritual eating is not denied, but in the Lord's Supper it only follows the sacramental manducation. Holl. (1130) thus contrasts them: "The former (the spiritual eating) is common to all times; the latter is peculiar to the New Testament. The former is unconnected with the Supper; the latter takes place only in the Supper. The former may occur without the symbols; the latter, only through the medium of external symbols. The former always contributes to our salvation; the latter sometimes may occur to our condemnation. The former apprehends the whole Christ, with all His benefits; the latter apprehends only the body of Christ in and under the bread. The former is metaphorical; the latter is literal, by virtue of a grammatical, not a physical literalness."

The different senses in which the Lutherans and Calvinists employ these terms are thus stated by Grh. (X, 303): "The *Calvinists* thus define the *sacramental* eating: that we receive by the mouth the bread, which is the Sacrament, *i. e.*, only the sign, of the absent body of Christ. *We* thus describe the sacramental eating: that we receive with the mouth the bread which is the *communion* of the truly present body of Christ. The *Calvinists* thus define *spiritual* manducation: that the soul elevates itself, and its organ, viz., faith, to heaven, and there enjoys the body and blood of Christ, *i. e.*, applies to itself the benefits derived from the giving of His body and the shedding of His blood. We by no means deny the application of the benefits of Christ by faith, *i. e.*, the spiritual eating and drinking of the body and blood of Christ, as spoken of in John 6; but we have reference

to the *fruits* and *design of the Holy Supper*, and therefore distinguish from that the *sacramental* manducation belonging to the *form* of the Eucharist. But when the sacramental eating is called spiritual, this is meant to counteract all the carnal and earthly ideas which human reason can conceive with regard to this celestial mystery."

[8] Chmn. (de c. Dom., 20): "If the union or presence of the body of Christ in the bread were physical, constituted in a natural way and after the manner of the things of this world, then the evident and manifest manner of the sacramental manducation could be reasonably asked for and could also be shown. For the manducation is the same in kind as the union or presence of Christ in the Supper. But that union or presence is not physical, constituted after the manner of the things of this world. It is therefore more easy to show what sacramental eating is not than what it is. *It is plainly not physical*, which consists in the mastication, deglutition, and digestion of the substance which is eaten, because the presence of Christ in the Supper is not natural, constituted after the manner of the things of this world; yet nevertheless *not figurative* or feigned, but true and substantial, although it is effected by a supernatural, celestial, and inscrutable mystery." Accordingly, there is indeed assumed an oral manducation of bread and wine, as of the body and blood; but, because these substances are in their nature so different, the mode of manducation in each is also distinguished. In the bread and wine, as physical and earthly things, the mode assumed is physical; in the case of the body and blood, as heavenly things, the mode of manducation assumed is *hyper*physical. Holl. (1130): "The sacramental eating and drinking is an undivided single action, by which at one and the same moment we eat the eucharistic bread and the body of Christ sacramentally united to it. But the mode of this one eating and drinking is twofold. *For, although the terrestrial and celestial object is received by one and the same organ, yet this is not done in the same way. Bread and wine are received by the mouth immediately and naturally: the body and blood of Christ are received mediately and supernaturally.*" The physical and hyperphysical mode are thus described by Holl. (1130): "The former is that by which food, taken into the mouth, is passed into the stomach, digested, and ejected. The latter is that by which food that is offered is, indeed, received through the mouth into the body, but is not digested and ejected in a natural way. Angels ate (Gen. 18: 8), and Christ ate after His resurrection; but it was not an ordinary, natural eating, nor was the food digested in a natural manner. But as the earth absorbs water in one way and the sun in another, so also was that food not digested in a natural way."

Quen. (IV, 204): "We must distinguish between the manducation itself, with its form, definition, and properties, on the one hand, and the accidents and consequents of manducation on the other. We cannot say: 'The body of Christ is literally eaten, therefore it is masticated by the teeth,' etc. For it is not essential to literal eating and drinking, in general, that the meat and drink should pass by means of deglutition into the stomach, since the above stated accidents and consequents pertain only to the physical mode of manducation and not to the hyperphysical." The physical mode of eating the body and blood is rejected, under the name also of Capernaitic manducation (according to John 6:26). Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., VII, 64): "That command of Christ ('take, eat'), when all the circumstances are rightly considered, must be understood of an oral, and yet not of a gross, carnal, Capernaitic, but of a supernatural and incomprehensible manducation of the body of Christ."

[9] Grit. (X, 116): "The sacramental presence and union is effected in such a way that, according to the appointment of our Saviour Himself, the body of Christ is united to the consecrated bread, as a divinely appointed medium; and, to the consecrated wine as a medium also divinely appointed, the blood of Christ is united *in a manner incomprehensible to us.* Thus in a sublime mystery, with the bread, by one sacramental eating, we take and eat the body of Christ, and with the wine, in one sacramental drinking, we take and drink the blood of Christ." Ib. (302): "We teach, therefore, that in the Holy Supper we do not receive the bread, alone and by itself, nor the body of Christ, alone and by itself; . . . but, that with the wine the blood of Christ is received, and this in consequence of the mystical and sacramental union of the bread and the body and of the wine and the blood of Christ, which has its origin in the appointment of the true and omnipotent Christ, but which cannot be understood, nor should it be investigated by human reason."

Hefele. (517): "The sacramental union is such a real and true conjunction of the consecrated bread with the body of Christ, and of the consecrated wine with His blood, in which, by virtue of the institution and ordination of Christ, in the administration and reception of the Holy Supper, the true body and blood of Christ are taken, eaten, and drank together with the bread and wine."

Quen. (IV, 181): "The complex subject [viz., the τοῦτο in the words of the institution] signifies that a terrestrial and a celestial object are conjointly given to be eaten and drank. But what are conjointly given, in a real presentation, these are also united after their own peculiar manner. Now, in the Holy Supper the euchar-

istic bread and the body of Christ, and also the wine and the blood of Christ, are conjointly given in a real presentation. Therefore they are also really joined in a sacramental union."

Holl. (1120): "The sacramental union of the terrestrial and the celestial object implies the mutual presence and communion of the bread and the body, also that of the wine and the blood of Christ, so that the consecrated bread is the vehicle of the body, and the consecrated wine is the vehicle of the blood of Christ."

In order to avoid all misconception, it is added with special emphasis, that only the body and blood of Christ, and not the whole Christ, body and soul, are united with the bread and wine; hence there is a difference between the presence of Christ and the participation of the body and blood of Christ.

Quen. (IV, 200): "It is one thing that the whole Christ is present in the Holy Supper, and another that the whole Christ or the celestial object is united with the element of bread and wine, and thus also the whole is sacramentally eaten. The former we affirm, the latter we deny. For we say that the body of Christ only is united with the bread, and the blood with the wine, and sacramentally received by the mouth of the body, but that the whole Christ is received spiritually by the mouth of faith."

For the difference in the doctrine of the Lord's Supper between the Lutheran and the Reformed, see Form. Conc., VII, 2–9.

Grh. (X, 184) states the difference as follows: "Our opponents contend (1) that the body of Christ is substantially present only in heaven; hence they draw an argument against the presence of His body in the Supper from the article of His ascension; (2) that Christ in His human nature is not present on earth, but that He was taken to heaven, and will remain there until the last day; (3) that presence in many places is opposed to the nature of a true body; hence they argue against our opinion from the properties of a true body; (4) that the body of Christ was as much present to Abraham and to the godly of the Old Testament as He is to us in the sacrament of the Eucharist; (5) that the eating of His body can be performed alone by faith soaring to heaven; (6) that the body of Christ is communicated and united to us by the operation of the Holy Spirit; yet it remains in heaven, where it is received until the last day; (7) that the presence is asserted not on account of the bread, but on account of man (according to which they oppose the means to the end, which, nevertheless, are subordinates); (8) that the sacramental union consists in a mere form and analogy; which they thus explain, that the bread is a sign, figure, and representation of the body, which is absent, according

to its essence; (9) that those eating unworthily do not receive the body and blood of Christ, but only the external symbols, viz., bread and wine; (10) besides the natural eating of the bread, and the spiritual eating of the body of Christ by faith, there is no sacramental eating of the body of Christ; (11) that the body of Christ is neither locally nor illocally present; (12) that the body of Christ is neither visibly nor invisibly present; (13) that the body and blood of Christ, before His return to judge the world, is neither ordinarily nor extraordinarily present on earth, where the Supper is administered. But how or in what manner may these false hypotheses be reconciled with the true opinion of the true, real, and substantial presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Supper? How great must be their effrontery, to assert that the question is only concerning the mode of the presence, and not of the presence itself, when we have always protested that we will not dispute with any one about the mode, for that is unknown to human reason."

[10] HEFFR. (517): "The sacramental union is not (1) a transubstantiation of the bread into the body of Christ, for to a union at least two things are necessary; (2) it is not a consubstantiation or commixture of the substances, but in both the bread and wine the substance of the body and blood of Christ remains unmixed; (3) nor is it a local or durable adhesion or conjunction to the bread and wine apart from the use of the Supper; (4) nor the inclusion of some small corpuscle lying hid under the bread (impanation); (5) nor is it, finally, a personal union of the bread and body of Christ, such as exists between the Son of God and the assumed humanity." *

[* The late Dr. Krauth has given the following tabular statement, which will show how the Lutheran doctrine has often been mistaken for consubstantiation:

The theories of presence may be thus classified:

"I. SUBJECTIVE: 1. Natural—Zwingli.
2. Supernatural—Calvin.

II. OBJECTIVE: 1. *Monistic;* one substance only really present—the body and blood; Roman Catholic *transubstantiation.*
2. *Dualistic;* the two substances really present—bread and wine, body and blood.
a. *Substantial conjunction* of the two—*consubstantiation, impanation,* as held by John of Paris and Rupert; falsely charged on the Lutheran Church.
b. *Sacramental conjunction*—mystical mediating relation of the natural (bread and wine) to the supernatural (body and blood), each unchanged in its substance, and without substantial conjunction; the *Lutheran* view." Johnson's Cyclopædia, CONSUBSTANTIATION.]

[11] Grh. (X, 261): "The form of this Sacrament consists in an action, and in one which Christ and the apostles observed in its administration, and, not only by their own example, but also by a precept, commanded to be observed. The three sacramental acts belonging to the form and integrity of this Sacrament are gathered from the description of the Evangelists: (1) Christ took the bread and blessed it; (2) He gave and distributed the broken bread to the disciples; (3) the disciples received and ate the consecrated bread. . . . There are then three sacramental acts: (1) *The consecration* of the bread and cup; (2) the distribution of the consecrated bread and cup; (3) the sacramental eating and drinking of the distributed bread and cup." Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., VII, 83): "But this consecration, or recitation of the words of the institution of Christ, does not alone constitute the Sacrament, if the whole action of the Supper, as ordained by Christ, be not observed, *e. g.*, when the consecrated bread is not distributed, received, or partaken of, but is shut up, or offered as a sacrifice, or carried about in procession. For the command of Christ (do this) which embraces the whole action, must be wholly and inviolably observed. Rule: Nothing can be called a Sacrament unless administered as instituted by Christ, or according to the manner divinely appointed."

From what has been said it follows that the practice of the Roman Catholic Church in excluding the laity from the participation of the cup, is utterly rejected, and it is maintained "that as eating is an essential part of the Sacrament, so also is drinking; he who receives it in one kind only does not partake of the whole Sacrament, but only of a part." Quen. (IV, 226, 227). And yet Quen. himself remarks (IV, 225): "The laity in the papacy do not on this account sustain injury to their souls, because they are deprived of the cup of the Lord; for the sin belongs to the priests, and only the suffering of injury to the people: and although the laity do not derive the benefit of the cup by partaking of the cup, because it is denied to them, yet God will make amends for this in some other way, and relieve their misery."

Quen. (IV, 179): "The consecration consists (*a*) in the separation of the external elements, the bread and wine, from a common and ordinary use; (*b*) in the benediction, or setting them apart for sacred use, as appointed in the Holy Supper, by solemn prayers and thanksgiving; (*c*) in the sacramental union of the bread and wine with the body and blood of Christ, so that the consecrated bread becomes the communion of the body, and the consecrated wine becomes the communion of the blood of Christ." (For "by virtue of the Word the element becomes a Sacrament, without the

accession of which it remains a mere element." CAT. MAJ., V, 10.) But "this sacramental union itself does not take place except in the distribution; for the elements, bread and wine, do not become portative media (προσφερόμενα) of the body and blood of Christ, until during the distribution they are eaten and drank." HUTT. (Loc. Com., 726): "The Romanists, ancient as well as modern, insist upon it that there is a hidden magical power in the pronunciation of those four words, *Hoc est corpus meum*, by the force of which the bread is essentially changed into the body, and the wine into the blood of Christ. So there are even some among ourselves who dream that, when the words of the institution have been recited, there results a permanent sacramental union of the bread with the body and of the wine with the blood. . . . Both errors result from the false premise, in which it is assumed that the sacramental union depends upon the force and efficacy of the recitation of the words of the institution. The purified Church, correcting this error, teaches that no sacramental union takes place until the external use is added, which consists in eating and drinking; so that if the words of the institution were recited a thousand times, and this use, *i. e.*, the eating and drinking, were not added, there would still be no sacramental union of the bread with the body or of the wine with the blood of Christ. Therefore there is no reason for the anxious inquiry, Where are the consecrated wafers to be kept, if there be no use for them? or what is to be done if there be more consecrated wafers than communicants? For they are to be stored away and kept for use upon a subsequent occasion, and in the same place where the other unconsecrated wafers are kept; and this for the reasons already assigned."

GRH. (X, 270): "But since Christ, in the institution of the Holy Supper, expressly commanded us to do in its administration what He did, it follows that the minister of the Church, in celebrating the Supper, should repeat the words of the institution, and consecrate the bread and wine in this manner, and distribute it to the communicants. . . . This consecration of the Eucharist is (1) not a magical incantation, essentially transmuting, by the power of certain words, the bread into the body and the wine into the blood of Christ; nor (2) is it only the historical repetition of the institution; . . . but it is (3) an efficacious ἁγιασμός (sanctification) by which, according to the command, ordination, and institution of Christ, sanctification is, as it were, carried over from the first Supper to the Supper at the present day, and the external elements destined to this sacred use, so that with these the body and blood of Christ are distributed."

We do not, indeed, attribute to the recitation of the words of the institution such power as to make the body and blood of Christ present by some hidden efficacy inherent in the words, much less essentially to change the external elements; but we sincerely believe and profess that the presence of the body and blood of Christ depends entirely upon the will and promise of Christ, and upon the perpetually enduring efficacy of the original institution: nevertheless we also add, that the repetition of that primeval institution, made by the minister of the Church, is not merely historical and doctrinal, but also consecratory; by which, according to the appointment of Christ, the external symbols are truly and efficaciously set apart to sacred use, and in the very act of distribution become the communion of the body and blood of Christ." . . . FORM. CONC. (Sol. Dec., VII, 77): "It is not our doing, nor our pronouncing, but the command and appointment of Christ, that cause the bread to become the body and the wine to become the blood of Christ, and this is continually taking place from the first institution of the Supper to the end of the world: and by our ministry these things are daily distributed."

It was also a matter of dispute between the Lutherans and Romanists whether the consecrated host should be adored. GRH. says, in regard to this (X, 353): "When the matter of the adoration of the host is discussed with the Romanists, the question, properly speaking, is not (1) whether Christ, the God-man, who is really present in the administration of the Holy Supper, and distributes to us His body and blood by means of the bread and wine, is to be adored; for this we not only gladly admit, but also urge and inculcate; . . . (2) nor is the question strictly this, whether very special reverence is to be paid to this Sacrament, according to the rule of the divine Word; for we ourselves teach that the body and blood of Christ, which are presented to us in this Sacrament by means of external symbols, are to be distinguished from common food and drink; . . . and (3) there is properly also no question here as to the external reverence which is shown in the distribution and reception of the Eucharist; for we ourselves teach that profound reverence should be shown by the external deportment, and he who truly and heartily believes that Christ Himself, truly present in the administration of the Eucharist, feeds us with His body and blood, will manifest his profound faith and devotion by bowing his knee, and yielding external reverence. . . . Concerning these matters, therefore, there is no question between us and the Romanists; but the three points in controversy are particularly these: (1) The Romanists maintain that the Sacrament of

the Eucharist, or the whole of that which was appointed by the Lord to be received, is to be adored with the worship of *latria*. On the other hand, since the Eucharist consists of two things, a terrestrial and a celestial, we teach that adoration is not to be addressed to the terrestrial elements of bread and wine, lest we worship the creature as well as the Creator, but unto Christ, who is God and man, and who, being truly present in the administration, distributes to us His body and blood. (2) The Romanists, when they contend for the worship, adoration, and veneration of the Sacrament, do not particularly refer to this, that Christ, who is God and man, should be adored in the administration of the Holy Supper, or in its use as divinely appointed; but they labor to establish the adoration of the bread aside from the use instituted and commanded by Christ, when, namely, the bread is carried about in processions. But we maintain that *the bread, when not used as appointed by Christ, is not the body of Christ*, and so artolatry (bread-worship) is committed when bread is adored in those solemn processions. (3) The Romanists are particularly solicitous about the external worship of the Eucharist, as that it be honored by being kept in a splendid repository, etc. . . . But we are particularly solicitous in the use of the Eucharist as appointed by Christ concerning the inner and spiritual worship, upon which genuine external indications or internal reverence spontaneously follow."

QUEN. (IV, 233): "The Lord's Supper consists in a sacramental action, viz., in the consecration, distribution, eating, and drinking; and so we deny that, aside from the use of distribution, eating, and drinking, the body and blood of Christ are permanently united under the forms of bread and wine after the consecration, and we teach that the elevation, carrying about, and adoration of the consecrated wafers is not the worship of Christ (*κριστολατρεία*), but the worship of bread (*ἀρτολατρεία*)." (234): "That the sacrament of the Supper is not a permanent thing, but a temporary action, is proved (1) *From the description which Christ gives of it.* Whatever is described by Christ Himself as to its form, by means of actions, and has its complement and perfection in them, that is not a permanent thing, but an action. But the sacrament of the Eucharist is described by Christ Himself, as to its form, by actions, such as blessing, distribution, eating, drinking, and has its complement and perfection in these. Therefore, etc. (2) *From the assertion of Paul*, 1 Cor. 10: 16. 'The bread which we break,' *i. e.*, which we distribute to be eaten, 'is the communion of the body of Christ.' Whatever bread, therefore, is not broken or distributed, that is not the communion (*κοινωνία*) or participation of the body of Christ.

(3) *From the nature of the Sacrament.* No Sacrament, aside from its use as divinely appointed, is truly a Sacrament, therefore the Eucharist is not. The reason is, an institution is not observed except in its use; but where an institution is not observed, there there is no Sacrament. A Sacrament is entire through aggregation; if, therefore, one of the aggregates or connected parts be wanting, there is no Sacrament."

[12] Grh. (X, 397): "Faith does not belong to the substance of the Eucharist; therefore, it is not on account of the faith of those coming to the Lord's Supper that the bread is the communion of the body of Christ, nor does the bread cease to be the communion of the body of Christ on account of their unbelief." Hence, "hypocrites and the unworthy also partake of the substance of the Sacrament, although they do not receive its benefits. 1 Cor. 11: 27." The sacramental manducation is theirs, but "not the spiritual, for this occurs through faith to eternal life;" rather, they partake of the Holy Supper unto condemnation, while believers receive a blessing.

Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., VII, 63): "The godly receive the body and blood of Christ as a certain pledge and confirmation that their sins are surely pardoned; . . . but the wicked receive the same body and the same blood of Christ also with their mouth unto judgment and condemnation." Quen. (IV, 250): "The antithesis of the Calvinists, who maintain that the unworthy and hypocrites receive only the half of the Sacrament, viz., the external signs, but not the whole Sacrament, *i. e.*, they are not made partakers of the body and blood of Christ in the Holy Supper, but receive only the mere and empty signs."

Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., VII, 68): "But it must also be distinctly declared who are the unworthy guests in this Holy Supper; those, namely, who come to the Table of the Lord without true penitence and contrition, without true faith and a serious determination to amend their lives. These bring upon themselves condemnation, *i. e.*, temporal and eternal punishment, by their unworthy oral manducation, and make themselves guilty of the body and blood of Christ. . . . But the worthy guests in the Holy Supper are those Christians, weak in faith, timid, desponding, who, while they revolve in their minds the greatness and multitude of their sins, are alarmed; who, in reflecting upon their great impurity, judge themselves unworthy of this most precious treasure and of the benefits of Christ; who feel and deplore the infirmity of their faith: these are the worthy guests. . . . Their worthiness, therefore, consists neither in the greatness nor in the weakness of

their faith, but in the merit of Christ." The question here naturally arises, whether all who live in the Church are to be admitted to the Holy Supper? Grh. (X, 381): "Nor are all Christians promiscuously to be admitted to the Lord's Supper; but, according to the rule of Paul, only those who examine themselves, 1 Cor. 11: 28; *i. e.*, those who condemn themselves, v. 31; those who distinguish the body of the Lord from other ordinary food, v. 29; and who show forth the death of the Lord, v. 26. Therefore all those are excluded who are either unwilling or unable to examine themselves, as (1) those who are defiled with heresy, *i. e.*, who pertinaciously and refractorily persevere in error concerning the foundation of the faith, neglecting all kinds of admonition; for, since by their heresy they cut themselves off from the fellowship of the true Church, they also cannot at all be admitted to the Sacraments, which are the blessings peculiar to the Church: such are, *e. g.*, those who pertinaciously deny the true and substantial presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Holy Supper, Matt. 7: 6; Phil. 3: 2; 1 Cor. 11: 29. . . . (2) Notorious sinners. . . . (3) The excommunicated. . . . (4) The possessed, maniacs, the demented. . . . (5) Infamous persons."

[13] Form. Conc. (Sol. Dec., VII, 32): (Luther), "I confess, concerning the Sacrament of the Altar, that the true body and blood of Christ are orally eaten and drank in the bread and wine, even if the ministers who distribute the Lord's Supper, or those who receive it, do not believe, or otherwise abuse the Holy Supper. For the Lord's Supper is not based upon the faith or unbelief of men, but upon the Word of God and His appointment."

But the Lord's Supper is always to be distributed only by the minister. Quen. (IV, 177): "The dispenser of this Sacrament is none other than the minister of the Church, so that its administration is not to be intrusted to any private person, even in a case of necessity . . . (*a*) Because Christ committed the administration to the apostles. (*b*) Because He dispensed it, representing the person of the administrant. (*c*) Because He committed the administration of the Sacraments, as well as the preaching of the Word, to the apostles, Matt. 28: 19. (*d*) Because ministers are the servants and ambassadors of Christ, 2 Cor. 5: 19. (*e*) Because they are stewards of the mysteries of God, 1 Cor. 4: 1. (*f*) Because the necessity of the Eucharist is not absolute, or such as that of Baptism; it is evident, therefore, that it should rather not be administered, than be improperly distributed. (Comp. 1 Cor. 15, at the end.) When, therefore, regular ministers of the Church are not at hand, the saying of Augustine is applicable: 'Believe, and

thou hast eaten.' It is necessary, also, that the minister be orthodox, or a minister of the true Church; for the Holy Eucharist cannot be lawfully or legitimately asked or received from any other than an orthodox minister." But COTTA remarks, upon GERHARD'S statement (X, 21): "In a case of such necessity, where death seems immediately impending, if a pastor cannot be procured, and the dying person earnestly desire to enjoy the Sacrament, many of our theologians maintain that the Holy Eucharist can be administered even by a layman. Let it suffice that I mention, among these, JN. GALLUS and TILEMAN HESSHUSS."

[14] AUG. CONF. (de Missa, III, 30): "Christ commands us to do this in memory of Him; wherefore the Lord's Supper was instituted, that faith, in those who partake of the Sacrament, may call to mind the benefits which it receives through Christ, and may encourage and console the timid conscience. For, to remember and feel the benefits which are truly presented to us, is to remember Christ." HOLL. (1138): "The commemoration and annunciation of the death of Christ are made in true faith, when we consider and believe that His body was sacrificed as a victim for us on the altar of the cross. But the application of faith, as far as it relates to the body of Christ, is called the spiritual eating of the body of Christ, without which a mere oral manducation does not produce the saving benefit of the Eucharist, because all spiritual benefits are received by faith."

QUEN. (IV, 237): "The Eucharist is not an external, visible, and properly so-called propitiatory sacrifice, or a procurer of all kinds of benefits, in which the body and blood of Christ are truly and literally offered to God under the visible form of bread and wine; but it is only a commemoration of the propitiatory sacrifice once offered by Christ upon the altar of the cross." HOLL. (1139): "Observe II. The word *sacrifice* may be used either literally or figuratively. Figuratively, it is used (1) for every act which is done that we may cleave unto God in holy fellowship, and having in view the end that we may become truly happy. (2) For the worship of the New Testament and the preaching of the Gospel, Rom. 15: 16; Phil. 2: 17. (3) For kindness and the works of charity towards our neighbor, Phil. 4: 8; Heb. 13: 16. (4) For prayers and giving of thanks to God, Heb. 13: 15; Rev. 5: 8. . . . We do not deny that the mass, or the celebration of the Eucharist, may be figuratively called a sacrifice, because (1) it is a work which is done that we may cleave unto God in holy fellowship. (2) It is not the least part of the worship of the New Testament. (3) Formerly, when the Eucharist was celebrated,

gifts were usually offered which fell to the use of the ministers of the Church and of the poor. (4) The administration of the Holy Supper was joined with prayers and giving of thanks. (5) It was instituted in memory of the sacrifice of Christ . . . offered upon the altar of the cross. Observe III. We must distinguish between a sacrifice considered materially and considered formally. If we view it *materially*, in the Eucharist the sacrifice is the same in number as that which was upon the cross; or, in other words, the object and the substance are just the same, that is, the victim is the same as that offered on the cross. But if we consider the sacrifice *formally*, or as the act of sacrificing, then, although the victim is one and the same, yet the act or the immolation, which takes place in the Eucharist, is not the same with that which took place upon the cross. For upon the cross the oblation was made through the true suffering and death of an immolated living subject, without which there could not in any way be a sacrifice, properly speaking; in the Eucharist, however, the oblation is made through prayers and through the commemoration of the death, or of the sacrifice that was offered on the cross."

[15] Grh. (X, 364): "The design and benefits of the Holy Supper are very many in number, inestimable as regards their utility, and inconceivable in importance. For, when we receive in the Holy Supper the literal body of the Son of God Himself, crucified for us, and His own literal blood shed on the altar of the cross for our sins, it plainly follows from this that all things which Christ meritoriously procured for us, by delivering His body and shedding His blood, are applied, conferred upon, and sealed to us in the salutary use of this Sacrament. . . . But Christ embraces all and each of these benefits with wonderful brevity in the words of the institution, when He declares that His same body is offered to us to be eaten which was broken for us on the cross, . . . and when He commands us to do this in memory of Him."

[16] Baptism and the Lord's Supper are thus distinguished: The former is the Sacrament of initiation, the latter the Sacrament of confirmation. Grh. (X, 2): "By *Baptism* we are regenerated and renewed; by the *Lord's Supper* we are fed and nourished unto eternal life. In *Baptism*, especially that of infants, faith is kindled by the Holy Spirit; in the use of the *Supper* it is increased, confirmed, and sealed. By *Baptism* we are grafted into Christ; by the *salutary use of the Lord's Supper* we receive a spiritual increase in this relation. By *Baptism* we are received into the divine covenant; by the *use of the Eucharist* we are preserved in it, or, when we fall from it by sins against conscience, we are restored to it by true penitence."

Id. (304): "As Baptism regenerates not only the soul, but the whole man, in soul and body; so with the body and blood of Christ not only the soul but also the body, or the whole man in body and soul, is nourished unto life spiritual, celestial, and eternal. When, therefore, the Eucharist is called the food of the soul, this is to be understood in an inclusive, not an exclusive sense. And if, indeed, the body of Christ is especially only the food of the soul, yet it does not hence follow that it is not received with the bodily mouth; because the Word of God is the food of the soul (Heb. 5: 12), and yet is received with the bodily ears, Rom. 10: 14. Now, just in the same way the body of Christ is received with the bodily mouth, that the nutrition of the soul may be the more efficacious through the union of the bread and the body."

Cat. Maj. (V, 23): "By Baptism we are at first regenerated, but nevertheless the old and vicious covering of flesh and blood adheres to man. Now, there are here many impediments and assaults by which we are so severely tried, on the part of the world and of the devil, that we often grow weary and weak, and sometimes even fall into the filth of sin. Hence this Sacrament is given to us, that by its use our faith may again restore and refresh its strength; that it may not retreat or finally fall in this contest, but become daily stronger and stronger. For the new life is so constituted that it may continually increase and gather strength as it advances."

[17] Holl. (1138) combines both under the general name of evangelical grace, which is communicated to us through the use of the Holy Supper. "Christ's design in offering His body to be eaten by us . . . is, that evangelical grace, or the divine grace promised and offered to us in the Gospel, may be applied and sealed to us individually. When we attentively consider this, the act of applying grace becomes very clearly known. *God promises through regenerating grace to bestow faith upon all.* This regenerating grace, and its effect, viz., faith, God confirms, strengthens and increases through the Sacrament of the Eucharist. Moreover, he who receives the body and blood of the Lord may be most firmly assured that the promise of the Gospel belongs to him individually. . . . Next, through *justifying grace* God forgives the sins of the regenerate and imputes to them the righteousness of Christ; which justifying grace and forgiveness of sins are sealed in the Holy Supper. For, when we receive in the Holy Supper the very body of Christ which was delivered up to death for us . . . then we are positively assured, as by a seal of the New Testament, that the forgiveness of sins is imparted, bestowed upon, and applied to

us who believe in Christ. Through *indwelling grace*, God graciously united Himself with us, which mystical union is rendered more close and firm by the eating of the body and the drinking of the blood of Christ, John 6: 57. It is, moreover, a proof of ineffable love, that Christ, not content with being spiritually embraced by us through faith, in addition comes to us in His body and blood through a special appropriation, and thus unites Himself with both our body and our soul. Through *renovating grace*, spiritual strength is conferred upon us, so that we bring forth the fruits of righteousness. In the Holy Supper we are more intimately united with Christ, as the vine, so that in Him we, the branches, may bring forth more abundant fruit. By *preserving grace*, we are shielded from sin and refreshed with consolation. The sacrament of the Supper is a daily medicine against sin (Ambrose). And, just as complete refreshment or nourishment for the body consists in food, which is the dry aliment, and drink, which is the moist aliment; so, in the Eucharist Christ is offered to us as both food and drink, lest we might think that we lacked anything needful for our complete alimony or spiritual nutrition (Augustine). Through *glorifying grace*, blissful immortality is conferred upon us, whose signs or pledges are the body and blood of Christ, received in the Holy Supper."

[18] Holl. (1139): "Being united through the Holy Supper with Christ, the Head, they are also united with one another as members of the mystical body, and thus the Eucharist is the basis of love between us and our neighbor, 1 Cor. 10: 17. Whence, also, it is a mark of ecclesiastical fellowship and a token of the Church with which we communicate in faith. (Gril. (X. 371): 'We testify that we approve the doctrine which is taught in the Church in which we, together with others, eat one Eucharistic bread and drink from one common cup')." The Dogmaticians usually distinguish between the principal designs or fruits, and the less principal or secondary. As the latter, Quen. (IV. 184) enumerates: "(*a*) The remembrance and commemoration of the death of Christ and of the benefits thereby acquired, Luke 22: 19; 1 Cor. 11: 24, 25 (*ἀνάμνησις* signifies both the remembrance of any one in thought, and the commemoration in words). (*b*) The separation of Christians from Pagans and Jews. (*c*) The more intimate communion of the members of the Church with one another in Christ."

It follows from the conception of the Eucharist that (1) as a rule, it should be administered in the public congregation, and not in private, unless in a case of necessity. When, moreover,

the Apol. says (XII, 6): "We do nothing contrary to the Catholic Church, though we administer only public mass or communion; for no private masses are now administered in the Greek parishes" . . . this is not stated in opposition to the private use of the Lord's Supper, but in opposition to the solitary masses of the Romish Church, from which the congregation is entirely excluded. (2) That the frequent use of the Eucharist is not only allowable, but should be commended.

CHAPTER III.

Of the Church.

§ 56. *Of the Church* [1] *in a Wider and a Narrower Sense.*

IN view of the efficiency which God has communicated to the means of grace appointed by Him, it may naturally be expected (Is. 55 : 10 ; 59 : 21) that through their instrumentality there should arise a community of such as really embrace the saving grace offered to them. These recognize as their Lord and their Head, Christ, who, by giving Himself up to death, has not only made a congregation of the redeemed possible, but preserves the same, presides over it as Head and King, and procures for it everything that is necessary and serviceable for its existence and prosperity. [2] This congregation is most intimately united to Him, and its members are also most intimately joined together by the bond of a common faith, a common hope, and reciprocal love ; [3] so that all who have become so united and believing constitute a single, great communion, which we call *the Church.* [4] To the Church belong all those who have the same faith and the same hope, however widely they may be separated one from another by space and time. The Church embraces, therefore, not only those now living, but, as well, those who have died in the faith ; and between these there is only this difference, that the latter have already reached the goal, the former are still striving after it (Church militant, triumphant). [5] There is, therefore, only *one such communion*, because there is only one

Head to whom all are subject, and only one faith through which they can be saved. This communion we then call *holy*, because in it the Holy Ghost is operating, to sanctify it; *catholic*, because, however widely the members of the Church are scattered, yet at all times and in all places the same faith is confessed; *apostolic*, because its faith, resting upon that proclaimed by the apostles, has never, in the course of time, been changed. [6]

Only those who belong to this communion are certain of their salvation, for the only way of salvation lies in the faith which is the faith of this communion (*extra ecclesiam nulla salus*). [7] To this communion, moreover, the promise is given that it shall endure for all time, [8] and it can never utterly fall into error, because in the Word of God it possesses the eternal truth. [9]

If, moreover, the members of this communion are joined together by the like hope and the like faith, it is just as natural as it is desired by God, that those who dwell together in the same place and at the same time, should combine in a close, visible community; so that thus the one, universal Church should take the form of several particular churches (*ecclesia universalis—particularis*), [10] and its actual existence be also externally recognized by such combination. It then becomes the duty of each such congregation to draw others also into the same saving fellowship with Christ, and for this end to employ the means of grace by which individuals can be gained. The particular [or individual] Church will then have to count all such as belonging to it, who unite themselves to it, though it be only by an outward profession: for, first, as it cannot, like God, look into the heart, it has no means whereby to determine whether any individual has indeed inwardly followed the call addressed to him; secondly, it can still always hope, in regard to those who at first have only outwardly accepted the call, that, through the power of the divine Word and Sacraments, they will still in time give inward heed to it. Concerning the particular church we cannot, however, assert so unconditionally, that it is a congregation of believers, *i. e.*, of such as have accepted the saving grace offered to them; to it, therefore, the definition of the Church

thus far given, viz., the communion of believers, does not apply, for in the midst of it there may be those who have not yet accepted the offered grace. While we count only those as belonging to the Church, as the communion of believers, whose treatment of the offered grace is what it should be, we must count as belonging to the particular Church all those also who stand only in outward relation to and in connection with it. And thus we see ourselves driven to admit a twofold conception of the Church, viz., the Church in the narrow sense, composed of only true believers, and the Church in the wider sense, by which we understand the congregation of those who have joined themselves together in the same confession in the use of the Sacraments (*ecclesia stricte et late dicta*). [11] We do not thereby assume two churches, antagonistic and standing alongside of each other; rather, the relation between them is this, that the Church in the narrower sense exists in the midst of the Church in the wider sense—not so that the latter is numerically equal to the former, but that it contains, or at least may contain, members within itself whom we dare not count as belonging to the Church in the narrower sense. [12] Thus, every one will readily understand what individuals are to be counted as belonging to the Church in this wider sense, not, however, who of them belong to the Church in the narrower sense; and hence the distinction between the *visible and invisible* Church corresponds to that between the Church *widely and narrowly considered*. [13] It becomes of the greatest importance, then, if these distinctions be made, not to transfer without qualification the promises and predicates that are given to the Church in the narrower sense to the Church in the wider sense, [14] which course might easily give occasion to false fear or to false hopes, and to self-deception. [15] Concerning the latter it cannot be said, in the same sense, but only by synecdoche, [16] that it is *one*, *holy*, *catholic*, and *apostolic*, or that it cannot fail or err; [17] rather, from the fact that the call reaches many who do not receive it in their hearts, it already is manifest, that individuals in it often fail and err, and it is quite as possible that the evil may preponderate in the Church as that the good should do so.

The Church (in the wider sense) is further called a *true* or a

false one, not in consequence of there being a greater or smaller number of believers or unbelievers in it, but just in proportion as the doctrines of the Gospel are preached in it purely or impurely, and as the means by which we attain salvation are more or less purely and fully administered in it. [18] The pure preaching of the divine Word and the proper administration of the Sacraments are, therefore, the marks by which we may recognize the Church as a true one. [19]

[1] Grh. (XI, 7): "The word Church [*ecclesia*] (from ἐκκαλεῖν) generically signifies an assembly or congregation, whence it is applied to political and secular assemblies. In order, therefore, that the holy assembly of the Church may be distinguished from secular assemblies, it is called the Church of God, ἡ ἐκκλησία τοῦ θεοῦ, Neh. 13: 1; Acts 20: 28; 1 Cor. 1: 2; 10: 32; 11: 16, 22; 15: 9; 2 Cor. 1: 1; Gal. 1: 13; 1 Thess. 2: 14; 2 Thess. 1: 4; 1 Tim. 3: 5, 15. Likewise ἐκκλησία ἐν θεῷ, 1 Thess. 1: 1, τοῦ κυρίου, Deut. 23: 1; Micah 2: 5. But, inasmuch as even heretics boast of a church, for the sake of difference and honor the true Church is called ἡ ἐκκλησία τῶν ἁγίων, Ps. 89: 15; 149: 1; 1 Cor. 14: 33, to which is opposed ἡ ἐκκλησία πονηρευομένων, Ps. 26: 5; Rev. 2: 9. Finally, inasmuch as the Church of both the Old and New Testaments is said to be the Church of God and of the Lord, in order to express the difference, the New Testament Church is said to be the Church of Christ. Matt. 16: 18; Rom. 16: 16; Col. 1: 24."

[2] Holl. (1292): "The Head of the Church is Christ, the God-man (Col. 1: 18; Eph. 1: 22, 23; 4: 16), not only because of His superior eminence and perfection above the members, but also especially because of the moral and physical or real influence, which, according to both natures, He affords the members of His mystical body. The influence which Christ exerts over the members of the Church is twofold: (1) *moral*, which consists in this, that Christ, by virtue of His merit, has acquired all spiritual blessings, Eph. 1: 3; (2) *physical*, or real, so called in distinction from that which is moral; this Christ affords the members of His Church efficiently, through actions terminating in themselves, by enkindling, increasing and strengthening faith, love, and other Christian virtues; by comforting anxious minds, by sustaining the wavering, by bringing back the wandering, by governing each and every one in the course of life."

The Church is, accordingly, the kingdom in which Christ exercises His dominion; hence many Dogmaticians append the doctrine

concerning the Church to that concerning Christ as the Sovereign in His empire.

In connection with the foregoing proposition, the following antitheses to the Roman Catholic doctrine are presented:

Holl. (1293): (*a*) "Neither from necessity, nor from Christ's free will and appointment, are we to recognize, in addition to Christ, any other head of the Church, that in Christ's stead visibly governs the Church Universal."

(*b*) (1295): "Christ never appointed the Apostle Peter the general head of His Church, neither did He grant to him primacy of power and jurisdiction over the Catholic Church."

(*c*) (1297): "The Pope of Rome is neither the successor of Peter in the episcopate nor the head or monarch of the Catholic Church."

The Protestant Dogmaticians, in expounding the passage, Matt. 16: 18, understand the "rock" to mean the confession which Peter had made, v. 17. Holl. (1295): "The meaning is, 'Thou art Peter, a man made of rock, standing upon thy confession just as upon a rock, or most firm *petra*, and upon this rock will I build my Church, so that it may be made of rock, immovable and impregnable, as long as it shall stand upon this confession of doctrine, as upon an immovable rock,' v. 19. Christ gave the keys to Peter, not as a prince, but as a minister and steward. Now, indeed, not only Peter, but also the rest of the apostles were appointed stewards by Christ, 1 Cor. 4: 1. Therefore the keys here promised Peter were likewise given to the rest of the apostles."

[3] Holl. (1300): "The inner and essential form of the Church consists in the spiritual union of true believers and saints, who, as members of the Church, are bound together with Christ the Head, through true and living faith (John 1: 12; Gal. 3: 27; 1 Cor. 6: 17), which is followed by a communion of mutual love (John 13: 35)."

[4] Br. (742): "Those men whom God, in accordance with His eternal decree, has granted His faith and grace, taken collectively, are called the Church."

"Men who are true believers and saints constitute the *material* of the Church." Hence the Church is defined as "the congregation of saints who truly believe in the Gospel of Christ, and have the Holy Ghost." (Ap. Conf., IV, 28.) It is better defined, "the congregation of saints," than "the congregation of the elect," as some define it; "because the title, 'saints and believers,' is broader than 'elect.' Wherefore, since the Catholic Church embraces within its limits, not only the elect, properly and accurately so

called, but also saints and believers who afterwards fall away, it is preferable to define the Church as the congregation of saints and true believers, than of the elect, although if the term 'of the elect' be employed in a correct sense, viz., according to the ecclesiastical and general usage, it ought to offend no one." (GRH., XI, 13.)

The scriptural proof that the Church is the congregation of saints, according to QUEN. (IV, 489): "In Scripture passages (1) the Church is called the mystical body of Christ, Rom. 12: 5; 1 Cor. 10: 17; 12: 27; Eph. 1: 23; Col. 1: 18; (2) the Church is the mother of true believers, Gal. 4: 26, of the sons of God, John 1: 12; 3: 6, who are led by the Spirit of God, Rom. 8: 14, and are the heirs of Christ, Rom 8: 17; (3) the Church is Christ's fold, John 10: 1, 27, 28; (4) prophets and apostles frequently ascribe such praises to the Church as cannot be referred to the entire assembly of the called, which embraces good and evil, wheat and tares, Matt. 13: 24, good and bad fish, sheep and goats, Matt. 3: 12; 13: 47, 49; John 10: 1." (IV, 490): "Therefore, that must be termed a Church, properly and accurately so called, to which these praises and attributes primarily and immediately belong. For, in the Old and New Testaments, it is frequently called the Bride of Christ, John 3: 29; 2 Cor. 11: 2; Rev. 21: 9; Cant. 4: 7, a chaste virgin, 2 Cor. 11: 2, one flesh with Christ, Eph. 5: 30 (none of these accord with the wicked), the house of the living God, 1 Tim. 3: 15, a spiritual house, 1 Pet. 2: 5; Tit. 2: 14, sq. To this none belong except those who are living stones built upon the chief corner-stone, Jesus Christ, Eph. 2: 20, 21; 1 Pet. 2: 5."

[5] BR. (742): "Believers, considered with respect to the present life, are called the Church Militant; but with respect to the other life, or the life to come, the Church Triumphant."

GRH. (XI, 10): "That is called the *Church Militant*, which in this life is still fighting, under the banner of Christ, against Satan, the world, and the flesh. (Here observe that this description pertains only to the Church of the elect, and if indeed it ought to be applied to the assembly of the called, it must be added that the Church Militant has been called and established for the purpose of fighting bravely against these contending powers, an object common to all those called into the Church.)"

"That is called the *Church Triumphant*, which, being transferred to heavenly rest, and relieved from the labor of fighting and the danger of being overcome, triumphs in heaven against all contending powers."

"The Church is called militant from its spiritual war, or battle against the devil, Eph. 6: 10, 11; 1 Pet. 5: 8, 9, the world, 1 John 5: 4, and the flesh, Rom. 7: 14; Gal. 5: 17."

"The Church derives the name, triumphant, from the spiritual triumph or victory obtained over its enemies, Rev. 2: 10; 4: 4; 7: 9."

[6] Symb. Nic.: (I believe) "One Holy Christian and Apostolic Church."

1. Grh. (XI, 35): "The Church is said to be *one*, because it is gathered by one Lord, through one Baptism, into one mystical body, under one Head, governed by one Spirit, bound together in the unity of a common faith, hope, and love (Eph. 4: 5), acknowledges one faith, and is called by one calling to one celestial inheritance." Holl. (1301): "The Church is (*a*) *one and undivided*, because all the members of the Church are united in Christ as a head, through faith in Christ, which is joined not only with love to God, but also with inseparable connection with our neighbor; (*b*) it is *one and no more* (*α*) because it does not acknowledge a plurality of assemblies, of the same nature, existing at the same time, inasmuch as the Church Catholic is the assembly of all believers, united by faith to Christ, as the Head; (*β*) because it does not acknowledge a Church succeeding it, inasmuch as it never has altogether perished, and never will altogether perish, but, from its first beginning, has continued, by a constant succession of believers, to the present time, and will always continue until the end of time."

2. Grh. (XI, 36): "The Church is said to be *holy*, from 1 Cor. 14: 33; Rev. 11: 2; because Christ its Head is holy, Heb. 7: 26, who makes the Church partaker of His holiness, John 17: 19; because it is called by a holy calling and separated from the world, 2 Tim. 1: 9; because the Word of God, committed to it, is holy, Rom. 3: 2; because the Holy Ghost in this assembly sanctifies believers by applying to them, through faith, Christ's holiness, working inner renewal and holiness in their hearts, and awakening in them the desire of perfect holiness."

3. Ap. Conf. (IV, 10): "And it calls the Church *catholic*, so that we may understand that the Church is not an external polity of certain nations, but rather the men scattered throughout the entire globe, who agree concerning the Gospel, and have the same Christ, the same Holy Ghost, and the same Sacraments."

Holl. (1302): "The Church is called *catholic* (*καθ' ὅλον*, according to that which is entire or universal), either *with respect to its properties*, because of its doctrine and faith, in so far as it professes the faith that the whole body of believers has at all times professed; or *with respect to its extent*, because of its being spread over the entire globe, not like the Old Testament Church, taken from a particular tribe or nation, but from all nations on the whole globe. That

doctrine and faith is termed catholic, which is required of absolutely all who are to be saved." The predicate of catholicity can, therefore, be applied to the Church as the antithesis of heresy. "In this manner it is the same as the true and orthodox Church, and is so called from the catholic doctrine, *i. e.*, the orthodox doctrine of Christ and the apostles, which, inasmuch as heresies grew up here and there, has been called catholic, because it has proceeded from Christ and the apostles, has been intrusted to all believers, and been received and believed by them with unanimous agreement." In this sense, therefore, this predicate can be applied also to a particular Church. It can, however, be also applied to distinguish the Church in general from particular churches. "In this manner it is the same as Church Universal, and in this manner the fact that it embraces the doctrine of Christ and the apostles does not suffice, for a particular church receives this; but, for the Church Catholic there is required, besides, that it includes all believers of all times and places." Hutt. (Loc. c. Th. 555): "Therefore, whatever church be regarded, whether that of Rome, or Corinth, or Jerusalem, or any other, according to this latter signification, it is only particular; although with respect to preceding significations, it can be called catholic, provided that it preserve and retain, in good condition, the unity of the faith and spirit."

4. Holl. (1303): "The Church is called *apostolic*, partly because it was planted by the apostles, and partly because it has embraced and been built upon the doctrine handed down by the apostles, 'on the foundation of the apostles and prophets,' Eph. 2: 20."

[7] Grh. (XI, 39): "It is necessary for every one of those who are to be saved, to be a living member and true citizen of the *Catholic and Apostolic Church;* and those who are outside of the Church are, necessarily, aliens from God, from Christ, from the benefits of the heavenly kingdom, and the hope of eternal salvation. This is proved (1) by Eph. 2: 12, 13; 4: 16; 5: 8; 1 Pet. 2: 9; Rev. 22: 15; 21: 8; (2) by the peculiar benefits conferred by the Church, such as regeneration, renewal, etc.; for, since these have no place outside of the Church, there also cannot be salvation outside of the Church." The proposition, *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*, there is no salvation out of the Church, means, therefore, chiefly, that no one will be saved who does not believe.

[8] Conf. Aug. (VII. 1): "They teach that the one holy Church is to continue forever."

Grh. (XI, 107): "We, in no way, say that the Church Catho-

lic (viz., the invisible Church, and Church strictly so called) can fail or perish, because Christ is the eternal king, and the perpetual husband of the Church, and, therefore, by virtue of His relation, He has an eternal kingdom, and is always collecting for Himself, out of the human race, a Church, which He cherishes, loves, and protects as His bride, Matt. 16: 18; Luke 1: 33; 1 Tim. 3: 15."

[9] Grh. (XI, 143): "The entire Church never errs in such a manner, that there are not some who, following the simple guidance of the Word, by the direction and effectual working of the Holy Ghost, are so sanctified as to retain the foundation of salvation, to persevere exempt from fundamental errors, and be kept by the power of God unto salvation, although these are sometimes few and so concealed by the public prevalence of persecutions and corruptions that they are not recognized publicly by the world, Matt. 16: 16; 24: 24; 28: 20."

Id. (XI, 143): "Concerning the Church of the elect still warring on earth, we must distinctly reply, that, since errors are two-fold, some being fundamental and overthrowing the very foundation of faith, while others are non-fundamental, existing at the same time with the foundation of faith, and since error likewise can occur in a two-fold manner, either for a time or to the end, those who are elect may, for a time, be involved, and some even actually are involved not only in errors of a less grievous character, but even in fundamental errors. Yet these, in the meantime, before the end of life, again free themselves from such errors; for otherwise they would not be elect properly so called. They do not persevere to the end in *fundamental errors*, but may be involved in the *less grievous errors*, not only for a time, but even to the end; nevertheless, by the fire of the cross and of trial, these are diminished in them so as not to defeat their salvation."

[10] Br. (759): "The Church of Christ, scattered throughout the entire world, comprehends many particular assemblies, which also have appropriated to themselves the name and title of churches; for, although believers themselves are thus diffused over the earth, they still, being united here and there by certain bonds, grow into certain congregations and establish such, served by one regular and complete ministry, which is nevertheless distinct from the ministries of other congregations."

Quen. (IV, 479): "The Church is said to be *universal*, for a double reason: (1) With respect to place. (2) With respect to time. *With respect to place*, the Church is said to be the general assembly which is collected from different nations throughout the whole world, for church fellowship and participation, through the

Word and Sacraments, in the benefits of Christ. *With respect to time*, it is the assembly which, in different times, from the origin to the end of the world, is collected together through the Word. Therefore, the *Church Universal, considered absolutely*, or with respect to both time and place, is the general assembly of true believers, whom God, from the beginning of the world to its end, has called, and to-day calls, and to the end of the world will call, through the preaching of the Word, out of all peoples and nations, to the actual participation in spiritual and heavenly blessings. The *Church Universal, considered relatively*, is the assembly of all true believers, who at any one time, *e. g.*, that of the Old or of the New Testament, or even at the present day, everywhere continue in one and the same inner communion of faith, grace, love, and salvation. *A particular Church* is an assembly, not of all, but of some believers, called in a certain place to partake of salvation, and persevering in inner spiritual communion. A Church is said to be particular in a twofold sense, (*a*) with respect to time; (*b*) with respect to place. With respect to time, the Church of the Old Testament is one, and the Church of the New Testament another. With respect to place, one is collected by God throughout an entire kingdom; another, in a city, or even in a house. Hence, the apostles make mention not only of a Church in a house (*κατ' οἶκον*), Rom. 16: 5; and the Church at Corinth (*τὴν ἐν Κορίνθῳ*), 1 Cor. 1: 2; but, also, in the plural, of the churches of the Gentiles (*τῶν ἐθνῶν*), Rom. 16: 4; Gal. 1: 2, 22; Rev. 1: 4."

[11] The Church in this wider sense is, therefore, named "the *assembly of the called*," and, as "the Church broadly and improperly so called" ("the entire assembly of the called, in which all those who come together with the outward profession to hear the Word and use the Sacraments are regarded as members of the Church"), it is distinguished from "the Church strictly (properly, accurately, principally) so called (the entire assembly of true believers and saints), who are furnished not only with the outward profession of faith and the outward use of the Sacraments, but also with true faith of heart and inner regeneration." The *ecclesia late dicta* is therefore termed Church "by synecdoche, viz., of a part for the whole, by which there is ascribed to the entire assembly, composed of good and evil, that which belongs to only a part." To the Church in the former sense, the following passages refer: Acts 20: 28; 1 Cor. 12: 28; 14: 4, 23. In the latter sense: Matt. 16: 18; Eph. 1: 22, 23; 5: 23–26; 1 Tim. 3: 15. Grh. (XI, 50): "Those who by the call are brought together into the assembly of the Church, differ in two respects. For by the Holy Ghost some

are *inwardly* regenerated, renewed, endowed with true faith, enlightened, sanctified, and, in this manner, become true and living members of the Church. But others join the assembly of the called, *i. e.*, the visible Church, only by an outward association, which consists in the profession of faith and the use of the Sacraments, while, at the same time, they are without inner regeneration and holiness. The *former* are true and living members of the Church, deriving life and breath from Christ, their Head; the *latter* are corrupt and dead members. The *former* belong to the Church inwardly; the *latter* improperly. The *former*, by reason of inner and spiritual connection with Christ; the *latter*, by reason of outward custom, profession, and association with the assembly of the called. The *former*, in the heart; the *latter*, in outward appearance. The *former*, actually; the *latter*, according to opinion. The *former*, according to the judgment of God; the *latter*, according to the judgment of men. The *former*, to the Church equally in body and soul; the *latter*, in body, and not in soul. The *former*, as true and sound parts of the body; the *latter*, as the mange and evil humors in the body."

[12] Grh., Conf. Cath.: "We do not affirm that there are two Churches, the one true and internal, and the other nominal and external; but we say that the Church is one and the same, viz., the entire assembly of the called considered in a twofold manner, namely, ἔσωθεν [from within] and ἔξωθεν [from without], or, with respect to the call and outward association, consisting in the profession of faith and the use of the Sacraments, and with respect to inner regeneration and internal association, consisting in the bond of the Spirit. In the former manner and respect we grant that even hypocrites and those who are not saints belong to the Church; but in the latter manner and respect we contend that only true believers and saints belong to it." On the other hand, Hutt. (Loc. c. Th., 508): "Although it is by no means sufficient for salvation that you be in the Church, described thus generally, and only with respect to the outward profession of Christian faith, yet salvation itself cannot be found by any one outside of this assembly. And here the comparison of the Church with the ark of Noah is in point. For, as no one was saved outside of this while the deluge lasted, and yet not all who were in the ark were saved eternally, so outside of this Church of the called no one is saved, and yet not every one embraced in this vast assembly of the Church is saved."

[13] Hutt. (Loc. Th., 194): "If you consider the outward fellowship of signs and rites of the Church, the Church Militant is said to be *visible*, and embraces all those who are within the assem-

bly of the called, whether they be godly or ungodly, whether they be elect or reprobate. But if you consider the Church in so far as it is a fellowship of faith and of the Spirit dwelling in the hearts of believers, it is said to be *invisible*, and is peculiar to the elect." Cf. Ap. Conf., IV, 3.

Br. (769): "The Church, properly so called, *is*, indeed, *not distinctly visible* (or recognizable, so that we may be able to know distinctly and individually who those are that truly compose it as its members; for faith neither meets the senses, neither can we understand with much certainty what there is in others, 2 Tim. 2: 19), *but only obscurely* (namely, where congregations exist, especially the larger ones, in which the Word of God is correctly taught and the Sacraments rightly administered, it is well understood that there are there some true believers and saints who constitute a part of the Church of Christ). But that *which by synecdoche is called a particular church* is so visible that it can be recognized as true and with respect to its members, and can be distinguished from false or corrupt churches (for they profess the Catholic faith in its integrity and without corruption, and use the Sacraments aright, and can be perceived without doubt and individually)." The Church is therefore (Grh. XI, 82), "(1) *visible* with respect to the called, *invisible* with respect to the elect; for who are truly born again and elect does not appear outwardly, neither can it be perceived by the aid of the eyes; (2) *visible* with respect to outward fellowship, *invisible* with respect to inner fellowship; for who belong to the outward fellowship is manifest to men's eyes, but who belong to the inner fellowship of the Church is not likewise manifest, inasmuch as faith and spiritual newness lie concealed under the covering of the infirmities of the flesh; (3) *visible* with respect to outward means and instruments, through which the Church is collected by God on this earth; as also with respect to the outward exercises of religion, which are the profession of doctrine and Church discipline, the preaching of the Word, and the administration of the Sacraments, as also the remaining outward offices of the Church. On the other hand, it is said to be *invisible*, primarily indeed and chiefly with respect to faith and the inner gifts of the Holy Ghost in the regenerate, which cannot be perceived by human eyes; secondly, with respect also to the Head of the mystical body, whom now we do not see, and because the discerning of the good from the hypocrites, with whom they are intermingled in the visible Church, has been left only to the divine knowledge."

The same remarks, moreover, apply to this distinction as to that between the Church as taken in a broader or narrower sense. Grh.

(XI, 81): "We by no means introduce two Churches as opposed to each other, as though the visible and invisible Churches were contra-distinguished species; but we say that the visible and invisible are one and the same Church, *with a diverse relation.*" The visible and invisible Churches, therefore, are not opposed to each other as contraries, but as subalterns and subordinates. "For the invisible assembly of the elect is comprised under the visible congregation of the called, because the elect are not to be sought outside of the assembly of the called, and the Church of the called is more comprehensive than that of the elect (Matt. 20. 16). Whoever, therefore, belong to the invisible Church, *i. e.*, all who are elect, are also the called, but not the reverse." (GRH., XI, 83.)

Besides, false conceptions of the Invisible Church are guarded against by the following statements (ib.): "That the Church of the elect is said to be *invisible*, not because the godly scattered through the world do not come under the sight of men with respect to their person, but because faith and the divine election, by virtue of which they belong to the Church as true members, do not appear in them—they are seen as men having bodies, and not as elect men; *nor is the Church of the elect said to be invisible* because the godly and elect have no intercourse whatever with the visible ministry of the Word and Sacraments, and with the outward practice of divine worship, but because the inner gifts of the Holy Ghost, by which, in the sight of God, they are distinguished from corrupt and dead members, are in no way manifest to the sight of men." As a secondary reason for distinguishing between the Church visible and invisible, GRH. (XI, 85) states the following: "Because not only do earthly governments surpass the Church in outward splendor, but heretical assemblies also very often excel it in wealth, power, etc.; and therefore that the Church may not be judged from its outward appearance, it is said to be invisible, *i. e.*, that the pitiable, despised, and small assembly, in which are many weaknesses, and which is not only oppressed by persecutions and the cross, but is also disgraced by many causes of offence and stumbling-blocks, is the Church, concerning which we must decide not from its outward form, but from the Word, and of which we must judge in accordance with the norm of the Word. And in this sense and respect we grant that the Church, in this signification, is not constantly invisible in the same manner, *i. e.*, it does not always lie hidden, oppressed, despised, and degraded, but, like the moon, varies, and increases and diminishes its external splendor; for sometimes it is oppressed by persecutions and obscured by clouds of heresies, and sometimes enjoys true tranquillity, and shines most clearly with pureness of doctrine."

While the distinction between the Church visible and invisible was not expressed, in direct words, in the Symbolical Books, and by the earliest Dogmaticians, as Melanchthon, we nevertheless find the substance of it set forth in the following statements: Ap. Conf. (IV, 5): "The Church is not only the fellowship of outward matters and rites, as other governments, but is principally a fellowship of faith and the Holy Ghost in hearts. . . . And this Church alone is called the body of Christ, because Christ renews, sanctifies, and governs it by His Spirit. . . . Although, therefore, hypocrites and wicked men are members of this true Church, according to the outward rites, nevertheless, when the Church is defined, it is necessary to define that Church which is the living body of Christ, and likewise is the Church both in name and reality." But the earliest Dogmaticians do not set out, as we do, with the conception of the Church as an assembly of saints; and they, moreover, employ the expression, visible Church, in a different sense. Thus Mel. (Loc. c. Th., 285): "The visible Church is the assembly of those embracing the Gospel of Christ, and using aright the Sacraments, in which, through the ministry of the Gospel, God is efficacious." Their purpose is to rebuke those who refuse to attach themselves to any visible Church, saying that the Church does not assume a visible form. By the assertion that the Church is visible, Melanchthon means, therefore, only to say, that there are indeed certain marks by which a church can be recognized as the true one. Ap. Conf. (IV, 20): "Nor, indeed, are we imagining a Platonic state, as some impiously satirize us; but we say that this Church exists, viz., those truly believing and righteous scattered through the entire globe. And we add its marks, the pure doctrine of the Gospel and the Sacraments."

[14] Br. (761): "The more eminent praises and the promises of perpetual duration, which in the Scriptures are ascribed to the Church, ought not to be referred to any definite, particular church, but to the Church of Christ considered absolutely."

[15] Grh., Conf. Cath.: "The distinction of the Church into visible and invisible is opposed to the opinion of the Papists, that the Church of Christ is so confined to the Pope of Rome and the prelates who are in the regular succession, that whatever they affirm and believe must necessarily be received by all, and that there dare be no dissent from these in any manner or upon any pretext. Likewise, to the belief of those who flatter themselves in their offences, and think that they cannot be damned, as they are members of the visible Church."

[16] Grh. (XI, 13): "But, inasmuch as to the saints and true

believers in the Church, those are joined who are not saints, being indeed without inner regeneration and renewal, yet by outward fellowship (which consists in the profession of faith and the use of the Sacraments) joined, in this life, to the assembly of saints, it follows that the Church is sometimes received in a popular manner, for the entire assembly of the called, *to which those honorable commendations which are ascribed in the Scriptures to the Church belong only by synecdoche, an ordinary figure in the Scriptures*, doubtless because of the elect, who are in this assembly; just as if any one would eulogize a state because of its honorable and excellent citizens, with whom, nevertheless, wicked and perverse persons are intermingled; or, as if any one would adorn a field with praiseworthy epithets, because of the wheat, with which, nevertheless, tares are intermingled."

[17] Holl. (1317): "Every particular and visible church may be so corrupted by fundamental errors, that the teachers professing false doctrine may prevail, and constitute the public ministry, the small number of true believers lying concealed under the multitude of errorists."

Grh. (XI, 109): "We say that not this and that particular church alone, but absolutely all the particular churches, and, therefore, the entire visible Church, can be obscured by a cloud of corruptions, errors, scandals, heresies, persecutions, etc., and be reduced to such a condition that its outward splendor and glory may fail, and there may no longer remain *any manifest and visible assembly* to rejoice in the pure ministry of the Word as it sounds forth publicly." Hence, in opposition to the Catholics (ib.): "We therefore deny that the Church has been bound to any fixed seat in such a manner as to continue in it, with visible glory, by any perpetual succession; as our adversaries say of the Romish Church, that that is the only Catholic Church, in which the Pope is the vicar of Christ." Yet, on the other hand (ib. 110): "Nor is the Church ever hidden in such a manner as not to be seen by some, if not by the world and the unbelieving, yet by pious confessors in exile and concealment; nay even, as in the deepest state of self-renunciation, Christ, the Head of the Church, sent forth some rays of His divine majesty, from which His true divinity could be recognized, so, in the deepest depression of the Church, the confession of some of the martyrs shines forth, and presents the clearest testimony to the perpetuity and truth of the Church."

[18] Holl. (1306): "The true or pure Church is an assembly fo men, in which all things necessary to be believed for salvation, and to be done for attaining holiness of life, are clearly taught from

God's Word, without the mixture of any hurtful errors, and the Sacraments are rightly administered according to the institution of Christ, and thus spiritual sons of God are begotten, who, through true faith, are united to Christ the Head, and in Him are made one body."

(1307): "*A false or impure church* is an assembly of men, in which the doctrine of faith is publicly proclaimed from the Word of God, with a mixture of errors and corruptions, and the Sacraments administered, it is true, yet not distributed in that manner, and for that end, in and for which they were appointed by Christ."

"OBSERVATION. The true and false Churches are here opposed to each other, not *by way of contradiction*, in accordance with which a church which is clearly not a church is a false church, *e. g.*, an assembly of Mohammedans, treading under foot all of the true religion; but *privatively*, as a false church is a falsified, vitiated, corrupted, impure church." It is not asserted, however, in reference to the latter, that there may not be some within it who are saved, since even in such a church the Word of God is still preached. HOLL. (1313): "In a church in which the Word of God is publicly read and explained and preached, and, in like manner, Baptism is administered uncorrupt in its essentials, spiritual sons of God, and heirs of eternal life, can be and are born. But, in a corrupted church (the Roman and Greek), the Word of God is publicly read and explained, etc. Therefore," etc. (1314), "in a false church specifically so called, in so far as in the same the Word of God is publicly read and explained, and Baptism is administered uncorrupted in essentials, regeneration and salvation are granted, yet not without great danger of souls, because these can be so obscured by false dogmas, that either the light of faith is not enkindled, or, being enkindled in Baptism, is overwhelmed and extinguished by errors."

The phrase "*Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*," which our Church also adopts (comp. Note 7), does not, therefore, directly exclude the members of another particular church from the hope of salvation, since one may be regenerated even in such a church. The phrase is therefore not understood in our Church as it is in the Roman Catholic. That church declares salvation to be impossible for any one who belongs to another particular church, while we maintain by this statement only this, that he who would be sure of his salvation must belong to the assembly of the saints.

[19] HOLL. (1307): "The proper (essential and principal) marks of the true visible Church, from which its truth is recognized in such a manner that it can be distinguished from every

false church, are the pure preaching of the divine Word (John 15: 3) and the legitimate administration of the Sacraments (Rom. 4: 11)." Grh. XI, 195): "The Church is established, brought together, nourished, and preserved by the Word of God and the use of the Sacraments. Therefore, the Word of God and the use of the Sacraments are the proper, genuine, and infallible marks of the Church, and consequently where these are pure, the Church is pure." Grh. Conf. Cath.: "When the pure preaching of the Word is affirmed as a mark of the true Church, the term preaching is received *in a general sense* for a profession of doctrine common to all the members, pastors, and hearers of the Church, and for the public explanation of Biblical texts, which is also a preaching, Acts 15: 21" ("whether this be pure or impure ought to be determined from the public symbols and confessions published in the name of the entire Church, or approved by the entire Church, and not from the opinions or writings of this or that teacher" (Holl., 1308)). "Preaching, *in its narrow sense*, is an action peculiar to the pastor, rather than common to the entire Church, and is not purely and absolutely necessary to the Church, as is shown by the times of the most grievous persecutions, in which the Church was able to be preserved by the reading of Scripture alone, without the public preaching of pure doctrine."

Further: "Whole and entire churches are not to be estimated from the pastors alone, nor from some few; wherefore whole churches are not immediately to be condemned if either the pastors or some few depart from soundness and purity of doctrine, because the ears of hearers are often purer than the lips of teachers, and many in a corrupt state of the Church, retaining, after having received Baptism, the fundamental articles of the heavenly doctrine, either do not assent to the errors in reference to them which the false teachers scatter, or cling to these without any pertinacity, or again release themselves from them before the end of life."

Finally: "Yet we must observe that there are certain grades of this purity, because the Word of God is preached in the Church sometimes with greater and sometimes with less purity; nor does a church immediately cease to exist if the teaching on some articles of religion be even for the most part not pure. The more purely and truthfully, therefore, the Word of God is preached in a church, and the more nearly the preaching and doctrine approach the form of Holy Scripture, the purer and truer will be the church; but the farther it departs from the rule of the Word, the more impure and corrupt will be the state of a church. Yet it is not through every corruption that a church ceases to exist, because we have shown

above that God begets and preserves for Himself a holy seed and spiritual children, even at the time when the public ministry of the visible Church is corrupt."

In opposition to the Donatists and Montanists, it is very earnestly maintained that the marks above mentioned are the only essential ones; but that, also, where these exist, it is the duty of every one to connect himself with this Church. MEL. (Loc. c. Th., 284): "Neither let us praise the stragglers who wander about and attach themselves to no church, because they never find a church of such a type as that in it something is not wanting in morals or discipline; but let us search for a church in which the articles of faith are correctly taught, and to this let us attach ourselves."

The marks which the Roman Catholic Church assigns as those of a true Church are rejected as deceptive. They are the following: "The name Catholic, antiquity, uninterrupted duration, amplitude or multitude of believers, succession of believing bishops in the Roman Church, agreement in doctrine with the primitive Church, union of the members among themselves and with the head, sanctity of doctrine, efficacy of doctrine, holiness of life of its founders, glory of miracles, light of prophecy, confession of adversaries, unhappy end of enemies, temporal felicity conferred upon those who have defended the Church." Of the mark of antiquity, HOLL. (1312) observes: "By the primitive Church either that is meant which existed indeed many centuries ago, although very corrupt, or the apostolic Church. If the former, the true Church cannot be distinguished from the ancient corrupt Church. If the latter, the mark is indeed correct, but is consistent with our belief. For to agree with the primitive apostolic Chuch means to embrace the pure doctrine which that Church held."

§ 57. *The Church, Collective and Representative.*

The entire number of those who are called to salvation in Christ cannot equally participate in all the affairs of the Church by giving counsel, direction, or decision; it seeks, therefore, an instrumentality through which it can be represented, and to which it assigns this business, and it finds this in the Ministry, which is, therefore, not only entrusted with the business of publicly proclaiming the faith of the Church, [1] but also of leading the Church, and of discussing and deciding all the questions that may arise in it. The Ministry we therefore call the *representative Church,* as distinguished

from the *collective Church*, by which we mean the whole number of the members of the Church. [2] This Ministry, then, assembles in a council, whenever special occasions call for consultation, from which council laymen are not excluded if they prove themselves experienced in ecclesiastical affairs, [3] and the conclusions there adopted serve as a rule for the Church. Such an assembly is called a *General* or Universal *Council*, if all, or, at all events, the most of the particular churches are represented in it; it is called a *Particular Council* if only a few particular churches are thus represented. [4] Due regard for order makes it necessary that each council have a president, but only for the purpose of introducing in proper order the matters to be discussed, and to preside over the deliberations, and not as though in the matters of faith themselves that are discussed he should have a higher authority. [5] Under ordinary circumstances, a council is called by the political ruler under whose outward protection the Church stands; in extraordinary cases, a portion of the members of the Church has the right to call it. [6] The assembling of a council can have no other purpose than to discuss and decide the matters in question upon the basis of the Holy Scriptures, [7] for even the council can have no other means of forming a decision; the authority of a council is, therefore, not absolutely decisive in all matters of faith, and the council can never demand the submission of the Church to its decrees simply because it has issued them, but only because, and only when, the decision has been made upon the basis of the divine Word, and in accordance with it. [8] The more unanimously adopted the decrees of a council are, and the greater the number of the particular churches that agree in adopting them, the greater weight do they have; although even then they are not infallible, and therefore even then not of absolutely binding authority. [9]

[1] Holl. (1320): "The profession of faith which is announced by the voice of pastors, when they inculcate doctrine in public congregations and declare it for the reception of hearers, is regarded as the common confession of the entire Church and of the individual members."

[2] Holl. (1277): "*The Collective Church* (*ecclesia synthetica*,

ἀπὸ τῆς συνθλίσεως, from the collection or connection of all the living members, who constitute one mystical body) is the Church taken collectively, consisting of teachers and hearers, joined by the bond of the same faith, and is called the collective Church in distinction from the *Representative Church* (Matt. 18: 16), which is an assembly of Christian teachers formally assembled for the purpose of deciding questions concerning the doctrine of faith and practice" (Quen. (IV, 478), "inasmuch as they can represent and explain the public doctrine of the Church more fully and correctly than the hearers alone without the teachers."

The question here under consideration is, more generally stated, the following, viz.: "To whom does the government of the Church belong?" To this Hutt. answers (Loc. Com. Th., 568): "We contend that the aristocratic form of government is the best, and belongs most properly to the Church Militant on this earth." More accurately: "*It is our belief* that it is the best and most advantageous of all forms of Church government, if the Church be united in the unity of the faith and Spirit into one mystical body, under one universal Head, Christ, and under one equal ministry of teachers, or pastors, or bishops of the Church. *But the belief of the Romanists is this*, that the best and most advantageous of all forms of Church government is, if the Church, in addition to Christ, recognize also a visible Head on this earth, namely, the Pope of Rome." . . . Hutt. then proceeds (581): "The question is, If the monarchical form of government cannot exist, what form, therefore, has a place in the Church?" and answers: "I think that we ought to reply to this question not in an absoiutely categorical manner, but we should proceed to it distinctly, according to the threefold relation which the Church sustains. For (1) the Church may be considered with respect to its supreme and only Head, which is Christ Jesus alone. In this respect, we acknowledge that the government of the Church is purely and absolutely monarchical. Again (2) the Church may be considered with regard to its mystical body, which grows together from the entire organism of called believers into one body, and is quickened by one Spirit. Now, in so far as, in the election and calling of ministers, the votes and suffrages of the entire people and all the three hierarchical orders are required; in so far, likewise, as the privileges, benefits, rights, and dignities of the Church are not confined to this or that order alone, or this or that man, but have been handed down and committed by Christ and the apostles to the entire Church; so far, certainly, Flacius Illyricus judged not improperly that the government of the Church possessed something in common with a

democracy. . . . Finally (3) the Church is considered, also, with respect to its ministers and pastors; but in such a manner that the universal and particular churches differ. For a particular church can have one certain pastor. . . . But the question is not with respect to such a government of a particular church, but only concerning the government of the universal or catholic Church; whether this, with respect to its pastors and bishops, is monarchical, and depends upon one. Where we maintain the negative, . . . and believe and teach that this government is aristocratic, relying upon the following arguments: (1) The Church will at all times be administered in the same manner in which the primitive Church was governed by the apostles. But the apostles governed it in an aristocratic manner. Therefore, (2) That which is administered with equal justice by a few, and by these as the chief persons, is ruled in an aristocratic manner. But the Church is administered with equal justice by a few, and these belonging to a higher class. Therefore, (3) A proof can be derived from the practice of the primitive Church, which was governed by bishops. . . . (4) And the last proof can be produced from the agreement of antiquity. . . We therefore conclude our thesis with this general syllogism: 'Whatever God appointed, whatever was always observed by the apostles, was confirmed by the practice of the early Church, and finally was profitable and advantageous to the Church, that must be regarded as necessary, and be firmly retained in the Church. But such government of the Church, with respect to bishops and teachers, was aristocratic. . . . Therefore it must be regarded as necessary, and be firmly retained, nor must it be changed in any way into a monarchy.'"

[3] Holl. (1320): "In councils, the teachers and *delegates of the Church* are assembled" (Br. (773): "Laymen, provided they be experienced and skilful in sacred affairs, godly, and peace-loving"), "to whom the power has been committed, by the entire communion of believers, of examining and deciding concerning the public interpretation of doctrine in doubtful and controverted points."

As in councils the clergy largely preponderate, there is no need in the definition of the Representative Church just given, of any special mention of the laity.

"The *subjects* with which councils are occupied are questions concerning the doctrines of faith, the practical duties, and the ceremonies of the Church of Christ. Example, Acts 15: 29." God is called "the principal and remote cause of a just and legitimate council." Quen. (IV. 483): "Councils have a divine origin. In the Old Testament, Numb. 11. 16; Deut. 17: 9; Ps. 122: 5. In

the New Testament as to genus, Matt. 18: 17 (where by the Church is meant the assembly judging. But a promiscuous multitude does not judge. Therefore, a representative Church is intimated, which is the assembly of teachers" (Holl., 1321)), "having been inaugurated by the renowned apostolic conference at Jerusalem, Acts 15: 28."

[4] Holl. (1324): "There are *general councils*, to which learned and godly men are called either from all or from very many parts of the Christian world. There are also *particular* or *national* councils, to which learned and godly men of a single nation are summoned; or *provincial*, in which the teachers of a single province assemble; or *diocesan*, which consist of religious men of a single diocese."

[5] Holl. (1322): "*The invisible President of the council* is the Holy Ghost (Acts 15: 28, who, by means of the Word comprised in Holy Scripture, speaks, teaches, enlightens, and directs the minds of the Church's arbiters). *The visible president* is either political or ecclesiastical. *The political president* is a Christian emperor, king, or prince, or some one delegated by him. *The ecclesiastical president* is one bishop or more, chosen by the emperor, king, or prince, or by the common vote of the entire council.

"*The political president* controls the outward order of the councils, affords, to those conferring, security from external violence, prevents tumults, suppresses controversies, approves the decisions of the greater and better part, sanctions them by a public edict, and carries them into execution. *The ecclesiastical president* controls the internal affairs of the Church, or those particular ecclesiastical actions which pertain to the doctrine of faith, *not with coercive, but with ordinate authority*, and accurately states, and clearly explains, the questions to be considered."

(1323): "The *arbiters* and judges in the councils are, in addition to the presiding officers, not only bishops, teachers, and pastors, but laymen also, well versed in sacred literature, godly lovers of truth and peace, delegated by the churches to give their vote concerning the subjects proposed (Acts 15: 22, 25)."

[6] Holl. (1321): "The power to announce and convoke a council, belongs to an orthodox civil magistrate; in the absence of whom believers themselves can, without injustice to the heterodox princes of their domains, appoint an ecclesiastical assembly. Note.—If the magistrate be heterodox and unbelieving, nevertheless the right and power to convoke councils does not cease, if the orthodox earnestly request it. But, if, when it is asked, he do not assent to it, the bishops themselves, in accordance with the ex-

ample of the apostles, can, by request as it were, assemble councils (Acts 15: 2)."

Hence, the antithesis against the Roman Catholic Church: "1. The right and authority to announce councils, especially general councils, does not belong to the Pope of Rome, but to the highest political magistrate. 2. The president (ecclesiastical) is not necessarily the Roman bishop, or his legates, but those who are chosen for this office by the suffrages of the bishops." (Quen., IV, 516.)

[7] The only principle and norm, by which to decide controverted questions concerning doctrines and morals, is canonical Scripture (Deut. 4: 2; Is. 8: 20; 2 Tim. 3: 15; Gal. 1: 8; 6: 16).

[8] Holl. (1325): "Councils possess great authority, and this is both *decretory* (in establishing good order, and appointing rites, and correcting the morals of the Church, in order that all things may be done decently and in order, 1 Cor. 14: 40) and *decisive* (in doctrines of faith);" but the decision is "not purely judicial, but that of a servant and minister, being bound to a regular method of interpreting passages of Scripture (which they do not possess from the fact that they precisely represent the Church Universal). The authority of councils is not derived from a perfect representation of the Catholic Church (inasmuch as there never is a council that precisely represents the Church Universal, and, therefore, there is no council absolutely universal and œcumenical); but they possess it from their dependence upon Holy Scripture, and from the agreement of their decrees with the same."

[9] Holl. (1325): "Although some authority is *a posteriori* given to councils by the consent of churches existing throughout the entire world" ("the councils which are received by a majority of churches, are judged to possess such authority, that from them the doctrine of the true Church may be inferred not obscurely"), "yet, this is not infallible or free from danger of erring (for those who, when out of the council, are liable to mistake, remain the same even when assembled in a council; but teachers of the Church, when out of the council, are liable to mistake. . . . Therefore . . .)."

§ 58. *Of the Three Estates in the Church.*

Although all the members of the Church have the same heavenly calling, their earthly calling is not the same. On the other hand, they are divided into three estates, of which one (*status ecclesiasticus*) is called to arouse, maintain, and increase faith in the Church by the preaching of the divine Word

and the administration of the Sacraments; the second (*status politicus*) to care for the outward, temporal well-being of the community; both these estates, therefore, minister, each in its own way, to the third, that of the family (*status œconomicus*), for which they are to provide a well-ordered life, and which they are to aid in fulfilling its spiritual calling. [1]

§ 59. 1. *Of the Ecclesiastical Estate, the Ministry.*

As the Word and Sacraments are the means through which alone a Church can come into existence, God has willed and ordered that these means shall always be employed; thereby He has willed the office of the preaching of the Word and the administration of the Sacraments. [2] This office is, therefore, one of divine appointment, [3] and God has at times Himself immediately called single individuals into it, while now He does it only mediately, [4] namely, through the Church, which has received from Him the right and the authorization to do it. [5] The whole number of those who are intrusted with this office we call the Ministry. Individual teachers now must, therefore, have received their call and authorization from the Church, if they are legitimately to have the right to teach and administer the Sacraments. [6] It confers their office upon them, moreover, by the solemn rite of ordination, [7] an act by which, indeed, not a special supernatural power or gift is imparted to the person ordained, but which, nevertheless, in ordinary cases, dare not be omitted, because order in the Church, and the example of the ancient Church, require it. [8] With ordination the Church commits to them the obligation and the right to preach the Word of God and to maintain obedience to it, to dispense the Sacraments and to forgive or retain to individuals their sins (*potestas ordinis—potestas clavium*). [9] In all these functions the Minister does not act in his own name, but, as by the authority, so also in the name of Christ; all the effect, therefore, that follows the Word preached and the Sacraments administered by him, proceeds not from him, but from God. [10] Thus he has also, according to Matt. 16: 19; John 20: 23, the right to forgive the sins of the penitent, and retain those of the impenitent; and he upon whom this right is exercised must recognize in

this act not a mere announcement, but can be sure of this, that thereby his sins are really forgiven or retained. But the power to do this, the Minister has not of himself, but from the Lord, and he exercises this power entrusted to him, in each particular case, only as the servant of the Lord. [11] The Church expects from each one to whom she entrusts this power, and to whom she then obediently subjects herself, that he perform all his duties with fidelity, and has the right, if he fail to do this, to discipline him. [12] The Church assigns to individual ministers different ranks, and establishes different grades in the ministry, but this is done only for reasons of outward order; and the essential rights of preaching the Gospel and administering the Sacraments are possessed by all alike. [13]

[1] Grh. (XII, b. 2): "Three estates or orders appointed by God in the Church are enumerated, viz., the ecclesiastical, the political, and the domestic, which also are frequently called *hierarchies*. The *domestic* order is devoted to the multiplication of the human race; the *political*, to its protection; the *ecclesiastical*, to its promotion to eternal salvation. The *domestic* estate has been established by God against wandering lusts; the *political* against tyranny and robbery; the *ecclesiastical* against heresies and corruptions of doctrine."

[2] Conf. Aug. (Art. V): "For the obtaining of this faith (of justification), the ministry of teaching the Gospel and administering the Sacraments was instituted. For, by the Word and Sacraments, the Holy Spirit is given; who worketh faith where and when it pleaseth God in those that hear the Gospel. . . . They condemn the Anabaptists and others, who imagine that the Holy Spirit is given to men without the outward Word, through their own preparations and works."

Br. (785): "For the collection and preservation of the Church it is necessary that certain men discharge the office of preaching the Word and administering the Sacraments; in order that, through these means, faith may be conferred upon men, and when conferred may be strengthened and increased. And this is the office which is called the ministry of the Church."

Grh. (XIII, 224): "The ministry of the Church is a sacred and public office divinely appointed, and intrusted, through a legitimate call, to certain men, in order that being instructed they may teach the Word of God with peculiar power, may administer the Sacraments, and preserve church discipline, for the purpose of

effecting the conversion and salvation of men, and truly advancing the glory of God."

[3] Hutt. (Loc. Th., 186): "The ministry of the Church has been established certainly not by man, but by God Himself, John 20: 21; Matt. 28: 19, 20; Mark 16: 15." Ap. Conf., XIII, 11: "The ministry of the Word has the command of God, and has glorious promises, Rom. 1: 16; Is. 55: 11."

[4] Holl. (1332): "By the divine call is here understood the appointment of a certain and suitable person to the ministry of the Church, with the right to teach in public, to administer the Sacraments, and exercise ecclesiastical discipline, made by God either alone or by the intervening judicial aid of men."

Br. (787): "Moreover, God calls men to the ecclesiastical office, sometimes immediately (as Moses and the most of the prophets in the Old Testament were called, and likewise the apostles in the New Testament), *i. e.*, by no intervening judicial aid of other men; and at other times mediately, namely, through the Church, which, in the name of God, commits this office to certain persons." (Holl. (1333): "An immediate call is not to be expected in the Church to-day.") Concerning the difference between the mediate and the immediate call, Grh. (XII, b. 75): "The difference between the mediate and immediate call consists always and only in this, that the former is effected through ordinary means, divinely appointed for this purpose, but the latter through God Himself, who manifests His will concerning the immediate call of a person, either by Himself or through some representative." The mediate call, therefore, is to be considered no less a divine call. Grh. (XII, b. 79): "For, (1) It is referred to God as its author, Ps. 68: 11; Is. 41: 27; Jer. 3: 15; 23: 4; 1 Cor. 12: 28; Eph. 4: 11. (2) It is based upon apostolic authority, Acts 14: 23; 1 Tim. 4: 14; 2 Tim. 1: 6; 2: 2; 1 Tim. 3: 2; Rom. 15: 18; 1 Tim. 5: 21; Acts 20: 28; Col. 4: 17. (3) The mediate call rejoices in God's saving promises, 1 Tim. 4: 16; 2 Cor. 3: 6; Eph. 4: 12. And, indeed, essentially the same promises belong to those thus called. Grh. (XII, b. 81): "But if the mediate call, therefore, is not less divine than the immediate, it will follow that the promises made by God to those who have been immediately called, concerning the fruit and success of the ministry, concerning protection in dangers, concerning the reward of labors, etc., belong in their own way to those also who have been mediately called by God. We do not deny that the prophets and apostles, as those immediately called, had many and great prerogatives, such as the privilege of not erring, the right to teach in a plurality of places, more abundant gifts,

peculiar charisms, fuller promises concerning the success of the call and protection, etc.; yet, with respect to the ministry of the Church and the functions of teaching, both the mediately and the immediately called sustain one and the same office in the Church, and, therefore, the promises concerning divine aid, and divine virtue and efficacy in the ministry, can be referred in their own way to the mediately called." . . .

The "*mixed call*, by which God Himself names a certain person, but yet wills that he be called through others, as representatives (thus Aaron through Moses)," is not regarded by most of the Dogmaticians as constituting a distinct species."

[5] Holl. (1334): "The *less principal* cause constituting the ministry is the Church, to which the right has been granted by God of electing, ordaining, and calling suitable ministers of the divine Word, nevertheless with the observance of becoming order in the exercise of this right, 1 Cor. 14: 33." (Id. (1335): "Therefore the examination, ordination, and inauguration belong to the presbytery; the nomination, presentation, and confirmation of the call, by means of writing, to the magistrate; and the consent, vote, and approval to the people.") Br. (788): "To the Church, after it has been planted, belong the right and power to appoint ministers. For she has the keys of the kingdom of heaven, Matt. 16: 19; 18: 18, given her as a Bride, by Christ, her Husband; and, therefore, as it is her prerogative to open and close the kingdom of heaven, so is it also her prerogative to appoint ministers, through whom she may open and close [the same]. And, if we consider that the Church is a republic, and that the ministers of the Word are, so to speak, the magistrates or conductors of public affairs, upon whom the care of the whole republic rests, it is easily understood that the power to appoint them is vested, *per se* and in the very nature of the case, in the whole Church; nor does it belong to any one part, *unless, by the common consent of all, it be transferred to some one part.*" (It is not intended, therefore, hereby to lay down the law that, in practice, all the estates of the Church must participate in the choice of the individual teacher. Holl. (1334): "We must distinguish between the right to call ministers and the exercise of the right. The right to call belongs to the whole Church, and all its ranks and members. But the exercise of the right varies, according to the diverse agreement and custom of the particular Church.") According to the doctrine of the Symbolical Books, also, the Power of the Keys is in the hands of the whole Church. Art. Smalcald, "Of the Power and Primacy of the Pope," 24: "In addition to these things, it is necessary to confess

that the keys do not belong to the person of a certain man, but to the Church, as many very clear and very strong arguments testify. For Christ, speaking of the keys, Matt. 18: 19, adds: 'Where two or three are gathered together in my name,' etc. Therefore He gave the keys to the Church primarily and immediately; just as also, for this reason, the Church has primarily the right to call. 66. Therefore, when the regular bishops become enemies of the Church, or are unwilling to impart ordination, the churches retain their own right. 67. For wherever a church is, there also is the right to administer the Gospel. And this right is a gift given only to the Church, which no human authority can remove from the Church. . . . Where, therefore, there is a true church, there there must be the right to elect and ordain ministers. . . . 69. Lastly, the sentence of Peter (1 Pet. 2: 9), 'Ye are a royal priesthood,' also confirms this. These words pertain to the true Church; and since this has a priesthood, it certainly must have the right to elect and ordain ministers." Ap. Conf. (XIII, 12): "The Church has the command to appoint ministers, which ought to be most gratifying to us, because we know that God approves the ministry and is present in the ministry." In conformity with this, the Art. Smalcald (ibid. 11) likewise say: "Paul (1 Cor. 3: 6) makes ministers equal, and teaches that the Church is above the ministers. Wherefore superiority and lordship over the Church and the rest of the ministers are not ascribed to Peter."

[6] Conf. Aug. (XIV): "Concerning ecclesiastical orders, they teach that no man should publicly in the Church teach or administer the Sacraments except he be rightly called." (Hutt. "(1) On account of God's command, Jer. 23: 31; Heb. 5: 4; Rom. 10: 15. (2) For the sake of good order and the peace of the Church, 1 Cor. 14: 40. (3) For the sake of certainty of doctrine, that it may be evident of what nature it is, and by whom it has been received, there is necessity for an examination and testimonials as to the doctrine. (4) For the sake of the conscience of the teacher, that he may be certain that Christ's grace is with him, and that the hearers also may know that they are hearing an ambassador of God, 2 Cor. 5: 20.")

[7] Grh. (XII, b. 145): "*Ordination* is a public and solemn declaration or attestation, through which the ministry of the Church is committed to a suitable person, called thereto by the Church, to which he is consecrated by prayer and the laying on of hands, rendered more certain of his lawful call, and publicly, in the sight of the entire Church, solemnly and seriously admonished concerning his duty." Concerning the person to be ordained,

GRH. (XII, b. 159): "Our churches do not approve of the disorder and anarchy of the Anabaptists, but recognize distinct grades among ministers; yet, meanwhile, we deny that the power of ordaining is, according to divine right, so confined to the episcopal office that it cannot be exercised by presbyters, when the necessity and advantage of the Church especially demand it. The practice itself bears witness that, for the sake of good order, we commit ordination to the bishops or superintendents alone, who are called bishops, not only with respect to the flock intrusted to them, or their hearers, but also with respect to other preachers, viz., presbyters and deacons, the oversight of whom has been intrusted to them; yet, meanwhile, we do not recognize any such distinction between bishops and presbyters, as though the former alone, according to a divine right and the appointment of the Lord, have a right to ordain preachers, from which the rest of the presbyters have been excluded in such a manner that they cannot administer the rite of ordination even when necessity demands, as when bishops are not present or are neglecting their duty; but we say that, according to an ecclesiastical custom, introduced for the sake of good order, the power of ordaining has been left to the bishops, although from this presbyters have not been purely and absolutely excluded."

Of the ceremonies to be observed in ordination, GRH. (XII, b. 163): "In our churches we retain the laying on of hands, and reject the anointing. We make use of the χειροθεσία, not as though it were a sacramental symbol, appointed by Christ Himself, and commanded to be employed in this rite, but we use this ceremony according to our freedom, both because it descends to us from the practice of the Apostolic Church (Acts 6: 6; 1 Tim. 4: 14; 5: 22; 2 Tim. 1: 6), . . . and because it affords useful admonitions." . . .

Ordination is, therefore, no Sacrament, GRH. (XII, b. 147): "The belief of our churches is this, that ordination may be called a Sacrament, if the word be received in a wide sense; yet, if we wish to speak most accurately, in such a manner that only that be termed a Sacrament which has an outward element or sacramental symbol, appointed in the New Testament by Christ Himself, to which has been attached the promise of grace, for offering, applying, and sealing the remission of sins, according to which sense and signification Baptism and the Eucharist are called Sacraments: in such a sense, signification and respect, we deny that ordination is a Sacrament."

On the other hand, APOL. (VII, 11): "But if the word be understood of the ministry of the Word, we should not seriously

object to call ordination a Sacrament. For the ministry of the Word has the command of God, and glorious promises. . . . If ordination be understood in this manner, we do not object to call the laying on of hands a Sacrament. For the Church has the command to appoint ministers, which ought to be most gratifying to us, because we know that God approves the ministry, and is present in the ministry. And it is of advantage, so far as can be done, to adorn the ministry of the Word with every kind of praise, in opposition to fanatical men, who dream that the Holy Ghost is given, not through the Word, but through their own preparations." (Cf. § 53, note 5.)

[8] Grh. (XII, b. 168): "We do not deny that, in ordination, the gifts of the Holy Ghost, necessary for the discharge of the duties of the ministry of the Church, are conferred and increased. Yet, we make a distinction between the grace of reconciliation, or of the remission of sins, and the grace of ordination, since many receive the grace of ordination who nevertheless do not receive the grace of reconciliation; and we say further that the bestowal and increase of the gifts necessary for the ministry are by no means to be ascribed to the laying on of hands as a sacramental symbol truly so called, and divinely appointed, but to the prayers of the Church and the presbytery, to which the promise of hearing has been divinely made." Holl. (1342): "The necessity of ordination is *ordinate*, for the sake of good order or decorum, and because of the divine command (Acts 13: 2), although the number and form of the ceremonies vary according to the judgment of the Church; nevertheless, the necessity is not *absolute*."

Grh. (XII, b. 146): "We deny that ordination is necessary by reason of any special divine command, as this cannot be produced; or by reason of any such effect as the Papists ascribe to it, viz., as though by it any indelible character was imprinted, or as though it conferred, *ex opere operato*, gifts requisite to the ministry, concerning which no promise can be adduced from the sayings of Christ and the apostles; or by reason of any absolute and pure necessity." . . .

[9] Br. (792): "The ministry of the Church bears with it the power and office (1) of teaching publicly, and administering the Sacraments according to order; (2) the power and function of remitting and retaining sins." The former is termed *the power of the order* (*potestas ordinis*); the latter, *the power of the keys* (*potestas clavium*, called also *potestas jurisdictionis*).

Conf. Aug. (Of Church Power, VII, 5): "Now, their judgment is this, that the power of the keys, or the power of the bishops, by

the rule of the Gospel, is a power or commandment from God, of preaching the Gospel, of remitting or retaining sins, and of administering the Sacraments. For Christ doth send His apostles, with this charge, John 20: 21; Mark 16: 15. This power is put in execution only by teaching or preaching the Gospel and administering the Sacraments, either to many or to single individuals, in accordance with their call, for thereby not corporeal things but eternal are granted, viz., righteousness eternal, the Holy Ghost, life eternal; these things cannot be obtained but by the ministry of the Word and Sacraments." GRH. (XIII, 16): "The power of jurisdiction consists in the use of the keys. But the power of the keys is twofold, loosing and binding, Matt. 16: 19; John 20: 23. For, although the ministry of the Word, by which sins are loosed and bound, is one, wherefore, also, in a generic signification, one key is effectual to open and to close the kingdom of heaven; nevertheless, according to the diversity of objects, means and effects, one key is said to be a *loosing* key, by which penitents are absolved from their sins and heaven is opened to them, and another *binding*, by which to the impenitent sins are retained, and heaven is closed against them. The former is called *absolution;* the latter *excommunication.* Both are exercised either publicly or privately. Absolution is *public*, when, to all who truly repent, the remission of sins for Christ's sake is declared from the Gospel; *private*, when sins are remitted to some penitent in particular. *Excommunication* is *public*, when to all the impenitent and unbelieving, the wrath of God and eternal condemnation are declared from the Law; *private*, when to any obstinately wicked one in particular the retention of sins is announced. With respect to degrees, excommunication is said to be twofold, viz., the *less* and the *greater.* The *former* is exclusion or suspension from the use of the Lord's Supper; the *latter* is expulsion from the communion of the Church: the former is called καθαίρεσις [purifying], the *latter*, ἀφορισμός [excommunication in the proper sense]. To the latter extreme degree of ecclesiastical censure we dare not progress hastily, without serious deliberation, and without the consent of the Church, and especially of the Christian magistrate, but the order prescribed by Christ, Matt. 18: 15, must be carefully observed." Id. (XIII, 109): "As in the political and the domestic estates, so also in the ecclesiastical estate, a certain discipline is required, without which, just as in the former subjects and domestics cannot be kept in their duty, so also in the latter the hearers. The objects of church discipline are men who have been received into the house of God, and the family of Christ, and who sin, Matt. 18: 15; Gal. 5: 1, who must be rebuked, chided,

and corrected, in order that they may return into the way and perform their duty, according to the requirement of the Word. Such falls are twofold, viz., with respect to doctrine, and with respect to morals." . . .

[10] Ar. Conf. (Of the Church, 28): "Nor is the efficacy of the Sacraments destroyed, because they are administered by the unworthy; because *they present before us the person of Christ by virtue of the call of the Church*, and do not present before us their own persons, as Christ testifies (Luke 10: 16): 'He that heareth you, heareth me.' When they offer the Word of Christ, when they offer the Sacraments, they offer them in the stead and place of Christ." Grh. (XIII, 15): "Ministers do not act except instrumentally (*ὀργανικῶς*), and, therefore, ought to adapt their actions to the divine judgment and command."

[11] Holl. (1348): "The power which ministers of the Church have to remit sins is not *absolute* (*αὐτοκρατορική*), or principal and independent (which belongs to God alone, against whom alone sin is committed), but *ministerial and delegated* (*διακονική*), by which to contrite and penitent sinners they remit all sins without any reservation of guilt or punishment, not only *ἱστορικῶς*, or *by way of signification and declaration*, but also *effectually and really*, yet *ὀργανικῶς* (instrumentally)."

The remission is "*delegated*," Matt. 16: 19; John 20: 23. Therefore, the power to remit sins depends upon Christ (1) with respect to form, because it is a delegated power, and therefore such only, as to nature and extent, as God has delegated; (2) with respect to the norm, since the minister of the Church cannot absolve sinners according to his own judgment, but according to the norm of the divine judgment; (3) with respect to exercise, because in the act of absolution God concurs with the ministers and absolves through them; (4) with respect to efficacy, because the minister cannot absolve, except by delegated virtue and power, and, therefore, by that which is subordinated to the principal cause."

Ministers of the Church remit sins not "*by way of signification*," but "*effectively;* for they *really bind and loose*, and do *not merely declare the binding and loosing that has occurred in heaven;* because he who receives a key to unlock and open does not show that another has opened, but he himself opens. *For the key is not the same as the declaration of the act of opening, and to unlock is not the same as merely to declare that another has unlocked.* Through the Word of God, ministers really and effectively convert, regenerate, etc.; therefore, they also really and effectively remit sins."

Br. (798): "That which is declared by the voice of the minister

is truly presented and offered by means of his voice to the contrite and believing, or is confirmed by God, as certainly *as though Christ Himself were to say to the penitent*, what He said to the paralytic, Matt. 9: 2." HUTT. (Loc. c. Th., p. 765): "This absolution has its dependence upon confession. Therefore, it never errs, nor are the words scattered to the wind. For, inasmuch as absolution always either silently or expressly presupposes a condition of confession, it happens that absolution can, indeed, be invalid or ineffectual, yet it is never false; since it is declared by the minister only under the condition of a confession that has been properly and sincerely made." GRH. (VI, 298): "Neither can any one present this argument in opposition, that in this manner all certainty of absolution is removed, if it be said to depend upon the condition of repentance and faith: for we do not say that the absolution must be judged from the extent of the contrition or of the faith, but we do say that sincere contrition, and faith that is true and not hypocritical, are necessary; and, furthermore, every one can examine himself as to whether he truly recognize and detest his sins, and whether he truly believe in Christ."

HOLL. (1349): "The power that ministers of the Church have to retain sins is not principal and independent, but ministerial and delegated (*the right to the key of binding, Christ has intrusted to the Church, as the spiritual mother of a family.* The exercise of this right He has intrusted to the apostles and their successors, Matt. 18: 18; John 20: 23. Since, therefore, the power of the key of binding has been delegated, the ministers of the Church cannot bind impenitent sinners according to their own judgment, but in accordance with the norm of the divine judgment), by which they deny the remission of sins to obdurate, publicly infamous and notorious sinners, or only prohibit them from the use of the Holy Supper; or, by the consent of the church council, actually cast them out of the society of the Church; or, by an effectual declaration, hand them over to Satan, that they may truly repent and be reconciled to God and the Church."

[12] CONF. AUG. (XXVIII, 21): "Again, by the Gospel, or, as they term it, by divine right, bishops, as bishops, that is, those who have the administration of the Word and Sacraments committed to them, have no other jurisdiction at all, but only to remit sin, and to take cognizance of doctrine, rejecting doctrine inconsistent with the Gospel, and excluding from the communion of the Church, without human force, but by the Word, those whose wickedness is known. And *herein, of necessity, the churches ought, by divine right, to render obedience unto them*, according to the saying of

Christ, Luke 10: 16. But when they teach or determine anything contrary to the Gospel, then have the churches a commandment of God, who forbiddeth obedience to them, Matt. 7: 15; Gal. 1: 9; 2 Cor. 13: 8–10." Holl. (1351): "A minister of the Church should cultivate piety with his whole heart (1 Tim. 3: 2), and if his impiety be notorious, the censure of the Church ought to be employed against him, 1 Tim. 5: 20. Yet his impiety does not derogate from the efficacy of the doctrine which he presents from the Word of God." ("Efficacy of doctrine does not depend upon the minister, but upon the Holy Ghost, who is inseparably joined to the Word of God. Wherefore, by whomsoever it be preached, the divine Word is and remains the power of God to every one believing, Rom. 1: 16.")

Grh. (XIII, 214) under the caption, "Things Hostile to the Ministry of the Word," discusses the chief hindrances to the efficiency of the Gospel ministry. He makes a distinction between the faults of the pastors and the faults of the hearers. Of the former he enumerates: "(1) abuse of the office, and of the power of the keys; (2) corruptions of doctrine, which degenerate into heresies, if obstinacy be added; (3) faults of character and life." Among the faults of hearers, he gives prominence to "(1) the contempt of the ministry . . . (2) καισαροπαπία, by which some claim for the political magistracy absolute power over the ministers of the Church. They decide that the regulation of the ministry belongs to regal affairs, and ascribe to the magistracy the power, according to its pleasure and without the consent of the Church, to appoint and reject ministers, and to prescribe laws according to its own discretion. They refuse to submit themselves to Church discipline, and strive to put a muzzle upon the Holy Ghost when He censures their errors and crimes." A heresy he thus defines: "A heresy is any private opinion, which any one selects for his reception in preference to a Christian doctrine and the Catholic faith, and obstinately defends." (Id., 222): "That any one should be a heretic, properly so called, it is necessary (1) that he be a person received into the visible Church by the Sacrament of Baptism; (2) that he err in the faith; whether he introduce an unheard-of error or embrace one received from another, although the former seems to be peculiar to a heresiarch, and the latter to a heretic; (3) that the error directly conflict with the very foundation of the faith; (4) that to the error there be joined wickedness and obstinacy, through which, though frequently admonished, he obstinately defends his error; (5) that he excite dissensions and scandals in the Church, and rend its unity." Gerhard, with

Augustine, thus distinguishes heresy and schism: "Heretics violate the faith itself, by believing false things of God; but schismatics, by wicked dissensions, break away from brotherly love, although they may believe those things which we believe." (221.)

[13] Holl. (1351): "For the sake of good order it is useful and prudent that, corresponding to the disparity of gifts, there should be, among the ministers of the Church, distinct degrees of dignity and influence, 1 Cor. 14: 40; Eph. 4: 11." Quen. (IV, 396): "Meanwhile, we say that the same power of the ministry in preaching the Word and administering the Sacraments and power of jurisdiction consisting in the use of the keys, belong to all the ministers of the Church."

§ 60. 2. *Of the Political Estate;* [1] *The Civil Authority.*

The civil authority, no less than the ministry, is an estate appointed by God. [2] The power intrusted to it, with all its prerogatives, is derived, therefore, from Him; [3] and through it He desires to promote the temporal welfare of men. [4] Its primary duty, therefore, is to watch over the preservation of outward order and good behavior, [5] and it has the right and the duty of operating in this direction through laws which it is to enact, according to its own judgment, yet without encroaching upon natural or divine right. [6] This mission assigned to the civil authority has, however, as its ultimate aim the promotion of the prosperity of the Church; for the outward welfare aimed at by the civil authority would of itself have no significance. [7] Therefore the civil authority has, at the same time, an immediate calling to fulfil in regard to the Church (*officium circa sacra*); it is hence also to aid and protect the institutions of Christianity, to ward off all hostile attacks by means of the external power committed to it, and to withstand all injurious influences. [8] It is not to interfere, however, with the internal doctrinal or disciplinary affairs of the Church. [9]

[1] Grh. (XIII, 228): "The term *magistratus* is taken in a twofold sense: (1) *abstractly*, for the power and authority themselves, with which those are divinely endowed to whom the government has been intrusted; (2) *concretely*, for the persons who exercise the magistracy and are endowed with the power to govern."

[2] Holl. (1353): "The *efficient principal cause* of the magis-

tracy is the triune God (Rom. 13: 1; Prov. 8: 15; Dan. 2: 21), who intrusts to certain persons the office of magistrate, either immediately (Ex. 3: 10; Numb. 27: 18; 1 Sam. 9: 15) or mediately (John 19: 11)."

Id. (1354): "To-day, by God's control, suitable persons attain to the office of magistrate, either by election, or by succession, or by rightfully taking possession of it."

[3] Grh. (XIII, 308): "From Rom. 13: 1, etc., it is evident that the magistrate has been endowed with certain power." Yet "the power of the magistrate is not absolute, unlimited, and unconditional, but it is restricted by laws and the norm of a higher power. For, since the magistrate has received his power from God, he is under obligation to recognize God as his superior, and, in the use of his power, to conform to His will and laws. When, therefore, statesmen ascribe absolute power to the supreme magistrate, this must be received not unconditionally, nor *with respect to the higher power, namely, God*, . . . but only *with respect to the lower magistrates.*"

Political power consists "(1) in *ordaining* in such a manner as to produce honorable and salutary laws, pertaining to the advantage of subjects and of the state" (legislative power); "(2) in *judging* so as, in cases for trial, to make the decision and administer justice to subjects according to the norm of the laws" (judicial power); "(3) in *executing* so as to adorn those obedient to honorable laws with rewards, and to punish the disobedient and negligent by means of penalties" (executive power). Hence the right of the sword, Gen. 9: 6.

[4] Grh. (XIII, 225): "Because of the fall of those first created, the human race has lost not only the spiritual and eternal blessings of the life to come, but also the bodily and outward comforts of this life; yet God, out of wonderful and ever unspeakable kindness, because of the intercession of His Son, has not only restored and renewed the former, but also the latter, and has appointed means for preserving them."

"Through the political magistrate, (God) preserves peace and outward tranquility, administers civil justice, and protects our property, reputation, and persons." (Ib., 226.)

[5] Grh. (XIII, 225): "By means of the former" (the civil magistrate) "both outward discipline and public peace and tranquility are preserved."

Hutt. (Loc. Th., 279): "The chief duties of the civil magistrate are: (1) to pay attention to both tables of the Decalogue, so far as they pertain to outward discipline; (2) to make enactments

concerning civil and domestic affairs, *harmonizing with divine and natural law;* (3) to diligently see to it that the laws that have been published be carried into execution; (4) to inflict punishments upon the delinquent, according to the nature of the offence; to assist the obedient and bestow upon them rewards."

Holl. (1366): "The civil magistrate has been ordained for the public good, and his office is fourfold: (1) *Ecclesiastical*, for kings are the nursing fathers of the Church, and the bishops outside of the temple. (2) *Civil*, by guarding the interests of citizens, and repelling foreign enemies from the boundaries of the country. (3) *Moral*, in so far as he enacts wholesome laws, by which subjects are held to their duty, so as to lead a peaceable life in godliness and honesty, 1 Tim. 2: 2. (4) *Natural*, by which rulers provide for the support and other necessaries of subjects; for example, Pharaoh, Gen. 41: 34."

[6] Hutt. (Loc. Th., 285): "Christians are necessarily under obligation to obey their magistrates and laws, except when they command us to sin; then we must obey God rather than men, Acts 5: 29."

[7] Grh. (XIII, 225): "The magistracy has been established by God, no less than the ministry, for the collection, preservation, and extension of the Church, inasmuch as by means of it both outward discipline and public peace and tranquility are preserved, without which the ministry of the Church could not readily perform its duty, and the collection and extension of the Church could scarcely have a place, 1 Tim. 2: 2."

The magistracy is therefore termed "a wall and shield to the Church, Ps. 47: 10. For not only by this most firm wall are our bodies and property surrounded, but a protection is also afforded the Church, while the rage of those is restrained who desire to overturn all sacred things, in order that they may freely indulge their own lusts." Further, it is designated "a nursing father to the Church, Is. 49: 23." . . . "Outward discipline is maintained, justice is administered, tranquility and favorable times are protected by the civil estate, to the end that, by the Word of God, through the ministry, a Church may be collected out of the human race. For, since by and since the Fall, the human race had been so miserably and dreadfully corrupted by sin, that, without a public rule, all things in it would be in confusion and disorder, *God also established governments for the sake of the Church.*" . . .

[8] Holl. (1361): "The magistracy is employed with sacred affairs, by carefully observing and performing those things which ought to be believed and done by all men who are to be saved, Ps.

2: 10–12, and by directing the Church and the Christian religion in their external government."

There belong specifically thereto (Br., 809): "The appointing of suitable ministers of the Church; the erection and preservation of schools and houses of worship, as well as the providing for the honorable support of ministers; the appointing of visitations and councils; the framing and maintenance of the laws of the Church, the controlling of the revenues of the Church, and the preservation of Church discipline; the trial of heretical ministers, as also of those of bad character, and all other similar persons belonging to the churches and schools, and the compelling them to appear before a court; providing for the punishment of those convicted of heresies or crimes; and the abrogation of heresies that are manifest and have been condemned by the Church, and of idolatrous forms of worship, so that the Church be cleansed from them."

[9] Holl. (1362): "The inner economy and government of sacred things, consisting in the doctrine of the Word, in absolution from sins, and the lawful administration of the Sacraments, are peculiar to the ministers of the Church. The magistrate cannot claim them for himself without committing crime."

"The civil magistrate has not the power of a master builder, in regard to sacred affairs, equally with, and without any distinction from, civil affairs."

§ 61. 3. *The Domestic Estate.*

The family constitutes the third estate in the Church. In this we distinguish the marriage relation, that of children to parents and that of servants to their masters. [1]

1. The *marriage relation* [2] was appointed and authorized by God; [3] through this the propagation of the human race was to be secured in the manner that was right and well-pleasing in the sight of God. [4] While, accordingly, the Church regards this estate as sanctified, she declares this also by the solemn rite of marriage, by which she publicly sanctions the matrimonial life of those who wish to enter into this estate. [5] As, however, marriage constitutes the closest bond of spiritual and bodily communion, it is also in itself indissoluble, and a divorce of those who have entered this estate can take place only when one of the parties has already practically rendered the continuance of the marriage life impossible by adultery or malicious desertion. [6]

2. "The *paternal relation* is the natural connection of parents with children, divinely instituted for the education of offspring and the well-being of the entire family." Holl. (1383.)

3. "The *servile estate* is the legitimate relation between masters and servants, divinely instituted for mutual advantage." Holl. (1384)

The last two relations are not further discussed by the Dogmaticians in this connection, as they have treated of them at large in the exposition of the Decalogue.

[1] Br. (816): "The third estate occurring within the Church, and which is as it were the seminary of the ecclesiastical and political orders, is the *domestic*, which embraces *conjugal*, *paternal*, and *servile* association;" "for from domestic association some come forth who are to be brought into the ministry of the Church, and others who are to be brought into the office of the civil magistrate."

[2] Holl. (1367): "Marriage is the indissoluble union of one man and one woman, according to divine institution, made by the mutual consent of both, for the begetting of offspring and mutual assistance in life."

Holl. (ib.): "The primary and supreme *efficient cause* of marriage is the Triune God, inasmuch as marriage, abstractly considered, and in a general way, as to its nature, was *immediately* instituted by Him. The second and subordinate causes of contracting marriage, are the husband and wife themselves and their parents, in whose power they are, agreeing to the marriage." (Grh. XV, 67: "The consent is not the form [see Appendix] of marriage. As I correctly infer that the builder is not the form of a house, but its efficient cause, since, if the builder were to depart or to die, the house would not at once fall into ruins; so the consent is not the form of marriage, but its efficient cause, because, if the consent cease, a marriage that has been ratified and consummated is not dissolved.") Id. (386): "We affirm that consent is not the form of marriage, but that, from the consent, the legitimate and indissoluble union of one man and one woman into one flesh originated, or, what is the same, that the conjugal union and relation has itself originated from the mutual consent of both parties to become one flesh."

Holl. (1371): "The material element, or the subjects, of marriage are the persons who are united in marriage, two in number, one man and one woman (Gen. 2: 24; Matt. 19: 4, 5; 1 Cor. 7: 2,

4), suitable for attaining the ends of marriage, and placed beyond the prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity (Lev. 18: 7)."

[3] Hutt. (Loc. Th., 287): "God Himself is the author of marriage. Gen. 2: 18."

[4] Quen. (IV, 453): "The *ultimate and supreme end* is the glory of God. The *subordinate* end is (1) the preservation of the human race, by the begetting and education of offspring, Gen. 1: 27, 28; 1 Tim. 2: 15; (2) mutual assistance, Gen. 2: 18; (3) a remedy against wandering desires, 1 Cor. 7: 2."

[5] Grh. (XV, 396): "The blessing of the ministry is necessary for rightly entering upon marriage, not from any special divine command, nor because of the nature of marriage, as though it were not complete without the consecration of the ministry, but on account of the ecclesiastical and civil arrangement introduced with reference to the public advantage and honor. The blessing, by the ministry, of those newly married, *is not required for the essence of the thing itself*, viz., of marriage, *but for a public witness of it*, so that it may be evident to all that the marriage is contracted lawfully and honorably. . . . In the forum of conscience and before God, a marriage is true and valid which has been entered upon with the legitimate and matrimonial consent of both parties, even though the blessing of the ministry be not added; but in the outer forum, a marriage is not considered true and valid, which has not been confirmed in the sight of the Church."

Holl. (1371): "The solemn blessing or union, made according to a usual rite, by the minister, pertains not to the contraction, but to the consummation of Christian marriage: (1) That the lawful marriage of those making the contract may be openly manifest. (2) That those making the contract may be admonished concerning the holy and indissoluble bond of marriage, the divine blessing, conjugal duties, and the endurance of troubles. (3) That newly married persons may be commended to God, the author of marriage, by means of earnest prayers."

[6] Holl. (1380): "The conjugal bond between husband and wife, *as long as they remain alive*, is in itself indissoluble, both on account of mutual consent, and especially on account of the divine institution, Gen. 2: 24; Matt. 19: 6." Br. (835): "Meanwhile, in two cases, divorce, or the dissolution of legitimate and valid marriage as to the conjugal bond itself, may occur. Without doubt, *in the case of adultery*, where, by the law itself, marriage both can be and is dissolved, and *the innocent party is permitted to enter into another marriage* (Matt. 19: 9; 5: 32); and *in a case of malicious desertion* (1 Cor. 7: 15), where the deserter himself

actually and rashly sunders the conjugal bond, and where to the deserted party, when a competent judge makes the declaration, the power belongs to enter into a new marriage." The reason why a divorce may be granted under these two conditions, lies in the very nature of the case.

Holl. (1381): "From the nature of marriage, adultery of itself and directly conflicts with unity of the flesh, and, therefore, also with the substance of marriage, through which two become one flesh, Gen. 2: 24. 'For he which is joined to a harlot is one body with the harlot,' 1 Cor. 6: 16, and, therefore, is no longer one flesh with his wife." (1382): "Whatever immediately interferes with conjugal fidelity itself and the *usus thori*, dissolves the marriage bond, and, therefore, by its own right, opens the door of a second marriage to the innocent party. But malicious and incorrigible desertion, etc. Therefore, . . . "

Grh. (XVI, 176): "Our churches, having followed the most clear declaration of our Saviour Christ, recognize no other cause of a divorce that is truly and properly so called but one, viz., adultery. . . . In case of malicious desertion, the apostle grants the innocent and deserted party the power to enter into a new marriage, because the injuring and deserting person has, in fact and indiscreetly, made the divorce on his or her own authority without sufficient and just cause." Ib., p. 214. "Since it has been proved, from the words of Christ and the Apostle Paul, that there are only two causes of divorce, viz., adultery and malicious desertion, . . . it will be manifest, at first sight, to every one, that the remaining causes of divorce, which are mentioned in addition to adultery and malicious desertion, are not just, legitimate, and sufficient causes." As such other causes, Grh. enumerates: "unbelief, heresy, a solemn vow of continence, crime, danger of life, sterility, supervening impotency, incurable diseases, madness, relationship to a harlot, flight or banishment because of an offence." He denies the right of divorce in all these cases, excepting only the "danger of life," which he places in the category of malicious desertion; p. 260, "that, if the husband persevere in obstinacy, and distinctly testify that he is unwilling at any time to take her back, or to admit a reconciliation, or to desist from his former habits, it cannot be doubtful that he is to be regarded a malicious deserter, and, therefore, the deserted one can be dealt with otherwise." The Dogmaticians are not, however, altogether agreed in regard to this point. Sarcerius allows divorce in the case of leprosy and incurable disease, and Hemming: "In case of flight and banishment on account of an offence;" but this he does upon

the ground "that every offence that is to be compared with adultery, is determined by Christ as a cause of divorce." (Grh. 266.) In a different way Chmn. justifies divorce "on account of cruelty, poison, and plots laid for the life." He says (Loc. Th., III, 210): "Since the text, Matt. 19: 19, makes mention only of adultery, some earnestly contend that divorces cannot occur on account of cruelty and plots laid for the life. But, in the *code*, the law of Theodosius . . . grants divorce even in such cases. But, although some reject this law and contend that it disagrees with the Gospel, yet they do not understand aright the distinction between Law and Gospel. And since the Lord says expressly, that in the Mosaic polity divorces were granted because of hardness of heart, he signifies that the mode of governing men who can be cured, who are members of the Church and desire to obey the Gospel, is entirely a different matter from the government of the impious and contumacious, who are unwilling to endure the restraints of the Law. . . . In a cruel person, not belonging to the Church, the civil magistrate seems to be able to use the law of Theodosius. God wishes civil government to be an honor to the good, and a terror to the evil. . . . Neither are there wanting in governments obstinate and unjust persons and those without natural affection, exercising their unjust cruelty over their own families, such as the Lord, in this discourse, calls hard-hearted."

There are still two points to be considered, in the matter of actual divorce. Br. (836): "1. When persons unlawfully united (in degrees of consanguinity prohibited by the law of nature, or where a mistake of person, or impotency of one or the other party has intervened) are separated, this is not properly divorce, but rather a declaration that in the union there was not a conjugal bond (namely, because the one person could not contract it with the other, as for example, with a blood relative; or, that he had not truly contracted it with her, but with another; or, that one of the two was utterly incapable of intercourse, and, therefore, also of the contraction of the marriage union)."

"2. In like manner, when husband and wife are separated, only as to *bed and board* (for example, because of severe enmity, which appears incorrigible, and even joined with danger to the life of one or the other), it is not divorce properly speaking; but a suspension of the acts of cohabitation and conjugal duty (the conjugal *bond* remaining unimpaired, so that neither husband nor wife can enter into another marriage; yea, sometimes the husband is bound to afford the wife support)."

PART V.

OF THE LAST THINGS.

§ 62. *Preliminary Statement.*

MAN attains his final aim, not in this life, but in that which is to come. What lies between the two, and what must take place in order to secure for individual men, and for the entire Church, final completion, constitutes the subject of this article. [1] It bears the title—of the Last Things (*de novissimis*)—because it discusses what is the last, viz., that with which the present world comes to an end. [2] We treat of the separate features in the order in which they will occur, viz.: (1) *of death;* (2) *of the resurrection of the dead;* (3) *of the final judgment;* (4) *of the end of the world;* (5) *of eternal damnation and eternal life.* [3]

§ 63. (1.) *Of Death.*

"Death (in the strict sense) is the deprivation of natural life, occurring through the separation of soul and body." Br. (354). [4] It is a consequence of the fall of our first parents, and therefore all men are subjected to it (Rom. 5: 12.)[5] In death the natural life of man ceases, it is true, as this was conditioned by the peculiar connection between body and soul [6] but the soul does not cease as does the body, but lives on with all the attributes and powers that belong to its essential nature. [7] For the immortality of the soul, reason has from time immemorial set up an array of proofs, but we become incontrovertibly certain of it through the positive declarations of the Holy Scriptures. [8] From them we learn also *this much concerning the condition of the soul* after death, that its lot, immediately thereafter, is a happy or unhappy one, just

as its possessor in this life embraced salvation through Christ or not. [9] The doctrine of an intermediate condition of the soul, in which it is neither happy nor unhappy, as though asleep, is therefore erroneous; [10] as is also the Roman Catholic view, according to which not two, but five different places are to be assumed, where we are to suppose the souls of the departed to be, viz., hell, purgatory, the abode of infants, the abode of the fathers, and heaven. [11]

[1] Br. (353): "Inasmuch as the highest or ultimate blessedness is not in this life, but in the life to come, and, in like manner, the lowest misery to which it is opposed occurs only after this life; we must now consider those things which, according to divine revelation, pertain to the end of this life, and to entrance into the life or state to come."

Quen. (IV, 534): "We have thus far considered the means of salvation, properly so-called, both those for bestowing (δοτικὰ), on the part of God, namely, the Word and Sacraments, and that for reception (λῆπτικὸν) on our part, namely, faith. The means, called so in a less accurate sense, now follow, viz., the four Last Things: death, the resurrection of the dead, the final judgment, and the end of the world, which are not so properly means to obtain salvation, as the way through which we reach the goal or limit. For the passing over of the godly from the Church Militant to the Church Triumphant occurs through death, for which reason Gregory of Nyssa compares it to a midwife bringing us to life truly so-called. Following death is the judgment, whose forerunner is the general resurrection of all men, and whose following attendant is the end of the world."

[2] Br. (353): "They are otherwise called the Last Things (*novissima*), in Greek τὰ ἔσχατα: because some both are, and are called, last, with respect to men as individuals; and others, with respect to men collectively and to the whole world. To the former class belong death and the state of the soul after death. To the latter, the resurrection of the dead and the corresponding change of the living, the final judgment, and the conflagration of the world."

[3] The later Dogmaticians treat, under this head, only of death, the resurrection of the dead, the final judgment, and the end of the world, because they had previously (immediately after the doctrine of Providence) discussed eternal life, as the formal end of theology, and had appended to that the topic of eternal condemnation, as the opposite of eternal life. We here follow the arrangement of the

earlier Dogmaticians. In regard to the division of the *novissima*, Grh. (XVII, 8): "The last things are those either of the macrocosm or of the microcosm.* The last things of the microcosm are of a twofold class. For they are either a way leading to the last limit or the goal terminating the way. The former passes through a twofold valley, namely, of death, Ps. 23: 4, and of Jehoshaphat or of judgment, Joel 3: 12, which judgment the general resurrection precedes. There is a goal, attained either by the soul of man when released from the body, or by the entire man after the resurrection. And this goal is of two parts, directly opposite each other, viz., for the wicked, hell, for the godly, life eternal. From all these enumerations, taken together, it becomes clear that there are six Last Things pertaining in general to man and the world: (1) The temporal death of man, to which belongs the separation of the soul from the body, and the reduction of the body to ashes in the sepulchre. (2) The general resurrection of all men. (3) The administration of the final judgment. (4) The conflagration of the world. (5) The eternal damnation of the wicked. (6) The eternal glorification of the godly. Since it is customary to state only four Last Things, we can, therefore, proceed in this manner: The Last Things, taken generically, are twofold, with respect to a twofold object: (*a*) of the macrocosm; (*b*) of the microcosm. The last thing of the macrocosm is the end of the world. The last things of the microcosm are four: (*a*) death; (*b*) resurrection; (*c*) judgment; (*d*) eternal state, viz., of the godly in heaven, and the damned in hell."

[4] Quen. (IV, 535): "Death, properly speaking, signifies the separation of the soul from the body, and its deprivation of animal life; to this ordinarily all are subject, the good as well as the wicked, and this is the signification in this article." Id. (ib.): "The *names of death* are sweet; it is called a gathering to their own people, Gen. 25: 8, 17; 35: 29; 49: 33; Numb. 20: 24, 26; Deut. 32: 50; a departure in peace, Luke 2: 29; a turning away from the evil to come, Is. 57: 1; resting on a couch; v. 2, a sleep, Dan. 12: 2; Matt. 9: 24; 1 Thess. 4: 13." Grh. (XVII, 15): "The term death is taken, in Holy Scripture and by the Church writers, either literally or figuratively. *Literally*, for natural death, which is the separation of soul from body. . . . In this signification it is received in this article, when death is enumerated among the Last Things of man. *Figuratively*, it is used by way either of metaphor, or of metonymy. Metaphorically, for temporal or eternal death.

* ["*Macrocosm*, the universe, or the visible system of worlds; opposed to *microcosm*, or the little world, constituted by man."—Webster.]

Temporal death, metaphorically so termed, is likewise twofold, either bodily or spiritual. *Bodily death*, metaphorically so termed, embraces calamities of every class endured by man in this life because of sin, which are the heralds and messengers of death, Ex. 10: 17. . . . *Spiritual death* is twofold, that of believers and of unbelievers; the former is glorious and profitable, the latter detestable and destructive. The spiritual death of *believers* is that by which, to their welfare, they are said to die (1) to sin, Rom. 6: 2; . . . (2) to the Law, Rom. 7: 4; . . . (3) to the ceremonies of the Law, Rom. 7: 4, 6; Gal. 2: 19; (4) to the world, Gal. 6: 14. . . . The spiritual death of *unbelievers* is that by which they are said to have died and to have been separated from the true life of the soul, which is in God, Matt. 8: 22; Luke 9: 60. . . . The eternal death of the *damned* is the final and entire loss of divine fellowship, and the horrible torture of soul and body resulting therefrom, the never-ending misery dreaded by the damned in hell, which is called by John the second death, Rev. 2: 11; 20: 14, in referring to both the natural and the spiritual death peculiar to unbelievers."

[5] Grh. (XVII, 30): "From the divine Word it is evident that there are three *principal* and primary causes, on account of which man is subject to death. The first is the malice of the devil leading him astray. The second is the guilt of man in sinning. The third is the wrath of God, as an avenger. These causes follow each other in a certain order."

Hfrffr. (650): "If man had remained in the nobility of the integrity in which he was first created, when the period of his earthly life had been completed he would have been transferred to the eternal and heavenly happiness without death, whose precursors are evils and calamities of every kind. But because he transgressed God's command, through sin death entered into the world, to which all men stained by sin remain subject. And although, through Christ, our Restorer, we have been regained for life eternal, yet this is the way of all flesh; and while we who believe pass, it is true, through death to life, the wicked are cast, by bodily death, into death and damnation eternal."

The Dogmaticians further distinguish the physical or proximate causes from the principal (in other words, remote or moral). Holl. (1225): "Of the physical causes of death, some are natural, others preternatural, and others violent. The natural cause is the consumption of radical moisture and the extinction of native warmth. Preternatural causes are the severer diseases. Violent causes are outward objects bringing such violence to the body that the bond of natural union, by which body and soul are joined, is broken."

[6] Holl. (1225): "The death of the body formally consists in the deprivation of natural life." Grh. (XVII, 51): "Scripture describes the form of death: Ecc. 12: 7; 2 Cor. 5: 1, 4, 8; Phil. 1: 23; 2 Tim. 4: 6; 2 Pet. 1: 14. For, since man consists of soul and body, united to each other by an essential bond, the death of man is nothing else than the ἀνάλυσις, or release, of the soul from the body. Since, as long as man lives, the soul sojourns in the body, just as in an earthly dwelling-place, man's death is nothing else than the κατάλυσις (dissolution, 2 Cor. 5: 1) and ἀπόθεσις (putting off, 2 Pet. 1: 14) of this earthly dwelling-place and tabernacle, and the ἐπαναχώρησις (return) of the soul to God from its long pilgrimage. Since the body is, as it were, the covering and garment of the soul, man's death is nothing else than the ἔκδυσις, or the taking off, of this garment. Since life is an act of the soul in the body, τὸ ζῆν ἐστι σύνθεσις καὶ σύνδεσμος ψυχῆς σώματι," "life is the composition and bond of the soul with the body." Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book VIII).

[7] Br. (363): "When the dissolution of the soul and body has occurred, and death therefore happens, the soul nevertheless survives and performs its operations separately, outside of the body; for example, in those things which pertain formally to the *intellect* and *will*, as essential powers of the human or rational soul, which themselves also survive and are not inactive. The *intellect* retains the intelligible forms which it had in the body, and therefore can also call forth acts of knowledge; to which, then, it is correctly believed that some acts of the will, with respect to objects presented by the intellect, correspond. And to this is generally referred the statement of Rev. 6: 10, that the knowledge of a former condition and a certain longing are ascribed to the souls of the martyrs. But we do not say that the souls of the deceased know distinctly and definitely the actions and affairs of each of the living, which have occurred since the departure of the former from the body, and especially the various prayers and rites of worship directed to them."

Grh. (XVII, 149): "In life, they (body and soul) are connected to each other by the closest bond, whence the affections and sufferings of the body flow over into the soul, and in turn the affections and sufferings of the soul flow over into the body; the soul does nothing whatever outside of the body, nor does the body do anything independently of the soul. But in death the soul is separated from the body, and returns to God, to whose judgment it is committed, from which it is either borne by holy angels into heaven, or is delivered to evil spirits to be cast into hell; the body

is turned back again into the dust of the earth, from which its first and earliest origin proceeded, and by putrefaction and incineration is reduced to its primitive elements. After this dissolution and separation, the affections and sufferings of the soul no longer flow over to the body; and, in turn, the affections and sufferings of the body no longer flow over into the soul. The soul no longer acts through the body as an instrument, but lives and subsists apart from it; neither is it dissolved nor does it fall apart as the body that is resolved into its own elements, but, subsisting outside of the body, it spends an immortal life, and, removed from all intercourse with the body, is preserved somewhere (*ποῦ*) until, on the appointed day of the general resurrection, the body raised up by divine power will be joined again to the same, and man will afterwards experience the righteous sentence of the judge."

[8] Quen. (IV, 537): "That human souls are immortal, and that they do not perish with the bodies, can be clearly and firmly established alone from the Holy Scriptures." Grh. (XVII, 150) produces the scriptural proof: "(1) From the distinct assertion of our Saviour, Matt. 10: 28. (2) From the opposition of soul and body. That in which soul and body are opposed to each other antithetically cannot in like manner be predicated of both. But in mortality, soul and body are opposed to each other in such a manner that mortality is affirmed of the body, but denied concerning the soul. Therefore mortality cannot be predicated of both in like manner, cf. Ecc. 12: 7. (3) From the original creation of the soul. The souls of brutes were produced from the same material as their bodies, whence, when their bodies perish, the souls themselves likewise perish, Gen. 1: 20. But into man He breathed a soul, Gen. 2: 7; whence we thus infer: 'A soul whose origin is different from that of the souls of brutes, does not have the same end with the souls of brutes. But now the primeval origin of the human soul is different from that of the souls of brutes, because it was made not of an elementary material, as the souls of brutes, but divinely breathed into the body formed from the earth. Therefore, to the body there is ascribed *πλάσις* (the being moulded) from the dust of the earth, but to the soul the immediate *ἐμπνευσις* (inspiration) of God. (4) From the name itself. . . . The human soul is called spirit, Ecc. 3: 21; Acts 7: 59; Heb. 12: 23. (5) From the continuation of life after man's death, Matt. 22: 32; Mark 12: 26; Luke 20: 37; Hab. 1: 12. (6) From the description of death, Gen. 25: 8; 35: 29; 49: 33; Dan. 12: 13; Acts 26: 18; Col. 1: 12, etc."

But concerning the immortality of the soul, Grh. still adds

(XVII, 150): "Add the fact that the soul is not immortal in the same manner as God, viz., essentially (ὀυσιωδῶς) and independently (for in that sense God alone is said to have immortality, 1 Tim. 6: 16), but through the grace of creation, because it was so fashioned by God as not to have in itself an inner principle of corruption, but to be incorporeal, invisible, and immortal. Yet God could, if He wished, reduce the soul to nothing, and altogether extinguish it; but because He wished it to be immortal, it continues through and because of the will of the immortal Creator. That is immortal which either can be destroyed by absolutely no power, not even by divine power (and in this manner God alone is immortal), or which has been so framed by God as not to perish, although by God's absolute power it could be destroyed; in the latter manner the souls of men and the angels are immortal." Concerning the force of the evidence in "the arguments sought from the light of nature," Grh. (XVII, 159): "We make a distinction between *antecedent and subsequent modes of reasoning. Thomas:* 'A mode of reasoning is employed with regard to any subject in a twofold manner: in the first place, to give sufficient proof to a statement; in the second place, when the statement has already been established, to show that the effects that follow correspond.' In this latter manner, the immortality of the soul can be proved from the light of nature, after it has been shown from Holy Scripture that the same consequence has been fully established. Again, we make a distinction between *conclusive* and *probable* modes of reasoning. The arguments produced from the light of nature can induce a persuasion of probability concerning the immortality of the soul, but can in no way present a firm, immovable, and irrefragable foundation of faith." Grh. (XVII, 147) produces as such proofs: "(1) A rational soul is a substance subsisting of itself and spiritual, as is manifest from its operation, because there are in us some spiritual acts of knowledge, *i. e.*, neither consisting of matter, nor depending upon matter or a subject, but inorganic in the cognizing of immaterial, universal, and eternal things; therefore it is also immortal. (2) The human soul is in essence simple, invisible, immaterial, most like unto God, and independent of matter. (3) It is an essence primarily self-moving. (4) By a natural longing it desires eternal things, and it is not probable that this desire would be born within it for no purpose. (5) It contemplates eternal essences, while, nevertheless, nothing can rise to the contemplation of that from which it entirely differs in essence. (6) In abstraction from objects of sense it is more and more perfected, and therefore, when it shall

be separated from the body, will become most perfect. (7) It has not originated from elements, because it has knowledge naturally implanted, which no elementary material can acquire. (8) It has the distinction between the Honorable and the Base implanted, from which it derives this rule of justice, viz., that it ought to be well with the good, and ill with the wicked. But now, in this life, more frequently neither the good receive their rewards, nor the wicked their merited punishments; therefore another life remains to which the immortal soul aspires: otherwise this distinction would have been implanted in the mind in vain. (9) To men self-conscious of evil because of crimes, it occasions fear; therefore it is naturally anxious concerning the condition that will follow death, and is certainly self-conscious of its immortality: for if the soul would not survive after death, men self-conscious of evil would have no reason to dread future punishments. (10) The state of ecstasy, *i. e.*, when, without any employment of the senses, it naturally undergoes an intense application of its rational portion to sublime affairs, and therefore can also naturally subsist of itself, because anything which is not of itself dependent upon another in working, is not so in existing. (11) Finally, they urge the agreement of the sounder philosophers, who prove that the immortality of the soul belongs to the number of those things which are προλήψεις (presuppositions), or certain preconceived notions admitted by all."

[A modern classification of the various arguments that have been used, is as follows:

I. Theoretical (speculative) Arguments:

1. *Metaphysical* Proof. Since the soul is immaterial and simple, it is also indissoluble (Plato, Cicero, Mos, Mendelssohn, the Herbartians, and the new school of Leibnitz).

2. *Teleological* Proof. The rich capacities of the human spirit cannot be satisfactorily developed in this earthly life; its destiny, therefore, must extend to a future life (Cicero, Leibnitz, Riemarius, Lotze).

3. Proof from *Cosmical Plurality.* As the heavenly bodies stand in communion with one another, so also their inhabitants must have a moral communion. But this can be realized only in a future world. (Wilkins, Fontenelle, Huyghens, Derham, Kant, Bonnet, Herder, Jean Paul, J. P. Lange, Chalmers, etc.)

4. *Analogical* Proof. From succession of germ, plant and fruit in vegetable life (Cf. John 12: 24; 1 Cor. 15: 36 sqq.); from the metamorphosis of the Phœnix (Clement of Rome, Theophilus, Irenæus, Tertullian), of the butterfly (Basil the Great, Swammer-

dam, Bossuet, Paley); or from the law of the conservation of force, (Teichmüller, Lilienfeld, Schlesinger, etc.).

5. *Moral* Proof:

a. Arg. Ethonomicum. Man strives after virtue, as well as after happiness. But this life affords no satisfaction (Kant, Sintenis, Schaarschmidt).

b. Arg. Juridicum. It is only the promise of a life beyond death that can inspire one with love for his country (J. G. Fichte).

II. Historical Arguments:

1. *Empirical attempts* at proof. The exhibitions and arts of the older necromantic superstition; the visions of Swedenborg; the experiments of Spiritism.

2. *Traditional* Proofs:

a. Arg. e consensu gentium (already in Homer, Virgil, Cicero).

b. The proof from New Testament history, from the testimony of Jesus to His resurrection (especially John 14: 2 sqq.; 11: 25), and the miracles of Himself and His apostles in raising the dead.

Proper demonstrative force pertains to these arguments only so far as they are sustained by religious faith; and even where this presumption occurs, the various speculative attempts at proof have only uncertain value. Complete firmness of conviction concerning personal progress in a blessed hereafter is afforded only by surrender to the Redeemer in loving obedience of faith, viz., the last of the above mentioned arguments appropriated in the life. (Zöckler's Handbook, *Dogmatik*).]

[9] Hutt. (Loc. Th., 297): "The souls of the godly, or of believers in Christ, are in the hand of God, awaiting there the glorious resurrection of the body, and the full enjoyment of eternal blessedness, Wis. 3: 1; Luke 16: 22, 23." Br. (364) "Yea, we believe that the souls of the *godly* attain essential blessedness immediately after they have been separated from the body (Phil. 1: 23; Luke 23: 43; John 5: 24; Rev. 7: 4, 15); but that the souls of the *wicked* undergo their damnation (1 Pet. 3: 19)." Grh. (XVII, 178): "Of receptacles and habitations. Scripture, by a general appellation, speaks of a place, John 14: 2; Luke 16: 28; Acts 1: 25. Not that it is a corporeal and physical place, properly so called, but because it is "a where" (*ποῦ*), into which souls separated from the body are brought together. Scripture enumerates only two such receptacles, habitations, guard-houses, and promptuaries of souls, one of which, prepared for the souls of the godly, is called by the most ordinary appellation *heaven*, and the other, intended for the souls of the wicked, is called *hell*."

[10] QUEN. (IV, 538): "The souls of men, separated from the body, do not sleep, neither are they insensible."

[The chief arguments of the Psychopannichists are stated and refuted by GRH., XVIII, 26 sqq.:

"1. 'The dead are said to sleep, Matt. 9: 24; John 11: 11; Acts 7: 60; 1 Cor. 15: 18; 1 Thess. 4: 13.' Answer: As sleep holds only the members and outward senses, while the soul exercises its inner operations, as is inferred from dreams; so in death, the body alone perishes, while the soul of the godly is transferred to Abraham's bosom, Luke 16: 22, and enjoys consolation, v. 25 (XVII, 20).

2. 'In the Psalms, it is often said: The dead shall not praise Thee, etc., Ps. 6: 5; 115: 17.' Answer: These passages refer to the proclamation and propagation of true doctrine, and the celebration of divine blessings through which, in this life, others may be invited to true conversion and the glorification of the divine name.

3. 'The Lord of the vineyard gives his laborers hire at evening time, Matt. 20: 8. But by evening, is meant the time of resurrection and judgment.' Answer: Parables do not apply in every part, but only the principal scope must be regarded; by evening here is indicated not only the time of universal judgment, but that of the particular judgment which occurs at death.

4. 'Heb. 4: 3: We which have believed, do enter into rest.' Answer: The rest of souls must be understood with respect to the *terminus a quo*, *i. e.*, they rest from labors and troubles, to which the godly are subjected in this life, as is explained in Rev. 14: 13, but not with respect to the *terminus ad quem*, as though the souls of the godly rest after death in the stupor of sleep; for, in this respect, it is said of the angels and the blessed in Heaven, that they rest not day nor night, but incessantly praise God, Rev. 4: 8. God is said, Gen. 2: 2, to rest, and yet: 'He that keepeth Israel, shall neither slumber nor sleep,' Ps. 121: 4. The souls of the martyrs are commanded to rest, Rev. 6: 11, and yet they cry with a loud voice, v. 10. Their rest, therefore, is a patient expectation of final liberation and union with the bodies which are to be raised, Is. 26: 20; Dan. 12: 12.'"

On the knowledge of the dead: "It is a pious and good thought to hold that they have a general knowledge of what is occurring to the Church Militant here on earth, and therefore they beseech Christ, with whom they are present in heavenly glory, for some good for the Church, especially since they are members of the same mystical body, of which Christ is the Head. Meanwhile it must

not be inferred from this, that they have in full view the individual circumstances and calamities of the godly."]

QUEN. (IV, 538): "Neither, after death, do the souls of the godly live in a cool and tranquil place, and possess only a foretaste of heavenly happiness, but they enjoy full and essential happiness. Neither, after death, do the souls of the wicked feel only the beginning of tortures, but perfect and complete damnation."

[Nevertheless this must be qualified by his statement (I, 564): "The *beginning* of infernal torments, with respect to the soul separated from the body, is the first moment of its departure from the body. The torture of the entire composite being will follow, when sentence of final judgment is given." (560): "The beginning of the plenary perception of ineffable blessings and joys, is, with respect to the soul, the end of this life. But the fullest perception will occur after the reunion of body and soul."

GRH. (XVIII, 21): "The pains of hell, which the condemned experience immediately after death, are graphically described, in Luke 16: 23 sq.: 1. They are in hell, εν τῷ ᾅδῃ. This expresses every kind of torture; since in hell there is the presence of all evil, and the absence of all good. 2. They are 'εν βασάνοις, *i. e.*, they feel such pains as criminals experience, who are subject to most exquisite tortures. 3. ὀδυνῶνται, they feel the anguish belonging to those who endure the pains of child-birth, under which figure Scripture expresses the most severe tortures. For they are burned 'εν τῇ φλογί, not lightly and superficially, but in the midst of flames penetrating *ad medullas*. 5. They can obtain not even a drop of water to cool their body, much less the least consolation for their soul. 6. They see the elect in glory, and hence, from envy, are seized with horror and indignation. 7. Their sorrow is increased by the remembrance of former good. 8. They know that their punishment will be eternal, that there is a gulf fixed between them and the godly, viz., God's immutable decision that none of the godly can relapse to the state of the damned, and, on the other hand, that none of the damned can be drawn to the state of the blessed. 9. They will be tortured by the pains of their kindred; for when the rich man wants his brethren to be warned, he does this, not from love and desire for their salvation, but from fear and terror, lest his pains may be increased by the sight of those prepared for them. 10. They resist and contend against God. 'Nay, father Abraham,' says the rich man. Here is the 'gnashing of teeth,' Matt. 13: 50, whereby, from impatience, indignation and constant despair, they contend against God. Although the souls of the godless do not immediately after their egress from the body

receive these punishments in full measure, yet they will be subjected to them in every part, when, on the day of judgment, they shall be reunited to their bodies; nevertheless, it is clearly seen, from the text, that the beginning of these tortures is experienced immediately after death."]

(Ib., 540.) Metempsychosis is entirely rejected. GRH. (XVII, 171): "Before all things, the absurd and senseless opinion must be removed, which states that 'souls migrate from bodies worn out by disease and death, and insinuate themselves into those that are new and recently born; and that the same souls are always being re-born, sometimes in a man, sometimes in a domestic animal, sometimes in a wild beast, sometimes in a bird, and in this manner are immortal, because they are frequently exchanging habitations of various and dissimilar bodies, in which words Lactantius describes the transmigration and transanimation of souls, called by the Greeks *μετεμψύχωσις καὶ μετενσωμάτωσις*."

[11] GRH. (XVII, 183): "The Papists fabricate five receptacles of souls: (1) *Hell*, to which they consign the souls of extremely wicked men, who depart from this life in unbelief, hardness of heart, and the more serious offences against conscience, or mortal sins. (2) *Purgatory*, next to hell, to which they consign the souls of those who have not yet been fully purged of venial sins, and have not given full satisfaction for the temporal punishments of sins, but who, nevertheless, have departed from this life in the faith of Christ; these, they state, must labor in purgatory until, with their stains purged away, they soar pure and cleansed into heaven. (3) The *limbus puerorum*, to which they consign the souls of unbaptized infants; who, because of original sin, in which they have departed without the remedy of Baptism, suffer in this subterranean prison *the punishment of loss*, although not with respect of *sense*, having been excluded from the joys of heaven, and yet not subjected to the pains of hell. It is called a *limbus*, because it is, as it were, the border and extremity of hell, just as the edge (*limbus*) of a garment. (4) The *limbus patrum*, into which they introduce the souls of the patriarchs, and of all the saints of the Old Testament who died before the descent of Christ *ad inferos*, which, they assert, bore, in this apartment, the temporal punishment of loss, until, by the payment of the debt of original sin through the death of Christ, they were delivered from this and introduced to the fruition of heavenly blessedness, when Christ descended *ad inferos*. (5) *Heaven*, into which they admit the souls of the saints altogether purged of all sins. The order of these stories, according to the Papists, is such as this: Hell is placed in

the very centre of the earth; next this, purgatory, which is, as it were, a second story; bordering upon this is the *limbus infantum*, to which the *limbus patrum* immediately succeeds, which at the present time is altogether empty, because of Christ's translation of the fathers to heaven." The doctrine of purgatory was rejected especially by the Lutheran Church as conflicting with that of reconciliation by faith alone. HFRRFR. (667): "Everything that is ascribed to the satisfactions either of purgatory or of the intercession of the saints, is detracted from the merit of Christ, which *alone cleanses us from sins.*"

[GRH., XVII, 189 sqq., rejects the *limbus puerorum:* "1. It is based upon the false hypothesis of the absolute necessity of Baptism. 2. Infants departing without Baptism, either believe or do not believe. If the former, they are in the grace of God, and obtain the remission of their sins; if the latter, they remain children of wrath, under condemnation, exiles from the heavenly Jerusalem, and are cast into the lake of fire. There is no *tertium aliquod* between faith and unbelief, the state of grace and of wrath, the kingdom of God and of the devil: so also there is none between life eternal and the eternal fire. Matt. 25: 46; Mark 16: 16; John 3: 18, 36; Rev. 20: 15; 21: 27. 3. If the infants of Christians departing without Baptism were to be cast into a peculiar limbus bordering upon the infernal fire, how would this be consistent with the promise of Gen. 17: 7? 4. Not even in the Old Testament were infants of Israel, departing before circumcision, absolutely excluded from the kingdom of God. 5. If infants departed without the forgiveness of original sin, they would be subject not only to the punishment of loss, but also to the punishment of sense, not only excluded from the kingdom of God, but also tortured by the infernal fire of eternal damnation. For the wages of sin is death and eternal damnation; not only the punishment of loss, but also of sense. 6. If infants neither rejoice nor grieve, nor know or feel aught, they undoubtedly cannot be said to sustain the punishment of loss, since, being ignorant, insensible and sleeping, they cannot be said to be punished."

Against the *limbus patrum*, he urges: "1. Scripture mentions no such limbus, separated from Heaven, in which the souls of the patriarchs were enclosed until the death of our first parent was paid for by Christ's death. 2. On the other hand, Scripture enumerates only two receptacles after this life, as well in the Old as in the New Testament, viz., Heaven and Hell. 3. Of the souls of the godly in the Old Testament, it is said, 1 Sam. 25: 25, and of the soul of Lazarus before Christ's passion and death, that they

were carried by the angels, who always see God's face, Matt. 18: 11, into Abraham's bosom, Luke 16: 22. Of the soul of the converted robber, it is said that it was taken into Paradise. Unless then we wish to confuse Paradise with hell, we cannot affirm of the Old Testament saints, that they descended into any infernal *limbus*. 4. Although the Epistle to the Hebrews testifies that the patriarchs of the Old Testament had not yet received the completion of the promises concerning the possession of the land of Canaan (Ex. 11: 13, 39), yet their souls were not for this reason excluded from the kingdom of Heaven, v. 10, 16. 5. The examples of godly patriarchs and prophets of the Old Testament. Enoch, Gen. 5: 24; Heb. 11: 5; Abraham, John 8: 56; 3: 36; Rom. 4: 11; Luke 16: 22; Elias, 2 Kings 2: 11; Moses and Elias, Matt. 17: 5; Luke 9: 31. . . . 7. It is based on the false opinion, that, before Christ's death, the gate of Paradise was not open to the godly. . . . 9. It detracts from the merits of Christ, as though their efficacy did not abound to the fathers of the Old Testament, while yet He is said to be the Lamb of God, slain from the foundation of the world, Rev. 13: 8, not only with respect to decree, promise and types in sacrifices, but also with respect to fruit and efficacy, Jesus Christ being 'the same yesterday, to-day, and forever,' Heb. 13: 8."

Against purgaeory: "1. It is without scriptural foundation.

2. It directly contradicts Scripture: (*a*) Scripture divides all men into only two classes, believers and unbelievers, good and evil, sheep and goats; heaven being assigned to the one class, hell to the other. (*b*) It teaches that only in this life is the time to labor, to run, to strive, *i. e.*, to repent, believe, attain the grace of God, the forgiveness of sins and eternal life, but that after death there is no time for repentance and faith, Ecc. 9: 4, 5, 10; 11: 3; 12: 5; Matt. 25: 10; John 9: 10; 1 Cor. 7: 29; 9: 24; Eph. 5: 16; Gal. 6: 8, 10; 2 Tim. 4: 7; Heb. 12: 1; Rev. 2: 5; Is. 55: 6. (*c*) It teaches only two purgations of sins: one external and Levitical for the cleansing of the flesh; the other, internal and spiritual, for the cleansing of the heart. The former is assigned to Levitical ceremonies, Lev. 12: 8; 13: 6; 14: 9; the latter to *Christ* as the *efficient* cause, Is. 43: 25; John 13: 8; Heb. 1: 3; to the *blood* of Christ, as the *meritorious* cause, Heb. 9: 13, 14; 1 John 1: 7; Rev. 1: 5, 7, 14; to the Word of the *Gospel* and *Baptism*, as the *instrumental* cause *on God's part*, Mal. 3: 3; John 15: 3; Eph. 5: 26; Tit. 3: 5; and, finally, to *faith*, as the *instrumental* cause *on our part*, Rev. 15: 9; 1 Cor. 6: 11. But there is no mention of any purgation to be expected after this life. (*d*) The precepts, promises and

examples of the blessed death presented in Scripture not only give no dread of future torments to believers in Christ, but also offer matter for hope, confidence, and exaltation, Job 19: 25; Ps. 31: 5; 27: 13; 116: 7, 9; Luke 2: 29; Acts 7: 59; 2 Cor. 5: 1, 2, 8; Phil. 1: 23; 1 Thess. 4: 13; 2 Tim. 1: 12; 4: 6, 7; 1 Pet. 4: 19; Rev. 2: 10. Especially, the example of the converted robber, Luke 23: 43. For if any one needed purgation after death before entrance into Paradise, the robber seemed especially to need it; and yet Christ introduces him immediately into Paradise. (*e*) All believers in Christ immediately after death are happy and blessed, their souls without any interval or delay being transferred to Paradise, Gen. 5: 21; Heb. 11: 5; 2 Kings 2: 11; Luke 16: 22; Ps. 31: 5; Acts 1: 58, etc.; John 5: 24; Rev. 14: 13. (*f*) Scripture knows but two receptacles, and is ignorant of a third, 1 Sam. 25: 29; Matt. 3: 12; 7: 13; 25: 46; Mark 16: 16; Luke 16: 22; John 3: 36. (*g*) Scripture restricts the attaining of forgiveness of sins, the grace of God and salvation, to this life, Ps. 39: 13; 95: 7; Matt. 9: 6; 16: 19; 18: 18; 2 Cor. 6: 2. Pertinent to this topic, are the passages which testify that the good done in this life is brought into judgment, but not those things which either we ourselves, or others for us, have suffered in purgatory, Matt. 25: 35; 1 Cor. 3: 8; 2 Cor. 5: 10; Gal. 6: 5; Rev. 14: 13. The Scripture circumscribes temporal punishments only by the limit of this life, and those which are required after death it teaches will be eternal, 2 Cor. 4: 18; Rev. 10: 7; from which we infer that, if there were a purgatory after this life, it would be temporal, not eternal. (*h*) It denies that after this life, the dead can be aided by the voice of the living, Ps. 49: 8, 9, 10; Eccl. 9: 5, 6.

3. It is contrary to the analogy of faith: (*a*) The article concerning the *mercy* of God. For this is described in Scripture as earnest, sincere and perfect. That, however, for which a satisfaction is still demanded, or punishment still inflicted, is not perfectly forgiven. (*b*) The article concerning the *justice* of God. For this does not allow guilt already forgiven to be punished. (*c*) The article concerning the *merits* of Christ. If we still had to make satisfaction for our sins, the satisfaction of Christ would be insufficient. If we could make satisfaction for the penalties of our sins, a part of Christ's redemption would be transferred to us. (*d*) The article concerning the *Gospel*, which is a joyful message concerning the gratuitous and full forgiveness of sins because of Christ. It is the peculiar doctrine of the Gospel to offer to believers the forgiveness of sins, and not a commutation of eternal into temporary punishment. (*e*) The article concerning the saving fruit of *repent-*

ance; its fruit being the forgiveness of sins, Ps. 32: 5; Jer. 36: 3; Mark 1: 4; Luke 24: 47; Acts 3: 19; 5: 31, and where there is forgiveness of sins, there is no longer need of punishment for sins. The Holy Spirit not only before the reception of Baptism and in Baptism, but even after Baptism, leads those who have fallen into sin to the *only* satisfaction of Christ offered for us on the altar of the cross, but never presents such a difference as to say that in Baptism the remission of sins is purely gratuitous and perfect, but that, for the sins which have been committed since Baptism, it requires satisfaction from the sinners themselves, or commutes their eternal into temporal punishments. Let a single passage of Scripture be quoted, in which such difference is stated. (*f*) The article concerning *justification.* For sins are forgiven so as to be no longer remembered, Ps. 25: 7; Jer. 3: 34; Ez. 18: 22, etc. (*g*) The article concerning the *state of the justified,* Rom. 5: 1, 2; 1 Cor. 1: 30; Rom. 8: 1, 24, 33, 34, 38; John 3: 36; Rom. 12: 12; Heb. 4: 16; Luke 1: 74; 2: 29; 2 Cor. 5: 8. (*h*) The article concerning the *final judgment.* If at the final judgment there will be no longer a purgatorial fire, there can be none now; for the grounds of justification and salvation, viz., the mercy of God, the merit of Christ, the Word of the Gospel and true faith in Christ, are of the same and equal virtue before as in the judgment itself. If it do not conflict with divine justice, that they whom the last day finds alive be transferred into Paradise, without the intervention of purgatorial fire, undoubtedly it will not conflict with the same that they who die in the Lord before the judgment, go into Heaven free from the flames of purgatory.

4. It contradicts even the hypotheses of the Papists.

5. It is without support from the Church nearest the Apostles.

6. It is based upon many false assumptions: (*a*) That some sins are by their own nature venial. (*b*) That for venial sins, man himself must make satisfaction; if not in this life, after this life. (*c*) That, even when the guilt is remitted, the debt of punishment remains to be discharged. (*d*) That the application of Christ's merit for removing temporal punishment occurs through works of satisfaction. (*e*) That sins are remitted in a different way in Baptism, from that in which they are remitted in true repentance. (*f*) That man is his own redeemer and saviour. (*g*) That submission to the penalty inflicted by God, when it proceeds from love, is a virtual repentance, and avails for the remission of sins. (*h*) That souls in purgatory are neither on the way, nor at the goal."]

§ 64. (2.) *Of the Resurrection of the Dead.*

The separation of body and soul, which is occasioned by death, is not one of permanent continuance, but the time will come, as we are most positively assured in the Word of God, in which God will awaken the body and reunite it with the soul that belonged to it before death. [1] This will be, in substance, the same body with which the soul was united in this life, but endowed with new attributes, adapted to the nature of the circumstances then existing. [2] But, just as the condition of souls after death is different, according as they were godless or godly in this life, so will also the bodies of those who are raised receive different attributes, according as a happy or a miserable life is their portion. [3]

[1] Br. (367): "Just as the soul of man survives after death, so also the body which has been destroyed by death will rise again and be restored to life, as is most clear from the Scriptures (Job 19: 26; Is. 26: 19; Dan. 12: 2; John 5: 28; 11: 23; 1 Cor. 15: 12; 1 Thess. 4: 16); but this certainly cannot be discovered from natural reason, although not opposed to it. When Scripture reveals the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, then reason, which recognizes God as the avenger of crimes and rewarder of the good, discovers that it is rather harmonious with itself than opposed to it, that the bodies, the instruments of good and evil deeds, should be raised for participation in punishments or rewards. And, although reason does not discover how bodies, the same in number as were resolved into ashes, can be raised again; yet, so far from showing its impossibility by an invincible argument, it is compelled rather to leave this to divine power."

Holl. (1245): "The resurrection of the dead consists formally (*a*) in the reproduction or restoration of the same body which had perished by death, out of its atoms or particles which had been scattered thence and dispersed; (*b*) in the reunion of the same with the soul."

[2] Quen. (IV, 582): "The subject of the resurrection is the entire man that had previously died and been reduced to ashes. The subject from which, is the body, the same in number and essence as we have borne in this life, and as had perished through death (Job 19: 26; Is. 26: 19; Ps. 34: 21; Rom. 8: 11; 1 Cor. 15: 53; 2 Cor. 5: 4; Phil. 3: 21), yet clothed with new and spiritual qualities (1 Cor. 15: 42). (Observe: The body which will rise

again will be spiritual, not as to substance, but as to qualities and endowments.)" Of these new attributes, Holl. (1243): "The bodies which we bear about with us in this life differ from the risen bodies not with respect to substance, but (1) with respect to duration: the former are subject to corruption, and perish; the latter are free from corruption, and always endure; (2) with respect to outward form: the former become unsightly, colorless, offensive corpses; the latter will be glorious, brilliant, most beautiful; (3) with respect to vigor: the former are sown into the earth, feeble and destitute of sense and motion; the latter will be active, vigorous, abounding in extraordinary senses, subject to no defect; (4) with respect to activity and endurance: the former are subject to generation, nutrition, growth, local progress, and feel the need of food, drink, marriage; the latter will be entirely at leisure for spiritual actions, and will not need nourishment or conjugal intercourse."

[3] Grh. (XIX, 38): "These very qualities of the revived bodies, by reason of which they are distinguished in this life from animal bodies, must be accurately distinguished from each other. For some are *common* to all the revived, the wicked as well as the godly, the unbelieving as well as the believing. Such are *ἀφθαρσία καὶ ἀθανασια*, incorruptibility and immortality, because the souls and bodies of the wicked are to be lost (not by being annihilated, but by being tortured) in *gehenna*, Matt. 10: 28; for the worm gnawing them will not die, and the fire burning them will not be quenched (Is. 66: 24; Mark 9: 44, 46, 48), and therefore their bodies will likewise rise again incorruptible and immortal, never to be separated from the souls, but to be reserved for eternal and never-ending tortures. From this it is also understood that the incorruptibility and immortality in the bodies of the wicked are very different from the incorruptibility and immortality of the godly, both with respect to the rest of the connected qualities, and with respect to the end. . . . But some qualities are *peculiar* to the godly alone when raised again for everlasting life, which the apostle, 1 Cor. 15, recounts in this order, vs. 43–49; Phil. 3: 21. From which it is inferred that the bodies of the godly men raised to life eternal will be not only incorruptible and immortal, but also: (1) *glorified*, *glorious*, because they will be clothed, as with a mantle, with ineffable honor, splendor, and glory, and therefore, with divine light, lustre, and brilliancy, Matt. 13: 43; Dan. 12: 3; 1 Cor. 15: 41; (2) *powerful*, because they will be altogether free from mortal difficulties and former infirmities, pains and diseases, to which they were subject in this life, and therefore, will be

strong, vigorous, incapable of suffering, agile, subtle, which neither weight nor gravity will be able to prevent from being caught up into the air to meet the Lord, 1 Thess. 4: 17; (3) *spiritual*, not indeed with respect to essence; for they will not be spirits, but spiritual bodies. They will be ἰσάγγελοι (like the angels), not angels, not equal to, or the same as angels, Matt. 22: 30; but, by reason of spiritual qualities, their bodies will no longer be natural bodies [*animalia*, Vulgate translation, 1 Cor. 15; 44, of Gr. ψυχικόν], standing in need of food, drink, sleep, and other supports, but spiritual, in which there is no strife of the flesh and spirit, but which are perfectly subjected to the control of the spirit, are entirely ruled by the Holy Ghost, and need no food or other means for their support [Chemnitz, *De duabus naturis*, p. 175: "Bodies in this life are called ψυχικὰ, not because they are transmuted into soul, or of the same substance with the soul, which is a spiritual substance, but because they are moved to action and governed, not by themselves or their own bodily conditions, properties and faculties, but by the power of the soul. So in the resurrection, the bodies will be πνευματικὰ, spiritual, not because they will be transmuted into spirit, or be of the same substance with the Holy Spirit, for they will have and retain their nature or bodily substance, as Job says: 'In my flesh, I shall see God,' and in the Creed we confess that we believe the resurrection of this flesh. But they will be spiritual, because what the soul is now to the body, the Spirit will be to body and soul. For the body will without means be sustained and preserved by the Spirit. And the body with the soul will be most perfectly subject to the direction and control of the Spirit. For in this life the regenerate are led in things pertaining to God by the Spirit of God, but only partially and imperfectly. In the resurrection, however, both body and soul shall, without any resistance, be perfectly subject to the guidance and control of the Spirit, who will use both bodies and souls of saints, according to His omnipotence, for whatever movements and operations He wishes; and the bodies and souls of saints in glory will use the virtue of the Spirit for all movements and operations the Spirit wishes, and will have no longer psychical, but most perfect spiritual conditions and faculties"]; (4) *heavenly*, likewise, not with respect to substance but with respect to qualities, because they will shine with heavenly light and glory, will no longer be subject to earthly infirmities, but will be distinguished by their heavenly lustre, and no longer be disfigured, corrupt, imperfect, maimed, and unsightly, but most beautiful, pleasing to the sight, perfect, handsome, and complete in members, etc. An example of these

qualities is presented to us in the body of Christ, as raised from the dead and placed at the Right Hand of God, to which our body is to be made like. But although *the bodies of the wicked and the damned* will be incorruptible and immortal, yet they will not be impassible, but will be subject to eternal tortures, and will be adorned by no honor, no glory, no power, no spiritual excellence, but will be marked by perpetual foulness and ignominy, destined to eternal disgrace, and oppressed by infernal darkness. They are vessels made unto dishonor and disgrace, Rom. 9: 21; 2 Tim. 2: 20." According to the characteristics imparted to those raised from the dead, as the saved or lost, their resurrection is termed: "The resurrection to life, which is peculiar to the godly and true believers, and the resurrection to judgment, which is peculiar to the wicked and unbelieving."

[A question to which the Dogmaticians give much attention is as to whether the godless will rise by virtue of the merit of Christ. On this, GRH., XIX, 13: "The virtue whereby Christ will raise the godless, properly speaking does not belong to the merit of Christ, but to the divine power, communicated to His human nature by means of the personal union and exaltation to the Right Hand of God. This power extends farther and to more objects than does the merit of Christ, because, by means of this power, Christ also, as man, sustains, rules and governs all things in Heaven and earth, in His general kingdom, called the kingdom of power. The resurrection of the godless pertains rather to His functions as Judge, than as Mediator and Saviour; as may be inferred from the end of the resurrection."]

§ 65. (3.) *Of the Final Judgment.*

Upon the resurrection of the dead there follows the *final judgment*, and then the end of this world will have been reached. [1] There will, therefore, still be men living upon this earth when the final judgment comes, and these will not experience a reuniting of soul and body, as no death has preceded; the change, however, that takes place in the bodies of those raised from the dead, will take place in theirs also, but in a different manner, viz., by transformation. [2] The precise time when the final judgment will take place is not known to us, [3] but signs will precede it from which the approach of that day may be inferred. Such are, especially, the most extreme development of Satan's power, and the like extraordinary security and ungodliness of men. [4] When all

this shall have reached the highest degree, God will cause judgment to break forth, and thus become for the godly the helper in the highest need. The judgment will be held by Christ, [5] who will appear to all, visibly and in glory, to the longed-for consolation of the godly, and to the fearful terror of the ungodly. [6] Then, in the case of all, everything will be revealed that they have done, the good and the evil; all will then be judged according to the norm of the revelation given to them upon earth, [7] and judgment will be executed upon them all in such a manner, that the godly will be admitted to the kingdom of glory, and the ungodly will be driven out into the kingdom of eternal darkness. [8]

[1] Quen. (IV, 605): "The general judgment is, with respect to order, subsequent to the resurrection of the dead, 1 Thess. 4: 16. For the general judgment will immediately succeed the general resurrection of the dead. The resurrection will occur on the last or latest of all days, and will place an end to the vicissitude of worldly things, and therefore to time itself, John 11: 24."

Holl. (1246): "The final general judgment is a solemn act, by which the triune God, through the Lord Jesus Christ, appearing in a visible form and with the highest glory, will place all angels and men before His judgment-seat, for the purpose of judging all thoughts, words, and deeds, of the godly, indeed, according to the norm of the Gospel, but of the wicked, according to the precept of the Law; and will assign to the former, and confer upon them, eternal joys, and, to the latter, eternal tortures, to the glory of His retributive and vindicatory justice." A distinction is also made between this general or final judgment and "the *particular judgment* by which, at the hour of death, a state of glory or of ignominy is awarded every man."

[Grh. XVIII, 35: "There are five reasons, because of which the general, universal and public judgment ought to occur, even though a particular and private judgment precede:

1. *The manifestation of divine glory*, viz., that the justice and mercy of God may be displayed. For since, in this life, it seems to be well with the wicked and ill with the good, and, on this account, divine Providence is attacked by malevolent critics, God will appoint a day, in which, in the presence of the whole world, He will display His supreme justice against the godless, and His supreme mercy towards the godly, and in the sight of all angels and men declare, that, in connection with supreme mercy towards the

godly, He uses no cruelty or injustice towards the godless, and in connection with supreme severity towards the godless, He uses no respect of persons or unjust liberality towards the godly.

2. *The glorification of Christ:* "We see not yet all things put under Him," Heb. 2: 8, "but then He shall come in His majesty," Matt. 25: 31. As, at His first advent, He was unjustly condemned as a culprit before all; so, at His second advent, He shall judge all, as a just and glorious Judge.

3. *The exaltation of the godly.* As in this life, the godly "are made a spectacle unto the world, and to angels, and to men," 1 Cor. 4: 9, so, in the final judgment before the whole world, all angels and men, it is right that they be pronounced and crowned as victors.

4. *The completion of rewards and punishments.* The souls of godly and ungodly, separated from their bodies, receive only the beginnings of blessedness and condemnation; but then the entire man, consisting of body and soul, will be judged, and will receive in his body the completion of rewards and punishments.

5. *The continued consideration of good and evil works.* For the good and evil works of the dead are not yet finished. Prophets and Apostles still serve the Church by their writing and example; heresiarchs still corrupt the minds of men by their writings; when, then, on the day of judgment, the good and evil deeds of the dead shall be finished with the world itself, the ultimate and decisive sentence will be given."]

[2] Quen. (IV, 585): "The circumstance most closely connected with the resurrection of the dead, is the change of those whom the last day will find alive, which is to take place in a moment and in the twinkling of an eye, 1 Cor. 15: 51, 52; 1 Thess. 4: 15, 17." The order of the resurrection is the following, Hefele. (682): "When the last day shall dawn, Christ (while, by means of fire, heaven and earth are passing away with a great noise) will come in the clouds in the same visible form in which He ascended into the heavens, with many thousands of angels, with the greatest shout or thunder, in the voice of the archangel and the trump of God; and then the dead, hearing the voice of the Son of God, will first rise, each one in his own body; then we, whom that day will find alive, will be changed in a moment, so as to be placed before the judgment-seat, 1 Thess. 4: 15."

[3] Grh. (XIX, 226): "The time of the final judgment can be regarded as twofold, of the beginning and of the continuance. The time of the *beginning* we define as precisely that point of time in which Christ will return from heaven to judge the living and raise

the dead to life, and, by means of the ministry of angels, to assemble both before His judgment-seat for the purpose of hearing a decisive sentence. The Holy Scriptures testify that this will occur on the last day, in which also the resurrection of the dead will precede the judgment, and the end of the world will follow, Matt. 24: 30; 25: 31; 1 Cor. 15: 52; 1 Thess. 4: 16; Rev. 20: 11; but what day will be the last and latest, and, therefore, on what day or what hour Christ will come to judgment, we believe that no man can know exactly and precisely, and, therefore, we ought to abstain from bold and anxious inquiry concerning it, Acts 1: 7."

[4] Holl. (1248): "By the will and appointment of God, divinely revealed signs will precede the last day, from which it can be known in a general way that that great day is approaching." The signs are distinguished as remote or general signs, and near or peculiar signs. Holl. (ib.): "The *former* occur not merely in one age, and frequently recur, or are continued. The *latter* are those which are to be seen only as the judgment approaches nearer, but not likewise in former ages. The general and more remote signs, although they do not seem to indicate the time of judgment, yet, according to God's appointment and intention, indicate and ought to admonish Christians, from the force of divine justice and the truth of the predictions, that an appointed judgment is to be expected. Moreover, among the nearer or peculiar signs, there is this difference, that some precede the judgment by a longer, and others by a shorter interval; and, for this reason, not even these indicate precisely a certain time." Among the former are enumerated (according to Grh. XIX, 246): "1. *The multiplication of heresies*, Matt. 24: 5." (Concerning this passage Grh. says (ib.): "The apostles asked, at the same time, both when those things would take place which He had predicted concerning the destruction of the temple, and what would be the sign of His coming, and of the end of the world. Matt. 24: 3; Mark 13: 4; Luke 21: 7. For they thought that it would not be until the second coming of Christ for judgment, that Jerusalem would be destroyed, and the temple, and with it the entire world; and that thus there would be an end of all things, and that then only, when all things should have become new, the Messiah would enter upon His new reign. Christ, therefore, distinctly replies to both members of the question; and first, indeed, discourses concerning the devastation of Jerusalem, indicating by this itself that they would be not of the same, but of diverse times. Although, therefore, the matters presented by Christ in the first part of His reply pertain properly and principally to the times preceding the destruction of Jerusalem, yet

the matters which are predicted in the same place, concerning the coming of false prophets and the rest of the evils that were to precede the devastation of Jerusalem, can be properly referred, secondarily and by way of consequence, to the state of the times that precede the final judgment, because the destruction of Jerusalem was a type of the general destruction destined for the entire globe. Whence, those things also which are here said by Christ concerning the times that were to precede the destruction of Jerusalem, are adapted in other passages of Scripture to the times that were to precede the end of the world. Compare Dan. 12: 1 with Matt. 24: 21, and 2 Pet. 3: 9 with Matt. 24: 22). 2. *Seditions throughout the entire world, arising from wars*, and the disquiet arising from earthquakes, Matt. 24: 6–8; Luke 21: 9–11. 3. *Dreadful persecution of the godly*, Matt. 24: 9; Mark 13: 9; Dan. 11: 44; Rev. 11: 7; 12: 4, 13; 13: 7; 17: 6; 18: 24; 19: 2; 20: 4. 4. An *inundation of* careless *security* and defiant *wickedness*, and extreme depravity of life, Matt. 24: 12, 37–39; Luke 17: 28–30; 18: 8; 2 Thess. 2: 7; 2 Tim. 3: 1–5; 2 Pet. 3: 3. 5. *The universal preaching of the Gospel* throughout the entire world, Matt. 24: 14; Dan. 11: 44; Mal. 4: 2. As *near and peculiar signs*, the following are cited: (1) *The overthrow of the distinguished fourth monarchy* (Dan. 2: 31, sq.). (2) *The overthrow of Antichrist*, (for since, in the Church of the Thessalonians, the report had been spread under the name and pretence of apostolic doctrine, that the last day was immediately at hand, Paul advises the Thessalonians to have no faith in this false opinion, for Antichrist must be revealed before the Day of the Lord will come, 2 Thess. 2: 3. Of this revelation of Antichrist, and his conquest by the preaching of the Gospel, other prophecies of Scripture also speak, Dan. 8: 25; 11: 44; Jer. 51: 58; Mal. 4: 5; Rev. 14: 6; 18: 2); (3) the *observing of various signs*, in all parts of the entire universe, Matt. 24: 29; Mark 13: 24; Luke 21: 25." Br. (377): "Remarkable eclipses of the heavenly bodies and their fall to the earth," "for although the mode and precise nature of these heavenly signs, and especially of the fall of the stars to the earth, have not been revealed; yet it is better in these matters to retain the letter of Scripture, and to leave the manner of the occurrence to divine wisdom and power, than, the literal sense being deserted, to seek or embrace a metaphor, especially since in other connections express mention is made of heavenly signs, as contradistinguished from earthly, Luke 21: 25." Holl. (1148): "There are some who explain the words of Christ mystically, as referring to a remarkable change of the Church, the obscuring of the heavenly doctrine, and the apostasy of the Church's teachers; others advise

that the literal sense be not abandoned." As to the purpose for which these scripturally foretold signs were intended, GRH. (XIX, 274): "Christ made the predictions to the end that they might be: (1) *Indicative of His love towards us.* To advise any one beforehand of coming evils is the office of a friendly and kind mind. (2) *A means of driving away security.* (3) *Antidotes against over-anxiety.* Christ predicted signs of the judgment, by which it could be recognized beforehand, but was unwilling to determine a definite day of judgment. This avails to drive away security from our minds, lest we should think that the decisive and judicial day were still far off; but it also avails for the removal of curiosity, lest we should boldly dare to search into that which God has placed in His own power and knowledge. Just as death is certain, but the hour of death is uncertain, so it is certain that the final judgment will at some time follow, but the hour of judgment is uncertain and unknown to men, Matt. 24: 44; Luke 10: 46. (4) *As remedies for pusillanimity.* Just in the proportion that numerous and terrible evils befall the godly, do they hasten the more rapidly the day of redemption and refreshing" (ἀπολυτρώσεως καὶ ἀναψύξεως). GRH. (XX, 95): "The Millennarians teach that, before the last day, Christ will return from heaven to earth, to raise the godly dead, and, with them, together with those also whom He will find alive, all the godless being suppressed, to pass on this earth for a thousand years a life abounding in corporeal pleasures, an earthly, corporeal and visible reign being begun; and that then, when the thousand years of this reign shall have been finished, the end of the world and the general resurrection of all shall follow."

In regard to Antichrist, we remark that the word is used in a twofold sense by the Dogmaticians. HOLL. (2070): "(*a*) Generically, for all heretics who disseminate doctrines that are false and conflict with the doctrine of Christ, and who obstinately defend these. Concerning those who are commonly called little Antichrists, 1 John 2: 18. (*b*) Specifically, and by pre-eminence, for that remarkable adversary of Christ, described in 2 Thess. 2, whom, for the purpose of making a distinction, we call the great Antichrist." A distinction is made also between the Eastern and the Western Antichrist. QUEN. (IV, 522): "The *Eastern* is outside of the Church, and is called, Ez. 38: 2; Rev. 20: 7, 8, Gog and Magog. The *Western* sits in the very lap of the Church, and of this we are here treating. Some of the fathers thought that this would be a Jew springing from the tribe of Dan, and the Papists also generally follow this opinion; but we are certain that Antichrist has his origin not from the Jews, but from the assembly of Chris-

tians, or from those who make a Christian profession, 2 Thess. 2: 3, 4 sq."

Of Antichrist it is held, Br. (783): (He is) "not any one particular human individual. For (1) Antichrist was to come, when that which hindered the erection of his government (viz., the ancient Eastern Roman empire, whose seat was at Rome) would be removed; but he was to continue until the glorious advent of Christ; now, this duration, for so many ages, altogether exceeds the life of one man. (2) The Scriptures describe the origin or planting, and the progress or growth of Antichrist in such a manner that it is impossible for all to occur in the life of one man; that is, if we consider that the power was to have been derived from hidden beginnings, not so much by means of arms and open violence as by insidious arts by which the minds of men are gradually occupied and brought over to its side, and that, too, not in one nation or people, but throughout the greatest part of the earth; and that kings and nations were to make use of his society to satiety and nausea, and to avail themselves of his aid for persecuting the saints, etc., according to Rev. 13, 14, 17, concerning the beast and the great whore." Thereupon the Pope was declared to be Antichrist. Quen. (IV, 526): "These marks of Antichrist are to be taken here not apart and separately, but unitedly and together, and thus taken they exactly coincide with the Pope of Rome, whence the conclusion emerges, that the Pope of Rome is the great Antichrist, predicted by the Holy Ghost."

Among the events that are to occur before the final judgment, (1) some, even among Lutheran theologians, enumerate the *general conversion of the Jews.* By the great majority, however, this opinion is rejected. Holl. (1263): "Although access to repentance and faith in Christ has not been debarred the Jews by an absolute decree of God, and many of them, in the course of time from the apostolic era downward, have returned into favor with God, yet their universal, or their certainly manifest and solemn conversion about the time of the end of the world, is not to be expected." The passage, Rom. 11: 25, 26, which seems most distinctly to teach such a general conversion, is thus explained by Holl. (1269): "(*a*) The proposition of Paul is universal, not absolutely, but with limitation. The limitation exists in this very chapter 11, v. 2, likewise v. 5, also v. 23. Wherefore, with the limitation added, the meaning is: 'All Israel that God foreknew would believe in Christ will be saved;' or, 'All Israel elect unto eternal life will be saved;' or, 'All the Israelites who do not remain in unbelief will be saved.' But it is not lawful to con-

clude from this 'the whole nation of Israelites, or the greater part of the Jews, will be saved,' since it is evident that the faith does not belong to all, nor the election to many; the particle ἀχρις οὗ, until or as far as, does not always denote the ceasing from or end of anything, but frequently, in affirmative propositions, a continuation so as to be equipollent with *always*. Wherefore the mind of the apostle is: As long as the conversion of the Gentiles and their entrance into the Church shall continue, so long will Jews be successively converted. But the conversion of Gentiles will continue during the entire time of the New Testament. Therefore, so also the conversion of Jews."

GRH. (XIX, 293): "Neither can the absolutely universal conversion of all the Jews be hoped for. For, as the fulness of the Gentiles does not denote nations taken individually and collectively, and their individuals taken one by one, but a great number from the nations of the Gentiles, so also by 'all Israel' the entire Jewish people and all their individuals are not indicated, but only a great multitude of the Jewish nation."

(2) Others not of the Lutheran Church enumerate as among these events, "A coming of Christ, to be expected before the final judgment, for the purpose of establishing a kingdom on this earth under the control of the elect for a thousand years (Chiliasm)." But the Lutheran Church has always taught as follows (QUEN., IV, 649): "Since the second advent of Christ, the general resurrection, the final judgment, and the end of the world are immediately united, and one follows the other without an interval of time, it is manifest that, before the completion of the judgment, no earthly kingdom and life abounding in all spiritual and bodily pleasure, as the Chiliasts or Millennarians dream, is to be expected." CONF. AUG. (XVII, 4): "They condemn others also, who now scatter Jewish opinions, that before the resurrection of the dead the godly shall occupy the kingdom of the world, the wicked being everywhere suppressed." The following are mentioned as such Chiliasts: "The Jews, Cerinthus, Papias, Joachim (Abbot of Floris), the Fanatics and Anabaptists, Casp. Schwenkfeld, and others." A distinction is also made between "gross and subtile Chiliasm. The *former* estimates the millennium as happy, because of the illicit pleasure of the flesh; the *latter*, because of the lawful and honorable delights of both body and soul." (HOLL., 1256.) But both are rejected. GRH. (XX, 109): "But . . . it clearly appears that the hope and opinion of all concerning this Chiliastic government is not the same. 1. For some contend for a subtile Chiliasm consisting in the peace of the Church, perfect

justice, rest from temptations, universal conformity with the orthodox faith, etc.; but others for a gross Chiliasm, driven hither and thither by bodily delights and pleasures. 2. Some hope that this kingdom will begin before the resurrection, others after the resurrection; unless we be willing to unite these two dissenting opinions by this bond of distinction, that it will begin after the resurrection of the saints, or certainly of the martyrs, and before the universal resurrection of all men. 3. Some present their own opinions as probable, and, in suspense and doubt, commit the whole matter to the future issue; but others are earnest in their endeavors to obtrude them upon the Church, with the necessity of belief, as arguments evident beyond contradiction. 4. Some dispute in schools and books *theoretically* concerning the Chiliastic and imaginary kingdom; but others endeavor to accomplish it *practically*, as the Anabaptists of Münster, who taught that all wicked magistrates must be removed from their midst, in order that that most peaceful rule might follow. 5. Some say, in general, that the kingdom of Christ must be established on this earth; but others designate the land of Canaan in particular, as that into which the Jews are to be brought back. 6. Some say that the time of the duration of this kingdom is known precisely to God alone; but others assign to it precisely a thousand years. 7. Some hope that all the godly and saints will first be raised, in order to become partners in this kingdom; the Jews, that Israelites alone; Piscator, that the martyrs alone: some say that they will die again before the final judgment, but others hope that they will live forever with Christ. 8. Some dispute concerning this kingdom from the Holy Scriptures, others from the Sibylline oracles, others from apostolic traditions, others from the Apocryphal Books, the fourth book of Esdras especially. Thus, therefore, its patrons do not at all agree among themselves concerning the nature, the time, and the subjects of this kingdom, and the mode and grounds of discussion with regard to it."

The principal passages to which Chiliasts appealed are Is. 65: 22; Matt. 26: 29; Jn. 10: 16; Eph. 5: 5; 1 Thess. 4: 17; Rev. 20: 6. The last, which is the chief passage, Grh. (XX, 124 sq.) thus explains: "The opinion of those seems especially probable who place the beginning of these 'thousand years' in the empire of Constantine the Great; for then Satan, who in the first three centuries from the birth of Christ had impelled the heathen emperors and Roman proconsuls to horrible persecutions of the Christians, was bound, as under Constantine peace was given to the Church, and persecutions ceased, neither were the nations of which the Apoca-

lypse especially makes mention, able any longer with such violence and cruelty to propagate their rage for idols. According to this hypothesis, the end of these thousand years will fall in the year of Christ 1300, about which time Satan, being again released, aroused the Ottoman family, under which Gog and Magog, *i. e.*, the Turkish empire . . . acquired the greatest strength, and the Saracen race raged against the Church with a greater effort than before, the greatest and most flourishing part of the world having been occupied, and the city of Constantinople having at length been taken, which was the seat of the Eastern empire; so that in this manner, between the empire of Constantine, who warded off persecutions from the Church, and that of the Ottoman Turk, who greatly afflicted the Church, these thousand years intervene. And because horrible persecutions, excited by the heathen emperors, in which several thousand Christians were slain, preceded this binding of Satan and the rest for the Church which followed at length under Constantine the Great, John, in his vision, introduces the souls of the martyrs who had been beheaded or slain because of the testimony of Jesus, and because of the Word of God. . . . To these he joins the souls of those who had not adored the beast and his image, nor received his mark on their foreheads or in their hands. . . . Concerning these souls of godly martyrs and confessors, to which also may be added the souls of those who were killed when Satan was loosed in the persecutions of the Papists and Turks, John declares first 'that seats of judgment were given,' viz., as a sign of the judgment they were to exercise; secondly, that they lived; and thirdly, that they reigned with Christ a thousand years. They exercised judgment against their persecutors, by whom they were killed. For, as the blood of the godly cries out from earth to heaven, and begs for punishment against those who have shed it, so also their souls in heaven cry out under the altar, and beg for vengeance for their own blood and that of their brethren. They have lived evidently in heavenly peace, tranquility, and glory. The tyrants passed sentence that they should be destroyed both in soul and body, but the Holy Ghost, in this passage and frequently elsewhere in the Scriptures, bears witness that immediately after death they live in heavenly glory. Finally, 'they reigned with Christ,' *i. e.*, all enemies, the devil, the flesh, the world, and all adversaries having been entirely overcome. Neither from the particle 'until' are we permitted to infer that when this 'a thousand years' shall have been finished, the happiness of the saints will also have been ended. . . . But for this reason the thousand years are expressly mentioned, because when they have been completed,

what happens to the Church is memorable, viz., that, Satan being again released, it shall be attacked anew by the most grievous persecutions."

Holl. (1259): "(1) Because the Apocalypse is a prophetic book, full of most abstruse visions, as well as allegorical and quasi-enigmatical forms of speech, difficult to be understood, and therefore to be expounded according to the analogy of the faith, based upon clear and perspicuous Scripture passages. (2) The Chiliasts cannot clearly show from the cited passage the solemn advent of Christ to establish a millennial kingdom in which (*a*) men shall live endowed with a perfect knowledge of God, distinguished for consummate holiness and rejoicing in earthly felicity; (*b*) the martyrs shall rise from the dead; (*c*) all the Jews be converted, and (*d*) at its commencement Antichrist be overturned."

[5] Br. (379): "The judge will be Christ Himself (Matt. 25: 31; according to both natures, John 5: 22, 27), who, gloriously appearing in His assumed humanity, and seated as upon a judgment-throne, conspicuous to all, will pronounce sentence with authority divine. Moreover, Christ will have holy men, Matt. 19: 28; Luke 22: 30; 1 Cor. 6: 2, and good angels, Matt. 25: 31, partly as judges and partly as ministering attendants of the judgment. And, indeed, it will be the office of the angels not only to accompany Christ to judgment, and to manifest His advent by sending forth a great sound (1 Thess. 4: 16), but also to assemble, from all parts of the world (Matt. 24: 31; Mark 13: 27), both those who have been raised from the dead and those found alive, then to separate the godly from the wicked (Matt. 13: 41, 49), by placing the former at the right hand and the latter at the left (Matt. 25: 32), and then to thrust the damned to hell (Matt. 13: 42, 50). But holy men will be the witnesses and approvers of Christ's judgment."

[6] Holl. (1249): "The advent of Christ as judge will be public, and exceedingly glorious, terrible to the wicked, and greatly longed for by the godly."

[Grh. treats of a number of supplementary questions:

1. Is Christ's return to judgment contradictory to His presence on earth in both natures? Here we must distinguish between modes of presence, 1 Kings 19: 11: "God was not in the wind;" and yet it could not be said absolutely that God was not there, but only that there was no manifestation of His presence. So in Ex. 33: 3, the presence of His grace, but not of His power, is denied.

2. Will His return be local? Yes; nevertheless not successive, as though during a period of time He will descend from heaven in

the clouds, as at the ascension He was gradually received into heaven, but sudden and momentary, Matt. 24: 43; Luke 12: 39; 1 Thess. 5: 2; 2 Pet. 3: 10; Rev. 16: 15; Luke 21: 35.

3. What of the clouds? After stating the various interpretations, as that they are used metaphorically to represent the serenity, or the severity of divine judgment, or the saints who will attend Him, Jude 5: 15, who are called in Heb. 12: 1, "a cloud of witnesses," he prefers the literal interpretation, "since, in articles of faith, we must not depart from the letter without urgent necessity."

4. Why will He come in the clouds? (*a*) They are God's throne and chariot, Ps. 104: 3; Is. 19: 1. (*b*) At His ascension, a cloud received Him, Acts 1: 9, cf. v. 11. (*c*) At His transfiguration, a cloud overshadowed Him, Matt. 17: 5; Mark 9: 7; Luke 9: 34. (*d*) The analogy of the cloud which separated the Israelites from the Egyptians, Ex. 14: 19, dark to the one, bright to the other, Ps. 105: 39. (*e*) In the Old Testament, His glory appeared in the cloud, Ex. 16: 10; 19: 9; 40: 38; Num. 12: 5; 2 Chr. 5: 13.

5. In what form will He be seen? Some think that the wicked will see Him as He was crucified, arguing from Zach. 12: 10. But Scripture leaves no doubt, Matt. 16: 27; 24: 30, *i. e.*, He will be seen in a glorified form by all. Nevertheless we must distinguish between the beatific vision of the godly and the terrifying vision of the godless.

Quenst. (IV, 622) considering whether He will display the wounds of His passion, as He reappears, refers to the dissent of Brentz and Aegidius Hunnius, who maintained that they were laid aside with His resurrection, and only displayed to His disciples by a peculiar dispensation, in order to prove the truth of the resurrection-body, and after quoting Luther, Chemnitz and Grh. on the other side (that "they are retained, yet so as to occasion no deformity, but so as to render His body all the more beautiful, and affording the more consolation"), concludes:

"Almost all the holy doctors of the Church have been of the opinion that Christ Jesus, not only by a peculiar dispensation, showed the marks of His wounds to His disciples after His resurrection, but also that He has ascended into heaven imprinted with these as seals of His victory and triumph, and that He displays the same now in heaven to His Father and the holy angels, and that He will offer them to the sight of all on the last day. But this opinion, since it is not expressly propounded in Holy Scriptures, we do not maintain as an article of faith, but as a dogma not contrary to the analogy of faith, supported by the authority of

antiquity, useful to excite devotion, and most full of consolation."]

[7] Quen. (IV, 611): "The norm of this judgment is, indeed, *generally* speaking, with respect to the men to be judged, the entire heavenly doctrine, John 12: 48; Rom. 2: 16; but *specially*, and with respect to the pious, the Gospel, strictly so called, and as contradistinguished from the Law, Gal. 3: 9, 12; Matt. 25: 34; and with respect to the unbelieving, the Law, Gal. 3: 10; Rom. 2: 12; 1 Cor. 6: 9, 10; Gal. 5: 19, 20, 21—the Law, I say, but not alone, and considered by itself, but as it has been illumined by the Gospel."

[8] Quen. (IV, 610): "The form of the final judgment consists in the judicial examination of a case, Matt. 25: 35, 42; 1 Cor. 4: 5; in the decision of the case when examined, as also in the publication of a definitive sentence, Matt. 25: 46; and, finally, in the execution of the sentence." A distinction is made between judgment of examination and of retribution. Holl. (1253): "In the judgment of examination (*discussionis*), the cases of all men, the just as well as the unjust, will be investigated, and the wicked deeds of the unjust, having been accurately examined, will be published. In the judgment of *retribution*, a sentence suitable to each one will be pronounced. This judgment will be twofold, of approbation, or absolution, by which eternal life will be assigned to the elect and conferred upon them, and of reprobation or condemnation, by which reprobates will be sent away into eternal fire." As to the mode of procedure, Hefele. (683): "Not that troublesome and continued din of a forensic court of justice, where the truth must be elicited, and the judge informed by means of certain articles, inquiries, replies, and prolix examinations of witnesses; but, since the president of this court is true God and man, and the searcher of hearts, He not only knows and observes all things, but will bring every secret word, deed, thought, desire, and purpose into clear light (their conscience bearing witness, and the wicked being separated from the good, the former being placed at the left, and the latter at the right hand), and will pronounce and execute sentence against the wicked without the intervention of any delay. This process is described by Christ Himself, Matt. 25, and by Paul, 2 Cor. 5: 10."

§ 66. (4.) *Of the End of the World.*

After the final judgment, the absolute end of this world will come; angels and men excepted, everything that belongs to this world will be burnt up by fire and reduced to nothing.

[1] Not a transformation of the world, therefore, but an absolute annihilation of its substance is to be expected. [2]

[1] Br. (385): "When the judgment shall have been finished, the end of the world will immediately follow, whereby heaven and earth, and likewise the other elements and the bodies composed of elements will, with respect to their substance, perish by means of fire." Holl. (1273): "The consummation of the world is an action of the triune God, by which, to the glory of His truth, power, and justice, and the deliverance of elect men, He will destroy with fire and annihilate the entire fabric of heaven and earth, and all created things, intelligent creatures alone excepted." Of the means by which God will destroy the world (Holl., 1275): "God will destroy the world by means of true and proper fire (2 Pet. 3: 12); but the power and nature of this no mortal is able to investigate."

[2] Quen. (IV, 638): "The form of this consummation consists not in the mere change, alteration, or renewing of qualities, but in the total abolition and reduction of the world's substance itself to nothing (Ps. 102: 26; 2 Pet. 3: 10; Rev. 20: 11; Is. 34: 4; Luke 21: 33; Job 14: 12)."

§ 67. (5.) *Of Eternal Damnation and Eternal Life.*

With the Judgment, a complete and eternal separation takes place between the ungodly and the godly. The former are delivered over to eternal damnation, a condition which in Scripture is also called eternal death ("eternal death, eternal damnation, is a condition most miserable through the aggregation of multitudinous evils, and to last forever." Holl., (978).) [1] The Holy Scriptures say of them that they are in Hell (ᾅδης, שְׁאוֹל, a place of torment, [2] in which they suffer, according to the degree of their ungodliness, [3] in bodily and spiritual pains, [4] for their sins, eternally. [5] The latter, however, the godly, become partakers of eternal life, [6] *i. e.*, they enjoy, according to the degree of their godliness, [7] the highest and completely undisturbed happiness in beholding the face of God. [8] The place of their happiness is in the Scriptures called Heaven. [9]

[1] Holl. (979): "Death eternal is the separation of the unbelieving soul from the beatific sight of God and eternal enjoyment."

Quen. (I, 565): "Death eternal, or damnation, is that most unhappy state in which, from the just judgment of God, men who remain unbelieving to the end, being excluded from the beatific sight of God, and associated in the infernal prison with devils, will be tortured eternally (in soul, immediately after its departure from the body, and in both parts of their composite being, at length when sentence has been passed at the final judgment) with the most severe and ineffable torments, to the praise of the divine truth, and the glory and exultation of the godly." Holl. (979): "Death eternal is named likewise the *second death*, Rev. 2: 11; 20: 6, because it occasions the forfeiture of that other life which man was able to attain when the present life had been completed; besides it is called corruption, Jude 12; Matt. 7: 13; everlasting destruction, 2 Thess. 1: 9—not as though eternal death were an annihilation of substance, but because it is the forfeiture or the want of happiness, and shame, and everlasting contempt, Dan. 12: 2, since there is nothing more contemptible, in the eyes of God, the angels, and the blessed, than the damned, for they will be an abhorring unto all flesh, Is. 66: 24; everlasting punishment, Matt. 25: 46; tribulation and anguish, Rom. 2: 9." Quen. (I, 551) presents scriptural proofs from Ps. 49: 15, 20; Is. 66: 24; Dan. 12: 2; Zach. 9: 11; Matt. 3: 10; Luke 3: 17; Matt. 5: 22; 25: 46; 8: 12; Luke 13: 27, 28; Matt. 10: 28; 13: 40, 42; 22: 13; 25: 41, 46; Luke 16: 23. (Grh. (XX, 169) adds: "Reasons and arguments sought (1) from the condition of divine justice, 2 Thess. 1: 6; (2) from the curse of the divine Law, Deut. 27: 26; Matt. 19: 16; Rom. 4: 15; 1 Thess. 1: 10; (3) from the deformity and confusion of sin, Rom. 6: 23; (4) from the witness of one's own conscience; (5) from the tasting of the pains of hell, 2 Sam. 22: 6; Ps. 18: 5; 30: 3; 49: 15; 86: 13; 88: 4; 116: 3; (6) from the article concerning the descent of Christ *ad inferos;* (7) from the resurrection of the wicked; (8) from the administration of the final judgment.")

[2] Grh. (XX, 175): "The name, Hell, can be received in a twofold manner: (1) for eternal death; (2) for that place (πού), in which they suffer, and to eternity will sustain that most miserable condition and those ineffable tortures. By reason of the former signification, the devils are said to carry about with them their own hell wherever they wander. By reason of the latter, it is said that on the day of judgment they will be cast into hell, and be confined there. In the former signification, the name, hell, is received internally and formally; in the latter, *externally, objectively, and locally*, the term used in the article being received in a general

sense, according to the language of Scripture, Luke 16: 28. What hell is, in the former signification, cannot be understood more correctly than by collecting and distributing into certain classes, the descriptions by which, in the Holy Scriptures, the extreme misery of the damned is prefigured. But what hell is, in the latter signification, pertains to a question that is extremely difficult and obscure. Some altogether reject the latter signification, and think that hell should not be defined except by the *sense of divine wrath, and of the eternal curse and horror of conscience.* But there is no apparent reason why a certain place (ποῦ), in which the damned suffer their punishments, should be denied." Holl. (984): "It is certain that the infernal prison is in a real locality (Luke 16: 28; 1 Pet. 3: 19), separate from the abode of the blessed (Rev. 22: 15; Luke 16: 23). It is also probable that the same is outside of this habitable world (2 Pet. 3: 10; John 12: 31; Matt. 8: 12); but *where* this place definitely is, is unknown to men during the present life."

[3] Holl. (990): "The punishments of Hell differ in degree, according to the quality and measure of sins, Matt. 11: 24; Luke 12: 47; Matt. 23: 15."

[4] Hefele. (691): "They are the most exquisite pains of soul and body (for both had sinned), arising from the fear and sense of the most just wrath and vengeance of God against sins, the most sad consciousness of which they carry about with them, the baseness of which is manifest, and of which, likewise, no remission afterwards, and, therefore, no mitigation or end can be hoped for. Whence, in misery, they will execrate, with horrible lamentation and wailing, their former impiety, by which they carelessly neglected the commandments of the Lord, the admonitions of their brethren, and all the means of attaining salvation; but in vain. For in perpetual anguish, with dreadful trembling, in shame, confusion, and ignominy, in inextinguishable fire, in weeping and gnashing of teeth, amidst that which is eternal and terrible, torn away from the grace and favor of God, they must quake among devils, and will be tortured without end to eternity. These future torments of the damned far surpass all the penetration of the human mind, so that we are not sufficient to ever comprehend in thought their greatness; therefore, what they will be, or of what nature, cannot be at all expressed in words. Scripture, nevertheless, in order to show that these tortures are the greatest and most exquisite, likens them to those things by which, in this life, pain both of soul and body is accustomed to be excited. For this reason they are compared now to the gnashing of teeth, now to the gnawing of

worms, now to the most sorrowful darkness, and whatever other matters of sadness and of the most complete pain can be mentioned, Is. 66: 24; Matt. 5: 22; 8: 12; Rev. 19: 20." Quen. (I, 562): "The form (of eternal death) is the entire mass of evils intended for the damned. These are partly privative, and partly positive. The *privative* are: (1) forfeiture of the beatific sight of God; Matt. 25: 41; 22: 13; 8: 12; (2) separation from the society of all the good, Matt. 8: 11, 12; 22: 13; Luke 16: 23, 26; (3) exclusion from heavenly light, rest, and happiness, Matt. 8: 12; 22: 13; 25: 30; 2 Thess. 1: 6, 8, 9; (4) entire denial of pity, divine as well as human, Prov. 1: 26; Ps. 52: 6, 7; 58: 10; Luke 16: 24, 25; (5) despair of every kind, Rev. 6: 16, 17. Of the *positive*, some are internal, and others external. The *internal* are those which the damned experience within themselves, viz., the inexplicable pains and tortures of soul, Ps. 18: 4, 5; Is. 66: 24; Mark 9: 44, 46, 48." (Holl. (982): "Their *intellect* will recognize God as the most just judge and the most severe avenger of sins, Ps. 139: 7; 2 Thess. 1: 9; Wis. 5: 3. Their *will* will be tortured by hatred to God, the greatest sorrow, and raging impatience.") "The *external* are those most sorrowful evils, outside of themselves, that they deeply feel, namely, association with devils, Matt. 25: 41; a most foul dwelling-place, Matt. 25: 30; and most painful burning without being consumed, Luke 16: 23, 24; Rev. 14: 10, 11; 20: 10." Holl. (983) answers the question concerning the nature of the fire: "The bodies of the damned will be tortured in infernal fire, *properly so called, and, therefore, material.* For the sentence of the judge announces a fire, Matt. 25: 41, from which smoke ascends, Rev. 14: 10, whose flames burn, Luke 16: 24. That, therefore, to which the Holy Ghost has ascribed the name, the properties, and the effects of true fire, is not metaphorical, but fire properly so called. But to the infernal fire, etc. Therefore, etc. —But this will not be the *element of fire*, but that which is altogether peculiar. Ordinary fire burns only bodies; the infernal fire will act also upon souls. The former ceases when fuel fails; the latter does not stand in need of nourishment properly so called. But to desire to explain the nature of infernal fire more explicitly, is a matter of curiosity rather than of profit."

[5] Quen. (I, 564): (A property of these evils is) "eternal continuance, which will augment the punishments of the damned beyond any measure. The *sufferings* will be *continuous, i. e.*, they will have no interval, no interruption; they will be *eternal*, they will have no end, Is. 34: 10; 66: 24; Rev. 14: 11; 20: 10; Dan. 12: 2; Matt. 3: 12; Luke 3: 17." Of the time in which the suffer-

ings will begin, Holl.: "The tortures of hell will befall the souls of the damned, as soon as they have departed from the body. Luke 16."

[6] Hefele. (695): "Life eternal is the ineffable, greatest, and purest happiness, which believers, when their glorious and spiritual bodies have been received, being freed from every sin and bodily infirmity, will, with the holy and blessed angels, eternally enjoy God Himself, without end, satiety or disturbance. This felicity is called, and is, life eternal."

Grh. (XX, 340): "What life eternal is can be known, from the revelation of the Word, *in a general and obscure* (αἰνιγματικῶς) *manner*, viz., that it is the most blessed and felicitous state of the godly, into which being transferred after this life, they will see God face to face, and, free from every trouble, will live and reign in eternal joy and glory, and in ineffable felicity; but, in the infirmity of this life, this cannot be known *specifically and exactly*, because 'eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him,' Is. 64: 4; 1 Cor. 2: 9." Synonymous expressions with eternal life are: simply life, Ezek. 18: 9; Matt. 7: 14; 18: 8; the kingdom of heaven, Matt. 5: 20; 7: 21; the kingdom prepared from the foundation of the world, Matt. 25: 34; an inheritance, Acts 20: 32; Gal. 3: 18; Eph. 1: 14; the joy of the godly, John 16: 22. Quen. (I, 551): "That this life exists, is evident from Job 19: 25; Ps. 16: 5, 6, 9, 11; 17: 15; 36: 9; Is. 65: 17, 18; Dan. 12: 2, 3; Matt. 25: 46; John 5: 29; 10: 28."

[7] Grades of happiness, therefore, are assumed; but what one enjoys, in addition to that enjoyed by others, is described as something accessory, while all alike share in essentially the same salvation. Comp. Ap. Conf. III, 234. Quen. (I, 559): "As to accessory rewards, the harmonious belief of the Orthodox Church is, that in life eternal there will be degrees of not essential but of accidental glory. Moreover, blessedness can be considered in a twofold manner, (1) with respect to its essence, which consists in the clear and intuitive knowledge of God, and thus there is no doubt that it belongs to all the blessed equally; (2) with respect to its accidents, in view of which the blessed are not altogether equal, and thus, while there will be the same essential blessedness to all, there will be, nevertheless, some difference in accidental endowments. . . . But there will be some difference and inequality among the blessed, not only with respect to the brilliancy and splendor of their bodies, but also with respect to their position (*sessio*) and other accessory rewards. For, in life eternal, in addi-

tion to essential blessedness, upon some saints there will be conferred various ornaments of soul and body, Dan. 12: 2; 1 Cor. 15: 41, 42." But: "The cause of this inequality must be sought, not in human merits, but in the most free distribution and the gratuitous promise of divine kindness."

[8] Holl. (456): "Our eternal and highest blessedness consists in the perfect sight and enjoyment of God. The former is an operation of the intellect, the latter of the will. By the former we obtain possession of God as the highest good; by the latter we perfectly enjoy and repose in the same. The beatific *sight* of God is an act of the intellect illumined with the light of glory, by which it perceives God clearly and immediately, and as He is in Himself. The enjoyment of God is an act of the will, by which the blessed, in the heavenly country, most eagerly embrace God as the highest good, most delightfully comprehend Him, and are most fully satisfied with Him, Ps. 17: 15. Inseparably accompanying the beatific sight and enjoyment of God, will be the most ardent love to God, the most complete joy (Matt. 25: 23; Ps. 16: 11), the eternal celebration of the divine name, Rev. 4: 8, *ἀναμαρτησία*, or immunity from the danger of sinning, and the most constant holiness, Eph. 5: 27; Rev. 19: 4."

Quen. (I, 553): "The form" (of life eternal) "consists, generally speaking, in the ineffable, most full, and never-ending reception of incomprehensible blessings. The blessings of life eternal are either privative or positive. The *privative blessings* are the absence of sin and of the causes of sin, viz., the flesh inciting, the devil suggesting, the world seducing, and of the punishments of sin, such as various calamities, Ps. 116: 7–9; Is. 25: 8; 49: 10; Rev. 21: 4; temporal death, Is. 25: 8; Hos. 13: 14; 1 Cor. 15: 26; Rev. 2: 7; 21: 4; eternal death, Hos. 13: 14; 1 Cor. 15: 26; Rev. 2: 11; 20: 14. Here also belongs immunity from the affections and actions of the animal body as such; such are hunger, thirst, eating, drinking, the use of marriage, etc., Rev. 7: 16; 1 Cor. 6: 13; Matt. 22: 30; 1 Cor. 15: 42, 43. Some of the *positive blessings of life eternal* are internal, others are external. The *internal blessings belong to the entire composite being*, and affect both body and soul of the blessed, among which the beatific and immediate sight of God is prominent. The *internal blessings of either part of the composite being*, belong either to the soul or to the body. Those of the soul are, (1) the perfect enlightenment of the intellect, 1 Cor. 13: 9, 10; (2) complete rectitude of the will and appetite, Ps. 17: 15; Eph. 4: 24; 5: 27; (3) the highest security concerning the perpetual duration of this blessedness, John 16: 22. Those of the *body* are, (1)

Spirituality, 1 Cor. 15: 44, 47; Matt. 22: 30; Luke 20: 36; Phil. 3: 21; (2) Invisibility, 1 Cor. 15: 44; (3) Impalpability, 1 Cor. 15: 44, 47; (4) Illocality (ib.); (5) Subtilty (ib.); (6) Agility, 1 Thess. 4: 17; 1 Cor. 15: 44; (7) Impassibility, Rev. 7: 16; 21: 4; (8) Immortality and incorruptibility, 1 Cor. 15: 42–48, 53; 2 Cor. 5: 4; Rev. 21: 4; (9) Strength and soundness, 1 Cor. 15: 43; (10) Brilliancy, Dan. 12: 3; Matt. 13: 43; 1 Cor. 15: 41, 43; (11) Beauty, 1 Cor. 15: 43; Phil. 3: 21. The external blessings are those which the blessed experience deeply outside of themselves. Of these, two are chief; the most delightful intercourse with God (Luke 23: 43; John 12: 26; 14: 3; 17: 24; 2 Cor. 5: 8; Phil. 1: 23; 1 Thess. 4: 17; Rev. 14: 4; 21: 3), and the angels (Heb. 12: 22), and all the blessed (Matt. 8: 11; Luke 13: 28, 29; Heb. 12: 23), consisting in mutual presence and most agreeable conversations, and rendering of mutual honor joined with mutual love; and a most beautiful and magnificent abode."

Two other questions here naturally follow: "(1) Whether the saints, therefore, will recognize each other in the life to come? (2) Whether the joy of life eternal will be clouded by the fact that the blessed will see many of their most intimate friends tortured in hell?" The first question, Hfrffr. answers (699): "Certainly. Because, the perfect image of God in which we had been created being restored, we will be endowed also with perfect wisdom and knowledge. Hence, if Adam, before the Fall, immediately recognized his rib as Eve, much more, in the life to come, when all these gifts will be far more perfect, we will recognize each other, Luke 16: 23; Matt. 17: 1." The second, Hutt. (Comp. Th., 318) as follows: "Not at all, for the will of the blessed shall in all things concur with that of God. Such carnal affections, which are the sign of our weakness in this life, will entirely cease in the life to come, when our love will extend only to those who are beloved of God, and whom He has made heirs of everlasting life. But in the damned, they will supremely admire and eternally praise the exalted justice of God."

[Grh. (XIX, 498): "God loved the human race far more ardently than in this life any parent can love his own son, because He gave His only begotten Son unto death for the world. Nevertheless, His happiness and joy are in no way disturbed by the sight of the damned, Prov. 1: 26."]

[9] Grh. (XX, 341): "By the name Heaven, that certain place (*τοῦ*) is to be understood, in which the blessed will see God, and perfectly enjoy the heavenly glory and pleasure, Matt. 5: 12; 6: 20; Luke 6: 23; 12: 33; 1 Pet. 1: 4."

[On the practical use of this doctrine, GREG. (XX, 528): "The doctrine concerning the Heaven of the blessed and eternal life is set forth in Holy Scripture, not that we may idly dispute as theorists, concerning the locality of Heaven, the beatific vision, the properties of glorified bodies; but that, as practical men, considering the promised joys of eternal life every day, aye every hour, aye every moment, we may keep closely to the way leading thither, and carefully avoid all that can cause delay or recall us from entrance into life eternal. In 2 Cor. 4: 18, the godly are well described by the Apostle as looking not at *τὰ βλεπόμενα*, but at *τὰ μὴ βλεπόμενα*. One of the ancients, who was asked what books he used in his daily studies, answered that he studied every day a book with three pages, one red, one black, one white; that on the red page he read of our Lord's passion, on the black, the torments of the lost, on the white, the joys of the glorified; and that from this study he derived more profit, than if he were to ponder all the works of the philosophers."]

APPENDIX.

I.

SKETCH OF THE DOGMATICIANS CITED.

Philip Melanchthon, or Melanthon (often incorrectly spelled Melancthon), born 1497; professor at Wittenberg, 1518 to his death, 1560. The foundation of Lutheran Systematic Theology was laid in his *Loci Communes Rerum Theologicarum seu Hypotyposes Theologicæ* (1521), which had its origin in a brief outline prepared for his own private use, and afterwards dictated to his students as an introduction to his lectures on the Epistle to the Romans. During the author's life it passed through eighty editions, was greatly enlarged, and on certain points, as, for example, the Freedom of the Will, its doctrine was materially changed. For details, the English reader is referred to the article Melanchthon, prepared by the author of this sketch, in *McClintock and Strong's Cyclopædia*, vol. vi. The collection of Melanchthon's works in the *Corpus Reformatorum* affords the student the best facility for the critical study of Melanchthon's theology. It contains a reprint of each of the principal editions, as well as of several translations of the *Loci*.

Martin Chemnitz, born 1522, lecturer at Wittenberg, 1552–1554, pastor at Brunswick, 1554–1567, superintendent of Brunswick, 1567–1586. Gerhard frequently refers to him as "the incomparable theologian;" Quenstedt styles him, "without doubt the prince of the theologians of the Augsburg Confession;" and Buddeus, "that great theologian of our Church, whom no one will refuse to assign the chief place after Luther among the defenders of the Gospel truth." His *Loci Theo-*

logici (1591) is a commentary upon the *Loci Communes* of his teacher, Melanchthon, the outgrowth of theological lectures begun at Wittenberg, and continued at Brunswick. It was published after his death, under the editorship of Polycarp Lyser. His *De Duabus Naturis* (1570) has been repeatedly called "an epoch-making production" (Kahnis, Luthardt), while his two treatises on the Lord's Supper, *De Cœna Domini* (1560) and *Fundamenta Sanæ Doctrinæ*, are especially valuable for their thorough discussion of Scripture, and their historical development of the subject. The *Examen Concilii Tridentini* (1565–73) is the ablest defence of Protestantism ever published. He also commenced the celebrated *Harmony of the Gospels*, and was one of the authors of the Formula of Concord. Wealth of Scriptural learning, profoundness of reasoning, clearness and accuracy of statement, well-balanced judgment, simplicity and freshness of style, a constantly practical tendency, and devout feeling, are the prominent characteristics of his works. For further details, see *Evangelical Review*, vol. xxi, p. 410, seq.

Nicholas Selnecker, also a pupil of Melanchthon, and one of the authors of the Formula of Concoad, born 1532, professor at Leipzig and Jena, repeatedly exiled, died 1592. His *Institutiones Christianæ Religionis* (1563) introduced the practice of prefacing works on Systematic Theology with *Prolegomena*. In addition, he prepared a compend of Melanchthon's *Loci*, and wrote numerous monographs, *De Cœna* (1561), *Exegema de Unione Personali* (1571), etc.

Matthew Hafenreffer, born 1561, professor at Tübingen, died 1619. His chief work, *Loci Theologici, sive Compendium Theologiæ*, was especially esteemed in Würtemburg, Sweden, and Denmark, where it was generally used as a text-book.

Leonard Hutter, born 1563, professor at Wittenberg from 1596 until his death, in 1616. His best known work is his *Compendium Locorum Theologicorum* (1610), for nearly a century almost universally used as a text-book in the Church-schools of Germany. It has been translated into German (three times), Swedish, and English, and has formed the basis of at least seven commentaries. It is characterized by con-

ciseness, precision, and almost entire reliance upon the Symbolical Books and the older theologians (Chemnitz, Ægidius Hunnius) for its definitions. His posthumous work, *Loci Communes Theologici* (1619), edited by the Wittenberg faculty, is a development of the *Compendium*, or a commentary upon it. See Preface to English translation of the *Compendium* for further details.

John Gerhard, the pupil of Hutter, born 1582, professor at Jena from 1616, until his death, in 1637, a theologian "who combined rare learning, great acuteness, wonderful industry, sound judgment, and practical ability with ardent piety." (Luthardt.) His great work, *Loci Theologici, cum pro adstruenda veritate, tum pro destruenda quorumvis contradicentium falsitate, per theses nervose, solide et copiose explicati*, was begun in 1610, and completed in 1621. "A more careful exegetical treatment than is found in his predecessors, the comprehensive consideration of the material afforded by the history of dogmas, the most thorough elaboration of every question, the objectiveness of its judgment, and its firmness in polemics, combined with the reference to the practical and consolatory use of the individual dogmas, distinguish this work, which also through its copious application of the scholastic theology (especially in the doctrine of God), and its employment, although still in a moderate degree, of the scholastic form, was of the most significant influence upon works which followed it." (Luthardt, *Compendium*, p. 42.) "The strength of this work does not lie in the systematic arrangement of the material, but in the thorough elaboration of the individual doctrines, according to the entire extent of their exegetical, dogmatico-historical, symbolical, polemical, and practical material. Yet it cannot be said that Gerhard produced epoch-making dogmatic thoughts; he has, rather, learnedly and with great thoroughness, brought together what had been already prepared." (Kahnis, *Luth. Dogmatik*, I, p. 29.) "Gerhard's advance beyond Chemnitz and Hutter consists not so much in a more systematic arrangement, or in a deeper speculative basis for his doctrines, or a more subtle formal development of them, as in an erudite thoroughness, transparent clearness, and comprehensiveness." (Tholuck, in *Herzog's Encyclopædia.*) "Some,

indeed, accuse him of re-introducing scholastic theology into the Church, as the treatment of his *Loci Theologici* is after the scholastic mode; yet the same persons must admit that he was more cautious than those who followed him, and that he was careful not to mingle philosophy with theology. . . . Those who admire his industry, but overlook his sound judgment, prove thereby that they themselves are destitute of judgment, as I am certain that they cannot produce a single example of an error in judgment." (Buddeus, *Isagoge*, p. 353.) "What work, among those which fully treat of this department, is to be named above all others, can as little be asked as what star surpasses all others in brilliancy, As the only answer to the latter question must be the sun, so the only answer to the former is the *Loci Theologici* of John Gerhard. . . . In our opinion, this work is the most excellent and complete, both in contents and form, that has been produced within this department of the Christian religion, and will remain until the last day the model for all who make attempts in this sphere." (Prof. Walther.) Hence, too, the high value set upon this work by theologians of other churches. Passing by encomiums of the Reformed Churches, we need only mention those coming from a direction the most unlooked-for. The Roman Catholic Du Pin praises it as a work of the greatest erudition, commends the chapters concerning God and the Trinity as most worthy of the study of Catholic theologians, styles its author a thorough linguist, a most diligent student of the Scriptures and the Fathers, a fair disputant, "of all the Protestants, shedding the greatest light upon the arguments on which he touched," and concludes that "Bellarmine had no adversary more to be dreaded than Gerhard." Bossuet is said to be the author of the often-quoted remark that Gerhard is the third (Luther, Chemnitz, Gerhard) in that series of Lutheran theologians in which there is no fourth. The best edition of the *Loci* is that of Cotta (Tübingen, 1762–87, 22 vols.), valuable for its accurate text, the learned notes of the editor, and its exhaustive indices. A more accessible and less costly edition, especially attractive because of its clear type and paper, is that begun in 1863, by Schlawitz, Berlin, and completed in 1875 by J. C. Heinrichs (Leipzig); it preserves the paging of

the Cotta edition on the margin. The *Isagoge Locorum Theologicorum* of John Ernest Gerhard is a very full and satisfactory compendium of his father's great work. The *Confessio Catholica*, showing the harmony of the Lutheran Church with the purer Church of all ages, and the *Harmony of the Gospels*, begun by Chemnitz, continued by Lyser, and completed by Gerhard, also contain valuable material belonging to the department of Dogmatics.

Caspar Brochmann, born 1585, professor at Copenhagen and Bishop of Seeland, died 1682. The title of his principal work is *Universæ Theologiæ Systema* (1633). An interesting copy of this comparatively rare work, once the property of Erick Biork, one of the most efficient pastors of the old Swedish churches on the Delaware (pastor of the Christiana Church, 1696–1714), is in the library of the Theological Seminary at Philadelphia.

Abraham Calovius, born 1612, professor at Königsberg and Wittenberg, died 1686. The most voluminous of our theologians, distinguished by his wonderful industry, untiring zeal in controversy, unyielding firmness and severity, vast and varied learning, and critical power of the first rank. He represents the strictest school of orthodoxy, and wrote on all departments of theological science. His work in the department of Dogmatic Theology is *Systema Locorum Theologicorum* (12 vols., 1655–77). His *Biblia Illustrata* (1672–6) contains valuable Dogmatical material.

John Frederick Koenig, born 1619, professor at Greifswald and Rostock, died 1664. His compend of theology, *Theologia Positiva Acroamatica* (1664) was widely used as a text-book. It differs from Hutter's work, in being scientific rather than popular. "The author comprehended much in a few words and nervously; but, by an excessive desire of brevity and accuracy, produced a mere skeleton, destitute of all sap and blood." (*Buddeus, Isagoge*, 359).

John Adam Scherzer, born 1628, professor at Leipzig, died 1683, wrote a brief outline of theology, *Breviculus Theologicus*,

(1678), and afterwards a system, *Systema Theologiæ*, xxix *definitionibus absolutum* (1680).

John Andrew Quenstedt, born 1617, professor at Wittenberg, died 1688, the nephew of John Gerhard. His *Theologia Didactico-Polemica* (1685), because of its exhaustive collection and its accurate classification of dogmatic material, is one of the most important works of Lutheran theology. It possesses little originality and follows closely the outline of Koenig, but manifests the greatest erudition in its citations of authorities, and skill in rendering the work of reference easy. From this characteristic, its author is often styled the "bookkeeper" of the Wittenberg Orthodoxy, and is conceded to be "next to Gerhard the most instructive representative of the Orthodox Dogmatik." [Luthardt.] The objection, however, is often presented against Quenstedt, that his excessive attention to the details of his system has deprived Dogmatic theology of its life, by reducing its doctrines to the shape of mathematical formulæ.

John William Baier, born 1647, general superintendent of Weimar and professor at Halle, died 1695. The *Compendium Theologiæ Positivæ* (1685), is largely, as its title indicates, a compend of the theology of Musaeus (Baier's father-in-law, born 1613, professor at Jena, died 1681), and "many other orthodox theologians." An accurate acquaintance with the history of the controversies of the preceding periods, is a necessary prerequisite to the successful study of this much valued and widely received text-book. Professor Walther, in his valuable series of articles in the first volume of the *Lehre und Wehre*, entitled *Lutherisch-Theologische Pfarrer's-Bibliothek*, sums up the merits of this compendium, as "great completeness combined with compact brevity, exclusion of all extraneous material, exquisite selection, and, above all, accurate exegesis of scriptural proof-passages, critical comparison, and employment of the labors of his predecessors within the department of dogmatics, and, in addition to Lutheran fidelity in doctrine, the expression of a living heart faith, and of a mild, pious sensibility." The most accessible edition is that

edited by Preuss, and published by Schlawitz, Berlin, 1864. Prof. Walther has also published an edition with notes.

Frederick Bechmann, born 1628, professor at Jena, died 1703. *Annotationes uberiores in comp. Theo. L. Hutteri* (1696); *Theologia Polemica* (1702); *Institutiones Theologicæ* (2d ed., (1706); *Annotationes* on Dieterich's *Institutiones Catechcticæ* (1707).

David Hollaz, born 1646, pastor at Jacobshagen, rector at Colberg, died 1713. His *Examen Theologicum Acroamaticum* (1707) recapitulates with great clearness and compactness the results attained by his predecessors, under the form of questions and answers. It is "especially happy in its definitions," but in addition to some of the faults of the scholasticism of Quenstedt, it possesses already some of the characteristics of the succeeding period.

APPENDIX.

II.

EXPLANATION

OF SOME SCHOLASTICO-DOGMATIC TERMS.

[Translated from Luthardt's Compendium der Dogmatik, p. 302, sqq.]

Circumscriptiva præsentia, contrasted with *definitiva* præsentia, or in Scholastic usage (Occam) diffinitiva (disfinere): the former used with reference to bodies, in so far as their single parts correspond to the single parts of [occupied] space, and thus are locally limited; the latter, of spiritual existences (or pneumatic bodies, such as the body of Christ in the Lord's Supper), in so far as they stand in such a relation to a specific space that they are entirely present at each point of it, as the soul in the body, and angels at the respective places of their presence and activity.

Concretum designates the unity of substance (subjectum) and form (*i. e.*, that distinction in view of which the substance is designated). Thus, the concretum *person* designates the person together with its nature; the concretum *nature* designates nature viewed in its personal existence; whilst the *abstractum* nature designates nature viewed in itself, aside from personal existence, as humanity, Deity, human nature, divine nature.

Connexa are such conceptions or objects as reciprocally necessitate each other, so that they cannot be conceived of without each other; as, *e. g.*, Creator and creature. Hence they are designated as related.

Connotata, are relative conceptions that imply others corresponding to them (connotare, *i. e.*, innuere or indigitare): a father implies a son; a son implies a father.

Distinctio rationis rationantis signifies a purely subjective logical distinction, not objectively founded upon the thing itself; whilst distinctio rationis *ratiocinatæ* signifies a distinction that is, indeed, only conceived, but conceived with a factual basis. Compare the doctrine of the Divine Attributes.

Essentialiter.—A predicate is said to belong essentially to a subject (or a substance) if the latter cannot, according to its nature, at all exist or be conceived of without the former; as, *e. g.*, man is *essentially* rational. A predicate is said to belong *accidentally* to a subject, if the latter can be conceived of independently of the former; as, *e. g.*, the accidental attributes of roundness, whiteness, etc.

Forma is the more specific definiteness that imparts to a subject, in itself indifferent, its characteristic peculiarity; or it is the conception of anything existing in a definite manner. Thus, in the sphere of morals, actions in themselves indifferent receive through the intention of the actor their *forma*, *i. e.*, their specific character of virtue or vice. In this sense Scholasticism speaks of a *fides formata caritate* (a faith *formed* by love), or the Dogmaticians say: Concurrit Deus ad materiale non ad formale peccati (God concurs as to the matter, not as to the *form*, of sin). The same mode of conception underlies the Aristotelian and scholastic definition of the soul: Anima est forma corporis (Aristotle: the soul is ἐντελέχεια σώματος ὀργάνικου, or εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ ζωὴν ἐχοντος, *i. e.*, the specifying formal principle of organized matter). Thus also, *e. g.*, religion, considered *materialiter*, is conceived of as religion taken as a whole; considered *formaliter*, it is conceived of as specific religious knowledge or profession. Or, it is said, also, Mary is the Mother of God, not *formally*, *i. e.*, inasmuch as she did not bring forth God, as God according to His Deity; but *materially*, inasmuch as she brought forth Him who is true God.

Habitudo designates, in contrast with existence or the thing itself, the reference to, or capacity for, some other thing. Thus, between God and man there is a relation [or correspondence] not of *entitas* (for as to their existence they are infinitely different), but of *habitudo* (for they have a reference to each other).

Habitus is the condition [or state of being] which includes

in itself at the same time a power to act. This *habitus* may be *infused* (wrought by God), and thus is the condition [sine qua non] of all corresponding activity; or *acquired*, and then it is the result of actions already performed. Comp. habitual and actual sin.

Qualitas is used either in a wider sense, for every attribute, or in a narrower sense, to designate the essential peculiarities of anything.

Relatio is the relation of one thing to another. *Ens relativum* is, therefore, something that cannot be conceived of without something else (*e. g.*, master, like, etc.), as contrasted with *ens absolutum* (*e. g.*, man).

Subsistentia designates an *independent* existence (suppositum), which carries the source of its activity within itself. When applied to a rational being (suppositum in the sense of person), it designates, therefore, personality. Thus, *e. g.*, every angel, man, brute, etc., has its *subsistentia*, while the body and the soul, considered as separated from each other, have no *subsistentia* of their own, and are not a *suppositum*, but only a *pars suppositi*. Therefore, in the case of God, the immediatio suppositi (of His existence) *i. e.*, His ad essentia ad creaturas substantialis [His substantial nearness to creatures] is distinguished from the immediatio virtutis, *i. e.* of His operatio [activity].

Substantia completa is an existence that is not a part of a whole, but constitutes a whole in itself (*e. g.*, man, tree, etc.); *substantia incompleta* is a partial substance, which serves to complete another (body, soul of man, while the angels are spiritus completi). The substance needs subsistence to render it a substantia completa (therefore man becomes such only through personality), according to the well-known definition of Augustine (De Trin., VII, 4, 9): Sicut ab eo quod est esse appellatur essentia, ita ab eo quod est subsistere substantiam dicimus. (Just as anything is called an essence from the fact of its existence, so anything is called a substance from the fact of its subsistence.)

INDEX.

Ability, human, 257
Absolution, is it a Sacrament? 525
Abstractum, 672
Accident, defined, 673
  none in God, 131
Accommodation, of the Holy Spirit, in inspiration, 48
Act, or action, divine, ad extra, 151, 158, 161
  ad intra, 147
  and action, contrasted, 176
Active and passive obedience of Christ, 344, 352, sq.
  spiration of the Holy Ghost, 154
Acts, personal divine, 147
Actual sins, defined and classified, 250
Adam the representative of the human race, 224
ᾅδης (שְׁאוֹל), 634
Adiaphora, 543
Administration of Sacraments, *see* Dispensation
Advent, the second, 655
Aepin, on the descent to hell, 397
ἀγεννησία, 150
Adoration of the host, 574
Agnoetæ, 389
ἀγόρασις, 369
ἀθανασία, 641
Alicubitas, of the angels, 204
Allegorical sense of Scripture, 78
ἀλλοίωσις, of Zwingli, 326
  of Cyril, 327
"Alone," the exclusive particle in doctrine of justification, 439
Americans, "and other barbarians," 450
Anabaptists, condemned, 606
  Chiliasm of, 650
Anagogical sense of Scripture, 78
Analogical attributes, 115
Analogy of faith, 70, 76
ἀναλύσις, 628
ἀναμαρτησία, of Christ, 295, 301
  of the glorified, 661
Andreae and Luke Osiander vs. Beza on the Sacraments, 526
ἀνεργήτα, attributes, 118
Angels, existence of, 199
  relation of, to space, 204
  when created, 195, 200
  described, 195–199
  are complete substances, 201
  original state of, 197, 206, 207
  attributes of, 196, 202
  orders, of, 198, 213
  power of, 206, 210, 211
  knowledge of, 205
  number of, 206
  the good, 197 sq., 207
    can they sin? 197, 207
    not essentially holy, 208, 210
    works of, 198, 199, 211
    not to be adored, 198, 213
  the evil, 198, 213
    why they fell, 197, 207, 213
    when they fell, 214
    works of, 216
    punishment of, 199, 214
    knowledge and power of, 199, 215
  guardian, 211
Annihilation of the world, 658
ἀνομία, its origin, 233
Anselm, on the atonement, 351
Antecedent articles of faith, 94, 98
  benevolence of God, 270, 278, 282
Anthropology, 217 sq.
Antichrist, 647 sq.
  marks of, 649
ἀντίδοσις, 314, 327
Antilegomena of the New Testament, 89
ἀντίλυτρον, 357
Antinomian controversy, 516
Antitrinitarianism, sophistry of, 138
ἀνυποστασία of the human nature of Christ, 295, 300
ἀφορίσμος, in church discipline, 612
ἀπιστία, final, cause of reprobation, 292
Apocryphal books, 80, 81, 83
  why denied canonical authority, 88
ἀποδοκιμασία, 292
ἀπόθεσις, 628
ἀπολύτρωσις, 347, 362, 369
Apostasy of our first parents, 236
Apostles, in how far inspired, 49

Apostles' Creed, sometimes called the rule of faith, 195
no adequate basis of church organization, 195
ἀποτέλεσμα, 336 sq., 505
Apotelesmatic intercommunication of properties, 312, 315
Appeal from the inferior to the supreme Judge, 62
Application of redemption, 407 sqq.
Applying grace of the Holy Spirit, 409
Appropriation of divine attributes, 327
Aquinas on the Trinity, 136
Arius on the Trinity, 138
on the creation, 163
Ark of Noah, figure of the Church, 592
Arminian view of the mystical union, 486
of inspiration, 50
Arrhabo, 418
ἄρσις, 382
Articles of faith, pure and mixed, 37, 92, 95
fundamental and non-fundamental, 92, 96
primary and secondary, 93
not contrary to, but above reason, 34
antecedent, constituent, consequent, 94, 98
Ascension of Christ, 380
Assent, an element of faith, 413
Assurance of faith, 292, 414
ἀταξία, in concurrence, 186
ἀθανασία of Christ, 302
Athanasius on the Trinity, 140
Atonement, infinite, 343, 351, 355
Anselm on the, 351
real object of, 361 sqq.
personal object of, 363 sqq.
Attributes, of God, 116, sq.
of the Scriptures, 50
of angels, 196, 202
of a mediator, essential, 350
Augustine, on the Trinity, 140
on humiliation of Christ, 385
on angels, 200
on original sin, 250
on schism, 616
Auricular confession, 470
Authority of the Scriptures, 51, 84
external criteria of, 57
not dependent upon the Church, 67
of the ministers of the Church, 606
of the civil magistrate, 616
αὐθυπόστατος, 301
αὐταρκέστατος, 162
αὐχηματα, 387
ἀφθαρσία, 641

Baptism, defined, 536, 539, 542
form of, 542, 553
validity of, 537
Baptism, signification of, 543, 545
primary design of, 537, 546, 554
Sacramental union in, 540
secondary design of, 538, 547, 555
by heretics is valid, 545
of adults, demands faith, 537
faith not essential to, 545, 547
of infants, 546, 547, 548
of those regenerated by the Word, 547
accompanying usages of, 543
of hypocrites, 547
effects of, 536, 537, 545
material of, terrestrial, celestial, 539
necessity of, 538, 554
Holy Spirit present in, 547
in cases of emergency, 531, 545
should not be repeated, 538, 552 sq., 554
efficacy of, in a corrupt Church, 597
and original sin, 250, 546
of John, 538
and Eucharist, benefits of compared, 579
of the unborn, 542
Baptized and unbaptized contrasted, 268
Baptismal grace, permanence of, 552
regeneration, 462, 464, 545 sqq.
Beget vs. create, 154, 163
Beatific vision of God, 197, 660, 661
בָּרָא and עָשָׂה, 163
βελτίωσις, 328
Benevolence of God, general and special, 270, 271
universal, 272
sincere, and earnest, 271, 280
gratuitous and free, 271
ordinate, 271
efficacious, 271, 280
conditionate, 271
antecedent and consequent, 270
Bernard, on the obedience of Christ, 352
Besetting sins, 242
Blessedness, grades of, 660
Birth, new, *see* Regeneration
Bodily perfections of Christ, 302
presence, *see* Lord's Supper
Body, the human, relation to the soul, 165, 626, 628
affected by original sin, 246
psychical and spiritual, contrasted, 401, 642
glorified, qualities of, 641
and blood of Christ received by the mouth, 566
Bonaventura, on the sacrifice of Christ, 362
on the articles of faith, 94
Brentz, on faith, 423
on the humiliation and exaltation of Christ, 389

Brentz, on the obedience of Christ, 360
Bread, of the Holy Supper, 560
Brunswick theologians, on the omnipresence of Christ, 334
Bucan, on the "Right Hand of God," 406
Burial of Christ, 379

Call, divine, *see* Vocation
to the ministry, *see* Ministry
Calixtus, on tradition, 68
inspiration, 46
Apostles' Creed, 94
the articles of faith, 94
omnipresence of Christ, 334
Calvin, on the relation of election to antecedent will, 288
foreknowledge and predestination, 290
predestination and the merits of Christ, 291
communicatio idiomatum, 326
the two natures, 326
the descensus, 400
the twofold signification of the Sacraments, 533
Calvinists, on the sacrifice of Christ, 363
will of the sign and purpose, 280
election and predestination, 286
personal union, 316
communicatio idiomatum, 316, 322, 326
the power of the Word, 507
Canon of Scripture, 80 sq.
Canonical authority of the Scriptures, 52, 63, 80, 82, 84
internal and external criteria of, 86
belongs only to the original languages, 53, 63
Canonicity, marks of, 80
Carlstadt, on the ubiquity of the flesh in Christ, 330
Catholicity of the Church, 582
Catholics, *see* Roman Catholics
Causative authority of the Scriptures, 63
Causes, first and second, defined, 184
Celestial material in the Sacraments, 527, 560
Ceremonial law, 511
Ceremonies, Church, 67
Cerinthus, 650
Chance, theories of, 188
Characteristics of the Father, ad extra, 151
χειροθεσία, in ordination, 609, 610
Children born outside of the Church, 449
Chiliasm, 650, sqq.
Choice, in the *liberum arbitrium*, 260
Christ, Mediator according to both natures, 294, 338
Christ, divine and human nature of, asserted, 305, 306
proved, 334
Jesus, proved to be the Messiah 293
peculiarities of His human nature, 300 sqq.
His person, how constituted, 302, 307
complex, 307
forsaken of the Father, 394
our righteousness, 435
ascension of, 380
return of, to judgment, 653
Christianity, the true religion, 22 sq.
Church, in what sense visible and invisible, 584, 593 sqq.
true and false, 587, 596
indestructible, 589
not more ancient than the Scriptures, 59
decides in matters of faith, 61 sq.
gives the call to the ministry, 605, 607 sqq.
particular, 583, 596
collective and representative, 599, 600
militant and triumphant, 587
the congregation of saints, 587
marks of the true, 583, 585, 597 sqq.
Roman Catholic theory of, 597, 599, 601
government of, 601
discipline of, 612, 614, 615
councils, how constituted, 600, 602
authority of, 604
Church and state, 615, 616
in a wider and narrower sense, 582 sq., 592
Christ the only head of, 586
one and undivided, 588, 592
why called Catholic? 588
why called Apostolic? 589
why called universal? 590
Circumcision of Christ, 394
Circumscriptive presence defined, 672
Civil government, 616
its rights and duties, 616
its relation to the Church, 615, 616
righteousness, 266
Cœna Domini, *see* Lord's Supper
Communicatio idiomatum, 312, 321, 564
genera of, 312
degrees of, 322
based upon unity of person, 322, 323
Calvinists on the, 316, 322, 326
Communication of person, 305
of natures, 303, 309, 316
Communion of natures in Christ, 310
of attributes, 311
private, 581
Complete and incomplete substances, 674

Conception of Christ, 305, 378, 393
Concrete, term technically used, 319, 672
Concupiscence, 235, 244, 250
Concurrence, divine, defined, 171
objects of, 172, 184
general and special, 172
of God with second causes, 180, 184
in evil actions, 172, 185
in revelation, 43
Confession, 470
auricalar, repudiated, 470
in what sense it has been used of Lutheran confession, 470
Confessions, *see* Symbols
Confidence, an element of faith, 414
the principal part of faith, 415, 418
Confirmation, defined, 551
how to be employed, 551
not the completion of Baptism, 551
not the prerogative of bishops, 551
Conjugal relation, 619, sqq.
Connexa, defined, 672
Connotata, defined, 672
Conscience, 106
Consecration, sacramental, 572
Consensus, of the Fathers, 28
Consequent will of God, 282
Conservation, 170
of species and individuals, 178
Constituent elements of Faith, 408
Consubstantiation rejected, 571
Consummation of the world, 655
Contingency in human actions, 181
Contrition, defined, 461
the beginning of conversion, 461
what is embraced in, 467
and attrition, 469
requisites and marks of, 469
Controversies, theological, how to decide, 52, 62
Conversation (daily life) of Christ, 378, 394
Conversion, defined, 460
acts preceding, 460
a divine act, 474 sqq.
not irresistible, 461, 475
causes of, 460
only two, 479
gradual, 471
transitive and intransitive, 460, 474
man's attitude in, 472
begins in contrition, ends in faith, 460
in a wide sense, 465, 472
in a special sense, 466, 472
in a double sense, 466
man passive in the beginning of, 461, 472
alone through the divine Word and the Holy Spirit, 461, 475 sqq.
universal, of the Jews, 649
of unregenerate and regenerate, 473
Conversion, occurs not by constraint, but willingly, 477
man can and should co-operate in, 478
of the Gentiles, 650
Co-operating grace, 471, 479
Co-operation, divine, *see* Concurrence
Corporeal possession, by evil spirits, 216
Corporeal presence, *see* Lord's Supper
Corruption, man's state of, 231 sqq.
Cotta contrasts Lutheran and Reformed views of Christ's person, 329
Council, general and particular, 600
who can call it? 600
Cranmer, on the sacrifice of Christ, 360
Create, beget and make, contrasted, 154
Creation, the first outward work of God, 159
out of nothing, 159, 163, 169
mediate and immediate, 160
defined, 159, 169
impelling cause of, 160
instantaneous, 162
three steps of, 164
especially the work of God the Father, 162
undivided work of the Trinity, 160
design of, 160, 169
a Divine work, 159
order of, 160, 164, 165
man's place in, 165
time of, 164
of man, 165
chief design of, 103
of angels, 195, 200
why not earlier? 164
Creationism refuted, 166
Credere Deum, Deo, in Deum, 414
Creed, the Apostles', called the rule of faith, 95
no adequate basis of organization, 95
Cross (affliction), 499
Curable and incurable readers and hearers, 56
Cyril, on the Trinity, 138
on the person of Christ, 327

Damascenus on hypostasis, 145
Damnation and eternal life, 656
Death, temporal, spiritual and eternal, 624 sqq.
literal, figurative, 626
eternal, 626, 656
spiritual, 238, 627
of Christ, 379, 395
of the body, a consequence of sin, 238, 624
Decalogue, 513, 514
Decrees of God, not absolute, 272, 291
immutable, 273

Decrees of God preceded by foreknowledge, 278, 290
ordinate, 272
relative, 290
Definitive presence defined, 563, 672
Degrees of happiness in heaven, 660
Deity of the Son, proved, 157
of the Holy Ghost, proved, 158
Demoniacal possession, 216
Demonstrative retrogression vs. sophistical circle, 56
Depraved state of man, 234
Depravity, *see* Original Sin
Descensus Christi ad inferos, 379, 395, 658
when and why, 396 sq.
various views of, 396, 400
Determination, 173, 190
in human ability, 259
Devils, *see* Angels, evil
Dichotomy of human nature, 167
δικαιοῦν, 427
διακυβέρνησις, 175
דמות, 221
διό, importance of the particle, 386
διοίκησις, 175
Direction, 173, 190
Discipline, *see* Church
Disciplines, theoretical and practical, 18
Dispensation (*δόσις*), sacramental, 531
Distinctio rationis rationantis, 673
Distinctions in the Godhead, 133, 146
Distribution (*δόσις*), sacramental, 531
Divorce, sole ground of, 621
diverse views concerning, 622
partial, 623
Domestic estate, 619
Dominion of man before the Fall, 228
Donatistic views of the Church, 599
Donum superadditum, 230
Double sense of Scripture denied, 78

Ecclesiastical estate, *see* Ministry
Ecstasy, 454, 631
Education of Christ, 378
Efficacy of the divine Word, 80, 501
of the Sacraments, 534
ἐκδυσις, 628
ἐλάττωσις, 328
Elect, the attributes of, 273
cannot fail of final salvation, 273
to be found in the visible Church, 594
Election, defined, 272
attributes of, 273
based upon *πρόθεσις* and *πρόγνωσις*, 272, 289
causes of, 287
how faith enters into, 286
personal assurance of, 292
based upon the consequent will of God, 286
Elements, *see* Lord's Supper
ἔλεγχος, 453
ἐμπνευσις, 629
ἐναλλαγὴ καὶ κοινωνία ὀνομάτων, of Theodoret, 327
ἐνανθρώπησις and *ἐνσωμάτωσις*, 303
End of the world, 655
ἐνεργεία, of faith, 439
ἐνεργηματα, 336, 505
ενεργητικα, attributes, 118
ἐνθρωνισμός, 385
ἐνσάρκωσις, 313
ἐντελεχεία, 673
ἐντυγχανειν, 367
ἐνυποστασία, 295, 300, 301
ἐπαναχώρησις, 628
Epicurean view of Providence, 188
Equality of persons in the Godhead, 133
Equivocal attributes, 115
Essence, divine, distinguished from person, 156
one and undivided, 142
of God (quid sit Deus), 111, 115
Essentialiter, term defined, 673
Estates of Christ, 376 sqq.
three in the Church, 604
contrasted, 604, 606
Eternal generation of the Son, 152 sqq.
Eternal life and death, 656
ἑτερωσίαι, 151, 298
Eucharist, *see* Lord's Supper
εὐκρασία, 302
Eutychian errors, person of Christ, 298
ἐξαγόρασις, 369
Exaltation of Christ, 385, 387
Exclusive particles, doctrine of, 438
Excommunication, greater and less, public and private, 612
Exinanition (humiliation, self-renunciation), 381
ἐξομολόγησις, 469
Ex opere operato, in Sacraments denied, 532, 548
Exorcism, 544
Expiatory intercession of Christ, 367
Explicit faith, 411, 415
Extra ecclesiam nulla salus, 583, 589, 597

Faith, essential, constituent elements of, 410, 414
a work of God in man, 411, 421, 423
subjective and objective, 412
assent, the second act of, 413
antecedent, constituent and consequent articles of, 94, 98
knowledge, the first part of, 413
articles of, pure and mixed, 92, 95
explicit, 411, 415
threefold foundation of, 96
implicit, 411, 415
justifying, 410, 420 sqq., 436

Faith, instrumental cause of, 421
direct, reflex and discursive, 421
receptive and operative, 423
explicit, implicit and informal, 411, 415
weak or infirm, 424
an element of repentance, 468
articles of, fundamental and non-fundamental, 92, 96
general, special, saving, 414, 415, 419
sole condition of justification, 420
not essential to the integrity of a Sacrament, 532, 576
essential to the appropriation of the blessing of a Sacrament, 532, 547, 576
false or dead, true or living, 412, 422
concomitants and consequences of, 423, 426
assurance of, 292
of infants, 548 sqq.
as related to election, 288
confidence, the principal part of, 415, 418
analogy of, 70, 76
Family, the Christian, 619
Fate, stoical, astrological, Christian, 188
Fathers, testimony of, 28, 51 sqq., 76, 85
Feeling, no criterion of the presence of the Spirit, 502
Feuerborn, on the humiliation of Christ, 391
Fides and *fiducia*, 415
Figurative sense of Scripture, 78
Filiation of the Son, 152
Final judgment, 643
Fire, infernal, 659
Flacius, on the relation of reason to revelation, 31
substance of man, 223
original sin, 247
obedience of Christ, 354
regeneration, 463
church government, 601
Fomes, the tinder of sin, 250, 546
Foreknowledge, divine, 275
no act of the will, 275
prior to the divine purpose, 272
basis of the divine, 177
not dependent upon any divine decree, 275
the basis of predestination, 285, 289
Forensic nature of justification, 424
Forma, term defined, 673
Fortune, 189
Foundation of the faith, threefold, 96
Fraternal redemption, 293 sqq.
Free will, 265 sqq.
in spiritual things, 262
in external things, 265
before the Fall, 278
since the Fall, 258, 259, 261, 264
Free will, in the regenerate, 268
Fundamental doctrines, 92, 94 sq.
primary and secondary, constitutive and conservative, 92, 98
antecedent, constituent, consequent articles of faith, 92, 98

Gallus, can laity administer the Lord's Supper? 578
גָּאַל, 293, 369
General and special assent, in faith, 415
General intercession of Christ, 345
Generation of the Son, eternal, active, passive, 152 sq.
eternal not temporal, 152
passive, 153
twofold in Christ, 298
Gentiles, conversion of, 650
Genus, apotelesmatic, 315
idiomatic, 313
majestatic, 314
Giessen Dogmaticians vs. those of Tübingen, 391
Glorification of Christ, 385
Glorifying grace, 409
God, existence of, 111, 112
can He be defined? 112 sq.
what is He? 113
names of, 113 sq.
hypostatic character of, 149
attributes of, 117 sqq.
ascertained in a threefold way, 117, 122 sqq.
negative, 118
positive, 119
are not accidents, 121
distinguished from divine essence, 121, 122
variously classified, 125
analogical, not univocal or equivocal, 116
natural and supernatural knowledge of, 103
image of, in man, 218, 221, sqq.
Right Hand of, 403
not the author of sin, 231
Goel, 293, 369
Gog and Magog, 752
Good works, no ground for justification, 437
Gospel and Law, 508 sqq., 515, 518
Government, divine, defined, 172, 187
of the Church, 601 sqq.
civil, 615 sqq.
Grace, preserving and glorifying, 409
prevenient, operative, co-operative, 471, 479
illustrated in Augustine, 478
of the Holy Spirit, in applying redemption, 408, 478

Grace, assisting and indwelling, 776
loss of, 292, 465, 552
of God, universal, 279
Grades of happiness in heaven, 660
Gratis, the exclusive particle in justification, 358, 425, 438
Gregory, of Nyssa, on satisfaction of Christ, 350
Guardian angels, 212
Guilt, 234
Guilt of original sin, 239, 250
Guilty of crime and deserving of punishment, 234, 237

Habitudo, habitus, defined, 673
Happiness, grades of, 660
Hardening of the heart, judicial, 255
Heathen, judgment of, 448
Heaven, *see* Life Eternal
Heidegger, on the "Right Hand of God," 406
Hell, 399 sqq., 625, 626, 634, 656, 657
what and where it is, 659
Helmstadt theologians, 334, 480
Heresy, defined, 615
Heretics, baptism by, 545
Hesshuss, on lay administration of the Lord's Supper, 578
Hilary, on the nature of God, 113
Hindrance, 173, 189
Historical Faith, 411
Hoc est corpus meum, 573
Hoffman, Daniel, on relation of philosophy to theology, 31
Holiness, *see* Renovation, Sanctification of primeval man, 225
Holy Spirit, *see* Trinity
in the incarnation, 304
hypostatic character of, 154
witness of, 55
spiration (procession) of, 163
applying grace of, 407
Homologoumena, 189
Host, adoration of, 574
הִצְדִּיק, 427

Huber, on predestination, 288
Hulseman, on the Means of Grace, 508
on the articles of faith, 98
Human ability, 257
Human nature not threefold, 167
of Christ, 298 sqq.
Humiliation of Christ, 377, 381 sqq.
Hunnius, on the articles of faith, 98
Hypostatic presence of the *λογός*, 563
Hypostasis, distinguished from person, 145
Hypostatic union in Christ, 296, 306
plurality in unity, 143
חָשַׁב (*λογίζεσθαι*), 241

Idiomatic intercommunication of properties, 312
ἰδιοπόιησις or *οἰκείωσις*, 314
ἰδιοποίια καὶ ἰδιοποιησις of Cyril, 327
ἴδιωμα, 313, 321
ἱλασμός, ἱλαστήριον, 347
Illocalitas, of the angels, 196, 204
Illumination, 407, 408
defined, 451
gradual, 452, 454, 457
external and internal, 452
legal and evangelical, 451, 456
literal and pedagogical, 452, 457
spiritual and completely saving, 458
objective, effective, 452
influence of, upon intellect and will, 453
Image of God, in man, 218, 222, 223, 227
accidental, substantial, 222, 229
viewed *μερικῶς, ὁλικῶς*, 227
natural perfections of, 218, 229
loss of, 238
Immanence, *immeatio* (*περιχώρησις*), 151, 297, 317, 484
Immediatio supposiți et virtutis, 184
Immersion, 542, 553
Immortality of the soul, 629, 630
of primeval man, 228
theoretical arguments for, 631
historical arguments for, 632
Impanation, rejected, 571
Impartation of natures in Christ, 328
Impeccability of the good angels, 208
Imperfection of renewal, 487, 490
Impersonality of Christ's human nature, 300
Implicit faith, 411, 415
Impulse, divine, in inspiration, 44
Impulsive internal and external cause of justification, 434
Imputation of Adam's sin, 239
mediate and immediate, 240
of Christ's righteousness, 425, 429, 431, 433, 437
Inability, human, in spiritual things, 257
Incarnation defined, 310, 381
common to the entire Trinity, 303
mode of, 303
Independence of God, 116
Individual, defined, 297
Induration, 255
Indwelling sin, 242
grace, 471
Infallible truthfulness of Scripture, 54
Infants, regeneration of, 547 sqq.
baptism of, 548, 549
faith of, 550 sqq.
Innate knowledge, 129, 104, 105 sqq.
Infirmities of man, natural and personal, 299
Influence of second causes, 180

Inherent original sin, 247
Innocence, man's original state of, 217, 220
Inspiration, real and verbal, 39, 43, 45
  Arminian view of, 50
  in historical matters minute, 45
  of the vowels of the Hebrew text, 48
  and revelation contrasted, 49
  internal and external criteria of, 51, 57 sqq.
Inspired books, have any perished? 64
Integrity, man's state of, 217, 220
  of the Scriptures, 53
Intellect, as affected by original sin, 245
Intention, in the Sacraments, 531, 545
Intercession of Christ, true, real, literal, 345, 368
  expiatory, 368
  eternal, 368
  of the Holy Spirit, 368
  of saints, 636
  of angels, 212
Intercommunication of properties, 324
Intermediate state, no, 625
Internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, 57, 86
Interpretation, of the Scriptures, right, 53, 74, 76
Intuitu fidei, 288
Invocation of angels, 213
ἰσάγγελοι, 642

Jachtaufe, 531
Jena theologians on the Sacraments, 528
Jerome on foreknowledge, 177
יהוה, *essentiator*, 141
Jesuits on justification, 433
Jews, conversion of, 650
Judas, betrayal by, in what sense necessary, 183
Judge of controversies, the Scriptures alone, 60, 62
  the principal, instrumental, inferior, 61
Judgment, final, 626, 643
  general, 644, 655
  particular, 644
  private, in matters of faith, 53
  office of angels at, 212
  signs preceding the, 646, 649
  of examination and retribution, 655
Justification, defined, 424, 428
  a forensic or judicial act, 424, 426, 428
  twofold effect of, 428, 429
  and sanctification confounded by the Romanists, 435
  only ground of, 431
  by faith "*alone*," 438
  without our merit, 438 sqq.
Justification, precedes good works, 437
  effects and properties of, 441
  a free gift of God, 438
Justifying faith, 412, 436
  concomitants and consequences of, 441 sqq.

καθαίρεσις, in church discipline, 612
καταλλαγή, 347
κατάλυσις, 628
κένωσις, 328, 382, 390
Keys held by the Church, 615
Kingly office of Christ, 370
Kingdom of Christ, 370, 373
  of power, grace and glory, 371 sqq.
  eternal, 375
Knowledge, explicit, an element of faith, 411, 413
  of God, saving, 111
  natural (objective), of God, imperfect, 109
Knowledge of primeval man, 110, 224
  of God, subjective, 126
  naturally implanted, 42, 107
  supernatural, 111
κοινωνία, of the two natures in Christ, 308
  a term for the Lord's Supper, 560
κοινωνία τῶν θειῶν, 314
κρύψις, 382, 390

Laity, to partake of the cup, in the Lord's Supper, 572
  can administer the Lord's Supper, 578
λάλειν in 2 Peter 1 : 21, 47
Last day, 626, 643
  signs of, 646–649
  things, 626, 632 sqq.
Lay baptism, 531, 545
Lay delegates, qualifications of, 602, 603
Laymen, to take part in church councils, for, 602
  deciding upon doctrines, 602
Law of God defined, 232, 511
  ceremonial and forensic, 511
  chief and subordinate, end of, 512
  moral ; of nature ; Sinaitic ; primordial ; universal and perpetual ; particular and temporary ; demonstrative ; didactic and pedagogical ; political, 512, sqq.
  fulfilled by Christ, 352
  and Gospel contrasted, 508 sqq., 515, 518
  office of, in illumination, 456
  in conversion, 468
  weakness of, 514
  in the members, 242
Leidener, on the "Right Hand of God," 406

λῆψις στοφῆς δούλου, 383
in the Lord's Supper, 530
Liberty of contradiction and of contrariety, 264
of the will, 257 sqq.
of the unregenerate man, 268
Liberum arbitrium, 257
variously explained, 259
Life eternal, 660, 661, 663
human controlled by providence, 190, 191
Limbus patrum, 625, 635
puerorum, 625, 635
Literal and figurative sense of Scripture, 78, 558 sqq.
Lombardus, on the satisfaction of Christ, 350
Lord's Supper, defined, 555, 560, 575
Lord's Supper, nature of, 555
mode of the Saviour's presence in, 562
primary design of, 557
secondary design of, 557, 578, 579, 580
form of, 556
material of, terrestrial and celestial, 560
doctrine of, upon what founded, 557
as instituted, explained literally, 558
nature of the real presence in, 555
objections answered, 564 sqq.
not transubstantiation, 556, 571
not consubstantiation, 571
differently understood by Lutherans and Reformed, 570
may layman administer it, 577
and Baptism contrasted, 579
benefits of, 579 sqq.
should be administered in public, 581
is a temporary action, 575
Lutheran and Reformed views of the person of Christ contrasted, 329
λύτρον, λύτρωσις, 347 sqq., 357

Macrocosmos, microcosmos, 626
Magistrate, political, 615 sqq.
authority of, derived from God, 615 sqq.
duties of, 616, 617
power of, 616 sqq., 619
Majestatic genus of communicatio idiomatum, 312, 314
Man, his original condition, 165, 217, 268
why, when and how created, 104, 165, 217
his fall, 220, 241
primeval, wisdom of, 224
Man, threefold nature? 166
Manducation, spiritual, mode of, 566
not physical, 568
but hyperphysical, 568
oral, but not capernaitic, 569
sacramental, 567
Marriage relation, divinely appointed, 619 sqq.
how constituted, 619, 620
ecclesiastical sanction not essential to, 621
can be sundered for only one cause, 619, 621
Martyrs, resurrection of, 652
Mass, sometimes means the Holy Supper, 560
Materia cœlestis, in the Sacraments, 526 sqq.
Material of the Sacraments, terrestrial and celestial, 527, 560
of sin, 250
fire in hell, 659
Means of grace, Word and Sacraments, 409, 500
of salvation, *δοτικὰ, ληπτικά*, 502
Mediator, essential attributes of, 350
Christ the, according to both natures, 336 sqq.
Mediatorial office of Christ, 337
Melanchthon, on the Sacraments, 525
Mentzer on the obedience of Christ, 352
omnipresence of Christ, 391
on the humiliation of Christ, 391
Meissner on faith and predestination, 289
Mercy of God, not absolute, 347
Merit of Christ, 345, 366, 431
Messiah, Jesus the, 293
Μετεμψύχωσις, 635
Millennarianism, 648, 650
Millennium, 648, 650
Ministry, ecclesiastical, the representative Church, 599
of divine appointment, 605, 606
mediate and immediate call to, 607
of evil spirits, 216
of good spirits, 211
Ministers, called and ordained by the Church, 608
authority of, 611
can they remit sins? 612 sqq.
things hostile to, 615
grades of, 611, 616
essential parity of, 616
Missa, the Sacrament of the Altar in the Latin Fathers, 560
Mission of the Son, 153
Mixed articles of faith, 37, 95
Moempelgard colloquy, 529
Monothelete error, 299
Montanists on the marks of the Church, 599

Moral and natural law, 513
Mortal sins, 254, 257
μορφὴ θεοῦ, 383
Muentzer, relation of the Spirit to the Word, 502
Musæus on faith, 440
on the means of grace, 508
Mysteries consistent with perspicuity of Scripture, 69, 75
Mystery defined, 96, 135
Μυστήιον, 96
Mystical sense of Scripture, 78
Mystical union, defined, 480, 482
Mystical union, preceded by regeneration and justification, 481
special and general, 480
accompaniments and consequences of, 483
not essential, 485
contrasted with the general union, 484
not substantial, 481, 484
not sacramental, 486
not personal, 481, 486
not figurative, 484
true and real, 482, 483
an inexplicable mystery, 480
not transubstantiation or consubstantiation, 485
Arminian view of, 486
Mystics and Quietists, concerning the human body, 168
illumination, 455
relation of the Holy Spirit to the Word, 454, 506 sqq.

Names of God, 113 sq.
Nativity of Christ, 378, 394
Natural, variously used, 229
knowledge of God, 107
infirmities common to men, 299
Nature, defined, 297
and person distinguished, 297
of Christ, divine and human, 294, 297
of God, 112, 113
Nazianzen, on the Trinity, 139
Necessity and contingency contrasted, 181
of consequence and of constraint, 182
and chance excluded from Providence, 182
Nestorius on the Person of Christ, 316
New birth, *see* Regeneration
Nicolai on the humiliation of Christ, 390
Normative authority of the Scriptures, 52, 59
Noth-taufe, 531, 545
Novissimis, de, 624
Nuda adessentia, in the omnipresence of Christ, 390

Oath upon the Symbolical Books, 102
Obedience, of Christ, active and passive, 344, 352, 355 sqq.
Bernard on, 352
new, an effect of repentance, 468
Office of Christ, threefold, 337
prophetic, 340
sacerdotal, 342
regal, 370
οἰκείωσις, 314
Old and New Testaments, how related, 82
ὁμαιώνιος, 142
Omnipresence of Christ, 329, 564
objections answered, 564
of the flesh of Christ, Dogmaticians differ concerning it, 333
not absolute, but relative, 334
Omniscience of Christ, 334
ὁμοιούσιος, 142, 151
ὁμοίωσις ἀνθρῶπων, 383
ὁμοουσία, 142, 151, 298
Opera ad intra, ad extra, 133, 147 sqq.
Operating grace, 471
Opus operatum in the Sacraments, 532
Oral manducation, 536
Order, of the persons in the Trinity, 148, 150, 491
of operating in the Trinity, 150
threefold hierarchical, 604
Ordination, is it a Sacrament? 525, 610, 611
why necessary, 605, 609
performed by bishops or presbyters, 610
χειροθεσία in, 611
not absolutely necessary, 611
Origen, on the satisfaction of Christ, 350
Original righteousness, 226, 244
condition of man, 229
sin, *see* Sin.
text of Scripture, the final resort in controversies, 53, 63
Osiander, Andrew, on the office of Christ, 360
obedience of Christ, 354, 360, 435
exaltation of Christ, 390
justification, 431
righteousness of Christ, 435
faith, 431
Osiander, Luke, on the humiliation of Christ, 390
on the Sacraments, 526
Ottoman power, 652
οὐσία, 142
οὐσιωδῶς, 151, 630

פָּרִיוֹן, 369
παντεποψία, 177
Papias, 650
Parabolical sense of Scripture, 78

Parental relation, 620
Parity of the ministry, 609, 610, 616
παῤῥησια, 416
Parsimonius, on the obedience of Christ, 355
on hell, 398
Particles, exclusive, doctrine of, 423
πᾶσα in 2 Tim. 3: 16, 48
Passion of Christ, 378, 394
Passive obedience of Christ, 344
Passive spiration of the Holy Ghost, 154
Passivity in conversion, 461, 471, 472
Patripassianism, 324
Patristic designations, in communicatio idiomatum, 327
Pelagianism, 243, 247
Penitence, in a wide sense, 461
πεποιθησις, 416
Perfection or sufficiency of the Scriptures, 64, 65
sinless, unattainable in this life, 490
Perfections of God, 121
of man, principal, 218
less principal, 219
περιχωρησις, defined, 306
essential, 151
personal, 151
mystical, 484
in the person of Christ, 297, 317
Permission in Providence, 189
Person, abstract and concrete, 672
contrasted with nature or essence, 146, 672
defined, 672
of Christ, Lutheran and Reformed view of, contrasted, 329
diverse views among Lutheran Dogmaticians, 333
Cyril on, 327
Persons in the Godhead, predicates of, 133
how distinguished, 147
plurality of, 156
Personal peculiarities in the Godhead, 133, 148
of Christ's human nature, 300, 311
union in Christ, 294
Calvinists on the, 337
attributes of, 300
negative properties of, 309
object of the sacrifice of Christ, 360
properties, 149
Perspicuity of the Scriptures, 69, 70 sqq.
proof of, 70
degrees of, 72
Peyrere on the creation, 165
Philosophy not opposed to theology, 31 sqq.
Photinians, on the knowledge of God, 107
personal union, 298
office of Christ, 349
Piety, essential to an interpretor of the Scripture, 72
Piscator, on the person of Christ, 326
resurrection of the martyrs, 651
obedience of Christ, 355
πίστις and πεποίθησις, 415
Plan of salvation, 409
πλᾶσις, 621
Platonics controverted, 455
Plenary inspiration, 46
πληροφορία, 413, 416
Plurality of God, not of essence or accident, 143
but of persons, 143
proved from Scripture, 156
Political estate, 616
Pope, the, the great Antichrist, 650
Positive depravity, 245
Possession, corporeal, by evil spirits, 216
Potentia and *potestas*, distinguished, 128
Potestas ordinis and *potestas clavium*, 611
πνὺ, of the angels (das Irgendwosein), 204
Power of the ministry (potestas ordinis —jurisdictionis), keys, 611
merely instrumental and delegated, 613
but effectual, 613
Powers, human, since the Fall, 259, 473
Prayer, 499
Preadamitic view of creation, 165
Predestination, defined, 274, 287
the Fathers treat it cautiously, 276
attributes of, 273
not absolute, 272
of the Calvinists, 279, 280, 286
in a wider and narrower sense, 284
as related to election, 285
Presbytery, part of the, in the call of ministers, 608, 610
Prescience and predestination, 285, 289
Presence of Christ in the Holy Supper, *see* Lord's Supper
Preservation and creation contrasted, 170, 179
a divine act, 170
Preserving grace, 409
Prevenient, preparatory, exciting grace, 475 sqq.
is how far irresistible, 475
Priestly office of Christ, 342
Private judgment, right of, 53
Procession of the Holy Spirit, 154
temporal, 155
πρόγνωσις, 175 sqq.
πρόθεσις and πρόγνωσις, contrasted, 175, 176, 285
with διοίκησις, 175
also with προορισμός, 275, 285
προνοία, 175
προορίσμος, 275, 285

Propagation of original sin, 249
of human souls, 166, 249
Propensity to evil, 235
Prophetic office of Christ, 340
Prophets of the Old Testament, 341
Propitiation, *see* Sacerdotal Office of Christ
Propositions, personal, 300, 318
πρόσληψις, 303
πρόσωπον, 146
πρόταξις, 175
Providence, defined, 174
universal, concerning good and evil, 173, 192, 193
ordinary and extraordinary, 173, 193
general and special, 190
primary and secondary objects of, 190
in the beginning, progress and end of human life, 191
scriptural proof of, 175
can it be deceived? 182
determines contingent actions, 181
employs second causes, 173, 180
special objects of, 190
grades of, 190
summarily stated, 193
Epicurean view of (carnalism), 188
Psychical body, 401, 642
Psychopannychism, 633
Punishment, divine, 237
eternal, 656 sqq.
Pure and mixed articles of faith, 37, 92, 95
Purgatory, 625, 635, 637 sqq.
Purity of original text of Scripture, 52
Purorum naturalium, 220
φύσις, 141
Pyx (sacramental receptacle), 530, 572

Quakers controverted, 455
Qualifications needed in an interpreter of Scripture, 69
Qualitas, defined, 674
Qualities, personal, internal and external, 124, 149, 300, 302
Quietists controverted, 168, 455, 507

Rathman, on an internal Word, 42, 506
perspicuity of the Scripture, 74
power of the divine Word, 506, 507
Real presence, *see* Lord's Supper
Reason, defined, 29, 30, 31
how related to revelation, 30, 32
before and after the Fall, 29, 34
of man, unrenewed and renewed, 29, 34, 35
teaches nothing *contrary* to Theology, 31 sqq.
Reason, right, properly so called, 35 sq.
the organic or instrumental use of, 36
the edificative and destructive use of, 37
the normal use of, in theology, 29, 33, 35
no source of theology, 28, 32
no judge of theological controversies, 29, 30, 35 sqq.
as related to the mystery of the Trinity, 135
Reatus culpæ et pœnæ, 233, 237
Reciprocation of natures in Christ, 328
Recognition, heavenly, 662
Reconciliation with God, 362
Redemption, fraternal, by Christ, 293
defined and illustrated, 369
application of, 407 sqq.
Regal office of Christ, 370
Regeneration, a divine act, 459, 461
conditioned by the conduct of men, 459
instantaneous, successive, 461, 464
not a substantial change, 463
perfect, amissible, recoverable, 459, 465
by the Word and Baptism, 462, 545
of adults and infants contrasted, 459, 461, 463, 547
Relatio, defined, 432, 433, 674
Relation, conjugal, 619 sqq.
parental, 620
servile, 620
of angels to space, 204
Religion, defined, 21, 24
characteristics and evidences of the true, 22
subject-matter of, 24
true and false, 22
the Christian, the true, 22 sqq.
Remission of sins, 425
Renovation, 220, 486
a work of God in man, 486
co-operation of God in, 487
gradual, never complete in this life, 487, 490
starting point and goal of, 489
transitive and intransitive, 487
in a wider and narrower sense, 488
and justification contrasted, 488
the Holy Spirit, the terminative cause of, 491
Repentance, consists of contrition and faith, 468
and *see* Contrition and Penitence.
Repletive presence, 563
Reprobation, adjuncts and cause of, 274, 363
contrasted with predestination, 274
God not the cause of, 292

Res cælestis, in the Sacraments, 526 sqq.
Resurrection of Christ, 379, 400
design of, 401
of the body, 626, 640 sqq.
of martyrs, 651
Retribution, final, 655
Reus culpæ et pœnæ, 424
Revelation, defined, 25, 49
demonstrated, modes of, 26
differs from inspiration, 49
now no immediate, 28
progressive, 27
natural and supernatural, 26
general and special, 26
the source of theology, 26
Right Hand of God, 402 sqq.
Righteousness, original, 244
original, not a supernatural gift, 230
civil, 265
of faith, 426, 431, 434, 437 sqq.
carnal, 265
of Christ, Romanist sense of, 435
Riis, on "the Right Hand of God," 406
Ritualism, 67
Roman Catholics, concerning inspiration, 44
relation of the Church to Scripture, 59
perfection of Scripture, 56
tradition, 68
articles of faith, 68, 94
state of integrity, 220
image of God, 230
sensuous appetite, 226, 250
justifying faith, 419
justification, 433
conversion, 469
mystical union, 486
intention of minister, 531
efficacy of Sacraments, *ex opere operato*, 532
efficacy of Baptism, 544
doctrine of transubstantiation, 571
communion of the laity, 572
adoration of the host, 574
head of the Church, 586, 599
distinction between visible and invisible Church, 595
marks of the Church, 599
power to convoke councils, 604
indelible character of ordination, 611
state of the soul after death, 635 sqq.
Rule of faith and practice, the Scriptures, 60, 84

Sabbath of the soul, eternal, 456
Sabellianism unscriptural, 138 sqq., 324
Sacerdotal office of Christ, 342 sqq.
Sacramental presence, *see* Lord's Supper, 561 sqq.
union in Baptism, 541
union, mode of, 559, 569
eating, defined by the Calvinists, 567, 570
conjunction, 571
consecration, 572
Sacramentarians, 558
Sacraments, in general, 520 sqq.
are the visible Word, 501
primary design of, 533
defined, 520, 522, 523
secondary design of, 535
only two, 520
three in the Apology, 525
form of, 521
by whom to be administered, 521, 531
necessity of, 535
variously defined, 522, 524
number of, 524
true conception of, 523, 526
false views of, 533
threefold meaning of, 524
of the Old Testament, 535
require a twofold material, 526, 527, 560
faith in the administrator not necessary, 531
in the recipient essential, 532
efficacy of, 530
Sacrifice, *see* Sacerdotal Office of Christ.
Salvation, sources of, 269 sqq.
Samosatenus, on the person of Christ, 316
Sanctification, *see* Renovation.
Satan, 213, 215
as related to man's original sin, 234, 236, 237
Satisfaction, defined, 343, 347, 366
contrasted with merit, 355, 362, 366
real object of the obedience of Christ, 361
general, proved against the Calvinists, 363 sqq.
Saving faith, 410
Saxon theologians on the humiliation of Christ, 392
Scandalum (offence), 255
Schism defined, 615, 616
Schismatics and heretics contrasted, 616
Scholastics, on the satisfaction of Christ, 362, 363
on the mystical union, 486
Schwenkfeldians, on an internal Word, 42
on the mystical union, 486
Chiliasm of, 650
Scriptures, defined, 39, 40
why called holy, 39, 40
attributes of, 51, 33 sqq.

Scriptures, causative and normative authority of, 51, 61, 64 sqq.
power of self-interpretation, 70, 73
the judge of controversies, 61 sqq.
normative and judicial power of, 52, 60, 63
perfection or sufficiency of, 64, 66
sense of, but one original and proper, 78
directive authority of, 60
corrective authority of, 60
perspicuity of, 68, 70 sqq.
natural and spiritual apprehension of, 73, 74
contain incomprehensible mysteries clearly stated, 69
no infallible human interpreter of, 61
rules for the interpretation of, 77
efficacy of the, 80, 500, 503
authority of, not derived from the Church, 59
canon of the, 52, 80
why written, 39
Holy Spirit inseparably united with the, 20
the source of theology, 28
principal and instrumental cause of, 39, 42
synonymous designations of, 40
identical with the Word of God, 40, 41
the rule of faith and life, 60, 84
Second causes, influence of, 180, 184
how God concurs with, 180, 184, 193
Second advent, 653
Second death, 656
Seduction of our first parents, 232, 233, 234, 237
Self-interpretation of the Scriptures, 70, 73
Self-renunciation of Christ, 376, 381 sqq.
Sending forth of the Son, 152
of the Holy Ghost, 154
Sense of Scripture, but one true, 78
literal, tropical, mystical, 78
allegorical, parabolical, 79
Serpent, the instrumental cause of original sin, 236
Servile estate, 620
Sessio Christi ad dextram Dei, 380, 403
Sibylline books, 651
Sight of God, beatific, 197, 660, 661
Sin, in general, 231
original, defined, 234, 236
originating and originated, 242 sq.
proofs of, 242
negative and positive, 244
hereditary, 235
indwelling, 242, 247, 248
Sin, original, not a mere accident, 247
not the substance of man, 247
as affected by baptism, 250
how perpetuated, 248
duration of, 250
consequences of, 232, 234, 235, 237, 246
God not the cause of, 231, 232
the true cause of, 231, 233, 236
actual, defined, 250, 252
division of, 251
venial and mortal, 253
first, of man, 536 sqq.
against conscience, fourfold, 253
against the Son of Man, 257
against the Holy Ghost, 252, 256
why unpardonable, 257
voluntary, 253, 264
involuntary, 252, 253
Sins, pardonable and unpardonable, 253
of ignorance and infirmity, 251
of various kinds, 251, 253
Sinless perfection, 487, 490
Sinlessness of Christ, 295, 302
of the good angels, 206 sqq., 210
Sitting of Christ at God's Right Hand, 330 sqq., 380 sqq., 402
Sleep of the soul, 633
Socinian errors, concerning the knowledge of God, 107
sacrifice of Christ, 358
sensuous appetite, 226
offices of Christ, 349
mystical union, 486
inspiration of the Scriptures, 50
Soul, the human, 166 sqq.
immortality of, 624
after death, 624, 633
created or propagated? 166
Source of theology, 25
Sources of salvation, 269 sqq.
Special intercession of Christ, 345
faith, 411
Spiration, active and passive, 154
Spirit, witness of the, *see* Testimony.
Spirits, complete, incomplete, 201
Spiritual possession, 216
Spiritual death, 238, 627
Spiritual acts, in the *liberum arbitrium*, 262 sqq.
Spiritual essence, 674
Sponsors, 550
Stancarus, on the office of Christ, 339
on justification, 435
State of corruption, 263 sqq.
States of Christ, humiliation, 376, 378, 381 sqq.
exaltation, 376, 379, 385 sqq.
different, of man, 220
Status purorum naturalium, 230

στεφάνωσις, 385
Style of the New Testament, 48
Subsistentia, defined, 674
Substance, defined, 674
complete and incomplete, 674
Sufficiency of the Scriptures, 64
συναίδιος, 142
συναμφοτερισμός, 314
συνδύασις, 310
σύνεργος, man with God in conversion, 478
συγκατάβασις, 48
Suppositum, defined, 144, 674
Swabian theologians, on the person of Christ, 334
Symbols of the Church, 100
wherein they differ from the Scriptures, 100
earlier and later, 93
necessity of, 101
Syncretism, 68
Synergism, 263
of Melanchthon, 263, 484
Synods, *see* Councils.

ταπείνωσις, 328, 385
ταπείνωσις ὑποτακτική, 328, 383
Temptation of the evil angels, 213
of our first parents, 236, 237
Terminative, 149, 491
Terrestrial material in the Sacraments, 526, 528, 539, 560
Testament, Old, not equal in clearness to the New, 157
Sacraments of, 535
Testaments, Old and New, not identical with Law and Gospel, 510, 515
Testimony of the Church, 61 sqq.
Holy Spirit, internal, 57, 427
Θανατωθείς, 397
Θεογνῶσια, 110
Theodoret, on the person of Christ, 327
Theodosius, code of, on divorce, 623
Theologian, defined, 19
regenerate and unregenerate, 19
Theology, in general, 15
defined, 15
wider and narrower sense of, 16
original and derived, 16
a practical science, 17
subject matter of, 18, 19
source of, 16 sqq.
relation of, to philosophy, 30, 31
objective end of, 18, 105
archetypal and ectypal, 16
catechetical and acroamatic, 19
fourfold sense of, 26
a *habitus practicus*, 17, 18
of the way and of the home, 17
natural, revealed, catechetical, 15
Theology, acroamatic, exegetical, didactic, polemic, homiletic, casuistic, 19
subject of, religion, 21
source of, revelation, 25 sqq.
Θεόπνευστος, 43, 45, 84
Θεσις, 382
Threefold office of Christ, 337 sqq.
Thummius, on the humiliation of Christ, 390
Tradition, oral and dogmatical, to be rejected, 64, 66, 67
ritual, of the Church, 67
various senses of the term, 66, 67
not a source of faith, 28
Traducianism (traduction), 166, 248
Trance, 455
Translations of the Scriptures, no final authority in controversies, 53, 54
not inspired, 63
Transmigration of souls, 635
Transmission of original sin, 234, 239, 248
Transubstantiation, 556, 571
Trent, Council of, on confession, 470
Trinity, a mystery, 129
why stated in terms not scriptural, but philosophical, 130, 138
of persons, not of essence or accident, 130, 156
intimations of, among the heathen, 135
foreshadowed in the creature, 136
how made known, 130, 137
not taught by reason, 129
a fundamental doctrine, 137
no new doctrine, 130, 140
summarily stated, 140
triune, not threefold, 141 sqq.
scriptural proof of, 149, 156 sqq.
Aquinas on the, 136
Athanasius on the, 140
Augustine on the, 138, 140, 146
Trichotomy, no, of human nature, 166
Tropical sense of Scripture, 78
τρόπος ὑπάρξεως, 132
τροπος ἀντιδόσεως, 327
Trust, *see* Confidence.
צֶלֶם, 221
Tübingen Dogmaticians vs. those of Giessen, 390
Turks, 652
Typical sense of Scripture, 79

Ubi, definitivum, repletivum, circumscriptivum, occupativum, 204
Ubietas definitiva, 196
Ubiety of the flesh of Christ, 330 sqq.
Unbelief of our first parents, 237
final, cause of reprobation, 292
Union, personal, 294 sqq.

Union, mode and attributes of, 296, 305, 306, 307
mystical, 480 sqq.
special, general, 484
not transubstantiation or consubstantiation, 485
sacramental, in Baptism, 542
in the Lord's Supper, 556, 569 sqq.
ὑιοθεσία, 152
Unity of the divine essence, 131
univocal, equivocal, and analogical contrasted, 116
Universality of grace, 278
Unworthy guests at the Lord's table, 576
ὑπαρξις, 145, 149
ὑπάρχων, 384
ὑπερεντυγχάνειν, 368
ὑπερύψωσις, 328, 385
ὑπόστασις, 140 sqq., 144 sqq.
ὑφισταμενον, 144

Venial sins, 253
Verbal inspiration, 45, 47 sqq.
Versions of Scripture, efficacious in producing faith, 63, 86
Vestigium and image contrasted, 221
Via eminentiæ, negationis et causalitatis, 118 sqq.
Vicarious sacrifice of Christ, 357 sqq.
Vision of God, beatific, 197, 661, 662
Vocation (the call), 407, 442 sqq.
defined, 444
direct and indirect, 442
general and special, 442, 445
mediate and immediate, 442, 446
ordinary and extraordinary, 442, 446
particular and universal, 443, 448
(calls) three general, 443, 448
to the ministry, mediate and immediate, by the Church, 605, 607
Volition, uncoerced, essential to the will, 258, 260
Vostius, on the conception of Christ, 304
Vowel points, inspiration of, 48

Wafers, consecrated but not used, 573
not united with the body of Christ, 575
Warfare, the Christian, 498
Weigelians, on the internal Word, 42
on the mystical union, 486
Wicked partake of the body and blood in the Lord's Supper, 576
Will of God, antecedent and consequent, 282
benevolent, 271, 278, 280
conditionate, 127, 272, 279, 281
natural and free, 271
efficacious and inefficacious, 271
absolute and ordinate, 271, 272
general or universal, 271 sqq.
special or particular, 272
universal, attributes of, 271
of the sign and of the purpose, 128 280
of man, free? 259
threefold condition of, 268
Wine, of the Holy Supper, 560
Wisdom of God, mediate, 124, 126
of primeval man, 224
Witness of the Spirit, 55, 423
Word, divine, 500 sqq.
efficacy of, 500 sqq., 507
no unwritten, 42
distinguished into audible and visible, 522
illuminating power of, 451, 453, 456
the means of conversion, 501, 505 sqq.
and Holy Spirit, inseparable, 505, 506
and Sacraments, the means of grace, 500 sqq.
Works, good, 491 sqq.
wrought only by the regenerate, 492, 496
of the unregenerate, 496
imperfection of, 494
no ground of justification, 497
necessary, 492, 493, 497
rewards of, 498
divine, ad extra, ad intra, 132, 147 s.qq, 159, 161 sqq.
World, not from eternity, 163, 164
why not sooner created? 164
annihilation of, 656
Worthy reception of the Eucharist, 576

ζωοποίησις, 395, 397
Zwingli, on the person of Christ, 327
on the Lord's Supper, 564

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